Iran Update, September 30, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET 

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Senior Iranian officials appear to be preparing for potential military conflict. Iranian officials continue to believe that the current ceasefire between Israel and Iran will collapse and fighting will resume at some point in the future. Iranian Deputy Interior Minister for Security and Law Enforcement and National Security Council (NSC) Secretary Ali Akbar Pour Jamshidian stated on September 27 that the Supreme National Security Council (SCNC) had directed all Iranian military and civilian officials to designate several successors to ensure continuity of governance in the event of leadership disruption.[i] Pour Jamshidian added that the Interior Ministry adopted the same decision and designated several individuals, down to provincial governors, as successors within the Interior Ministry.[ii] The SNSC rejected Pour Jamshidian’s statement on September 27 and denied holding any meeting on this issue.[iii] The SNSC likely pursued succession planning as a part of the Iranian government’s attempts to amend issues it faced during the 12-day war, including those posed by the Israeli decapitation campaign that targeted senior Iranian officials. Israeli strikes destroyed the Islamic revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force command bunker on June 13 and killed senior IRGC commanders.[iv] The death of these commanders disrupted Iran’s command-and-control and made responding to Israeli attacks extremely difficult.[v] The SNSC’s succession planning also comes after Khamenei’s absence during the war, which prevented his principal subordinates from reaching him for rapid decisions.[vi] Khamenei also reportedly named three senior clerics as potential successors during the war and directed the Iranian Assembly of Experts to choose from those clerics to ensure an orderly wartime transition.[vii] The rare decision to take steps to ensure a smooth succession suggests that senior officials have already considered succession plans, even before the SNSC’s reported order.

Senior Iranian military commanders also continue to inspect military and air defense units across Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard inspected the Dezful Air Defense Group on September 29 and assessed its combat readiness.[viii] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately inspected Artesh and IRGC naval, commando, and aviation units in Hormozgan Province on September 30.[ix] Mousavi assessed the capabilities of different units, met with commanders and personnel, and emphasized that both navies have achieved full readiness ”for a possible future conflict.”[x]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Succession Planning: Senior Iranian officials appear to be preparing for potential military conflict. Iranian officials continue to believe that the current ceasefire between Israel and Iran will collapse and fighting will resume at some point in the future. Senior Iranian military commanders also continue to inspect military and air defense units across Iran.
• Iranian Water and Energy Crisis: Iran’s worsening water and energy crisis could gradually increase the Iranian public’s frustrations with the regime and compound existing challenges to regime legitimacy. The Karaj Dam’s water reserves decreased from 111 million cubic meters to 28 million cubic meters between September 2024 and September 2025, making the dam incapable of generating electricity for Tehran.
• Iraqi Airspace Superiority: Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji said on September 30 that Iraq would take “all necessary measures” to prevent Israel from using Iraqi airspace to attack Iran, during a meeting with Iranian Armed Forces Intelligence head Brigadier General Sayyed Majid Mirahmadi in Baghdad. Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians and militia figures have long called on the Iraqi federal government to adopt policies that would restrict the United States and Israel’s ability to fly through Iraqi airspace.

Iran

Iran’s worsening water and energy crisis could gradually increase the Iranian public’s frustrations with the regime and compound existing challenges to regime legitimacy. The Karaj Dam’s water reserves decreased from 111 million cubic meters to 28 million cubic meters between September 2024 and September 2025, making the dam incapable of generating electricity for Tehran. The dam is currently only 15 percent full. The Karaj Dam is one of five dams that supply Tehran with drinking water. CTP assessed in August 2025 that the regime will likely not be able to meaningfully improve its water crisis if it does not address underlying issues, including mismanagement and unsustainable development.[xi] The water and electricity shortages reflect the regime’s inability to meet the basic needs of its citizens, which could generate potential internal instability.

Source: Hashemi Mukhtar and Roya Mirzaei et al.[xii]

The United Kingdom imposed sanctions on over 70 Iranian individuals and organizations linked to Iran’s nuclear program on September 30 after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on September 27.[xiii] The United Kingdom froze the assets of Iranian banks, such as Bank Sepah and Bank Melli, that have supported Iran’s defense industry.[xiv] Iranian banks reportedly held at least 1.9 billion euros in assets in Europe, with a large part being in the UK, as of March 2024.[xv] UK sanctions also targeted Iranian oil, nuclear engineering, and shipping companies that contribute to the funding of and projects for Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[xvi] The United Kingdom imposed sanctions after the European Union imposed similar sanctions on September 29 that are designed to politically and economically isolate Iran due to its failure to fulfill its obligations under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[xvii]

Iraq

Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji said on September 30 that Iraq would take “all necessary measures” to prevent Israel from using Iraqi airspace to attack Iran, during a meeting with Iranian Armed Forces Intelligence head Brigadier General Sayyed Majid Mirahmadi in Baghdad.[xviii] Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians and militia figures have long called on the Iraqi federal government to adopt policies that would restrict the United States and Israel’s ability to fly through Iraqi airspace.[xix] Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu discussed potential Russian involvement in the development of Iraqi air defenses with senior Iraqi officials in mid-September, but CTP-ISW assessed that those discussions are unlikely to translate into Iraqi air defense purchases from Russia due to Russian constraints related to its war against Ukraine.[xx] Iraq lacks the capabilities to stop Israeli F-35s, though improved air defenses could theoretically challenge Israel’s ability to operate other aircraft in the area if the Israelis did not strike the air defenses.

Syria

An Assadist militia detonated its third roadside improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Syrian government forces on September 29. Rijal al Nour, Saraya al Jawad (Men of Light, Jawad Company) detonated a roadside IED on a likely government position near  , Latakia Province, on September 29.[xxi] None of Rijal al Nour’s three IED attacks, including the September 29 attack, caused casualties.[xxii] Rijal al Nour said that it conducted the attack in revenge for the killing of four Alawite construction workers in Jardin, Hama Province, on September 28. [xxiii] The General Security Service (GSS) arrested three unidentified individuals responsible for the murders on September 30, however.[xxiv] Rijal al Nour’s consistent failure to inflict casualties on government forces with roadside IED attacks suggests that the group lacks explosives expertise.  Rijal al Nour’s attacks, rhetoric, goals, and iconography indicate that the group aims to restore Assad-era political and economic structures.[xxv] Many militia groups supported the Assad regime to advance their political and economic interests and have since sought to preserve these benefits or restore the regime’s power structures (if not Assad or his family) after the regime’s collapse in December 2024.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The Lebanese government will provide new benefits to active and retired military personnel and the families of deceased soldiers.  The Lebanese government signed a decree on September 30 to provide two financial grants to active-duty military personnel, retirees receiving pensions, and families of military martyrs in September and October.[xxvi] Active-duty military personnel will receive approximately $156 USD a month, while retirees and families will receive $133 USD a month.[xxvii] LAF veterans protested in Beirut on September 17 against poor pension payments and limited benefits.[xxviii] The protestors emphasized that the protest was a ”warning message” and that ”subsequential steps” would follow if the Lebanese government did not improve the financial situation for LAF personnel.[xxix]