Iran Update, September 16, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET 

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Comments from sources involved in ongoing Syria-Israel security negotiations indicate that a security agreement between the two countries is currently very unlikely, despite US pressure. Reuters reported on September 16 that the United States is pressuring the Syrian transitional government to accelerate negotiations with Israel for a limited security pact ahead of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on September 23.[i] This limited security pact would reportedly not include Israel-Syria normalization. US pressure has not resolved fundamental challenges to the current negotiations, however. The Syrian transitional government seeks to reinstate the 1974 demilitarized buffer zone between the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights and Syria, curb Israeli incursions and airstrikes in Syria, and secure an Israeli withdrawal from recently seized territory in southern Syria, according to nine sources involved in the talks.[ii] Syrian sources said the proposal for a security pact will not address the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, which will be handled “in the future.”[iii] US sources said that “even a modest agreement would be a feat” due to Israel’s hardened stance in negotiations.[iv] The US sources added that the Syrian transitional government is in a weakened position after intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province in July “inflamed calls for partition.”[v]  Unspecified sources said to Reuters that Israel would be reluctant to give up recently occupied Syrian territory, and an Israeli security source confirmed that “Israel is not offering much.”[vi] Israel’s negotiating position further narrows the prospect of a near-term security agreement due to the domestic political constraints that Shara faces. An Israeli source said Israel proposed to US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack that Israel would withdraw from southern Syria in exchange for Syria relinquishing its claim to the Golan Heights.[vii] Syrian sources said that President Ahmad al Shara has rejected this proposal since “any compromise on the Golan would mean the end of his rule.”[viii]

A Syrian military official separately told Agence France-Presse (AFP) on September 16 that Syrian government forces withdrew all “heavy weapons” from southern Syria, where Israel has repeatedly demanded a demilitarized zone.[ix] A southern Syrian journalist confirmed this claim.[x]  A Syrian diplomatic source added that the Syrian military has withdrawn heavy weapons northwards out of southwestern Syria to a line 10 kilometers south of Damascus.[xi] A Syrian diplomatic source told AFP that Israeli and Syrian officials will meet in Baku, Azerbaijan, on September 19, but the source did not specify attendees.[xii] Israel and Syria previously held bilateral negotiations in Paris on August 19, where the two sides discussed security arrangements in southern Syria and a previously rejected Israeli proposal for a humanitarian corridor that connects Israel to Suwayda Province.[xiii] 

Key Takeaways

• Syria-Israel Negotiations: Comments from sources involved in ongoing Syria-Israel security negotiations indicate that a security agreement between the two countries is currently very unlikely, despite US pressure. Reuters reported on September 16 that the United States is pressuring the Syrian transitional government to accelerate negotiations with Israel for a limited security pact ahead of the United Nations General Assembly on September 23.
• Iran and the Gulf: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani met with senior Saudi officials in Riyadh on September 16, likely as part of a broader Iranian effort to dissuade Gulf states from cooperating with the United States or Israel following Israel's September 9 strike in Doha. Larijani met with Saudi officials, including Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman, to discuss the "future of the region" and economic and defense cooperation.
• Chinese Imports of Iranian Oil: Iran is offering wider discounts on its oil exports to China to counter US sanctions and in reaction to demand drivers in the Chinese oil market.
• Israeli Strikes in Yemen: The Israel Defense Forces Air Force struck Houthi shipping infrastructure at Hudaydah Port on September 16, which the Houthis had repaired since the IDF’s last strikes on the port in July 2025. A Yemen analyst reported that Israel struck three recently repaired piers at the port.

Iran

Unspecified gunmen attacked an Iranian security force vehicle on September 16 in Khash, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, killing two police officers and wounding another officer.[xiv] The gunmen stopped the police vehicle on the Khash-Zahedan highway.[xv] The attackers’ identities and motives remain unknown, and no group has claimed responsibility for the attack. The attack follows a series of recent Jaish al Adl attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, however.[xvi] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.  

The United States sanctioned two Iranian financial facilitators and over a dozen Hong Kong- and United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based individuals and entities on September 16 for funding the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry (MODAFL).[xvii] The US Treasury Department stated on September 16 that two Iranian facilitators laundered more than $100 million in oil revenue through cryptocurrency, front companies, and exchange houses to support Iran’s weapons programs and the Axis of Resistance.

• Alireza Derakhshan

• • Managed UAE- and Hong Kong-based front companies, including Alpa Trading – FZCO, Alpa Investment LLC, Alpa Hong Kong Limited, Paul AD Sons Trading FZE, Unique Station Trading, Minato Investment LLC, Minato Goods Wholesalers, Minato Commercial Brokers, Everest Investment LLC, and Alliance First Trading LLC.
  • Facilitated illicit flows of funds on behalf of MODAFL and the IRGC, with transactions worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

• Arash Eskati Alivand
  • Coordinated cryptocurrency transactions and oil brokerage activities for the Iranian government.
  • Worked with the al Qaterji Company, a Syria-based IRGC Quds Force oil partner, to facilitate payments and sales.
  • Arranged a payment from Minato Commercial Brokers in 2023 (a Derakhshan-linked company) to an al Qaterji account.
  • Conducted transactions worth millions of dollars with Hezbollah-linked money changer Tawfiq Muhammad Said al Law, who provided Hezbollah with digital wallets to receive funds tied to IRGC Quds Force commodity sales.

A combination of larger oil stock levels at independent Chinese refineries and US sanctions on Chinese refineries using Iranian oil is forcing Iran to offer wider discounts on its oil exports to China.[xviii]  The United States imposed sanctions on Qingdao Port Haiye Dongjiakou Oil Products on August 21 for receiving Iranian oil on designated tankers.[xix] The Haiye Dongjiakou terminal, one of China’s largest handlers of Iranian crude, suspended operations shortly after the US sanctions.[xx] Kpler reported that crude imports at Dongjiakou Port fell 65 percent in September after the terminal suspended operations.  Reuters reported that demand for Iranian oil in China dropped because oil stockpiles in Shandong had reached record levels, which made refining at smaller refineries less profitable. Decreased Chinese government oil quotas further discouraged oil buyers.[xxi]  Iranian suppliers responded to the slump in demand caused by high oil stockpiles, government quotes, and US sanctions by offering deeper discounts to buyers in the PRC, with Iranian light crude trading about $6 below Brent in mid-September compared to $3 below Brent in March. Kpler predicted that traders will divert Iranian oil imports to another hub in the Qingdao Port area in response to sanctions on the Dongjiakou terminal.[xxii]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani met with senior Saudi officials in Riyadh on September 16, likely as part of a broader Iranian effort to dissuade Gulf states from cooperating with the United States or Israel following Israel's September 9 strike in Doha.[xxiii] Larijani met with Saudi officials, including Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman, to discuss the "future of the region" and economic and defense cooperation.[xxiv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iranian officials are using the strikes in Doha to frame the United States as an unreliable security guarantor for Gulf states in an effort to break up the nascent anti-Iran coalition in the region.[xxv] Larijani urged regional Islamic countries on September 13 to establish a ”joint operations room” against Israel to avoid their ”own annihilation.”[xxvi] The recommendation for a joint operations room is unlikely to generate any support in Gulf capitals because of Iran’s adversarial relationship with the Gulf states, most of which have all been attacked by Iran or its proxies within the last five years. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Qatari and Iraqi officials on the sidelines of the emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha on September 15.[xxvii]

Iranian Artesh Strategic Studies Center head Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Pourdastan stated on September 16 that Iran will engage Israel and the United States in areas beyond missile operations in future conflicts.[xxviii]  The Artesh Strategic Studies Center is responsible for conducting research to improve the Artesh‘s strategic plans.[xxix] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh similarly stated in August 2025 that Iran has "tools" other than missiles that it has not used yet.[xxx] Iranian leaders likely learned lessons about the limitations of missile attacks on Israel from the Israel-Iran War and Iran’s two large-scale missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024.

Iraq

Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu discussed the development of Iraqi air defenses with senior Iraqi officials, but these discussions are unlikely to translate into Iraqi air defense purchases from Russia due to Russian constraints related to Ukraine. Shoigu met with Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji, Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, Parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee Chairperson Dilan Ghafoor Saleh, and several additional Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee members in Baghdad on September 16.[xxxi] An unidentified Iraqi government source told Kurdish media on September 16 that Shoigu will hold several meetings with senior Iraqi political and military leaders during his two-day visit.[xxxii] Shoigu will also reportedly sign contracts to “arm” the Iraqi army and discuss the development of air defense systems to protect Iraqi airspace after US forces fully withdraw in September 2026.[xxxiii]  Shoigu's delegation reportedly includes the heads of Russian arms manufacturing companies.[xxxiv] Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians and militia figures have long called on the Iraqi government to procure advanced air defense systems to protect Iraqi airspace.[xxxv] Russia faces constraints on transferring military equipment to its partners, including Iran, as it wages war against Ukraine.[xxxvi]

Syria

A likely Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighter executed a General Security Service (GSS) member in eastern Daraa on September 14.[xxxvii] Syrian media circulated a video that depicted an unknown fighter executing a GSS member.[xxxviii] The fighter wore a patch commonly affiliated with ISIS and stated in the footage that the GSS member attacked “the soldiers of the caliphate.”[xxxix] Daraa-based media reported that the GSS member’s body was found in Nahta, eastern Daraa, on September 14.[xl] ISIS has not claimed any attacks in Daraa Province since the fall of the regime, but ISIS has long maintained a presence in southern Syria, particularly during the civil war.[xli] ISIS conducted two attacks in late May 2025 targeting transitional government forces in eastern Suwayda Province, demonstrating that ISIS retains a presence along ground lines of communication between the central Syrian desert and southern Syria.[xlii]

The United States, Jordan, and Syria developed a plan on September 16 to resolve the intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province, but the roadmap will likely require buy-in from the newly formed Suwayda Autonomous Government for effective implementation.  US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani developed a “road map” for Suwayda Province that "guarantees rights, supports justice, promotes societal reconciliation, and paves the way for healing wounds."[xliii] The Syrian government committed to an independent investigation of crimes committed in Suwayda Province and to holding all perpetrators accountable under Syrian law under the road map.[xliv] The Ministry of Interior will deploy personnel along the Suwayda-Damascus road and along the Suwayda Province border as part of the road map. The government also agreed to withdraw all tribal fighters from Suwayda Province who deployed to Suwayda from other parts of Syria during intercommunal violence there in July 2025.[xlv] Many of these tribal fighters declared their loyalty to the government and placed themselves under the government‘s command in July 2025.[xlvi] The road map seeks to set up short and medium-term security and administrative arrangements to facilitate the eventual integration of Suwayda Province into the Syrian state.[xlvii] The road map is similar to a previous three-phase ceasefire agreement, which stalled in its third stage after the Suwayda leadership declared an autonomous government on August 6.[xlviii] The Suwayda Autonomous Government established an alternative military structure on August 23, known as the “National Guard,” which has further complicated reintegration negotiations.[xlix] The Suwayda Autonomous Government has not commented on the road map at the time of this writing. The successful implementation of the road map for Suwayda Province requires adherence from Suwayda’s alternative governance structures and cannot proceed without it because these structures still control much of Suwayda Province.

Arabian Peninsula

An unspecified Israeli intelligence official told Axios that Israeli strikes killed “none” of the “top Hamas leaders” that Israel targeted on September 9 in Doha.[l] Axios reported on September 16 that the Israeli strikes killed five Hamas leaders and a Qatari security guard but that none of the “key targets” at the meeting were killed.[li] Regional media immediately following the strikes reported that Israel targeted Hamas’ Gaza Strip leader Khalil al Hayya, West Bank leader Zaher Jabarin, and former Political Bureau Chairman Khaled Meshaal.[lii]

The Israel Defense Force (IDF) Air Force struck Houthi shipping infrastructure at Hudaydah Port on September 16, which the Houthis had repaired since the IDF’s last strikes on the port in July 2025. A Yemen analyst reported that Israel struck three recently repaired piers at the port.[liii] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent, citing an unspecified Israeli security source, confirmed that the strikes targeted the port’s docks in order to prevent Houthi attempts to rebuild the port.[liv] Israeli airstrikes targeting Hudaydah Port since May 2025 have rendered several port berths inoperable, but commercially available satellite imagery from early August showed the Houthis conducting repairs to at least three berths damaged by Israeli strikes.[lv] Commercially available maritime data from between July 21 and September 16 confirmed that at least 25 vessels, including cargo ships, entered Hudaydah Port and docked exclusively at three berths, two of which CTP-ISW has observed the Houthis repair in August 2025.  It is unclear at this time if the IDF struck these three operational berths, but such an action would be consistent with the Yemen analyst’s report that the IDF struck three recently repaired piers.[lvi] The Houthis heavily rely on Hudaydah Port to generate revenue through oil exports and to import commercial goods.[lvii] The Israeli security source also stated that the IDF aims to continue the ”naval blockade” that Israel has imposed on the Houthis in recent months.[lviii]

The Houthis claimed to target Israel with one ballistic missile and an unspecified number of drones on September 16 after Israel struck Hudaydah Port.[lix] The IDF said it intercepted one missile launched from Yemen.[lx]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.