Iran Update, September 2, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The  Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told a UK-based website Oil Price on September 1 that Iran is working closely with Russia, China, and North Korea to advance its weaponization knowledge and missile development.[i] The source stated that Russia has sent dozens of nuclear scientists to Iran since June 2024.[ii] The source added that North Korea also sent three missile experts to Iran after June 2024.[iii] CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports.  Iran has previously sought Russian support to develop Iran‘s nuclear program.[iv] The Financial Times reported on August 5 that five Iranian nuclear scientists traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian institutes that produce dual-use technology relevant to nuclear weapons research.[v] Western media reported in January 2025 that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.[vi]

Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally. Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian held separate meetings with Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO) members, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, on September 2, on the sidelines of the SCO summit in China.[vii] Putin and Pezeshkian discussed bilateral trade, the Iran-Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Free Trade Agreement, and coordination on international issues, including the nuclear issue.[viii] Xi and Pezeshkian discussed the 25-year Iran-China strategic cooperation agreement..[ix] Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Iran’s nuclear rights and emphasized China’s commitment to expanding bilateral economic and energy cooperation. These meetings come after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28 to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[x]

Iran is coordinating with revisionist powers to block the implementation of snapback sanctions. Pezeshkian told Chinese media on September 2 that Iran supports China’s efforts to combat unilateralism and emphasized that rejecting unilateralism requires the serious implementation of SCO agreements, which call for circumventing international sanctions.[xi] Pezeshkian‘s interview comes amid Chinese and Russian efforts to propose resolutions for the UNSC that may ease pressure on Iran and undercut the E3’s position. A Wall Street Journal journalist reported on September 2 that Russia circulated a new draft resolution which urges all JCPOA participants to resume talks, removes a clause outlawing snapback under UNSCR 2231, and leaves the issue of snapback ”ambiguous.“[xii] Russia previously introduced a UNSC draft resolution, co-sponsored by China, to extend the snapback deadline by six months without requiring any concessions from Iran.[xiii] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months that would require Iran to restore full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, resume negotiations with the United States, and account for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[xiv] The Russia-China resolution does not appear to impose any conditions on Iran.

The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarrai and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil.[xv] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Samarrai as well as nine vessels and seven entities, tied to Samarrai as part of a broader US effort to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.[xvi] Samarrai’s network blended Iranian oil with Iraqi oil before marketing it to international buyers and generates millions of dollars in revenue for Samarrai and the Iranian regime.[xvii] Samarrai used a fleet of oil tankers operated by one of his UAE-based companies to conduct ship-to-ship transfers with US-sanctioned Iranian vessels.[xviii] The Iraqi Navy seized one of Samarrai’s tankers in the Persian Gulf, off the coast of Basra Province, Iraq, on August 6 for lacking proper documentation.[xix] Smugglers who transport sanctioned Iranian oil frequently use forged documentation to misrepresent Iranian crude oil as Iraqi oil to evade sanctions.[xx]

These sanctions come amid a broader US effort to curb Iraq’s role in Iranian oil smuggling. Iran oversees an oil smuggling network in Iraq that generates about one billion dollars annually for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[xxi] The United States sanctioned six entities and four vessels on July 3 that are involved in smuggling Iranian oil, including a network of companies run by Iraqi businessman Salim Ahmed Said.[xxii] The United States threatened in July 2025 to sanction the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization and block access to 350 million USD of Iraqi oil revenue if the Iraqi federal government failed to prevent Iranian oil smuggling.[xxiii]

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the ongoing US withdrawal from federal Iraq to the Iraqi Kurdistan region, likely in an effort to justify the militias’ continued existence amid US efforts to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds, formerly known as Ashab al Kahf, stated on August 29 that the US withdrawal to the Iraqi Kurdistan region is a “redeployment [within Iraq]” and reaffirmed the group’s commitment to the removal of US forces from Iraq.[xxiv] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee similarly reiterated its demand for US forces to withdraw from Iraq in a statement on August 21.[xxv] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is a coordinating body comprised of several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxvi] The United States is expected to complete the first phase of the withdrawal of US-led international coalition forces to Iraqi Kurdistan by the end of September 2025.[xxvii] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that the coalition forces remaining in federal Iraq after September 2025 would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xxviii] The removal of US forces from Iraq is a long-standing objective shared by Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxix] The effort by Iranian-backed militias to justify their continued existence comes amid US pressure for the Iraqi federal government to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq, especially via the dissolution of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xxx]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told a UK-based website Oil Price on September 1 that Russia and North Korea have sent nuclear scientists and missile experts, respectively, to Iran since June 2024.
• Iran: Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally. Iran is coordinating with revisionist powers to block the implementation of snapback sanctions.
• Iraq: The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarrai and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil. Iran oversees an oil smuggling network in Iraq that generates about one billion dollars annually for Iran and its Axis of Resistance. These sanctions come amid a broader US effort to curb Iraq’s role in Iranian oil smuggling.
• Iraq: Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the ongoing US withdrawal from federal Iraq to the Iraqi Kurdistan region, likely in an effort to justify the militias’ continued existence amid US efforts to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq.

Iran

The Institute for Science and International Security (The Institute) reported on September 2 that Iran has moved almost all the chillers from the two HVAC buildings at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at the Natanz Enrichment Complex to more secured areas based on satellite imagery.[xxxi] The Institute assessed that Iran has likely moved the chillers to make the chillers less vulnerable to future airstrikes. Satellite imagery from August 30 shows that Iran has dispersed 19 of the 24 total chillers from the two HVAC buildings at the FEP.[xxxii] Chillers help an HVAC system maintain certain temperatures within a facility to protect critical equipment and personnel at the facility and enable optimal functioning. The Institute reported that the chillers are currently not in use because the centrifuges at FEP are still inoperable, and there is no electric power.[xxxiii] Israeli airstrikes damaged electrical substations and support buildings critical to power supply at Natanz.[xxxiv] US and Israeli airstrikes rendered the underground centrifuges at Natanz inoperable due to the “sudden loss of external power,” according to International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi.[xxxv]

Senior Iranian officials met with Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan to discuss Iranian concerns about the Zangezur Corridor. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani and his newly appointed Deputy for International Affairs Ali Bagheri Kani met with Grigoryan on August 30 to discuss the recent US-brokered Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement that would grant the United States exclusive development rights to a strategic corridor in the southern Caucasus.[xxxvi] Grigoryan stated that Armenia is ”ready to provide guarantees to Iran“ in order to preserve Iran-Armenia relations.”[xxxvii] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately met with Grigoryan on August 30 to discuss Iran’s opposition to the presence of US soldiers along the new corridor and emphasized Iran’s commitment to deepening bilateral military relations.[xxxviii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Grigoryan on August 30 and stated that Iran’s concerns about the presence of foreign forces in the southern Caucasus have been ”largely resolved” following Larijani and Grigoryan’s meeting.[xxxix] Iran has historically opposed the Zangezur Corridor and viewed it as an effort to economically sideline Iran and limit Iranian regional influence while increasing US influence.[xl]

Unspecified armed fighters attacked an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) base and killed an IRGC officer in Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on August 30.[xli] The attack follows a series of recent attacks by Salafi-jihadi Baloch militant group Jaish al Adl on Iranian security forces.[xlii] Iranian security officials have recently announced the deployment of new technologies to help secure its borders in southeastern Iran.[xliii] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi discussed enhancing border security along the Iran-Pakistan border in a phone call with Pakistani Army Commander Asim Munir on August 26.[xliv] Iran has increased efforts to combatting terrorism in southeastern Iran since the uptick in anti-regime militant attacks since December 2023.[xlv]

Iraq

A parliamentarian from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah’s Haquq movement filed a complaint with the Iraqi electoral commission on August 31 to bar Sovereignty Alliance head Khamis al Khanjar from the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections for “insulting the Iraqi people.”[xlvi] Khanjar reportedly said he would defend Iraqi Sunnis from the ”mob.“[xlvii] An Iraqi Kurdish journalist said on August 31 that Khanjar’s comments are “old” and referred to Iraqis that committed “transgressions” near a mosque.[xlviii] It is notable that this complaint follows the Iraqi electoral commission’s request on June 11 for the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) to clarify if Khanjar is under investigation for suspected Baath party links.[xlix] Shia political parties have historically manipulated the AJC to target political opponents, including Sunnis.[l] CTP-ISW assessed on August 20 that former Prime Minister and State of Law coalition head Nouri al Maliki may be using the AJC to sideline political opponents ahead of the elections.[li] The State of Law coalition and the Haquq movement are both part of the governing Shia Coordination Framework, which is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, including some backed by Iran.[lii]

Syria

The recent ceasefire violations around Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province, Syria, between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are reconnaissance efforts along the frontline.[liii] A MoD source told Syrian state media on August 31 that SDF and MoD forces clashed after the MoD engaged an SDF force during an SDF effort to reconnoiter MoD positions near Tal Maaz, Aleppo  .[liv] The frontlines between MoD and SDF forces on the Deir Hafer-Tal Maaz axis are separated by a 20-meter-wide canal, which acts as a barrier that forces must cross to access the other side. This canal is probably the line separating MoD-controlled and SDF-controlled territory near Deir Hafer. The MoD position in Tal Maaz is located on a tactically significant 30-meter-high hill, which likely provides MoD forces with relatively clear lines of sight to SDF positions below. The source said that SDF fighters stationed in Umm Tina and Deir Hafer suppressed the MoD‘s Tal Maaz position with small arms fire, likely to allow the ambushed SDF reconnaissance force in contact near Tal Maaz to begin their withdrawal across the canal.[lv] The small arms fire was probably insufficient to suppress the MoD positions near Tal Maaz because Tal Maaz is 3 kilometers north of the canal. The distances involved required the SDF to fire artillery and heavy weapons, which suppressed the MoD and enabled the SDF reconnaissance force to break contact and withdraw north of the canal.[lvi] The MoD responded to this shelling by reinforcing its positions near Tal Maaz and conducting counter-battery fire.[lvii] The SDF claimed that the reported engagement was “completely fabricated” and that the clashes were instead between MoD factions.[lviii] The MoD and SDF previously conducted reconnaissance operations along the Deir H afer axis on August 12, which also caused minor engagements.[lix]

The Dei r Hafer axis is a significant SDF salient that protrudes into the rear of the MoD forces arrayed along the Euphrates River. This protrusion means that in the event of a ceasefire breakdown, the SDF could attempt to maneuver into the MoD’s rear, and the MoD could attempt to rapidly crush the salient. An SDF negotiator confirmed on August 22 that negotiations between the two sides had stalled after Damascus refused to hold a new round in Paris.[lx] Both the Syrian transitional government and SDF have reiterated their commitment to dialogue and diplomacy to negotiate the integration of the SDF into the MoD as outlined in the March 10 agreement.[lxi]

Two likely Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters attempted to conduct a suicide attack on a Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) checkpoint in northern Raqqa Province on August 31.[lxii] The SDF said that its forces engaged the two suspected ISIS fighters at the checkpoint with small arms fire and killed one fighter and injured the other fighter.[lxiii] The injured fighter managed to detonate his suicide vest, which wounded three SDF members.[lxiv] CTP-ISW has not observed any ISIS attack claim as of the time of writing.[lxv] ISIS recently attempted to conduct a suicide attack against Syrian transitional government forces in al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province, on August 22.[lxvi] ISIS remains active throughout Syria.[lxvii] ISIS’ ability to construct and deploy SVESTs may indicate that ISIS has reestablished support zones from which it can launch attacks into SDF- or government-held territory. ISIS would need to maintain secure manufacturing facilities, safehouses for suicide attackers, and access to explosives caches to construct and deploy SVESTs.

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched four drones targeting the Israeli Defense Ministry and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) General Staff Headquarters in Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion Airport, a power station in Hadera, and Ashdod Port, Israel, on September 1.[lxviii] The attack is likely a response to the Israeli airstrike on August 28 that killed several Houthi officials. The IDF Air Force intercepted a drone outside of Israeli territory on September 1.[lxix] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic “blockade” on Israel in October 2023.[lxx] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned on August 28 that Israel will continue to respond to Houthi attacks on Israel.[lxxi]

The Houthis claimed that they launched two drones and an anti-ship cruise missile targeting a Liberian-flagged container ship, MSC ABY, at an unspecified location in the northern Red Sea on September 2, as part of their economic “blockade” on Israel.[lxxii] The MSC ABY travelled from Port Said, Egypt, on August 31, to Jeddah Port, Saudi Arabia, on September 2, according to commercial shipping data.[lxxiii] The MSC ABY is part of the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC)’s network that operates globally, including at Israeli ports.[lxxiv] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations has not reported an incident in the Red Sea at the time of this writing. The Houthis recently conducted an unsuccessful ballistic missile attack targeting a Liberian-flagged oil tanker with ties to a prominent Israeli businessman approximately 40 nautical miles southwest of Yanbu Port, Saudi Arabia, on August 31.[lxxv]

Israeli airstrikes on August 28 targeting a residential building in Haddah District, Sanaa City, reportedly killed at least 35 Houthi personnel and severely injured 10 others, including senior officials, according to local sources.[lxxvi] The Houthis previously reported that the IDF airstrike killed 11 senior Houthi officials, including the Houthi prime minister and eight cabinet ministers.[lxxvii] Those that the Houthis confirmed dead do not command Houthi military forces, and exercise little real power. Power within the Houthi system is frequently exercised by the deputy ministers and Houthi supervisors.[lxxviii] Israeli media reported on August 28 that the IDF airstrike killed Houthi Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Mohammed Abdulkarim al Ghamari, who is responsible for planning and conducting military operations, and Defense and Military Production Minister Major General Mohammed Nasser al Atifi, who is responsible for overseeing arms production.[lxxix] A local source separately claimed on August 29 that the IDF airstrike seriously injured Atifi.[lxxx] Ghamari and Atifi published statements on August 29 and 30, respectively, criticizing US support for Israel, but neither official has made public appearances since the August 28 strike.[lxxxi] A Yemeni journalist circulated unconfirmed reports that the IDF airstrike also killed Houthi Deputy Interior Minister Abdul Majid al Murtada, who is responsible for internal security and suppressing political dissent in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.[lxxxii]

 The Houthis raided the United Nation’s World Food Programme (WFP) and Children’s Fund (UNICEF) offices in Sanaa and Hudaydah governorates on August 31 and took at least 11 WFP employees and five former employees hostage on espionage charges.[lxxxiii] The Houthis frequently arrest UN workers and aid workers under the false pretext of espionage. The UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg confirmed that the Houthis have detained 23 UN staff since 2021.[lxxxiv]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.