Iran Update, September 11, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Thre ats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

 Iranian media outlet Nour News highlighted the Defense Council as an important body in shaping Iran’s strategy after the Israel-Iran War. Nour News is affiliated with Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani. The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) established the Defense Council on August 3 to streamline wartime decision-making after the Israel-Iran War and justified its formation by citing fragmentation and lack of coordination among Iranian institutions.[i] Nour News published a video on September 9 in which it described the Israel-Iran War as a turning point that demonstrated how global security is no longer guaranteed by international law.[ii] It claimed that international institutions tasked with preserving peace “proved powerless,” and that law has effectively been replaced by power. Nour News described this as a global transition from “law-based security” to “weapon-based security.” The outlet stated that the formation of the Defense Council was a structural response to the shift to weapon-based security and that it is more than an administrative initiative. Nour News previously framed the Defense Council as responsible for executing a new Iranian defense doctrine against “hybrid threats.”[iii]

The United States and other foreign countries have taken steps to provide Lebanon with economic and military support. The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on September 10 that it will send a $14.2 million military aid package to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).[iv] The aid package will include a range of military equipment, including demolition charges, time blasting fuses, and blasting caps, to help the LAF dismantle unexploded ordnances and Hezbollah weapons caches.[v] The US DoD stated that the package will empower the LAF to ”degrade Hezbollah.”[vi] Lebanese officials met with French Presidential Envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian on September 11 to discuss providing the LAF with unspecified support to implement its disarmament plan.[vii] Drian reaffirmed that France would support the LAF, help with Lebanon’s reconstruction, and stimulate international investment in Lebanon.[viii] France will also continue its work to organize two international conferences aimed at acquiring support for the LAF and increasing economic investments in Lebanon.[ix]

Economic support for the Lebanese government would undermine Hezbollah’s ability to build support among the Lebanese population by giving the government the ability to provide services that it has been unable to provide previously. Hezbollah previously led reconstruction efforts and provided a social safety net for the Lebanese population after the 2006 war, but Hezbollah has recently struggled to access funds to pay for the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure following the conflict with Israel in late 2024.[x] Hezbollah has also struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters, which has contributed to growing frustration among Hezbollah supporters.[xi] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation to those who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xii]

The Iraqi Independence Gathering in Najaf, which is a political advocacy group, launched a campaign to pressure the Iraqi government to prevent parties tied to armed factions from running in the November 2025 parliamentary elections. The Iraqi Independence Gathering submitted a complaint to the Department of Political Parties and Organizations under the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC).[xiii] IHEC was established in 2019 as an “independent and impartial body” responsible for developing election rules and regulations, approving candidates running for elections, adjudicating electoral complaints and appeals, and approving election results.[xiv] The Iraqi Independence Gathering cited Article 9 of the Iraqi constitution in its complaints. Article 9 bars the formation of militias and excludes all Iraqi security forces from participating in or being affiliated with any political activity.[xv] The organization also claimed that parties violated Articles 8 and 47 of the 2015 Political Parties Law Number 36.[xvi] Articles 8 and 47 of the 2015 Political Parties Law prohibit political parties from having any ties to armed factions and states that violators will face a prison sentence.[xvii] The Iraqi Independence Gathering also filed a lawsuit with the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court against Parliament to challenge the current Elections Act.[xviii] The organization claimed that the Elections Act contained articles that contradicted the Iraqi constitution. The Iraqi Independence Gathering claimed the following political parties violated Iraqi federal and election laws:[xix]

• Muntasirun Bloc: led by Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada head Safaa Salem Hamid al Maliki;
• Islamic Movement of Iraq (Harakat al Iraq al Islamiyah): led by Imam Ali Brigades Secretary General Shibl Mohsen Ubaid al Zaidi;
• Services Alliance (Tahaluf Hadmat): led by Imam Ali Brigades Deputy Secretary General Ali Zaidan Hamid al Gharawi;
• Conservative Party: led by Popular Mobilization Forces member Wael Asim Hussein al Shammari;
• Jihad and Construction Party (Harakat al Jihad al Bina): led by Saraya al Jihad founder Jawad Rahim Qasim al Saadi;
• National Elite Alliance (Tahaluf al Safwat al Watani): led by Ansar Allah al Awfiya militia commander Haidar Mazhar Malak al Gharawi;
• National Plateau Alliance (Tahaluf al Hadba al Watani): led by Kataib Sayyida al Shudada Secretary General Hashim Fityan Rahm (Abu Alaa al Walai);
• Babylon Party: led by Raban Salem Sadiq al Kildani. The Babylon Party is the political wing of the 50th PMF Brigade (also known as the Babylon Brigade).
• Badr Organization: led by Hadi al Ameri. Ameri also leads the Badr Organization’s military wing.[xx]
• Sadiqoun Movement: led by Qais al Khazali. Khazali also leads the armed wing of the Sadiqoun Movement, Asaib Ahl al Haq.[xxi]

The Iraqi Independence Gathering’s complaint to IHEC and lawsuit with the Federal Supreme Court are unlikely to achieve meaningful results. The parties listed by the Iraqi Independence Gathering have also co-opted many of Iraq's adjudicating bodies and can protect members from prosecution. Parliament appointed a Shia Coordination Framework-approved judge, Abbas al Fatlawi, as the head of IHEC’s Electoral Administration in April 2023, in a move that was reportedly part of a broader effort to fill the IHEC Board of Commissioners with judges loyal to the Shia Coordination Framework.[xxii] The president of Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court, Faiq Zaidan, has similarly been accused of cooperating with Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia actors to pass favorable court decisions.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways

• Iran Defense Strategy: Iranian media outlet Nour News highlighted the Defense Council as an important body in shaping Iran’s strategy after the Israel-Iran War. The outlet stated that the formation of the Defense Council was a structural response to the shifts in the global security situation.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: The United States and other foreign countries have taken steps to provide Lebanon with economic and military support. The US Department of Defense announced on September 10 that it will send a 14.2 million USD military aid package to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Iran

West Azerbaijan Province’s chief justice announced on September 11 that the Revolutionary Court indicted four defendants accused of cooperating with Israel to threaten Iranian security.[xxiv] Iran claimed that the four defendants reconnoitered Iranian military facilities and sent the pictures to Mossad agents in return for cryptocurrency payments from the Israeli government.[xxv] These indictments are part of Iranian policies to crack down on real and perceived Israeli infiltration following the Israel-Iran War.[xxvi] Iran has used concerns over Israeli infiltration to justify a crackdown on the Kurdish and Azeri population in West Azerbaijan Province.[xxvii] The New York Times reported on August 30 that Iranian authorities have also arrested dozens of military, intelligence, and high-ranking government officials for spying for Israel.[xxviii] Iranian media reported on June 25 that Iran has arrested 700 alleged Mossad spies across Iran since the start of the Israel-Iran War.[xxix]

Iraq

Iraqi Oil Ministry sources told Arab media on September 11 that the Oil Ministry may contract with unspecified international oil companies that specialize in the “auditing, monitoring, and packaging” of oil to enhance the transparency of Iraqi oil exports.[xxx] The United States threatened in July to sanction the Oil Ministry’s State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) and block the Iraqi federal government’s access to $350 million of Iraqi oil revenue if the government failed to prevent Iranian oil smuggling.[xxxi]  The United States subsequently sanctioned two separate Iraqi businessmen for smuggling Iranian oil.[xxxii] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ordered the formation of a high-level committee on September 6 to investigate oil smuggling operations that involve mixing Iranian crude oil with Iraqi oil to help Iran bypass international sanctions.[xxxiii]

Unspecified Iraqi sources told Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated media on September 10 that Israeli-Russian dual-citizen Elizabeth Tsurkov was exchanged for Lebanese national Imad Amhaz and an unidentified “Axis of Resistance” prisoner.[xxxiv] Israeli naval commandos detained Amhaz in northern Lebanon in November 2024 on suspicion of Hezbollah membership.[xxxv] The unspecified Iraqi source did not suggest who the unidentified ”Axis of Resistance” prisoner was.[xxxvi] The Iraqi government, Kataib Hezbollah, and other regional sources have presented conflicting accounts of the circumstances that led to Tsurkov’s release.[xxxvii] Iranian-backed militias kidnapped Tsurkov, a Princeton University graduate student, in Baghdad in March 2023 while she was conducting research for her doctoral dissertation.[xxxviii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah released Tsurkov on September 9.[xxxix]

Syria

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) exchanged artillery fire north of Jirah Military Airport near Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province.[xl] Syrian state media reported on September 10 that the SDF fired several rocket artillery salvos, which struck civilian homes in the MoD-controlled villages of al Kayariya, Rasm al Ahmar, and Habubba Kabir, Aleppo Province.[xli] The SDF shelling killed two civilians and wounded seven others in al Kayariya.[xlii] MoD forces responded with counter-battery fire against SDF artillery positions at the Jarrah Military Airport and near the SDF-controlled town of Maskanah.[xliii] No military casualties have been reported at the time of writing. The SDF released a statement on September 11, which claimed that the SDF “repelled” MoD forces who attempted to “infiltrate and launch artillery attacks in the Deir Hafer area,” but did not mention the SDF's artillery barrages. [xliv] The frontlines north of the Jirah Military Airport are separated by a 20-meter canal, which acts as a barrier that forces must cross to access the other side. This is the same canal that is likely the frontline along the northern side of the SDF-controlled Deir Hafer salient.[xlv] Al Kayariya, Rasm al Ahmar, and Habubba Kabir are approximately eight kilometers northeast of the canal. The SDF and MoD have frequently engaged each other along the northern side of the Deir Hafer salient, which extends into the MoD rear along the Euphrates River.[xlvi] The SDF and MoD previously engaged each other on the Deir Hafer-Tal Maaz axis after the MoD engaged an SDF reconnaissance team on September 2 and separately on August 12.[xlvii]   

The General Security Services (GSS) arrested five Lebanese Hezbollah members and seized their heavy weaponry in Kanaker and Saasaa, Rif Dimashq Province, on September 11.[xlviii] Rif Dimashq Province GSS commander Major General Ahmed al Dalati stated that the Hezbollah members had received training in camps in Lebanon and planned to carry out unspecified attacks in Syria.[xlix] Lebanese Hezbollah denied that the five men the GSS arrested were Hezbollah members and said that “Hezbollah has no presence or activity on Syrian soil.”[l] The GSS seized a cache of heavy weaponry as part of the arrest operation on September 11.[li] A Syrian source said the cache, which included 19 Grad rockets, multiple anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), small arms, and ammunition, was stored uncovered in a garage.[lii] Syrian security forces in Homs Province previously arrested a Hezbollah-linked individual and seized several explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) he allegedly planned to use in “terrorist operations” on July 13.[liii] The GSS seized a separate heavy weapon shipment destined for Lebanon near al Zabadani, Rif Dimashq Province, on September 9.[liv]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched two separate drone and missile attacks targeting southern Israel on September 11. The Houthis launched a missile targeting an unspecified military site in the Negev region.[lv] The Houthis separately launched three drones, two of which targeted Ramon Airport in Eilat and one that targeted an unspecified military site in the Negev region.[lvi] The IDF reported on September 11 that it detected a suspicious aerial target and stated that the incident had ”concluded.”[lvii]

The Houthis released Deputy Representative of UNICEF in Yemen Luna Shukri Kataw on September 11.[lviii] An anti-Houthi journalist claimed that the release was part of a secret Jordanian-brokered settlement that involved a military flight from Amman to Sanaa to transport Kataw, who is a Jordanian citizen.[lix] He added that the Jordanian intelligence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Royal Jordanian Air Force coordinated the operation.[lx] The Houthis detained Kataw after a Houthi raid on UNICEF’s office in Sanaa on August 31.[lxi] At least five Yemeni UNICEF staff reportedly remain in Houthi custody.[lxii]

The United States sanctioned Houthi illicit revenue and procurement networks on September 11.[lxiii] The US Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions against 32 individuals and entities and four vessels in connection with Houthi fundraising, smuggling, and weapons procurement operations.[lxiv] The sanctions targeted networks across Yemen, China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Marshall Islands that finance and supply the Houthis’ attacks on the United States, its allies, and international shipping.[lxv] Sanctions targeted Houthi state capture, petroleum smuggling, maritime shipping, Chinese suppliers, procurement fronts, and shipping facilitators, as follows:

• State Capture and Corruption: The Treasury Department sanctioned family members of the Houthis’ Judicial Custodian, Saleh Mesfer Alshaer, who manages seized state-owned and private assets. Alshaer oversaw the Houthis' extortion and seizure of Yemeni state-owned and private assets totaling over $100 million in value.
• Petroleum Smugglers: The Treasury Department sanctioned two key operatives in the Houthis' oil smuggling network, Zaid Ali Yahya al Sharafi and Saddam Ahmad Mohammad al Faqih. Treasury also sanctioned several petroleum companies managed by Sharafi, including al Faqih International Trade, Import, and Oil Services Limited, Sam Oil Company for Trade and Oil Services Ltd, Azal Company, and Royal Plus Petroleum Derivatives Import, for assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technical support for the Houthis. The Treasury Department is also sanctioning Silm Road Company for Trading and Importing, and Oil Primer Company for being controlled by Zaid Ali Yahya al Sharafi.
• Maritime Shipping: The Treasury Department sanctioned the United Arab Emirates-based Tyba Ship Management DMCC, Star MM Inc., and MT Tevel Incorporated and four vessels associated with the companies.
• Suppliers to the Houthis: The Treasury Department sanctioned Hubei Chica, Shenzhen Shengnan Trading Co., and Shanxi Shutong Import and Export Trade Co. for selling chemical precursors and electronics to the Houthis that are used to build drones, missiles, and explosives. The Treasury Department reported that these companies sometimes falsified shipping documents to avoid detection.
• Procurement Front Companies: The Treasury Department sanctioned Yiwu Wan Shun Trading, a China-based firm used by Houthi procurement operatives to coordinate shipments of UAV components, and the Sanaa-based Irtiqa Institute for Development and Qualification Technical Institute (IQDI), which procures dual-use equipment and conducts weapon research and development (R&D) for the Houthis. Treasury noted IQDI has been instrumental in upgrading Houthi one-way attack UAVs.
• Shipping Facilitators: The Treasury Department sanctioned a network of Houthi-linked logistics companies operating in China that move dual-use components into Yemen. Guangzhou Yakai International Freight Forwarding arranged multiple shipments of sensitive materials, while Guangzhou Nahari Trading Co., owned by Yemeni nationals Mohammed and Hisham al Nahari, procured and concealed dual-use items in shipments bound for Houthi areas. Al Hammadi Trading, run by Yemeni national Nasr al Hammadi, procured and shipped additional components to Yemen.

The Treasury described the new sanctions on Houthis as its largest sanctions action to date and stated that all property and assets of those sanctioned are now blocked in the United States.[lxvi]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See the topline section.