8 hours ago

Iran Update: October 23, 2026

William Doran, Carolyn Moorman, Parker Hempel and Kelly Campa

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways:

Hezbollah is leveraging several political and informational lines of effort to deter the Lebanese government from prosecuting the group for a recent smuggling operation, which Hezbollah likely fears could establish a precedent for legal action against its illicit activities.
Hezbollah's lines of effort are indicative of the challenges that face the government as it attempts to confront Hezbollah but do not guarantee that Hezbollah will succeed in breaking the government's will to disarm and prosecute the group in this instance.
Iraq-based Axis of Resistance actors have very likely launched at least four drones targeting Saudi Arabia within the past 20 days. Attacks on Saudi Arabia and other regional countries from Iraq by any Iranian partner or proxy support Iranian objectives to compel the United States to end the war in terms favorable to Iran by imposing increasing costs on US partners and allies in the region.
Saudi Arabia is expanding the scope of its air campaign in Yemen by interdicting Houthi smuggling cargo that could sustain Houthi military activities against the Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia.

Toplines

Hezbollah is leveraging several political and informational lines of effort to deter the Lebanese government from prosecuting the group for a recent smuggling operation, which Hezbollah likely fears could establish a precedent for legal action against its illicit activities. The Lebanese government is investigating the group after Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) personnel interdicted a Hezbollah truck carrying nearly 800 kilograms of high explosives from the Bekaa Valley to Beirut's southern suburbs on October 5.[i] The government currently seeks to refer the criminal case to the Judicial Council, which is Lebanon's highest criminal court, and prosecute the Hezbollah members involved in smuggling explosives.[ii] Referring the case to the Judicial Council would break Hezbollah's de facto legal immunity and expose the organization to potential legal consequences.[iii] Hezbollah accordingly likely views the possible legal actions that the government is exploring as steps that could progress or even hasten existing government efforts to disarm the group entirely under the June 2026 Agreement, particularly by establishing a precedent for legal action against Hezbollah’s illicit activities.[iv] Lebanese government success in holding Hezbollah accountable for smuggling weapons threatens Hezbollah's ability to resupply itself with impunity and maintain its arms.[v] The successful prosecution of the case could also strengthen the government’s confidence and preparedness to further challenge Hezbollah’s military and criminal activities, potentially to the point of military disarmament.

Hezbollah is attempting to exploit the Lebanese government's sensitivity toward civil conflict by threatening the government with unrest and portraying the government as sectarian and beholden to Israeli interests. Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc warned on October 23 that Lebanon is liable to “fragmentation” and suggested that the government is pushing Lebanon toward civil conflict in pursuing legal action against Hezbollah.[vi] Hezbollah officials further derided the government’s efforts as “settling internal sectarian scores.”[vii] The Hezbollah officials also called any attempt to arrest Hezbollah officials an “act of Israeli aggression,” which is likely also a veiled threat to confront government police or military action.[viii] Hezbollah has historically used these kinds of threats and rhetoric to render the Lebanese government and public unwilling to threaten the group's military organization.[ix] The government is particularly sensitive to such threats given Lebanon's history of civil war and sectarian violence.[x]

Hezbollah also leveraged its political alliance with Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri, who leads the Shia Amal Movement, to delay President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam's efforts to prosecute Hezbollah on October 22.[xi] Lebanese media reported on October 23 that Berri urged Aoun and Salam to postpone a necessary cabinet vote that would refer the Hezbollah explosives case to the Judicial Council, which answers to the pro-government Justice Minister and issues binding rulings without appeal.[xii] Berri reportedly promised Aoun and Salam that, in return for postponing the cabinet vote, Hezbollah would neither foment civil conflict nor trigger a government crisis by withdrawing Hezbollah and Amal from the cabinet.[xiii] The Lebanese ISF and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will continue to investigate the incident during this postponement under the Lebanese Military Court’s jurisdiction.[xiv] The Military Court is led by Brigadier General Wassim Fayad, who is reportedly close to Hezbollah and has previously obstructed prosecutions under pressure from the group.[xv]

Hezbollah's lines of effort illustrate the challenges facing the Lebanese government as it attempts to confront the group, but these efforts do not guarantee that Hezbollah will succeed in breaking the government's will to disarm and prosecute the group in this instance. Hezbollah is relying on lines of effort that have succeeded during previous efforts to hold the group accountable over the last two decades.[xvi] Hezbollah is far weaker and less popular now than it was during some of these previous efforts, however, because it has exhausted much of its military strength and popular support since October 2023 by initiating destructive wars with Israel.[xvii] The Lebanese government is also demonstrating resolve to counter Hezbollah’s threats and thwart its illicit activities, including by authorizing ISF raids and LAF deployments in Beirut's southern suburbs, which are a historical Hezbollah stronghold.[xviii] CTP-ISW has outlined Hezbollah’s lines of effort to avoid disarmament and vulnerabilities that the United States and Lebanon can exploit in an October 22 special report (read the full report here: How Hezbollah is Preventing its Disarmament, Again.)[xix]

Saudi Arabia is expanding the scope of its air campaign in Yemen by interdicting Houthi smuggling cargo that could sustain Houthi military operations against the internationally recognized Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia.[xx] Saudi coalition aircraft reportedly struck a likely Houthi smuggling vessel near Houthi-controlled Zuqar Island in the Red Sea on October 22.[xxi] Saudi coalition aircraft have increasingly targeted Houthi smuggling vessels in the Red Sea since October 16.[xxii] The Saudi Joint Forces Command also issued a statement warning Yemeni vessels against supporting Houthi smuggling efforts on October 19.[xxiii] The Houthis have established an extensive international smuggling network, with support from the IRGC, to acquire small arms, drone and missile components, and other military equipment in recent years.[xxiv] Saudi interdiction efforts likely aim to prevent arms and equipment that the Houthis could use to resupply frontline units from reaching the group by interdicting vessels carrying illicit cargo. The Houthis could also theoretically use drone and missile equipment acquired through smuggling to supply Houthi missile and drone units that are conducting daily attacks on Saudi critical infrastructure (see below).

The increase in Saudi airstrikes targeting Houthi smuggling assets comes amid challenges to the Yemeni government’s ability to conduct maritime counter-smuggling operations. The Yemeni-government aligned, Saudi-backed National Resistance Forces historically relied upon its positions on the Red Sea coast, and at Mokha port in particular, as a base for the Yemeni government's maritime counter-smuggling operations in the Red Sea. The Houthis seized this coastline, including Mokha, on September 10.^[xxv] The loss of Yemeni-controlled territory and port infrastructure along the Red Sea coast has almost certainly limited the Yemeni government's ability to conduct anti-smuggling operations against the Houthis.^[xxvi] It is also unclear if government forces have had the bandwidth to conduct such counter-smuggling operations while forces are currently engaged in a full mobilization against the Houthis.

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:
- Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
- Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
- Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
- Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.
Lebanon

See topline section.

Iraq

Iraq-based Axis of Resistance actors have very likely launched at least four drones targeting Saudi Arabia within the past 20 days.[xxvii] Saudi security sources told US-funded regional media on October 22 that the drones targeted unspecified ”vital sites.”[xxviii] Saudi Arabia has reportedly informed the Iraqi federal government of the attacks.[xxix] The report did not specify where in Iraq the launches originated, but Iraqi authorities have reportedly increased surveillance over militia sites in Maysan Province over the past two weeks that they suspect Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are using to conduct attacks.[xxx] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-managed Iraqi militia cells based along the Iraq-Iran border, including in Maysan Province, have conducted multiple attacks on neighboring countries in recent months, including a September 10 attack on Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline.[xxxi] The Houthis, who maintain an active presence in Iraq, reportedly coordinated some of these cross-border attacks with Iraqi militias.[xxxii] It is possible that Iraqi fighters, Houthi fighters, or a combination of Iraqi and Houthi forces launched the drones at Saudi Arabia. Attacks on Saudi Arabia and other regional countries from Iraq by any Iranian partner or proxy support Iranian objectives to compel the United States to end the war in terms favorable to Iran by imposing increasing costs on US partners and allies in the region, including by imposing economic costs through attacks on energy infrastructure.

Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to advance into contested territory south of Taiz City, likely to try to break the Houthis' encirclement of government-aligned forces in central Taiz Governorate. Yemeni government-aligned forces advanced to Jabal Manara in al Misrakh District on October 22, which the Houthis previously occupied, according to Yemeni and DC-based Yemen analyst sources.[xxxiii] Yemeni government-aligned forces have advanced into al Misrakh District and engaged Houthi fighters in the area in recent days likely in order to try to break the Houthis' encirclement of central Taiz Governorate. The Houthis fully encircled the city on October 12.[xxxiv]

Yemeni government-aligned forces’ advances into al Misrakh District come amid the continued success of Yemeni government-aligned forces’ efforts to repel Houthi advances into the "Old Airport" neighborhood on the western outskirts of Taiz City on October 22.[xxxv] Yemeni government-aligned forces similarly repelled Houthi attempts to advance into the area on October 17 and 18.[xxxvi] The "Old Airport" neighborhood sits along a major road leading into Taiz City that the Houthis have sought to capture in recent weeks.[xxxvii]

The Houthis have continued to attack targets across Saudi Arabia to impose economic and political costs on Saudi Arabia and compel Saudi Arabia to capitulate to Houthi demands. The Saudi Joint Forces Command reported that Saudi air defenses intercepted one ballistic missile over Najran, southern Saudi Arabia on October 22.[xxxviii] Saudi air defenses also intercepted two ballistic missiles over Riyadh and Khamis Mushait and two drones over Saudi Arabia's southern region on October 23.[xxxix] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi oil facilities, airports, and other civilian infrastructure as part of their ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to halt military operations against the Houthis and accept the Houthis’ demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[xl]

[i] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-explosives-truck-beirut-f36ef1b24e3b505136d76e4fdfdcdcb6 ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5332776-إحالة-متفجرات-حزب-الله-إلى-المجلس-العدلي-تنتظر-انتهاء-التحقيقات

[ii] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/323297-all-you-need-to-know-about-thursday-s-cabinet-session ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5332787-لبنان-مذكرات-قضائية-تُطارد-المتورطين-في-متفجرات-حزب-الله

[iii] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5249507-hezbollah-pressure-military-court-undermines-lebanon’s-weapons-ban ; https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-lebanese-state/02-influence-through-state-institutions

[iv] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/trilateral-framework-between-the-united-states-of-america-the-state-of-israel-and-the-republic-of-lebanon/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/how-hezbollah-is-preventing-its-disarmament-again/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-june-27-2026

[v] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/how-hezbollah-is-preventing-its-disarmament-again/

[vi] https://t.me/sameralhajali/15659

[vii] https://t.me/sameralhajali/15659

[viii] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5332787-لبنان-مذكرات-قضائية-تُطارد-المتورطين-في-متفجرات-حزب-الله

[ix] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/how-hezbollah-is-preventing-its-disarmament-again/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-warns-lebanon-will-have-no-life-if-state-moves-against-it-2025-08-15/ ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1506156/may-7-2008-a-look-back-at-hezbollahs-coup-de-force.html

[x] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/how-hezbollah-is-preventing-its-disarmament-again/

[xi] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/323297-all-you-need-to-know-about-thursday-s-cabinet-session ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1551784/caught-between-hezbollah-and-the-risk-of-escalation-berri-loses-patience.html

[xii] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/323297-all-you-need-to-know-about-thursday-s-cabinet-session ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1551784/caught-between-hezbollah-and-the-risk-of-escalation-berri-loses-patience.html ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1551551/hacking-lebanese-politics-40-where-does-the-military-courts-jurisdiction-begin-and-end.html ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/89625

[xiii] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/323297-all-you-need-to-know-about-thursday-s-cabinet-session ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1551784/caught-between-hezbollah-and-the-risk-of-escalation-berri-loses-patience.html

[xiv] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/323294-report-hezbollah-won-t-remain-silent-if-warrants-issued-for-its-officials ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1551551/hacking-lebanese-politics-40-where-does-the-military-courts-jurisdiction-begin-and-end.html

[xv] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5249507-hezbollah-pressure-military-court-undermines-lebanon’s-weapons-ban; https://israel-alma dot org/lebanons-military-court-and-its-president-tipping-the-scales-in-hezbollahs-favor/

[xvi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/how-hezbollah-is-preventing-its-disarmament-again/

[xvii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/how-hezbollah-is-preventing-its-disarmament-again/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/israels-victory-in-lebanon/ ; https://english.ajel dot sa/world/n5z2skz2t

[xviii] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/2111438902192140684 ; https://x.com/LebISF/status/2111118059591155970?s=20 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-19-2026

[xix] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/how-hezbollah-is-preventing-its-disarmament-again/

[xx] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2113283323011444781?s=20 ; https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2111196763344244823 ; https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2112269738105848098

[xxi] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2113283323011444781?s=20 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3931

[xxii] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2111196763344244823 ; https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2112269738105848098

[xxiii] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2112252107361304758

[xxiv] https://tcf.org/content/report/from-smugglers-to-supply-chains-how-yemens-houthi-movement-became-a-global-threat/ ; https://www.2dec dot net/news82998.html ; https://www.2dec dot net/news83120.html ; https://www.2dec dot net/news83116.html ; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/2100696858477703372 ; https://tcf.org/content/report/from-spoke-to-hub-the-houthis-in-africa/

[xxv] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/c4eae92382c7456cae8c607af9d03794 ; https://www.alayyam dot info/news/A4712VT6-EEX71K-0B7C ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1921342821128376727 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1945393020339212612 ; https://x.com/Yem_army_media/status/2094102604099789047 ; https://www dot 2dec.net/news83057.html

[xxvi] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-10-2026

[xxvii] https://alhurra dot com/47714

[xxviii] https://alhurra dot com/47714

[xxix] https://alhurra dot com/47714

[xxx] https://almadapaper dot net/457787/

[xxxi] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-are-attacking-saudi-arabia-iraq-sources-say-2026-07-30/ ; https://alhurra dot com/en/32307 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-set-up-covert-iraqi-cells-attack-gulf-neighbors-2026-06-19/ ; https://thenewregion dot com/posts/6507 ; https://www.arabnews dot com/middle-east/iraq-finds-drone-launchers-near-iran-border-security-sources-3001417

[xxxii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-are-attacking-saudi-arabia-iraq-sources-say-2026-07-30/ ; https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-war-houthis-yemen-iraq-blockade-41b104b908daeb58ad1d714224f8f570 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/09/29/us-withdraws-forces-iraq-balance-power-shifts-iran/