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Iran Update: October 16, 2026

Adham Fattah, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Parker Hempel and Brian Carter

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways:

The Iranian regime has reportedly found ways to ship a very limited and relatively inconsequential amount of petroleum product exports via maritime routes despite the US naval blockade. Iran’s ability to export energy products continues to be severely hampered by the US economic campaign, however.
The Houthis are using imitative communications deception in an attempt to disrupt Yemeni government-aligned forces’ command and control and hinder government efforts to defend Taiz City.
Yemeni government-aligned forces regained control of Dhubab Airport on the southern Red Sea coastal plain by October 15.
Yemeni government-aligned forces are likely continuing to gradually advance further north and west in Marib Governorate along a major ground line of communication (GLOC) extending to Sanaa, Yemen’s capital.

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The Iranian regime has reportedly found ways to ship a very limited and relatively inconsequential amount of petroleum product exports via maritime routes despite the US naval blockade. Iran’s ability to export energy products continues to be severely hampered by the US economic campaign, however. Reuters reported on October 16 that Iran has used ship-to-ship transfers off the coast of Oman to conceal the movement of its tankers carrying liquified petroleum gas (LPG) and jet fuel, citing four people in maritime security who track Gulf oil movements.[i] Reuters added that at least eight LPG tankers and one jet fuel tanker have exited the Gulf of Oman – violating the US naval blockade – since mid-July, citing United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and maritime intelligence group SynMax.[ii] The United States reinstated its naval blockade of Iranian ports and ships on July 14, and has severely curtailed Iranian exports even assuming the Reuters reporting is accurate.[iii] UANI reported in January that Iran exported around 46.9 million barrels of oil per month. Reuters noted--also citing UANI--that the total volume of the LPG shipments across about three months was 4.1 million barrels, or an average of 1.36 million barrels per month. This is 2 percent of the export amount in January.^[iv] Assuming the Reuters report is accurate, it is notable that Iran is unsuccessfully making efforts to offset the impact of the US economic campaign against its energy exports, which are the lifeblood of Iran‘s economy.[v]

It is impossible to validate whether these vessels successfully ran the blockade from independent open sources available to CTP-ISW, and CENTCOM maintains that no vessels have successfully run the blockade.[vi] A US military official told Reuters on October 16 that a vessel transiting the strait does not necessarily mean it had evaded the blockade, as the ships could have been allowed through for various logistical and humanitarian reasons.[vii] A US Treasury Department spokesperson noted that Iran has been using various tactics to obscure its blockade running, such as shutting off AIS on vessels and falsely identifying vessels, but neither tactic should be effective against a US Navy blockade, in principle.[viii] US Navy destroyers and aircraft can detect vessels with their radars and other sensors, which makes AIS irrelevant. The blockade is also enforced against exports from and imports to Iranian ports in accordance with US Navy legal guidance related to blockades, not individual vessels. A vessel conducting a ship-to-ship transfer or transiting from or to an Iranian port would be detectable, assuming no human or technical errors in the tactical process of doing so.

The Houthis are using imitative communications deception in an attempt to disrupt Yemeni government-aligned forces’ command and control and hinder government efforts to defend Taiz City. Imitative communications deception is a mode of military deception in which a military force introduces false but plausible messages into an adversary’s communications network to induce the adversary to react in a manner contrary to its own objectives.[ix] Yemeni military sources told a Marib-based Yemeni journalist on October 15 that the Houthis infiltrated and broadcasted false evacuation orders on government-aligned force commanders’ radio communication channels during a Houthi ground attack on Jabal Han, immediately west of Taiz City.[x] Yemeni government-aligned forces and commanders refused to withdraw from Jabal Han despite the Houthis’ false withdrawal orders and reports that friendly forces’ withdrew, however.[xi]

The Houthis are supplementing their kinetic efforts to capture Jabal Han with imitative communications deception because the group’s ground attacks have repeatedly failed in recent days.[xii] Successful military deception enables a military force to achieve discrete objectives, such as capturing advantageous terrain on a frontline, with less force than the operational environment would otherwise require. The Houthis previously used imitative communications deception to successfully disrupt government-aligned forces’ coordination during the Houthi Red Sea coastal plain offensive between September 9 and 11.^[xiii] Yemeni government-aligned forces’ apparent refusal to withdraw from Jabal Han indicates that these forces have likely strengthened their command-and-control networks and learned from the coastal plain offensive in order to adapt to Houthi deception efforts.

The Houthis are concurrently reportedly attempting to secure a Yemeni government surrender in Taiz City to avoid the significant military costs in casualties, time, and resources implicit in a protracted urban combat campaign for the city. An Israeli open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst reported on October 16 that the Houthis have offered Yemeni government-aligned forces the option to withdraw safely from Taiz City and return to Aden with their vehicles and small arms.[xiv] The Houthis likely recognize that a military campaign to capture Yemen’s third-largest city and defeat or destroy all remaining government-aligned forces and anti-Houthi partisans would require significant manpower, equipment, logistics, and heavy combat. Yemeni government-aligned forces have previously demonstrated their ability to mount successful urban warfare operations against the Houthis, such as in Aden in 2015.[xv] Even a weakened Yemeni government-aligned force in 2026 poses a serious obstacle for the Houthis in the favorable urban and human terrain of Taiz City, where much of the population detests the Houthis.[xvi] The Houthis seek to avoid such a campaign because it could exhaust significant military resources amid continued combat on various other fronts.

Yemeni government-aligned forces regained control of Dhubab Airport on the southern Red Sea coastal plain by October 15. The Homeland Shield Forces, which are a Yemeni government-aligned military faction, published a recorded statement dated to October 15 that shows government-aligned forces at a recognizable site at the airport.[xvii] This footage is a near-certain indicator of government control over Dhubab Airport, following recent conflicting Yemeni government and Houthi claims of control over the area.[xviii] This does not indicate that Yemeni government-aligned forces have consolidated control over remaining areas on the coastal plain south of this position, however, as the front line remains porous due to flat terrain that permits combat units to move with relative ease. Geolocated footage shared by the Houthis on October 14 showed Houthi fighters and convoys near the towns of Murad and Ghurayrah, south of Dhubab Airport on the coastal plain, although it is unclear whether the footage predates Yemeni government-aligned forces’ advances in the vicinity on October 9.[xix]

Yemeni government-aligned forces are likely continuing to gradually advance further north and west in Marib Governorate along a major ground line of communication (GLOC) extending to Sanaa, Yemen’s capital. Saudi and Yemeni media published reports and images on October 16 that strongly suggest that government-aligned forces are advancing northwestward into Majzar district along the main GLOC between Marib City and Sanaa City.[xx] Saudi media reported that government-aligned forces have advanced to their furthest positions northwest of Marib City since 2021.[xxi] Steady government advances in northwestern Marib Governorate in recent weeks do not necessarily indicate future government successes, particularly as the Houthis are likely better prepared to defend positions along the GLOC nearer to Sanaa City and will strengthen that defense if it comes under threat.[xxii]