Iran Update, November 3, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian forces attempted to shoot down a US aircraft near Qeshm Island, in the Strait of Hormuz, on November 2. Iranian attempts to shoot down US military aircraft, if sustained, could seek to generate broader operational effects intended to hinder the United States’ ability to protect international shipping from Iranian attacks.
• Unidentified Iraqi security and political sources told US-funded regional media that the Iraqi federal government deployed four Iraqi Army brigades to Basra Province on October 31 to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from attacking Kuwait if the United States attacks Iran. This report of planned Iraqi militia attacks on Kuwait is consistent with militia activity during the US-Israel-Iran War. The militias will likely respond to US attacks on Iran.
• The Houthis are continuing to attempt to advance south, southeast, and southwest through al Maqatirah District, Lahij Governorate. These efforts are part of a Houthi campaign designed to confront the Yemeni government with simultaneous dilemmas in order to undermine its ability to prioritize and respond to threats on multiple fronts in southwestern Yemen.

Toplines

Iranian forces attempted to shoot down a US aircraft near Qeshm Island, in the Strait of Hormuz, on November 2.[i] US officials told the Wall Street Journal on November 2 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fired a surface-to-air missile (SAM) at a US fighter jet and that the US aircraft returned fire in self-defense.[ii] The officials did not identify the fighter jet model or describe its mission.[iii] The US aircraft could have been conducting a reconnaissance mission, a combat air patrol to protect commercial vessels in the strait, or preparing to attack an Iranian military target, all of which aim to inhibit Iran’s military activities in the strait. The Iranian SAM crew likely sought to destroy the aircraft in accordance with standard orders, although a SAM could still force the aircraft to deploy countermeasures, take evasive action, abandon a target, or otherwise interrupt its mission without striking the aircraft. Iran previously fired a SAM toward a US F-35 fighter jet in August 2026 that was providing cover to vessels in the strait, although a US official said that the missile did not come close enough to threaten the aircraft.[iv]

Iranian attempts to shoot down US military aircraft, if sustained, could seek to generate broader operational effects intended to hinder the United States’ ability to protect international shipping from Iranian attacks. Repeated Iranian SAM launches could require the United States to assign additional aircraft and support capabilities, including electronic warfare, air-defense suppression, stealth aircraft, or longer-range munitions, to military operations over Iran’s southern coast and the Strait. These requirements would increase the resources that the United States must commit to each mission and could accordingly reduce US aircraft availability and coverage for other combat, support, or reconnaissance sorties. Successful Iranian attacks could also cause US casualties and generate domestic political pressure to end US military activity in the Persian Gulf. Iran could attempt to increase the operational cost of US efforts to strike Iranian systems that threaten commercial shipping by sustaining SAM launches targeting US aircraft near the strait.

Iranian forces’ attempt to shoot down a US aircraft near Qeshm Island is part of a broader pattern of US and Iranian military activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf in recent weeks.^[v] US forces have conducted limited, unannounced strikes against Iranian military targets in recent weeks as part of efforts to prevent Iran from attacking commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.[vi] US officials described these US strikes as defensive measures that sought to prevent Iranian attacks on commercial vessels.[vii] This acknowledgement comes amid unconfirmed reports of US strikes near Jask, Hormozgan Province, on October 29, and Iranian media claims of US attacks on two fishing boats near Qeshm Island on October 31.[viii] Several sources, including an Israeli media outlet and an open-source intelligence social media account, previously claimed on October 22 that US forces struck IRGC missile launchers near Sirik, Hormozgan Province.[ix] These reports are consistent with US officials’ statements about recent limited strikes, but available reporting neither confirms the individual incidents nor establishes that the November 2 Iranian SAM launch was a discrete response to these strikes.[x] US forces separately intercepted an IRGC missile that originated from Qeshm Island and targeted commercial shipping on November 2.[xi] Iran has continued to target commercial shipping with various systems while simultaneously publicizing claims of vessels hitting mines in an effort to deter vessels from bypassing Iranian transit procedures. The IRGC Navy claimed on November 3 that three oil tankers struck naval mines and caught fire after disabling their automatic identification system and using an “unauthorized” route through the strait.[xii] US Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper announced on August 27 that US forces successfully removed the mines that Iran previously laid in the Strait of Hormuz’s internationally recognized traffic separation scheme.[xiii]

Unidentified Iraqi security and political sources told US-funded regional media that the Iraqi federal government deployed four Iraqi Army brigades to Basra Province on October 31 to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from attacking Kuwait if the United States attacks Iran.[xiv] The Iraqi federal government deployed these forces after an unidentified Gulf state reportedly informed Baghdad about Iraqi militias’ plans to launch drones at Kuwait from Basra Province and conduct cross-border ground attacks into the country if the United States attacks Iran.[xv] CTP-ISW has not observed any other reports of Iraqi Army deployments of this size, which would consist of four to six thousand soldiers, to Basra Province. Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Amir al Yasrallah met with Basra Province's governor and other provincial security leaders on November 1 to discuss border security, however.[xvi] Local social media accounts posted footage of Iraqi Army deployments to Baghdad in early August 2026 to thwart the militias’ planned response to US-Saudi strikes in Iraq, but Baghdad's more urban environment may have increased the likelihood that local observers could obtain and share such footage.[xvii]

This report of planned Iraqi militia attacks on Kuwait is consistent with militia activity during the US-Israel-Iran War. The militias will likely respond to US attacks on Iran. Iraqi militias, including those that belong to the militia coalition known as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, consistently attacked neighboring countries like Kuwait in March and April 2026.[xviii] Iraqi militias most recently used drones to surveil the US Embassy in Baghdad on October 27, which ISW-CTP previously assessed to be a threat that sought to deter the United States against attacking Iran.[xix] This threat is more discreet than the militias' traditional public threats and belligerent rhetoric, which is likely a response to the changing political situation in Iraq and Iranian preferences concerning the militias’ behavior.[xx] Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya, which is a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, nonetheless made such a public threat on October 30 to respond to any US use of Iraqi territory or airspace to attack Iran.[xxi] The realities of Iraqi politics and Iran's reported interest in some of the Iraqi militias prioritizing politics over kinetic activity are less compelling reasons to obstruct groups like Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya and the other members of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, who are considered closest to Iran and the most kinetically active, from responding to US strikes on Iran.[xxii]

IRGC-directed militia cells that operate along the Iran-Iraq border are also likely to respond to US attacks on Iran. These cells report directly to the IRGC instead of traditional militia leadership networks and have repeatedly conducted attacks on neighboring countries since at least April.[xxiii] Three or four of these cells launched at least seven drone attacks on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE between April 20 and May 17, for example.[xxiv] Iran reportedly organized these cells to insulate established militias from potential US and Iraqi government retaliation, given that the United States has continuously pressured the Iraqi federal government to disarm the militias.[xxv]

Iran is likely coordinating with the Iraqi militias in light of reports that the United States may be planning imminent attacks on Iran. Iran has dispatched senior officials, primarily IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, to meet and coordinate activity with the Iraqi militias ahead of and during past periods of regional conflict with the United States and Israel.[xxvi] Quds Force officers reportedly coordinated with Iraqi militia commanders to expand the US-Israel-Iran War by intensifying Iraqi militia attacks during the April ceasefire, for example.[xxvii] CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of recent meetings between Iranian officials and the Iraqi militias, but Iran could also be relaying messages to the militias via IRGC officers operating in Iraq, including those directing the independent militia attack cells.[xxviii] The Iraqi federal government has attempted to crack down on the unsanctioned activities and movements of Iranian officials in Iraq, such as Ghaani, but it is unclear how effective these efforts have been.[xxix]

The Iraqi Army’s reported deployment to thwart militia attacks on Kuwait is consistent with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi's efforts in recent months to prevent Iraqi militia attacks on neighboring countries, in response to US and Gulf pressure. A Shia Coordination Framework source told US-funded regional media on November 3 that Iraq's main intelligence agency is working with the Iraqi Army and Gulf states to prevent attacks on the Gulf states from Iraqi territory.[xxx] Houthi forces embedded with Iraqi militias and IRGC operatives have conducted multiple attacks from Iraq and otherwise contributed to Iraqi militia attacks on the Gulf in recent months, including the September 10 strike on Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline.[xxxi] The Iraqi federal government took several actions to restrict Iranian collaboration with Iraqi militias in response to the attack on the pipeline, which included temporarily closing multiple Iran-Iraq border crossings.[xxxii] CTP-ISW assessed that the closures were unlikely to cut Iran's weapons smuggling to the militias given that the arms smuggling networks operate outside of the official Iran-Iraq border crossings.[xxxiii] Baghdad also recently increased monitoring of the geographic area where Iranian-backed actors launched the September 10 attack on the pipeline and ordered government authorities to close Houthi offices in Iraq, which are both part of Zaydi’s efforts to stop attacks originating from Iraq.[xxxiv]

The Houthis are continuing to attempt to advance south, southeast, and southwest through al Maqatirah District, Lahij Governorate. Yemeni government media and Yemeni government-aligned media reported that Houthi fighters engaged Yemeni government-aligned forces at positions south and southeast of Souq al Roubah in al Maqatirah District on November 2 and 3.[xxxv] The Houthis previously captured Souq al Roubah, which lies at a critical junction in the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC), on November 1.[xxxvi] Geolocated footage of Houthi fighters on November 2 and Yemeni government-aligned media reports from November 3 indicate that the Houthis attempted to advance along the Taiz-Aden GLOC further south into Tur al Bahah District.[xxxvii] CTP-ISW assessed on November 2 that the Houthis are likely attempting to advance southeast through al Maqatirah District in order to seize sections of the GLOC to help set conditions for the Houthis to besiege or capture Aden City in the future, if they choose to do so.[xxxviii] Such efforts are part of a Houthi campaign designed to confront the Yemeni government with simultaneous dilemmas in order to undermine its ability to prioritize and respond to threats on multiple fronts.

Forces affiliated with the Yemeni government, including the Southern Giants Brigades and National Resistance Forces, engaged Houthi forces in the area after deploying to the district on November 2.[xxxix] An independent Yemeni journalist reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces recaptured Jabal Irf on November 3, which overlooks the last government-controlled sections of the GLOC that extend south toward Aden.[xl]

Some Houthi forces also appear to have infiltrated through mountainous terrain in southwestern al Maqatirah District in the direction of the coastal plain.[xli] UK-based, Saudi-owned media reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces engaged Houthi fighters in al Zariqa and al Majza on November 3.[xlii] Al Zariqa is a mountainous subdistrict approximately seven kilometers south of Houthi-controlled terrain in Lahij Governorate. Al Majza sits approximately 12 kilometers south of Houthi positions in Lahij Governorate. The terrain and locations of al Zariqa and al Majza suggest that Houthi light infantry forces likely infiltrated these areas. Houthi advances in al Majza indicate that the Houthis may seek to approach the Mokha-Taiz GLOC, which is approximately 40 kilometers to the southwest. The Houthis could, in theory, outflank and isolate government-aligned forces on the Red Sea coastal front by advancing towards the Mokha-Taiz GLOC, which supplies government forces operating on that front. Such an advance would compound the pressure on government-aligned forces by threatening both their positions on the Red Sea coast and the routes needed to sustain them. The Houthis may also be attempting to impose an operational dilemma on Yemeni government-aligned forces by attempting to establish positions southwest of the GLOC and requiring Yemeni government-aligned military officers to divert forces from other efforts to respond to Houthi infiltrations further southwest. CTP-ISW continues to assess that recent Houthi advances in Lahij Governorate are part of a Houthi campaign that is designed to confront the Yemeni government with simultaneous dilemmas that are intended to undermine its ability to prioritize and respond to threats on multiple fronts.[xliii]

US and Partner Military Operations

See topline section.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

See topline section.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

The Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is a coalition of Baloch anti-regime groups, may be expanding the geographic scope of its kinetic operations into coastal southeastern Iran. The MPF claimed on November 3 that it attacked alleged Fatemiyoun fighters at a government school in Konarak, which is a port city on southeastern Iran’s Makran Coast, on November 2.[xliv] The Fatemiyoun Division is an IRGC Quds Force-controlled Afghan Shia militia that conducts internal security operations in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, where the MPF is active.[xlv] CTP-ISW has previously observed MPF activity around Khash, Saravan, and Zahedan in recent weeks, although the group has never officially operated in Konarak before.[xlvi] The IRGC Ground Forces Quds Operational Base, which is a local IRGC command headquarters, claimed on November 2 that Iranian forces ambushed an unspecified cell before it could attack security forces’ positions and establish a roadblock on the Zarabad-Konarak road, killing one fighter and arresting several others.[xlvii] The shared location, timing, and incident details suggest that the MPF and IRGC may be describing the same engagement, which would indicate that the cell in question belonged to the MPF. The two incidents may also be distinct, which would indicate a more active MPF presence in the Konarak area.

Continued MPF activity along the Makran Coast could disrupt Iranian maritime operations and economic projects and force Iran to deploy additional forces to the area amid its broader confrontation with the United States. Konarak and the nearby port city of Chabahar host Iranian naval and air force stations, including Chabahar Air Base, which support Iranian strikes on vessels and drone operations in the Gulf of Oman.[xlviii] Iran views the Makran Coast and its port cities, particularly Chabahar, as a crucial economic outlet to the Indian Ocean, as well as way stations for trade routes extending to Afghanistan and Central Asia.[xlix]

Iran may be reinforcing its security forces in southeastern Iran in response to continued militant attacks there. Iranian media reported on November 3 that an unspecified hostile group killed one member of the Artesh Ground Forces 377th Mobile Offensive Brigade and wounded another soldier in southeastern Iran.[l] The presence of 377th Brigade forces, who are normally based in northeastern Iran’s Khorasan Razavi Province, may indicate that Iran has deployed forces from outside the province to reinforce security operations.[li] Iranian media separately reported that unidentified gunmen killed a Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Criminal Investigation Officer in Saravan on November 3.[lii] The MPF also claimed on November 3 that it killed an LEC Special Units field commander in Saravan.[liii] These two reports likely describe the same incident involving MPF fighters and LEC personnel. The MPF also claimed to kill an IRGC commander and three unspecified companions in Golshan on November 3.[liv]

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

US Ambassador to Iraq Steven Fagin told Iraqi officials that the United States will sanction Iraq if the government fails to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias by June 30, 2027, according to informed sources speaking to Iraqi media on November 3.[lv] Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi had pushed for an extension to the original September 30 disarmament deadline after failing to make significant progress in disarming the militias.[lvi] The Iraqi federal government, including Zaydi himself and the Shia Coordination Framework, continues to negotiate with the Iraqi militias over the details of the government's disarmament plan, even though many of the most kinetically active militias continue to refuse to disarm.[lvii]

Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to advance into central Jawf Governorate on November 3. Geolocated footage showed Yemeni government-aligned forces from the First Emergency Brigade recapturing a previously Houthi-controlled position near Jabal Dahida, which is a mountain range southeast of Jawf Governorate’s capital at al Hazm, on November 3.[lviii] Yemeni government-aligned forces likely advanced to Jabal Dahida from positions further south at Jabal Huwayshian.[lix] Yemeni government-aligned forces are likely attempting to recapture territory in central Jawf Governorate as part of an effort to set conditions to recapture al Hazm.[lx]

The Houthis claimed that they struck Saudi civilian and military airports in Saudi Arabia on November 3.[lxi] The Houthis claimed that they struck Abha International Airport with one drone and King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait with one ballistic missile.[lxii] Saudi Joint Forces Command spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki separately announced that Saudi air defenses intercepted one Houthi drone over Mecca Province on November 3.[lxiii] The Houthis have not claimed the attack in Mecca Province at the time of this writing. The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure, including civilian airports, as part of an ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands, which involve significant economic concessions.[lxiv]