Iran Update, October 14, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• Recent waves of Iranian attacks on vessels in and near the Strait of Hormuz indicate that Iran retains the ability to effectively target vessels in the strait, which suggests that Iran has either overcome previous operational challenges or is adapting to such constraints through new tactics or capabilities.
• The Houthis are attempting to domestically produce a variant of the Iranian Kheybar Shekan missile with People’s Republic of China (PRC)-manufactured components.
• Houthi development and use of Kheybar Shekan variants with maneuverable re-entry vehicles that can change the missile’s trajectory mid-flight present a challenge to Saudi air defenses as the Houthis continue to fire missiles and drones targeting Saudi critical infrastructu

Toplines

Recent waves of Iranian attacks on vessels in and near the Strait of Hormuz indicate that Iran retains the ability to effectively target vessels in the strait, which suggests that Iran has either overcome previous operational constraints or is adapting to such constraints through new tactics or capabilities.  CTP-ISW assessed in early September 2026 that recent US efforts, including airstrikes on Iranian coastal radars, appeared to have some success in disrupting Iran’s ability to attack ships in the strait.[i] Iran’s employment of suboptimal methods to attempt to maintain Iranian control in the Strait of Hormuz— such as using shore-based rocket launchers instead of fast attack craft (FAC) to deploy mines and using FAC to physically identify vessels—suggested that recent US strikes had degraded Iran’s maritime surveillance and mine-laying capabilities.[ii] A US military official noted to Reuters on October 13 that Iranian naval forces have continued to use small boats with spotters to identify targets and inform the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[iii] The US military official said that Iran pursued this method of target identification after the United States "destroyed" a significant part of Iranian radar capabilities.[iv] The US military official cited an example from the past seven to fourteen days in which the US military identified Iranian spotters calling in targets from a small vessel in the strait, which suggests that Iran may still be contending with somewhat degraded coastal radar systems.[v]

Iran’s recent waves of increased attacks on civilian vessels indicate that Iran is still able to conduct damaging attacks on vessels transiting through the strait and Persian Gulf, regardless of any remaining operational constraints.^[vi] Iran has struck at least 24 vessels between September 28 and October 11.[vii] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) additionally reported at least seven maritime incidents involving vessels between October 12 and 14.[viii] Iranian attacks also sank two Emirati cargo vessels in the strait on October 14.[ix] Iran has not sunk a vessel since March 2026.^[x]

Iran may have partially reconstituted some of its maritime targeting capabilities, which could be supporting Iran’s ability to conduct recent waves of attacks on commercial vessels.[xi] Iran previously attempted to rebuild radars struck by the United States in previous rounds of strikes, for example.[xii] A US official told the Wall Street Journal on October 4 that Iran improved its ability to target ships in recent weeks but did not provide any more details.[xiii] The official’s comment could refer to reconstituted Iranian capabilities, but it is also possible that Iran has adopted alternative tactics or developed new capabilities to adapt to its targeting constraints. Two Iranian officials told Reuters on October 13 that Iran is ”deploying new tactics,” including by changing the ”type“ and ”pace“ of attacks in the strait.[xiv] One of the Iranian officials added that Iran started using these new tactics around October 4 and that doing so has led to the increase in attacks on vessels, which is consistent with observed incidents in the strait.[xv]  The official noted that Iran seeks to keep oil prices high in order to pressure US President Donald Trump ahead of the US midterm elections in November.^[xvi]

The Houthis are attempting to domestically produce a variant of the Iranian Kheybar Shekan missile with People’s Republic of China (PRC)-manufactured components. A UK‑based investigative organization reported that the Houthis procured a range of custom-made missile components, tools, and testing equipment from an unspecified Chinese supplier.[xvii] Yemeni authorities interdicted a shipment bound for Houthi-controlled Hudaydah port in July 2026 that contained Chinese-manufactured missile components, including components of a Kheybar Shekan variant’s airframe and solid-propellant rocket motor.^[xviii] An independent missile analyst told the Wall Street Journal on October 14 that it is unclear if the Houthis have already begun to manufacture the missile or if they are still testing assembly techniques.^[xix]

The Houthis have unveiled several domestically-produced variants of the Kheybar Shekan in recent years, at least one of which possesses MaRV capabilities.[xx] A maneuverable reentry vehicle can be used to evade anti-ballistic missile systems or to improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles by altering their trajectory during the terminal stage of flight.[xxi] It is unclear which domestically-produced Kheybar Shekan variant the Houthis sought to produce with the interdicted Chinese-manufactured components. Some Kheybar Shekan variants have a detachable nosecone armed with a warhead that can adjust its trajectory during the terminal phase at speeds of up to 6,000 miles per hour.[xxii] Iran has fired advanced variants of the Kheybar Shekan missiles at regional US bases during the current conflict that have evaded US defenses, including a July 17 Iranian attack on the Muwaffaq Salti Airbase in Azraq, Jordan, that killed multiple US servicemembers.[xxiii]

Houthi investment in maneuverable ballistic missiles poses a particular threat to Saudi air defenses as the Houthis continue to fire missiles and drones targeting Saudi critical infrastructure. Recent Houthi ballistic missile and drone attacks have damaged Saudi infrastructure across the kingdom since July 24, including Saudi Aramco’s base in Dhahran on October 13.^[xxiv] Saudi air defenses have intercepted multiple Houthi projectiles since CTP-ISW's last data cut off, however. The Saudi Joint Forces Command reported on October 13 that Saudi air defenses intercepted at least eight Houthi missiles and multiple drones targeting Riyadh, Dhahran, Haradh, and al Kharj districts.[xxv] Saudi Civil Defense reported that intercepted Houthi missile debris injured four people in Riyadh.[xxvi] Regional officials warned the Associated Press in mid-September that Saudi Arabia is running low on interceptor missiles.[xxvii] Saudi Arabia's vast 1,300-kilometer border with Yemen poses a further challenge to Saudi Arabia‘s ability to defend critical infrastructure from drone and missile attacks.[xxviii]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

See topline section.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis published footage on October 14 that depicted Houthi fighters at key positions near the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[xxix] Geolocated footage shared by the Houthis on October 14 showed Houthi fighters and convoys near the towns of Murad and Ghurayrah on the Red Sea coastal plain.[xxx] The footage showed the Houthis destroying or disabling multiple Yemeni government-aligned vehicles along the coastal plain.^[xxxi]  Yemeni government-aligned forces reportedly recaptured territory immediately east of the Bab al Mandeb area from Houthi forces on October 9.[xxxii] It is unclear at the time of this writing whether the Houthi footage predates Yemeni government forces’ seizure of the area on October 9. The footage also depicts scenes near Dhubab Airport, which Yemeni government forces have held since October 5.[xxxiii] The Houthis claimed to have expelled Yemeni government forces from their position at the airport.[xxxiv] The Homeland Shield Forces, which is a faction aligned with the Yemeni government, claimed to have repelled a Houthi infiltration attempt at Dhubab Airport on October 10.[xxxv]  Yemeni government media separately released footage on October 14 that purportedly showed the Homeland Shield forces present at Dhubab Airport to dispute the Houthi claims of recapture, though it is unclear when the footage was filmed.[xxxvi]

Yemeni government-aligned forces advanced slightly northwestward toward Baramish in northwest Marib Governorate on October 13 amid ongoing fighting in Taiz Governorate as part of the Yemeni government’s multi-front counteroffensive. Geolocated footage from October 13 indicates that Yemeni government-aligned forces advanced their positions near Asdas, Marib Governorate.[xxxvii] This advance is likely part of the Yemeni government‘s counteroffensive in Marib Governorate, which seeks to stretch Houthi bandwidth over multiple fronts.[xxxviii] The advance also comes amid reports of continued intense fighting between the Houthis and encircled Yemeni government-aligned fighters in Taiz City.[xxxix] Houthi forces fully encircled Taiz City on October 12.[xl] CTP-ISW has not observed evidence of Yemeni government or Houthi advances or withdrawals near Taiz City since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.

The Houthis appear to be retaining their maximalist demands amid reports that third-party countries are pushing for negotiations between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia.^[xli] Houthi Political Bureau spokesperson Mohammed al Bukhaiti told the Associated Press on October 14 that the Houthis ”would welcome” mediated negotiations with Saudi Arabia.[xlii] Bukhaiti reiterated Houthi maximalist demands that Saudi Arabia must end its military operations in Yemen and lift Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports, however.[xliii] Saudi leaders have previously signaled that they are unwilling to enter any truce negotiations with the Houthis as long as the group controls the Bab al Mandeb.[xliv]

Bukhaiti told the Associated Press that multiple countries, including Oman, Russia, and China have attempted to encourage the Houthis and Saudi Arabia to resume negotiations on a ceasefire deal.[xlv] Previous reports noted that China and Pakistan have urged Iran to pressure the Houthis to stop attacks on Saudi Arabia, but Iran rejected such offers on the basis that it could not dictate Houthi operations.[xlvi] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan on October 11 that Iran is ready to facilitate dialogue between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, however.[xlvii]