3 hours ago

Iran Update, November 17, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

  • The Iranian regime has likely deployed security forces to some major Iranian cities in recent days as part of the regime’s preparations for potential anti-regime protests. Anti-regime media and an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) affiliated Telegram channel posted footage of the deployment of regime security forces to Tehran, Tehran Province, and Esfahan, Esfahan Province on November 14 and November 16, respectively.
  • The regime's willingness to deploy security forces to major cities like Tehran and Esfahan before protests materialized suggests that the regime may respond to a new protest in Abdanan, Ilam Province, with further nationwide security deployments as a preemptive measure. Regime security forces at the Abdanan protest appeared to refrain from using lethal or heavy force to crack down on the protesters, likely to avoid inflaming local tensions and triggering broader nationwide unrest.
  • Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi likely aimed to reach an agreement with IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani to force Kataib Hezbollah’s withdrawal from Jurf al Sakhr while avoiding armed conflict between the federal government and the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia. Shia Coordination Framework sources told US-funded, regional media on November 17 that Zaydi and Ghaani reached an agreement to allow unspecified Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units and security forces to enter Jurf al Sakhr in exchange for Kataib Hezbollah's withdrawal from the area.
  • Some Kataib Hezbollah members, especially those close to Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi, will very likely try to confront any security force that attempts to enter Jurf al Sakhr or otherwise undermine any agreement that requires Kataib Hezbollah’s withdrawal from Jurf al Sakhr. Hamidawi and senior Kataib Hezbollah official and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al Muhammadawi, aka Abu Fadak, have had a rivalry over control of Kataib Hezbollah since 2020, but the recent standoff with the Iraqi government over Jurf al Sakhr appears to have exacerbated those internal divisions.

Toplines

The Iranian regime has likely deployed security forces to some major Iranian cities in recent days as part of the regime’s preparations for potential anti-regime protests. Anti-regime media and an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) affiliated Telegram channel posted footage of the deployment of regime security forces to Tehran, Tehran Province, and Esfahan, Esfahan Province on November 14 and November 16, respectively.[i] There have not been protests in either location, meaning that the regime deployed the forces preemptively. The proximate trigger for the deployments is not clear, however. Iranian officials have reportedly grown more concerned over domestic unrest fomenting due to inflation and fuel shortages, according to a senior Iranian official and an Iranian security official speaking to Reuters on November 15.[ii] US economic pressure on the regime has only exacerbated Iran’s pre-existing economic troubles.[iii] Iran has also recently launched a mass mobilization and training effort called the Janfada (“Those Who Sacrifice Their Lives”) Campaign to bolster domestic support and expand security force manpower to suppress both protests and anti-government militancy.[iv]

The regime's willingness to deploy security forces to major cities like Tehran and Esfahan before protests materialized suggests that the regime may respond to a new protest in Abdanan, Ilam Province, with further nationwide security deployments as a preemptive measure. Anti-regime media and open-source intelligence (OSINT) accounts on X posted footage on November 17 of at least 1,000 Iranian protesters in Abdanan chanting in response to a November 14 bus crash that killed at least 12 people and injured at least 16 others.[v] Protesters first chanted against government incompetence and economic mismanagement, but the chants evolved calling for the overthrow of the regime.[vi] The regime deployed Law Enforcement Command (LEC) units to monitor the ongoing rally, though Iranian regime and local sources did not report major clashes.[vii] Some OSINT accounts have claimed that Basij paramilitary personnel also deployed to Abdanan, but CTP-ISW is unable to independently verify these deployments. The regime will now likely calculate that it needs to deploy security forces to other major cities given the scale of the protest in Abdanan.

Regime security forces at the Abdanan protest appeared to refrain from using lethal or heavy force to crack down on the protesters, likely to avoid inflaming local tensions and triggering broader nationwide unrest.[viii] Anti-regime media reported on November 17 that Iranian LEC units arrested at least six people at the protests but otherwise did not appear to use significant force against the protesters.[ix] The regime may calculate that a single large protest does not represent an existential threat, and that forcefully cracking down could trigger wider demonstrations nationwide. Abdanan has historically been a hotspot for large anti-regime protests, including during the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini and Winter 2026 protest waves.[x] Ilam Province also has a sizeable Kurdish population, which the regime has historically considered to be a threat to regime security.[xi] The regime’s concerns about Iran’s Kurdish population grew particularly acute during the Mahsa Amini protest wave, as the protests were partly concentrated among Kurdish communities that the regime worried the Kurdish militias could try to co-opt, for example.[xii]


Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi likely aimed to reach an agreement with IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani to force Kataib Hezbollah’s withdrawal from  Jurf al Sakhr while avoiding armed conflict between the federal government and the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia. Shia Coordination Framework sources told US-funded, regional media on November 17 that Zaydi and Ghaani reached an agreement to allow unspecified Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units and security forces to enter Jurf al Sakhr in exchange for Kataib Hezbollah's withdrawal from the area.[xiii] The Iraqi federal government has not confirmed the existence of this agreement at the time of this writing. Kataib Hezbollah has controlled Jurf al Sakhr since 2014 and has denied the Iraqi federal government access to the area for over a decade.[xiv] Ghaani had arrived in Baghdad on November 16 to mediate between the Iraqi federal government and Kataib Hezbollah after Zaydi ordered Iraqi security forces, including the Counter Terrorism Service, to enter Jurf al Sakhr if Kataib Hezbollah did not withdraw from the area by November 20.[xv] This demand came after the Iraqi government announced on November 14 that its investigative committee had found evidence to support claims of Kataib Hezbollah's involvement in oil smuggling in Jurf al Sakhr.[xvi] A leaked Iraqi Interior Ministry report recently revealed how Kataib Hezbollah has generated millions of dollars in illicit revenue from oil smuggling in the Jurf al Sakhr area since 2021.[xvii]

Zaydi likely attempted to reach this agreement with Ghaani to balance between his attempts to constrain Iranian-backed Iraqi militias while avoiding armed conflict with Kataib Hezbollah. Zaydi met with Ghaani after unspecified framework officials conveyed a likely Kataib Hezbollah threat to conduct drone and missile attacks targeting the Green Zone in Baghdad City if Iraqi security forces "stormed" Jurf al Sakhr during a November 16 framework meeting, according to two sources speaking to US-funded, regional media.[xviii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have historically attacked and threatened to attack the Green Zone, which hosts the US Embassy and other Iraqi federal government buildings, in order to pressure the government to act in accordance with militia interests.[xix] Kataib Hezbollah previously vowed on November 12 and 16 to confront any Iraqi security force that enters Jurf al Sakhr without obtaining the militia's permission.[xx] Zaydi’s attempt to pressure Kataib Hezbollah into withdrawing from Jurf al Sakhr comes after he has taken numerous actions in recent months to constrain Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including by attempting to disarm them and disrupt their illicit economic activities.[xxi] These actions are likely related to US pressure as well as his desire to increase his own personal power as prime minister, which illicit militia operations undermine.[xxii] Kataib Hezbollah's threats, combined with Zaydi’s recent efforts to constrain Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, probably motivated him to reach an agreement to allow a limited Iraqi government presence in Jurf al Sakhr. Previous Iraqi administrations have also unsuccessfully attempted to constrain Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxiii] Kataib Hezbollah, or at least part of the organization (see more below), is likely to exploit any agreement that attempts to undermine their interests in Iraq.

The Shia Coordination Framework is also reportedly attempting to mediate between the Iraqi government and Kataib Hezbollah for reasons that both align with and differ from Zaydi's. The framework likely shares Zaydi’s aim to avoid an armed confrontation between Kataib Hezbollah and Iraqi government forces but also seeks to remain involved in important negotiations. An informed political source told Iraqi media on November 17 that unspecified framework leaders will meet with Ghaani to discuss a proposed resolution to the Jurf al Sakhr issue.[xxiv] The framework's expected meeting with Ghaani comes after Zaydi and Ghaani reportedly reached an agreement regarding Jurf al Sakhr, which suggests that Zaydi did not involve the framework during his earlier negotiations with Ghaani. This comes after Zaydi has previously sidelined framework leaders from engaging in disarmament negotiations with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxv]

Some Kataib Hezbollah members, especially those close to Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi, will very likely try to confront any security force that attempts to enter Jurf al Sakhr or otherwise undermine any agreement that requires Kataib Hezbollah’s withdrawal from Jurf al Sakhr. Hamidawi and senior Kataib Hezbollah official and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al Muhammadawi, aka Abu Fadak, have had a rivalry over control of Kataib Hezbollah since 2020, but the recent standoff with the Iraqi government over Jurf al Sakhr appears to have exacerbated those internal divisions.[xxvi] Hamidawi remains opposed to allowing any Iraqi government presence in Jurf al Sakhr, while Abu Fadak reportedly supported reaching an understanding with Zaydi to allow limited Iraqi government presence over some areas of Jurf al Sakhr.[xxvii] Kataib Hezbollah members aligned with Hamidawi could thus undermine any attempt by the federal government and Abu Fadak to mediate between Zaydi and Kataib Hezbollah. Increasing tensions between Abu Fadak and Abu Hussein could also exacerbate the militia’s command and control issues. An informed source told Iraqi media on November 16 that lower-level commanders are not getting clear direction from either Abu Fadak or Abu Hussein due to the worsening tensions.[xxviii]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

  • Assessed Iranian War Aims:
    • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
    • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
    • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
    • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

 

Iran has continued targeting US military radar systems in Bahrain amid US strikes on Iranian air defense infrastructure on Qeshm Island. The IRGC claimed that it struck a US military radar system at Sheikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain on November 17 in response to US military activity and alleged violations of Iranian airspace.[xxix] US Central Command (CENTCOM) denied that the strike hit US military equipment and stated that US forces intercepted multiple Iranian drones that Iran launched toward Bahrain.[xxx] The IRGC previously claimed that it targeted US radar systems in Bahrain on November 13 and 15.[xxxi] Iran likely targets US radars to degrade US early-warning and air defense capabilities and complicate US efforts to protect military facilities in the Persian Gulf.[xxxii] IRGC Spokesperson Brigadier General Hossein Mohebbi also implied on November 17 that Bahrain’s cooperation with US military operations against Iran, reliance on US security guarantees, and treatment of Shia religious authorities have led to Iran‘s attacks on Bahrain.[xxxiii] Iran’s attacks come amid US strikes on Qeshm Island.[xxxiv] A US military official confirmed to Western media that US forces struck a missile launch site on Qeshm Island on November 17.[xxxv] The United States also previously struck Iranian air defense systems on Qeshm Island on November 6.[xxxvi]

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

 

Iranian Domestic Affairs

See topline section.
Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

See topline section.

 

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis are continuing to claim that the Bab al Mandeb Strait remains open to international traffic. Houthi territorial gains along Yemen's Red Sea coast and the Gulf of Aden since November 15 could allow the Houthis to more easily target international shipping.  Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on November 17 that the strait is "safer" now that Houthi forces have seized additional territory along the Bab al Mandeb Strait and Red Sea coast in recent days (see below).[xxxvii]  Allowing the Houthis to establish control over this newly seized territory risks causing long-term economic disruption for the United States and its partners. Insurance rates are unlikely to return to pre-crisis levels for a substantial period of time once a crisis ends.[xxxviii] 

The Houthis have continued to seize territory along the Gulf of Aden that could provide the group with advantageous terrain to attack the positions of Yemeni government-aligned forces. The Houthis have continued to advance and consolidate control over previously Yemeni government-controlled territory along Yemen's Red Sea Coast and the Gulf of Aden since Yemeni government-aligned forces withdrew to new defensive positions on November 15.[xxxix] A Houthi military commentator and an independent Yemeni journalist reported in recent days that Houthi forces seized control of territory around Jabal Kahbub on November 15.[xl] Jabal Kahbub is a mountainous area that sits approximately 30 kilometers north of Houthi positions along the Red Sea coastal plain near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. Houthi-appointed Lahij Governor Ahmed Jareeb inspected Houthi fighters on November 17 in Khour Umairah, which is located along the Mokha-Aden ground lines of communication (GLOC).[xli] Geolocated footage from November 16 and 17 also shows Houthi fighters at a former Yemeni government military site in Khour Umairah.[xlii] These reports indicate that the Houthis have established effective control along the Mokha-Aden GLOC that runs along a coastal highway from the previous Houthi positions in al Aradi, which is located roughly 75 kilometers west of Khour Umairah.[xliii]

Yemeni government-aligned forces have begun to establish new defensive positions near Jabal Kharaz on November 15 and 16, after withdrawing from the Red Sea coastal plain.[xliv] Jabal Kharaz is located immediately south of Khour Umairah and is about 80 kilometers east of the Bab al Mandeb Strait and 100 kilometers west of Aden City (see map).

The Houthis are now at Jabal Kharaz. The Houthi capture of Jabal Kharaz would mark the capture of the last defensible position between Kharaz and Aden City. Am Juhar is located about five kilometers east of Houthi positions in Khour Umairah. The Houthis have not yet accomplished this objective at the time of this writing. The consolidation of Houthi control over the Red Sea coastal plain and Gulf of Aden would allow the Houthis to protect the Houthis' rear flank and exploit the porous frontline between the Taiz-Aden and Mokha-Aden GLOCs as the group advances toward Aden City.

Saudi close air support (CAS) could help Yemeni government-aligned forces prevent the Houthis from establishing control over Jabal Kharaz and advancing further east down the relatively exposed Mokha-Aden GLOC and flat terrain in Aden Governorate.[xlv] The Yemeni government would need to hold defensive positions at Kharaz for a combination of airpower and ground forces to successfully stop Houthi attacks over open ground, however.

Yemeni government-aligned forces have continued to claim advances in Jawf and northwestern Marib governorates toward Jawf Governorate’s capital city, al Hazm.  Yemeni government-aligned forces have continued to engage Houthi forces in Jawf and northwestern Marib governorates since November 16.[xlvi] These engagements are likely part of a shaping operation to recapture al Hazm City.[xlvii] The Yemeni government-aligned forces' efforts to recapture al Hazm City are likely intended to primarily protect Yemeni-government controlled territory in Jawf and Marib governorates from future Houthi advances. Al Hazm City is located at the nexus of two key road networks that allow for expedited movement into both Jawf and Marib governorates, which the Houthis previously exploited in 2020 to launch offensives on both governorates.[xlviii]

It is possible that the Yemeni government advances in Jawf and Marib governorates are also intended to secondarily draw Houthi forces away from other fronts in Yemen, such as Lahij and Taiz, due to the proximity of Jawf and Marib governorates to Houthi-controlled territory in Sanaa Governorate.[xlix] CTP-ISW has not yet observed any indicators that the Houthis have redeployed significant forces to Jawf and Marib governorates as the Yemeni government-aligned forces advanced in these areas.

The Houthi movement claimed that it struck Saudi critical infrastructure and an early warning radar on November 16-17 as part of its ongoing campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands. Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed on November 17 that the Houthis struck two pumping stations along the East-West Pipeline in Riyadh Province with drones.[l] The Houthis have targeted and struck the East-West Pipeline on multiple occasions throughout the conflict.[li] A previous Houthi attack on the East-West Pipeline in September 2026 forced Saudi authorities to close the pipeline for approximately 11 days to conduct emergency repairs.[lii] The Houthis also claimed that the group attacked a Saudi early warning radar installation in Sharurah, Najran Province, with drones.[liii] The Houthis movement’s targeting of early warning radar installations also suggests that the Houthis are attempting to disrupt Saudi forces’ ability to detect and respond to attacks in southwestern Saudi Arabia. CTP-ISW cannot verify that any of the Houthis' claimed attacks on November 16-17 occurred at the time of this writing. The Houthis seek to impose economic and political costs on Saudi Arabia to compel the kingdom to submit to Houthi demands, which include ending Saudi support for Yemen’s legitimate government, lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports, and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[liv]

Saudi Joint Forces Command Spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki separately announced on November 17 that Saudi air defenses intercepted a Houthi drone near Riyadh.[lv] The Houthis have not claimed this attack since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff on November 17, however. 


[i] https://t.me/Iranian_Militarism/97041 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2122328840857084045?a=oJfnq129F5PpqBlBsgg&s=20

[ii] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iranian-leaders-fret-over-public-mood-gas-shortages-add-war-ills-2026-11-16/

[iii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-8-2026

[iv] https://iranwire.com/en/news/158047-exclusive-many-military-and-government-officials-oppose-expansion-of-jan-fada-campaign/  ; https://blogs.timesofisrael dot com/iran-tells-its-diaspora-to-die-for-the-country/

[v] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2122690806385422650  ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2122687342355923236  ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2122694693066567833  ; https://x.com/Osint613/status/2122698752595038523?a=gv8m3BTmB9ROMIOm5IU&s=20  https://en.irna dot ir/news/86321950/Bus-crash-in-western-Iran-kills-12-injures-16

[vi] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2122690806385422650?a=2bGHvq8DmVnB3SfPeA0&s=20

[vii] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2122721041763991757?a=zgVf5n_Atx9dDTPUC0w&s=20 ; https://x.com/urgentintel/status/2122691275526983811?a=tM0r5DUjkcBSb5LZ7P8&s=20 ; https://x.com/Osint613/status/2122701790500266467?a=2NjisuVdBG2pfJWeUEw&s=20

[viii] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2122721041763991757?a=i5yWrTS_JjLYSlb9UeI&s=20

[ix] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202611179154

[x] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2008563542241231112?a=XU0sHAbdwhI61Sbsl8s&s=20 ; https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-detains-amini-father-protests-death-anniversary/32595444.html

[xi] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/irans-kurdish-insurgency  ; https://amwaj.media/en/article/kurdish-militancy-in-iran-uncertain-as-armed-struggle-recedes-in-turkey

[xii] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202211230632

[xiii] https://alhurra dot com/55227

[xiv] https://alhurra dot com/32845 ; https://alhurra dot com/en/14420 ; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/standing-with-iran-the-integrated-combat-performance-of-iraqi-militias-during-operation-epic-fury/

[xv] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2026/11/17/iran-s-quds-force-commander-in-baghdad-to-ease-iraqhezbollah-tensions-sources-say ; https://apnews.com/article/iraq-iran-kataib-hezbollah-jurf-alsakhar-fed4063af6dbf61fd4fb6f5f5c3d278d ; https://alhurra dot com/55082 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/الزيدي-يمهل-كتا-ب-حزب-الله-لتسليم-الجرف-ويستعد-لتحريك-جهاز-مكافحة-ال-رهاب ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/جرف-الصخر-انفجارات-ما-قبل-مهلة-الجمعة ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/الكتا-ب-تنفي-تقرير-لجنة-التحقيق-بتهريب-النفط-الجرف-والسلاح-خارج-الصراع-السياسي

[xvi] https://x.com/IraqiPMO/status/2121671517734117837

[xvii] https://alhurra dot com/53527

[xviii] https://alhurra dot com/55227

[xix] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iranian-proxies-fire-rockets-at-green-zone-in-baghdad-saturday-february-11-2017/

[xx] https://almadapaper dot net/460907/ ; https://apnews.com/article/iraq-iran-kataib-hezbollah-jurf-alsakhar-fed4063af6dbf61fd4fb6f5f5c3d278d

[xxi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-9-2026/ ; https://ina dot iq/en/security/53616-pm-orders-the-cancellation-of-contracts-with-three-companies-at-mosul-airport-due-to-their-ties-to-armed-groups.html ; https://almadapaper dot net/459871/

[xxii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-13-2026/

[xxiii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iranian-backed-iraqi-militias-seek-to-undermine-baghdads-disarmament-efforts/ ; https://mei.edu/publication/al-kadhimi-and-kataib-hezbollah-raid/

[xxiv] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8-%D9%84%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%81-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D9%85-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A9

[xxv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-5-2026/

[xxvi] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/back-into-the-shadows-the-future-of-kataib-hezbollah-and-irans-other-proxies-in-iraq/

[xxvii] https://964media dot com/737310/

[xxviii] https://964media dot com/737310/

[xxix] https://t.me/mehrnews/432623

[xxx] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2122656792358289747

[xxxi] https://t.me/defapress_ir/72455 ;

https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/7009183

[xxxii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-15-2026/

[xxxiii] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/459551

[xxxiv] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2122773088609636765

[xxxv] https://apnews.com/article/582e0b5d51be06f0ed630fac24f39b72

[xxxvi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-7-2026/

[xxxvii] https://t.me/army21ye/4099

[xxxviii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-6-2026/

[xxxix] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-15-2026/

[xl] https://x.com/shmsanarmy/status/2122736161261265246 ; https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2121997086715518994

[xli] https://x.com/Almasirah_YE/status/2122742700977832271 ; https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3836919.htm

[xlii] https://x.com/AB4_Ali3/status/2122403901647573366?a=hf6Zoy0q7JIQmp8XNlo&s=20 ; https://x.com/AB4_Ali3/status/2122408903807991844?a=8Mhpm5jI0MOkAGGx3YY&s=20

[xliii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-22-2026/ ;

[xliv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-16-2026/ ; https://x.com/war_cube/status/2122315762194915597?a=pSvSPKK8CnxgO07jZ4o&s=20 ; https://x.com/IbrahimJalalYE/status/2121951445163606267 ; https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2121997086715518994

[xlv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-12-2026/

[xlvi] https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/353863 ; https://x.com/YemenAFMedia/status/2122514592962056484 ; https://x.com/YemenAFMedia/status/2122430678818050329

 

[xlvii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-12-2026/

[xlviii] https://mei.edu/publication/running-around-circles-how-saudi-arabia-losing-its-war-yemen-iran/ ; https://sanaacenter dot org/files/Capture_of_alHazm.pdf 

[xlix] https://www.majalla dot com/node/334002/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%83%D8%B3%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A ;  https://www.majalla dot com/node/333994/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9

[l] https://t.me/army21ye/4107

[li] https://t.me/army21ye/3948 ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-targeted-riyadh-airport-and-saudi-oil-pipeline/4100562; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/gulf/2026/10/26/fighting-intensifies-as-houthis-and-saudi-led-coalition-in-yemen-report-attacks/ ; https://t.me/army21ye/4070 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-attacked-pumping-station-saudi-arabias-east-west-oil-2026-11-12/

[lii] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/three-pumping-stations-along-saudi-east-west-pipeline-were-hit-recent-attack-2026-09-17/ ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudi-arabia-restarts-east-west-oil-pipeline-resume-exports-yanbu-sources-say-2026-09-22/

[liii] https://t.me/army21ye/4109

 

[liv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-9-2026/ ;  https://t.me/army21ye/3948

[lv] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2122714126690529378

 

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