Iran Update, November 10, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• Iran has continued to use informational effects to magnify the political and economic effect of each individual maritime attack on shipping.
• Iran and Russia are cooperating to counter US efforts to stop weapons shipments to Iran via the Caspian Sea and land routes. Iran has used its Caspian Sea trade routes with Russia to import Russian arms before and during the 2026 US-Israel-Iran War, which prompted Ukraine to strike a shipment in July 2026.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are using the potential resumption of conflict between the United States and Iran as an additional excuse to avoid disarmament. CTP-ISW continues to assess that the Iraqi militias are likely to participate in renewed conflict between the United States and Iran.
• Iraqi militias have already circumvented the Iraqi federal government's attempts to disarm them in recent months. The framework continues to obstruct Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi's efforts to constrain the Iraqi militias. Zaydi may have instead decided to pursue the reform independently due to disagreements with the framework over his preferred amendments and anticipated challenges in securing parliamentary approval for the law.
• Iran has formally abandoned its self-imposed 2,000-kilometer missile range limit, which codifies the regime’s longstanding efforts to develop longer-range missile capabilities. Iran has claimed for several years to have voluntarily capped its missile range at 2,000 kilometers, but the regime has long demonstrated both the intent and the technical capacity to pursue longer-range systems.

Toplines

Iran has continued to use informational effects to magnify the political and economic effect of each individual maritime attack on shipping. Informational effects, which include a host of tools ranging from strategic communications to economic, diplomatic, and military actions, can magnify a target entity's perception of any individual strike. Iran is conducting a relatively limited number of attacks daily and using suboptimal means to do so, but the informational effect that these attacks generate far outweighs the physical effect of any individual strike. Ship operators have frequently reported projectile strikes to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) that are likely Iranian attacks on commercial shipping, including a strike on an Emirati-operated tanker on November 10.[i] These kinetic actions have their own informational effects. For example, increases in attacks drive increases in oil prices.[ii] The Iranian regime often combines these strikes with threats and statements claiming that Iran has deployed naval mines and boasting about anti-ship missile capabilities.[iii] These threats and statements aim to further magnify the threat Iran poses to shipping beyond their immediate tactical effects on the shipping industry and energy markets.

An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) official also overstated the impact of Iran’s November 8 attack on fixed radar and communications infrastructure on Didamar Island.^[iv] The official claimed that the attack completely halted traffic through the southern route.[v] The island lies along the southern route through the Strait of Hormuz. The extent of the damage to these systems and the systems struck remains unclear at the time of this writing, but vessels continue to transit the strait’s southern route.[vi] Iran’s attack on Didamar Island notably follows recent US airstrikes on Iranian radars, missile launchers, and other equipment on Qeshm Island in the strait that Iran uses to attack shipping in the strait.[vii]

A recent decline in oil prices and continued diplomatic deadlock with the United States may also incentivize Iran to amplify the threat it poses to shipping in the strait both through attacks and threats. Oil prices fell to below $90 US dollars per barrel after US President Donald Trump stated on November 9 that renewed US strikes on Iran are “quite unlikely” because the Iran “militarily is effectively over.”[viii] The decline undermines Iran's effort to use maritime disruption to impose economic costs and shape US decision-making. Both Iran and the United States appear to maintain their redlines in negotiations.[ix]

Iran and Russia are cooperating to counter US efforts to stop weapons shipments to Iran via the Caspian Sea and land routes. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi explicitly announced on X on November 10 that he met with the Russian Ambassador to Iran to discuss efforts to counter US Central Command (CENTCOM)'s Task Force Iron Gate.[x] CENTCOM announced the formation of the task force on November 7 to prevent Iran from importing advanced weapons and "other materials" via the Caspian Sea and land routes.[xi] Iran has used its Caspian Sea trade routes with Russia to import Russian arms before and during the 2026 US-Israel-Iran War, which prompted Ukraine to strike on a shipment in July 2026.[xii]  

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are using the potential resumption of conflict between the United States and Iran as an additional excuse to avoid disarmament. Informed sources told Iraqi media on November 9 that Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada head Abu Alaa al Walai and Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali separately told Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi during disarmament negotiations that their willingness to disarm their militias depends on whether conflict between the United States and Iran resumes.[xiii] Asaib Ahl al Haq announced its willingness to disarm on June 2 and has taken some steps toward disarmament, although reports suggest that some members have formed a splinter group.[xiv] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada announced its commitment to an unspecified Shia Coordination Framework disarmament agreement on October 1, but the militia has continued to negotiate the details of the agreement with Baghdad.[xv] CTP-ISW continues to assess that the Iraqi militias are likely to participate in renewed conflict between the United States and Iran.[xvi]

Iraqi militias have already circumvented the Iraqi federal government's attempts to disarm them in recent months.[xvii] Some of the most kinetically active militias, specifically Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, continue to refuse to disarm. Informed sources told Iraqi media on November 9 that militias that have said they would disarm are attempting to set conditions that make the handover of their weapons a "superficial reshuffling."[xviii] These militias reportedly obstruct the government's attempts to take inventory of their weapons as they rearrange their military stockpiles, temporarily store their weapons with other militias who have refused to disarm, and register their weapons with multiple militias.[xix] Iraqi media reported on November 10 that Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) members attempted to transport rockets that Iraqi authorities seized on November 6 from an area south of Baghdad to a weapons warehouse in a Kataib Hezbollah stronghold to avoid the federal government's oversight, for example.[xx] Unidentified sources added to Iraqi media on November 9 that unspecified militias are willing to transfer weapons to Iran or another militia if they are "intended to deter any external aggression" but would not hand over weapons that "serve as internal political guarantees."[xxi] The militias have weapons that could serve both purposes. The militias' reported desire to maintain their weapons for internal political purposes indicates their continued willingness to undermine the state when it benefits the militias.

The framework continues to obstruct Zaydi's efforts to constrain the Iraqi militias. Framework leader and Islamic Council of Iraq head Humam Hamoudi reportedly told Zaydi that both the government and framework would collapse if Zaydi arrested militia members.[xxii] Zaydi threatened on November 9 to arrest militia members if they intervene in a potential US-Iran conflict on Iran's behalf.[xxiii] Zaydi also reportedly granted Iraqi Army commanders permission to pursue militia “violations” without waiting for his approval, according to an Iraqi official who spoke to Saudi-owned media on November 6.[xxiv] Hamoudi's comments suggest that he is concerned about the militias confronting the government in an unspecified manner if Zaydi takes certain actions against them. Some framework members also reportedly believe that other militias may side with Kataib Hezbollah in solidarity and derail disarmament negotiations if Zaydi continues his efforts against the militias.[xxv] This concern over the fate of disarmament negotiations is notable given that Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya reportedly decided to negotiate directly with Zaydi and the framework because they believe that framework leaders were using the negotiations to pursue internal competition.[xxvi] Framework leaders often compete for power and resources, but this competition has undermined Zaydi’s efforts to negotiate with the militias and disarm them. Zaydi has reportedly sidelined the framework's negotiation efforts with the militias in recent months, due in part, to the ties between the members on the negotiation committee and the militias.[xxvii]

Zaydi may move forward with his plan to restructure the PMF without a law passed in parliament despite reports that he had planned to pursue this reform via legislation. An informed source told Iraqi media on November 10 that multiple factors, including the regional distribution of militia-controlled PMF brigades and the organizational relationships between fighters and leaders, are "posing difficulties" for efforts to transfer brigades to other areas or merge them into different formations.[xxviii] Iraqi media also reported that PMF restructuring will use an electronic system to help merge brigades, redistribute fighters, and place army officers into PMF leadership positions, among other reforms.[xxix] These reports suggest that Zaydi has already begun, or is planning to soon begin, to conduct PMF reform. Zaydi has reportedly sought to implement such reforms, which CTP-ISW has assessed are part of his efforts to both increase his personal power as prime minister and meet US demands surrounding militia disarmament.[xxx] Previous reporting has suggested that Zaydi planned to conduct these PMF reforms through an amended PMF law.[xxxi] Zaydi may have instead decided to pursue the reform independently due to disagreements with the framework over his preferred amendments and anticipated challenges in securing parliamentary approval for the law.[xxxii]

Iran has formally abandoned its self-imposed 2,000-kilometer missile range limit, which codifies the regime’s longstanding efforts to develop longer-range missile capabilities. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Spokesperson Brigadier General Hossein Mohebbi told Iranian media on November 7 that the Iranian Armed Forces had lifted the regime’s self-imposed missile range restriction in accordance with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s recent directive.[xxxiii] Mojtaba ordered the Iranian Armed Forces on October 30 to achieve “maximum deterrence” and respond immediately and effectively to all threats “without geographical limitations.”[xxxiv] Iran has claimed for several years to have voluntarily capped its missile range at 2,000 kilometers, but the regime has long demonstrated both the intent and the technical capacity to pursue longer-range systems. Iran's farthest-ever attempted missile strike targeted the US-UK base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, approximately 3,800 km from Iran's southern border, in March 2026.[xxxv] The missiles' actual travel distances remain unclear because one failed in flight, while the other was intercepted at an unspecified location, but the attempt nonetheless demonstrated that Iran was prepared to use missiles at ranges well beyond 2,000 kilometers.[xxxvi] Iran can use its missiles at longer ranges without building new systems by adjusting warhead weight and other parameters. Iran likely made such modifications to conduct the Diego Garcia attack, according to a Dutch missile expert.[xxxvii]

Iran has also pursued technological capabilities that could support the eventual development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in recent years.[xxxviii] CTP-ISW assessed in July 2025 that Iran’s efforts to advance its space program could support ICBM development.[xxxix] Iranian officials have also signaled interest in such capabilities.[xl]

The formal lifting of the self-imposed limit comes as Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to expand any future conflict with the United States beyond the Middle East, which is very likely part of an Iranian effort to deter US strikes. Mojtaba's directive has prompted senior Iranian officials to echo his threat to respond to any attack "without geographical limitations" and repeatedly threaten US bases in Europe.[xli] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran likely seeks to prevent the resumption of US or Israeli strikes by increasing the anticipated costs of Iran’s retaliation on the United States and US regional partners with threats of retaliation beyond the location or actors involved in an initial attack.[xlii] These threats likely serve a deterrent purpose primarily, but Iran possesses some capabilities to carry them out. Several US bases in Europe lie within the range of Iran's existing missiles, and Iran could further extend their range if it reduced their payload mass (see map below).

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Iran has continued to threaten US bases in Europe in order to deter US allies from supporting potential US operations against Iran. The Wall Street Journal reported on November 10 that US forces relocated multiple tankers from the Royal Air Force (RAF) Mildenhall Base to Germany and other countries due to an imminent threat from Iran, citing people familiar with the matter.[xliii] A US official familiar with the matter added that the United States raised the security level at RAF Mildenhall and RAF Lakenheath to Force Protection Condition Charlie, which officials implement when intelligence suggests that “a form of terrorist action is likely.”[xliv] Both bases serve as critical hubs for US Air Force refueling and operational support. The relocation follows the US withdrawal of B-1 bombers from the RAF Fairford Base on September 27 after intelligence uncovered a complex Iranian-backed plot that involved drones and targeted attacks on US pilots.[xlv] Iran has repeatedly threatened to attack bases that either support US operations against Iran or host US forces or equipment.[xlvi]

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report. 

Iranian Domestic Affairs

The Iranian regime announced plans to use its mass mobilization campaign in order to curb excessive domestic energy consumption. The Iranian regime launched a mass recruitment campaign in March –Janfada (“Those Who Sacrifice Their Lives”)– in order to mobilize Iranian civilians to support the regime's objectives, including efforts to suppress anti-regime activity.[xlvii] Basij Commander Hossein Taeb announced on November 8 that 150,000 Basij members completed specialized training as ”energy helpers” to promote the reform of energy overconsumption and eliminate resource waste in the ”public arena.”[xlviii] These efforts come amid severe natural gas shortages and electrical grid instability. Grid instability and gas shortages are historically worse during the winter due to higher energy demands for heating systems.^[xlix] Energy shortages and power outages have fueled public discontent and triggered anti-regime protests in the past.[l]

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

Unspecified Iraqi government sources leaked a "top-secret" Iraqi Ministry of Interior intelligence report to US-funded regional media on November 9 that reveals Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah's involvement in oil smuggling operations in Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province.[li] The report, which is from October 2025, reveals how Kataib Hezbollah has engaged in oil smuggling in Jurf al Sakhr since 2021 and has generated millions of dollars in illicit revenue.[lii] The leaked documents also include satellite imagery, which suggests that the Iraqi government has been monitoring activities in Jurf al Sakhr for years.[liii] Kataib Hezbollah has controlled Jurf al Sakhr since 2014 and has denied the Iraqi government access to the area for over a decade.[liv] The leak comes as Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has taken steps to disrupt Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ illicit revenue sources.[lv]

The Iraqi federal government's recent decision to close one Iran-Iraq border crossing and reopen another is likely an attempt to balance between the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors. Iraqi state media reported on November 9 that Iraq will close the Mandali border crossing between Iraq's Diyala Province and Iran's Kermanshah Province on November 13 to complete unspecified "technical requirements."[lvi] The Iraqi Border Ports Authority separately announced the reopening of the al Sheeb border crossing between Iraq's Maysan Province and Iran's Khuzestan Province on November 10.[lvii] these decisions come after Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein recently claimed in a November 8 interview with Qatari media that the United States wants Iraq to close all but two Iran-Iraq border crossings to support US efforts to isolate Iran economically.[lviii] Iraq closed the al Sheeb crossing in late October, likely in response to US pressure on the Iraqi government to restrict trade with Iran.[lix] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have demanded the reopening of al Sheeb since its closure.[lx] The reopening of the al Sheeb border crossing, in conjunction with the expected closure of the Mandali border crossing, thus probably reflects the Iraqi government's efforts to balance US pressure and demands from Iranian-backed Iraqi actors.

Arabian Peninsula

Saudi Arabia struck the Houthi-controlled Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) headquarters in Sanaa City on November 10.[lxi] Saudi Arabia likely targeted the YPC building in response to the Houthis' strike on an Aramco office building in Riyadh on November 8.[lxii] Houthi media separately reported that Saudi Arabia struck a fuel station in Sanaa City on November 10.[lxiii] Saudi Arabia may have also targeted the YPC building and fuel station in Sanaa City in order to constrain the Houthis’ ability to sustain their military forces.[lxiv] Saudi attacks on fuel facilities could also exacerbate ongoing fuel shortages in Houthi-controlled territory and force the Houthis to raise fuel prices, which could impose further constraints on the group’s military and political efforts.[lxv] Saudi Arabia previously conducted airstrikes on several Houthi oil and fuel facilities in Sanaa, Dhamar, and Hudaydah governorates on October 13.[lxvi]

Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to engage Houthi fighters in northeastern Lahij Governorate. An independent Yemeni journalist reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces engaged Houthi fighters in Mabaq, a town along the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC) in al Maqatirah District, on November 10.[lxvii] The Houthis have attempted to advance southeast through al Maqatirah District along the GLOC in recent days, but Yemeni government-aligned forces appear to have prevented further Houthi advances.[lxviii] Yemeni government-aligned forces previously repelled Houthi fighters who attempted to advance toward the town of Gharib, approximately two kilometers east of Mabaq along the GLOC.[lxix] The Houthis are likely attempting to advance southeast through al Maqatirah District in order to seize sections of the GLOC to help set conditions for the Houthis to besiege or capture Aden City in the future.[lxx]

The Houthi movement claimed that it struck King Khalid International Airport and Saudi financial and energy infrastructure on November 10.[lxxi] Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on November 10 that the Houthis struck an unspecified "financial hub” in Riyadh, multiple East-West Pipeline pumping stations in Riyadh Province, and an Aramco facility in Abqaiq.[lxxii] The Houthis previously claimed attacks on the world’s largest crude oil processing plant in Abqaiq on October 29 and November 8.[lxxiii] The Houthis also previously claimed to strike a “financial center” in Riyadh on November 8, which was later identified by international media as an Aramco office building in Riyadh’s financial district.[lxxiv] CTP-ISW cannot verify the Houthis’ claims at the time of this writing. Saudi Joint Forces Command Spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki separately announced that Saudi air defenses intercepted two Houthi ballistic and cruise missiles near Riyadh, one Houthi ballistic missile in the Eastern Province, and one Houthi drone in southern Saudi Arabia.[lxxv] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[lxxvi]