Iran Update: October 31, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei directed Iran’s three top military commanders to prepare to retaliate against US strikes by expanding Iran’s targeting bank, likely part of an Iranian effort to deter the United States and Israel from striking Iran.
• Iran appears willing to continue indirect negotiations through Qatar but is unlikely to enter direct talks or soften its negotiating position before the United States meets Iran’s conditions.
• Yemeni government-aligned forces repelled attempted Houthi advances southeastward along the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC) in Maqatirah District, Lahij Governorate, with Saudi close air support (CAS) on October 30 and 31.

Toplines

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei directed Iran’s top three military commanders to prepare to retaliate against US strikes by expanding Iran’s targeting bank, likely as part of an Iranian effort to deter the United States and Israel from striking Iran.[i] Mojtaba met with Armed Forces General Staff Chief and Khatam ol Anbiya Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Abdollahi, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, and Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami on October 31, according to Mojtaba’s Telegram channel.[ii]  Mojtaba ordered the Iranian armed forces to achieve “maximum deterrence,” respond immediately and effectively to all threats “without geographical limitations,” and expand Iran’s target bank to include all “tangible and intangible” US and Israeli assets.[iii] Mojtaba’s emphasis on ”maximum deterrence” indicates that Iran likely seeks to prevent the resumption of US or Israeli strikes by increasing the anticipated costs of Iran's retaliation on the United States and US regional partners with threats of retaliation beyond the location or actors involved in an initial attack. Abdollahi separately warned on X on October 31 that Iran may act preemptively if Iranian forces detect signs of hostile action.[iv]

Mojtaba’s directive is also almost certainly designed to raise Iranian readiness ahead of an anticipated attack. The commanders reported that Iranian armed forces are raising their readiness in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Iran’s northwestern and southeastern border regions.[v] Iranian forces’ readiness in the strait and nearby waters is indicative of Iranian priorities, which include disrupting traffic through the strait as part of an effort to establish Iran’s long-term authority over the waterway. The emphasis on Iran‘s northwestern and southeastern border regions likely also reflects Iranian regime concerns about anti-regime activity that may or may not arise due to perceptions that the regime is distracted by the war with the United States. The commanders also claimed that Iran has increased ammunition and weapons production.[vi] 

Iran appears willing to continue indirect negotiations through Qatar but is unlikely to enter direct talks or soften its negotiating position before the United States meets Iran’s conditions. Axios reported that Qatari mediators held more than 12 hours of talks with Iranian officials in Tehran on October 30 and in Doha on October 31 while maintaining regular contact with the United States.[vii] A diplomatic source told an Axios reporter on October 31 that the United States and Iran have not agreed to resume direct negotiations and that the US delegation has not yet set a date to arrive in Doha.[viii] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Qatari media on October 31 that Iran was studying mediators’ proposals but did not view talks to be necessary unless the United States accepted Iran’s terms.[ix] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency separately reported on October 31 that Iranian officials do not plan to meet US officials in Doha.[x] Saudi media reported on October 30 that a preliminary framework would see Iran make concessions on its highly enriched uranium and the Strait of Hormuz, while the United States would lift the naval blockade and some sanctions.[xi] Saudi media later reported on October 31, citing unspecified sources, that Iran formed committees to review US Vice President JD Vance’s general proposal but insisted on a complete ceasefire before any negotiations could take place. The sources also said that Iran demanded guarantees that the United States would abide by a permanent ceasefire in exchange for reopening the strait.[xii] These demands remain consistent with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei’s demands on September 19 that the United States end the war on all fronts, release frozen Iranian assets, and lift the naval blockade before negotiations resume.[xiii] The unspecified sources added that a US delegation would visit Doha only after Qatar and Iran agreed on a roadmap for advancing US-Iran negotiations.[xiv]

Yemeni government-aligned forces repelled attempted Houthi advances southeastward along the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC) in Maqatirah District, Lahij Governorate, with Saudi close air support (CAS) on October 30 and 31.[xv] The Houthis are likely attempting to capture terrain in Maqatirah District that could set conditions for a Houthi offensive toward the Yemeni government's de facto capital in Aden.[xvi] An independent Yemeni journalist and anti-Houthi media reported that Houthi forces attempted to capture Souq al Raboua, which is located at a critical junction in the Taiz-Aden GLOC, on October 30 and 31.[xvii] Saudi warplanes reportedly conducted airstrikes targeting a Houthi convoy at Hayjat al Abd, about four kilometers northwest of Souq al Raboua, during the attempted advance on October 30 and destroyed several Houthi vehicles. The Saudi airstrikes prevented the remaining Houthi force from establishing control over Souq al Raboua.[xviii] Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to engage Houthi fighters in the vicinity of Hayjat al Abd and al Zurayqah, Maqatirah District, on October 31.[xix]

Saudi CAS and the restrictive local terrain features are likely challenging Houthi efforts to organize and conduct a successful, large-scale offensive in Maqatirah District. Saudi airstrikes on the Houthi convoy at Hayjat al Abd demonstrate local government-aligned forces' ability to coordinate effective CAS with Saudi forces.[xx] Maqatirah District's mountainous terrain and road infrastructure also likely restrict military convoys to slow, single-file traffic in narrow valleys, which renders these convoys far more vulnerable to airstrikes than the Houthis' regular, mobile light infantry forces.[xxi]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Iran is continuing to attempt to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and disrupt global energy markets in order to pressure the United States into a diplomatic settlement that favors Iran. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported two separate attacks in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.[xxii] A likely Iranian projectile struck an outbound crude oil tanker in the strait on October 28.[xxiii] Another projectile struck a vessel 40 nautical miles south of Lavan Island on October 30, causing an onboard fire.[xxiv] Iran intensified attacks on civilian shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in early October 2026 to disrupt shipping and drive up oil prices in response to recent US successes in facilitating the flow of oil through the strait.  The Iranian Artesh Navy separately claimed on October 31 that a non-compliant oil tanker caught fire after striking Iranian naval mines in a prohibited area east of the Strait of Hormuz, although available reporting does not link the claim to either UKMTO incident.[xxv] The IRGC has repeatedly issued claims such as this in order to falsely imply that the strait retains a significant number of mines in the wake of US Central Command (CENTCOM)’s announcement in late August that US forces had cleared mines.^[xxvi]

US-Iran Negotiations

See topline.
Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.
Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.
Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces reportedly recaptured territory in central Jawf Governorate on October 30 and 31, likely as part of an effort to set conditions to recapture the governorate capital at al Hazm. Saudi and Yemeni media reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces established control over all of Jabal Huwayshiyan, which is a mountain range overlooking al Hazm from the northeast, with Saudi CAS between October 30 and 31.[xxvii] The Yemeni Armed Forces announced on October 31 that it captured favorable terrain overlooking al Hazm, which suggests that Yemeni government-aligned forces could be planning a near-term offensive to recapture the city.[xxviii] Yemeni government-aligned forces in northeastern Yemen have generally exhibited more success in halting and reversing the Houthis’ territorial gains than their counterparts on the Red Sea coastal plain and in Taiz Governorate since the current conflict began in July 2026.[xxix]

The Houthis reportedly fired ballistic missiles targeting Aden International Airport on October 31, likely to disrupt weapons shipments to Yemeni government-aligned forces through the airport.[xxx] The Houthis have repeatedly attacked Aden International Airport in recent weeks to disrupt weapons shipments to Yemeni government-aligned forces through the airport and may also seek to deter Saudi partners, such as Pakistan, from delivering military aid to the Yemeni government.[xxxi]

The Houthis also reportedly fired ballistic missiles targeting the Yemeni Government Presidential Palace in Aden on October 31, likely in order to weaken the Yemeni government's legitimacy.[xxxii] The Houthis likely intend to demoralize Yemen's already weak and fractured government and depict it as incapable of defending its urban centers and citizens by striking the Presidential Palace.[xxxiii] The Houthis previously struck the palace on October 15, likely in order to generate this same effect.[xxxiv]

Saudi air defenses intercepted several likely Houthi drones in Saudi airspace on October 30 and 31. Saudi Joint Forces Command spokesperson Turki al Maliki announced that Saudi air defenses intercepted four drones over Medina, Riyadh, and southern and eastern Saudi Arabia.[xxxv] The Houthis denied on October 30 that they targeted Medina and have not claimed responsibility for any of the drone attacks at the time of this writing.[xxxvi] The Houthis have repeatedly launched projectiles at Saudi critical infrastructure across Saudi Arabia in order to maximize Saudi economic and political costs and compel the Saudi government to capitulate to Houthi demands.[xxxvii]