Iran Update, July 9, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Correction: This update was corrected on July 20, 2025, to change "December 2024" to "December 2015" in "Russia previously accepted 11,000 kilograms of enriched uranium from Iran in December 2024." We apologize for this error.

Russia offered to help replenish Iran’s depleted uranium stockpile to support a peaceful nuclear program.[i] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia's involvement in the US-Iran nuclear talks would be very unlikely to secure US interests due to Russia's alignment with Iran.[ii] Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on July 8 that Russia can receive and downblend Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile and return it to supply Iranian nuclear power plants. [iii]Downblending is the process of converting highly enriched uranium into low-enriched uranium. Russia previously accepted 11,000 kilograms of enriched uranium from Iran in December 2015 in exchange for natural uranium as part of the JCPOA.[iv] Russia also has previously offered to accept Iran's enriched uranium to "provide assistance" to the United States and Iran during the US-Iran nuclear negotiations before the Israel-Iran war.[v] Neither the United States nor Iran accepted Russia's offer to mediate. Russia has repeatedly opposed the stated US demands in the negotiations by supporting Iran's right to enrich uranium and has consistently supported the Axis of Resistance against Israel.[vi]

French Director General of External Security Nicolas Lerner told French media on July 8 that Iran’s nuclear program is very seriously damaged and its weaponization timeline is extremely delayed, which is consistent with previous reports.[vii] Lerner did note that Iran still retains a significant portion of its enriched uranium stockpile. Lerner stated that the US and Israeli strikes have "very seriously affected, very seriously damaged...and extremely delayed" all aspects of Iran's nuclear program.[viii] Lerner said that the strikes "destroyed" a small part of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile but claimed that Iran still retains most of its stockpile.[ix] He added that France has "indications" of the stockpile’s location but cannot confirm the details until the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resumes its verification activities at Iranian nuclear facilities.[x] The IAEA did not have access to all of the possible facilities Iran could use to store enriched uranium, so it is unclear how the IAEA is critical to confirming these details.  Israeli intelligence, for example, has consistently provided exclusive information about Iran's nuclear program that the IAEA has not provided (at least publicly). The enrichment level of the enriched material that Iran reportedly retains is unclear.

British Foreign Secretary David Lammy warned on July 8 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) could trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not cooperate on its nuclear program.[xi] Lammy emphasized that Iran needs to "step back" from its "nuclear ambitions," including by resuming IAEA inspections, to avoid snapback sanctions.[xii] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[xiii] The snapback mechanism would reimpose six United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on Iran, including bans on the transfer of conventional arms to and from Iran, international support for Iran's missile program, enrichment-related activities, and the testing and development of nuclear-capable missiles.[xiv] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025, after which the UN sanctions cannot be reinstated. The process of triggering the snapback mechanism and completing the UN Security Council can take up to 30 days, which means the E3 would need to start the process well in advance of the deadline. The sanctions, if imposed, would remain in place even after the deadline. These sanctions would increase economic pressure on Iran as it seeks to rebuild its military and economic infrastructure following the Israel-Iran war.

The Houthis killed at least four crew members and took up to 21 crew members hostage, probably as part of an effort to deter shipping companies from sailing to Israeli ports.[xv] The Houthis confirmed on July 9 that they conducted a July 7 attack that sank the Liberian-flagged, Greek-operated Eternity C. The Houthis deployed multiple small craft carrying armed personnel, who fired at least five rocket-propelled grenades targeting Eternity C before boarding.[xvi] The damage from the explosions sank the vessel. The Houthis killed four out of 22 to 25 crew members (21 Filipinos and one Russian) aboard the Eternity C and took roughly 12 crew members hostage. European vessels operating under the EU mission to protect shipping in the Red Sea rescued six other crew members.

The Houthis appear to have adopted hostage-taking to discourage international shipping companies from shipping goods to Israel. The effort to discourage shipping companies from shipping to Israel is part of a long Houthi campaign to “blockade” Israel and impose economic costs for Israel’s operations in the Gaza Strip. The Houthis have not taken any hostages from ship crews since November 2023, when they initially took 20 crew members from the Galaxy Leader.[xvii] The Houthis have targeted two vessels (the Magic Seas on July 6 and the Eternity C on July 7) in recent days and have either tried to take or have taken hostages from the vessels.[xviii] Both ships sailed on behalf of companies that also send ships to Israeli ports, though neither ship was itself bound for an Israeli port.[xix] The Houthis said that they targeted the Eternity C because some ships owned by its parent company docked at Israeli ports.[xx] This suggests that the Houthis are attempting to discourage shipping companies from traveling to Israeli ports by attacking their vessels regardless of destination. This tactic will have the added effect of driving up shipping costs in the Red Sea for all shippers, regardless of port of destination. Shipping prices have still not fallen to their pre-October 7 rates, and this hostage-taking will only exacerbate the issue.[xxi]

Key Takeaways

• Nuclear Negotiations: Russia offered to help replenish Iran’s depleted uranium stockpile to support a peaceful nuclear program. Russia's involvement in the US-Iran nuclear talks would be very unlikely to secure US interests due to Russia's alignment with Iran.
• Iran’s Nuclear Program: French intelligence assesses that Iran’s nuclear program is very seriously damaged and its weaponization timeline is extremely delayed, which is consistent with previous reports.
• Snapback Sanctions: British Foreign Secretary David Lammy warned on July 8 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) could trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not cooperate on its nuclear program. Lammy emphasized that Iran needs to "step back" from its "nuclear ambitions," including by resuming IAEA inspections, to avoid snapback sanctions.
• Red Sea: The Houthis killed at least four crew members and took up to 21 crew members hostage, probably as part of an effort to deter shipping companies from sailing to Israeli ports. The Houthis appear to have adopted hostage-taking to discourage international shipping companies from shipping goods to Israel. The effort to discourage shipping companies from shipping to Israel is part of a long Houthi campaign to “blockade” Israel and impose economic costs for Israel’s operations in the Gaza Strip.

The United States sanctioned 22 Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked entities and removed several Iran-related sanctions from shipping companies and vessels on July 9.[xxii] The US Treasury sanctioned 22 entities for their connections to the IRGC and its Quds Force. 18 of the 22 sanctioned entities are Hong Kong-based trading companies founded between 2019 and 2023. The US Treasury also sanctioned two Turkish companies, along with Dubai-based Bright Spot Goods Wholesalers LLC, for their ties to the IRGC. The US Treasury imposed additional sanctions on Hong Kong's Enka Trading Limited's sanctioned status to account for its links to the IRGC-QF. The United States previously sanctioned Enka Trading Limited in 2024 because it worked in the Russian economy’s technology sector.[xxiii]

The US Treasury also removed several Iran-related entities from its designated sanctions list, including UAE-based company Swedish Management Co Sa and six vessels previously linked to Swedish Management. The US Treasury removed the vessel Xuan Ning, which had been connected to Shanghai Xuanrun Shipping Company Limited. The US Treasury sanctioned these entities in 2023 for aiding the Iranian oil trade.[xxiv] It remains unclear why these entities were removed from the list.

The IRGC Ground Forces Quds Operational Base claimed on July 9 that its security forces killed six fighters and arrested others in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xxv] Security forces also reportedly seized light and heavy weapons and large quantities of explosives. The IRGC claimed that the individuals had planned attacks that would target crowded areas.[xxvi] The detainees may be Jaish al Adl fighters active in southeastern Iran. Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in this region. The Iranian regime has previously accused Israel of supporting Jaish al Adl.[xxvii] The IRGC may use these arrests as part of a broader justification to expand security operations and crack down on dissent in southeastern Iran. The Quds Operational Base previously announced on July 1 that security forces arrested over 50 individuals “linked to Israel” and killed two others in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xxviii] The July 1 ”arrests” are unlikely to be part of an effective counterintelligence campaign. The July 1 arrests instead appear to be part of the broader Iranian crackdown that has targeted minority groups for perceived disloyalty.

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi met with Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan on July 9 to discuss the regime’s stability.[xxix] Mousavi praised the LEC’s “effective presence” during the 12-day Israel-Iran war and highlighted its coordination with military and security institutions to counter “hybrid warfare and preserve domestic order.”[xxx] The regime defines hybrid warfare as the use of all domains of power—including information, electronic, cultural, social, terrorist, and military operations—by hostile actors.[xxxi] Radan also discussed the dismantlement of Israeli- and US-linked spy networks and emphasized the need to stay agile to counter modern threats.[xxxii] Both the AFGS and the LEC have historically participated in developing domestic surveillance and censorship infrastructure. The AFGS previously supported the development of state-approved messaging platforms in 2020 to replace foreign apps and expand regime surveillance and censorship.[xxxiii] The LEC created a Cyber Police division in 2011, and the IRGC trained cyber units to monitor dissent and spread pro-regime narratives. [xxxiv]Mousavi and Radan’s meeting is consistent with the Iranian regime’s broader effort to strengthen internal control and expand securitization measures.[xxxv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is prioritizing regime stability and deepening its securitization policies after the war. The Iranian Parliament approved a nine-article law on June 29, criminalizing any cooperation with hostile actors as “corruption on earth,” which is a charge punishable by death.[xxxvi]

Over 100 prominent Qom clerics stated on July 9 that they declared loyalty to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, likely in response to efforts to sideline him amid his prolonged absence from public view.[xxxvii] The clerics described Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel as a “historic victory” under Khamenei’s leadership and praised him as the “divine pillar” of the Islamic Republic.[xxxviii] They also warned that any “insult or attack” on Khamenei would provoke a severe response.[xxxix] Prominent cleric Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi on June 29 previously declared that individuals who threaten Khamenei or religious authority are “mohareb” (enemies of God) and therefore subject to the death penalty.[xl] The statement likely highlights growing efforts by Iranian hardliners to consolidate support for Khamenei amid signs of internal factional tension and attempts by other political actors to sideline Khamenei or regain influence for moderate politicians. Unspecified Iranian leaders reportedly developed a contingency plan during the Israel-Iran War to govern Iran without Khamenei if he is killed or informally sidelined.[xli] They considered forming a leadership committee to replace him and negotiate a ceasefire with the United States and Israel.[xlii] Former President Hassan Rouhani separately lobbied senior clerics in Qom during the war, including Makarem Shirazi, to pressure Khamenei to accept a ceasefire and drop Iran’s demand for uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.[xliii]

Syria

The Syrian transitional government met with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Kurdish officials on July 9 to discuss the implementation of the March 10 SDF-Syrian government agreement.[xliv] Both groups remain committed to the broad outline of the agreement, though neither side has changed its position on key outstanding issues. UK-based, Qatari-owned media reported that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack, and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi met in Damascus on July 9.[xlv] Several Syrian sources reported that Shara did not attend the meeting between Barrack and Abdi, however.[xlvi] The SDF and Syrian government agreed to a ceasefire and political agreement on March 10 that included the integration of the SDF’s military and civil organizations into the Syrian government and the handover of SDF-controlled sites in northeastern Syria to the government.[xlvii] Barrack and Abdi reportedly discussed the implementation of the March 10 agreement.[xlviii] Senior Syrian, French, US, Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) officials separately met in Damascus on July 9 to discuss the March 10 agreement.[xlix] The officials reportedly discussed Syria’s governing structure, the relationship between the AANES and the interim government, the economy, integration of AANES institutions, and military capabilities.[l] AANES co-chair Foza Youssef told Kurdish media that the meeting was positive, and negotiations will continue ”at a later stage.”[li]

Barrack told Western media that the Syrian government and the SDF “remain at odds” following the meetings in Damascus.[lii] Barrack noted following his meeting with Shara and Abdi that the SDF has been “slow” to “negotiate and accept” a deal with Damascus and that “federalism does not work” in Syria.[liii] Barrack‘s comments about federalism could be read as a repudiation of a key SDF demand surrounding the form of government in Syria, which they have variously referred to as ”federalism” and ”decentralization,” among other terms.[liv] The Syrian government continues to maintain that federalism is unacceptable.[lv] Syrian media reported on July 8 that the SDF may propose extending the implementation timeline beyond 2025 and addressing unspecified “Kurdish demands.”[lvi] Both the SDF and the Syrian government have taken several concrete steps to implement the March 10 agreement, including the creation of a deconfliction zone near Tishreen Dam and the integration of two historically Kurdish and SDF-controlled neighborhoods into Aleppo City’s governance.[lvii] Neither the Syrian transitional government nor the Kurds have adjusted their long-held positions on Syria’s governing structure or the integration of the SDF into the Syrian military apparatus since March 10, despite the early steps toward integration that both sides have taken.[lviii] Both sides remain committed to the agreement amid these outstanding issues that the March 10 agreement did not resolve.[lix]

The Syrian transitional government has continued to meet with US officials, potentially to seek further US assistance. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack in Damascus on July 9.[lx] Shara, Shaibani, and Barrack reportedly discussed prospects for US-Syrian cooperation and political dialogue between the two countries.[lxi] Shara, Shaibani, and Barrack’s meeting follows a call between Shaibani and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on July 3.[lxii] Rubio and Shaibani announced that the United States and Syria would establish a special committee focused on the chemical weapons issue in Syria.[lxiii] Rubio confirmed that the Trump Administration is working with Congress to repeal the Caesar Act in the coming months.[lxiv] Rubio also said that the United States is interested in reopening its embassy in Damascus and extended an official invitation to Shaibani to visit Washington ”as soon as possible.“[lxv] Shaibani and Rubio’s discussion topics align with the United States’ “expectations” for Shara to act upon following the US decision to lift sanctions on Syria, which include curbing Palestinian militant activity in Syria, preventing an ISIS resurgence, and taking steps towards an eventual entry into the Abraham Accords.[lxvi]

Two Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-linked fighters attacked a Syrian government checkpoint in Idlib on July 8.[lxvii] Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the General Security Service (GSS) personnel attempted to stop a vehicle suspected of carrying weapons on the Idlib-Binnish road.[lxviii] The two ”ISIS-linked” fighters refused to stop their vehicle and fired on security personnel, injuring one MoD member.[lxix] Members of the security services killed one ISIS fighter and arrested the other.[lxx] The security services captured a large quantity of anti-tank missiles in the vehicle that the two ISIS fighters were attempting to move.[lxxi] This is the first engagement between government forces and ISIS in Idlib Province since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. The United States recently conducted a drone strike that killed an ISIS member in Idlib Province on June 10, however.[lxxii] ISIS historically maintained a presence in Idlib Province before the Assad regime fell, and Uzbek fighters in northwestern Syria had contact with IS Khorasan Province (IS-KP).[lxxiii] ISIS often clashed with Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and planned external operations there.[lxxiv]

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, a Salafi-jihadi group ideologically aligned with ISIS, claimed responsibility for fires in Latakia to instill fear within the local Alawite community.[lxxv] It is not clear if the group set the fires themselves, however. Destructive fires have afflicted Latakia Province since June 30.[lxxvi] The group claimed on July 3 that it set fire to the Qastal forest with the intent to displace and kill local Alawites.[lxxvii] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah justified the alleged arson attack as retaliation for the Assad regime’s destruction of over $250 million in Idlib farmland between 2019 and 2025.[lxxviii] CTP-ISW cannot verify Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s involvement in setting the Latakia fires. The Syrian Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management blamed the fires on dry winds, higher-than-average temperatures, and the presence of unexploded ordnance from the civil war.[lxxix]  The temperature has been in the mid- to high-80s Fahrenheit in Latakia since July 1, and it has not rained.[lxxx] Syrian Interior Ministry spokesperson Noureddine al Baba said the ministry is investigating whether the wildfires were manmade and that several arson suspects have been arrested, but that there is no conclusive evidence of arson as of July 8.[lxxxi]

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is likely capitalizing upon the fires as an opportunity through which to instill fear in the coastal Alawite community, regardless of whether the group is responsible for the fires. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s claim of responsibility for the Latakia fires also follows a litany of false accusations or attributions of blame for the fires online. [lxxxii]  Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has claimed to have conducted arson attacks previously, however. The group claimed that it set forest fires that it claimed targeted Alawites in Qardaha, Latakia Province, in early March, and recently claimed to conduct arson attacks in Aleppo and Hama provinces in June.[lxxxiii]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem stated that Hezbollah’s loss of Iranian supply routes through Syria has reduced Iranian military support to Hezbollah.[lxxxiv] This acknowledgement has likely prompted Hezbollah to conduct a review of its strategy in Lebanon, as recently reported by Reuters.[lxxxv]  Qassem told Hezbollah-aligned media on July 8 that the Assad regime’s collapse was a loss for the “entire” Axis of Resistance because Iran used Syria to provide Hezbollah with military support.[lxxxvi] Qassem’s comment is notable in that Qassem previously referred to the disruption to Iranian supply routes through Syria as a “small detail” that ”may change with time” in December 2024.[lxxxvii] Qassem’s public recognition of Hezbollah’s permanent loss of the Iranian overland corridor likely reflects internal Hezbollah discussions about its ability to resupply its stockpiles and reconstitute its forces. Hezbollah has attempted to smuggle weapons into Lebanon since the fall of the regime, but the Syrian government has intercepted a number of these shipments, and the number of weapons that make it to Hezbollah is probably a minor fraction of the amount Hezbollah received prior to December 2024.[lxxxviii] The realization that the Iranian ground routes to Hezbollah have been severely and permanently disrupted with the establishment of an anti-Iranian Syrian government has likely led Hezbollah to begin rethinking its strategy in Lebanon. Three unspecified sources told Reuters on July 4 that Hezbollah has begun a review of its strategy in Lebanon.[lxxxix] This re-think is probably driven by Hezbollah’s losses in the October 7 War and regional changes since October 7, including the collapse of Syria, and does not represent a fundamental change in Hezbollah’s strategic aims.[xc]