Iran Update, July 23, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The New York Times reported on July 23 that the series of fires and explosions that have taken place across Iran since the Israel-Iran ceasefire have fueled public anxiety and suspicions among Iranian officials about Israeli sabotage.[i] Three unspecified Iranian officials, including an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officer, told the New York Times that they believed that “many” of these incidents have been acts of sabotage, though they provided no evidence to support this claim.[ii] The officials added that Iran has avoided blaming Israel publicly in order to avoid pressure to retaliate from Israel.[iii] An unspecified European official also assessed that the incidents were acts of Israeli sabotage, citing Israel’s recent history of covert operations in Iran.[iv] A similar pattern of explosions in 2020 took place at Iranian nuclear and military facilities, and Western and Iranian officials attributed them to Israeli cyberattacks and covert strikes.[v] Iranian authorities have publicly attributed the recent incidents to gas leaks, garbage fires, and aging infrastructure.[vi] The New York Times report highlighted several notable incidents, including a fire at the Abadan oil refinery, an explosion in Qom Province that damaged an apartment building, and a blast in Tehran Province that struck housing for Iranian judiciary staff.[vii] Images of the aftermath of the judiciary housing explosion show “walls and windows [that] were blown out.” This pattern of damage is similar to damage to apartment buildings in Tehran on June 12 and 13 during the Israel-Iran War.[viii] Such fires and explosions are not uncommon in Iran during the summer months, however. Some incidents may result from accidental causes, such as infrastructure failures or extreme heat. CTP-ISW has tracked dozens of explosions and fires across Iran since the Israel-Iran ceasefire on June 24, including the following incidents:

• June 25 – Janat Abad, Tehran Province: An explosion occurred in an unfinished building. Iranian media attributed it to a gas leak.[ix]
• June 26 – Farmaniyeh, Tehran Province: Unconfirmed reports and social media footage suggested that a drone struck an apartment building.[x]
• June 29 – Southern Tehran Province: Explosion and fire reported in two areas, reportedly near military and industrial sites.[xi]
• July 1 – Shahr-e Ray, Southern Tehran Province: An X account reported multiple explosions at an unknown site.[xii]
• July 1 – Southern Vali-e Asr, Tehran Province: A large plume of smoke was seen rising from an unknown warehouse following a large explosion.[xiii]
• July 3 – Azadegan Highway, Southeastern Tehran Province: Footage posted by anti-regime media showed a thick plume of smoke following a reported explosion along Azadegan Highway in southern Tehran.[xiv]
• July 4 – Gheshm Island, Hormozgan Province: A major fire broke out at a commercial complex.[xv] Iranian media stated that the cause is under investigation.[xvi]
• July 5 – Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province: A large fire and multiple explosions occurred in a truck parking lot.[xvii] Iranian media reported that flammable materials present at the scene intensified the fire.[xviii]
• July 6 – Ashrafi Esfahani, Tehran Province: Iranian media reported that two liquefied gas cylinders ignited after a gas valve in a three-story residential building was left open, which caused a large explosion.[xix]
• July 10 – Chitgar, Tehran Province: Iranian media reported that a gas explosion occurred on the 15th floor of Pamchal Tower and injured four people.[xx]
• July 14 – Khorasan Razavi Province: Iranian media reported that a massive fire broke out at a commercial complex.[xxi]

The Israel-Iran War has exacerbated longstanding divides within the Iranian regime as “pragmatic conservatives” seek to reassert influence over foreign policy and counterbalance hardliners’ opposition to diplomacy with the West. Reformist newspaper Ham Mihan published an article on July 23 in which it argued that the recent activities of two senior advisers to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Ali Larijani and Ali Akbar Velayati, signal a renewed effort by “pragmatic conservatives” to reassert influence over Iran’s domestic and foreign policy after the 12-Day Israel-Iran War.[xxii] The outlet highlighted Larijani’s unannounced trip to Russia on July 20 to discuss the Iranian nuclear program with Russian President Vladimir Putin. It also argued that Velayati’s public calls for a “new approach” on July 21 to preserve national unity reflect Velayati’s efforts to counterbalance entrenched hardliners. which likely includes the ultraconservative Stability (Paydari) Front faction.[xxiii] Velayati stated on X on July 21 that preserving “national cohesion” may require the government to change certain social policies and prioritize “public satisfaction in a tangible way.”[xxiv] Velayati added that "outdated methods" will no longer meet the needs of Iranian society after the war.[xxv] Velayati made other more pragmatic statements prior to July 20 and 21, such as on July 14, when he said that Iran is open to negotiations without “preconditions.” This July 14 statement is in direct opposition to the hardliners’ established position that the United States must classify Israel as the aggressor during the Iran-Israel War, that unspecified actors must investigate US involvement, and Iran must secure war reparations and security guarantees to prevent future attacks.[xxvi] Ham Mihan highlighted that Larijani and Velayati have historically aligned with “moderate conservatives” within Iran‘s traditional right wing and often supported ”cautious reforms” and engagement with the West.[xxvii]  Paydari leader Saeed Jalili and other hardline officials have openly challenged this pragmatic faction and opposed the ceasefire with Israel.[xxviii] Jalili also criticized Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi for agreeing to the ceasefire with Israel and signaling their openness to renewed nuclear negotiations with the United States.[xxix]  

This internal divide between hardliners and pragmatic conservatives is not a new phenomenon within Iranian politics, however. Parliament Speaker Mohhamad Bagher Ghalibaf, long seen as a hardliner, moved closer to pragmatic conservatives such as Pezeshkian during the 2024 presidential election.[xxx] Ghalibaf’s split from figures like Jalili highlighted the regime’s ongoing internal rifts over domestic and foreign policy and fissures between hardliners and pragmatic conservatives.[xxxi]

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) supporters attempted to foment intercommunal violence and encourage attacks by ISIS supporters against the Druze during the recent violence in Suwayda Province.[xxxii] A BCC Salafi-jihadi analyst reported on July 22 that hardline Islamist groups, such as the Islamic State (IS), have frequently shared literature in recent days that denounces the Druze as “infidels” and calls upon ISIS supporters to fight them.[xxxiii] The analyst said that IS supporters have invoked ISIS’s 2018 violence against the Druze in Suwayda to appeal to Sunni Bedouin tribes and as proof of ISIS’s ability to ”crush the Druze.”[xxxiv] IS supporters are reportedly engaging in theological debates via online forums regarding the religious permissibility for ISIS fighters or sympathizers to join the Sunni Bedouin tribes fighting against the Druze in Suwayda.[xxxv] Some IS supporters have argued that the intercommunal violence is motivated by "un-Islamic” tribal loyalties rather than religious motivations and used this as evidence for why it is impermissible to fight alongside Sunni Bedouin tribes.[xxxvi] Other IS supporters have argued that the current situation in Suwayda is an opportunity to launch attacks against the Druze.[xxxvii] These discussions reflect the discourse within IS constituencies, not strategic deliberations between senior ISIS commanders.

Several ISIS-linked social media accounts claimed that ISIS supporters are currently active in Suwayda Province and are participating in the conflict “discreetly and independently” alongside Sunni Bedouin tribes.[xxxviii] Syrian social media circulated several videos that show unknown fighters wearing clothing and holding rifles with flags showing the shahada in white text on a black field, which IS has long used as its flag.[xxxix]  These emblems do not necessarily verify that these are ISIS fighters or directly related to IS, however. Other Salafi-jihadi fighters in Syria have used the flag.

IS supporters have also called on Sunni Bedouin tribes to “form an alliance” with ISIS and reach out to ISIS fighters in the Syrian desert in the past two days.[xl] ISIS previously used eastern Suwayda to shelter some senior leadership and launch attacks during the civil war.[xli] ISIS maintained likely support zones in eastern Suwayda Province in 2022, and the Assad regime ambushed ISIS “supply” vehicles in Tulul al Safa in June 2022, demonstrating that ISIS previously operated in this rural area and used it to resupply fighters.[xlii] CTP-ISW defines a support zone as any area where an insurgent force can conduct offensive operations.[xliii] ISIS’s recent attacks in Suwayda Province in May 2025 suggest that ISIS retains a presence along ground lines of communication between the central Syrian desert and southern Syria.[xliv] ISIS uses central Syria’s sparsely populated desert as a sanctuary where it can rest, refit, and train new fighters.[xlv]

Unknown men in military uniforms reportedly executed Druze civilians in Suwayda Province during the recent bout of intercommunal violence, which will likely erode trust in government forces and increase the risk of future spasms of violence regardless of whether government forces are culpable for the executions. Druze civilians have alleged that gunmen in military fatigues executed Druze civilians during the violence in Suwayda from July 13 to July 18.[xlvi] Syrian media circulated a video on July 22 that showed men in military uniforms executing a supposedly Druze man.[xlvii] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra acknowledged the reports that men in military uniforms committed such violence and announced that the Defense Ministry formed a committee to investigate the individuals involved.[xlviii] Abu Qasra blamed ”regional groups” who carried out ”retaliatory operations” in Suwayda but noted that the individuals involved in the abuses will be punished “even if they are affiliated with the Defense Ministry.”[xlix] It is often difficult to discern between Syrian army personnel and other unknown fighters in military fatigues because the new Syrian army has no standardized uniform. The abuses against civilians by men in military uniforms risk significantly eroding minority communities’ trust in government forces, regardless of whether the men involved were Syrian army personnel or from so-called ”regional groups.” Community members subjected to this violence may associate military uniforms with the abuses described above and react aggressively to Syrian army deployments, as happened when Druze fighters mobilized against Syrian forces that deployed to Suwayda Province on July 14.[l] The Syrian army’s ability to secure Syrian territory is directly contingent on local communities’ trust in Syrian forces. The lack of a trusted, state-operated security force will create opportunities for other actors to exploit the ensuing security vacuum and drive instability in Syria in the long term.

Iran held trilateral talks with the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia in Tehran on July 22 ahead of expected United States-Iran nuclear talks, likely to rally diplomatic support for Iran in the event that the E3 triggers the JCPOA snapback mechanism. NOTE: A version of this text also appears in CTP-ISW’s July 23 Adversary Entente Task Force Update. Iranian media reported on July 22 that representatives of Iran, the PRC, and Russia discussed the nuclear negotiations and sanctions against Iran and agreed to continue “close consultations” in coming weeks.[li] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said that Iran has “aligned positions” with the PRC and Russia and noted that Iran is in “continuous” consultations with both countries to prevent the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from reinstating snapback sanctions or to mitigate the potential consequences of reinstated sanctions.[lii] The E3 threatened on July 17 to trigger the JCPOA snapback mechanism if Iran fails to achieve progress on a nuclear deal by August 2025.[liii] Iran has previously engaged with the PRC and Russia over the possibility that the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[liv] It is unlikely, however, that the PRC and Russia could prevent the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism, so Iran is likely trying to get the PRC and Russia to prevent the E3 from activating the snapback mechanism in the first place.[lv]

Key Takeaways:

• Explosions in Iran: The New York Times reported on July 23 that the series of fires and explosions that have taken place across Iran since the Israel-Iran ceasefire have fueled public anxiety and suspicions among Iranian officials about Israeli sabotage.
• Iranian Approach to the West: The Israel-Iran War has exacerbated longstanding divides within the Iranian regime as “pragmatic conservatives” seek to reassert influence over foreign policy and counterbalance hardliners’ opposition to diplomacy with the West.
• Iran-China-Russia Coordination: Iran held trilateral talks with the PRC and Russia in Tehran on July 22 ahead of expected United States-Iran nuclear talks, likely to rally diplomatic support for Iran if the E3 triggers the JCPOA snapback mechanism. It is unlikely that the PRC and Russia could prevent the reimposition of sanctions if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism, so Iran is likely trying to get the PRC and Russia to prevent the E3 from activating the snapback mechanism in the first place.
• ISIS in Southern Syria: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) supporters attempted to foment intercommunal violence and encourage attacks by ISIS supporters against the Druze during the recent violence in Suwayda Province. Several ISIS-linked social media accounts claimed that ISIS supporters are currently active in Suwayda Province and are participating in the conflict “discreetly and independently” alongside Sunni Bedouin tribes.
• Security in Suwayda: Unknown men in military uniforms reportedly executed Druze civilians in Suwayda Province during the recent bout of intercommunal violence, which will likely erode trust in government forces and increase the risk of future spasms of violence regardless of whether government forces are culpable for the executions.

Iran

Israel struck a munitions production facility and explosives handling facility in Qazvin Province during the 12-day Israel-Iran War, according to the Institute for Science and International Security (the Institute).[lvi] The Institute reported that the complex housed high-explosive munitions production, handling, storage, and testing facilities in Vandar, eastern Qazvin Province.[lvii] The Institute reported that a probable munitions production facility and an explosives handling facility sustained severe damage from Israeli strikes. Iran expanded the site before 2024 to include sections that reportedly appear to have been designed to produce newer munitions.[lviii] The IDF Air Force reported that strikes on June 17 and 18 targeted a complex near Vandar that produced anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) for Lebanese Hezbollah and other Axis of Resistance members.[lix] This strike is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that the Israeli air campaign will have a secondary effect of weakening Iranian-backed Axis of Resistance groups by degrading Iran’s ability to support the reconstitution of its partners and proxies.[lx]

Iran and Russia completed an annual combined naval exercise in the Caspian Sea on July 23.[lxi] The navies of the Artesh—the conventional Iranian military—and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), as well as the Russian Navy, began the three-day, search-and-rescue exercise on June 21 in the 4th Artesh Naval District, which is based in Bandar-e Anzali, Gilan Province.[lxii] The Russian SB738 tug participated in the exercise.[lxiii] IRGC-affiliated media reported that the exercise aims to strengthen “maritime interactions” between Caspian Sea states.[lxiv] Iran and Russia have used combined military exercises in recent years to improve interoperability, disseminate technical and tactical lessons, and pressure the US and its allies.[lxv] Iran previously hosted Russia and other Caspian Sea states for a previous iteration of this naval exercise in July 2024.[lxvi]

Iranian media circulated a video of an Iranian Navy helicopter reportedly harassing the US destroyer USS Fitzgerald in the Gulf of Oman on July 23. Iranian media claimed that the USS Fitzgerald approached Iranian territorial waters in an unspecified location in the Gulf of Oman.[lxvii] The United States did not acknowledge the incident as of this writing.

Iranian border guards clashed with Kurdish opposition forces on the Iran-Iraq border in northwestern Iran on July 22.[lxviii] The clash on July 22 killed two more border guards in Baneh, Kurdistan Province. This is the second incident between Iranian border guards and Kurdish opposition forces since July 21. A local Kurdish outlet in Iraq assessed that the Kurdish fighters were from the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), an anti-Iranian, Kurdish nationalist militant group.[lxix] PJAK claimed that an Iranian drone struck a PJAK vehicle and killed one PJAK fighter on July 19.[lxx] Iran threatened to launch attacks on Kurdish opposition forces in Iraq on February 21 if the Iraqi federal government and Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) do not properly uphold the March 2023 trilateral border security agreement with Iran.[lxxi] The agreement requires the Iraqi federal government and the KRG to prevent Kurdish fighters from attacking Iran near the Iran-Iraq border.[lxxii]  Iran continues to perceive Kurdish opposition forces in northwestern Iran as a threat to regime stability. Iran has increased its military presence in the region to ”fight against counter-revolutionaries and enemies” in the northwest region within the last year, likely referring to Kurdish opposition groups.[lxxiii]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

The US Consulate in Istanbul announced on July 23 that a US Treasury Department delegation met with Turkish, Syrian, and Iraqi officials in Turkey to discuss lifting sanctions on Damascus.[lxxiv] Acting US Treasury Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing Anna Morris led the US delegation.[lxxv] The US Embassy in Turkey said that Morris was expected to highlight the Trump Administration’s recent lifting of sanctions on Syria and ”seek compliance” with the administration's maximum pressure campaign on Iran.[lxxvi] The US Embassy in Turkey did not release any further details regarding the meeting. The US Treasury said that it is ready to assist the new Syrian government in improving the financial sector’s ability to counter money laundering and terrorist financing.[lxxvii]

Unspecified Turkish Ministry of Defense (MoD) sources told Turkish state media on July 23 that the Syrian transitional government officially requested the Turkish government’s support to strengthen its defense capabilities and combat terrorist groups such as ISIS.[lxxviii] The unspecified Turkish MoD sources said that the Turkish MoD will continue to provide Syrian forces with training, consultation, and technical support in line with the request.[lxxix] Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler previously told Western media on June 4 that Turkey had started providing military training and consultancy services while taking unspecified steps to increase Syria’s defense capacity.[lxxx] Turkey and Syria have engaged in defense talks since December 2024.[lxxxi] Turkey has long argued to the United States that Turkish forces could handle the counter-ISIS mission to demonstrate to the United States that US forces do not need to support the Kurdish-dominated SDF against ISIS.[lxxxii]

Arabian Peninsula

A shipping news outlet reported on July 21 that the Houthis increased their oil and gas imports ahead of the US military operation and sanctions against the Houthis in early March.[lxxxiii]  The Houthis likely sought to stabilize the local price of oil and gas as well as other commodities in Houthi-controlled territory to reduce the risk of unrest in these areas ahead of the US designation. The Houthis control official basic good prices in their controlled areas, which have remained consistent since July 2024.[lxxxiv] Most Yemeni civilians in these areas rely on black market prices in these areas, which are more volatile and harder to assess.[lxxxv] Both the US and Israeli campaigns against the Houthis in 2025 targeted Houthi financial assets and port facilities in addition to traditional military targets. The Houthis have continued to import petroleum products even after the United States sanctioned oil exports to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. The United States sanctioned at least five out of eight tankers berthed and anchored at the Houthi-controlled Ras Issa Port on July 23 for facilitating oil and gas trade to the Houthis.[lxxxvi] These tankers also turned off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) so that they could not be tracked. Tankers that transport Iranian crude oil to other places, such as China, have also turned off their AIS in the past to evade detection.[lxxxvii] All eight tankers sailed to Ras Issa from Djibouti Port, where the United Nations (UN) actively inspects vessels that are sailing to Yemeni ports for arms under the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM).[lxxxviii] UNVIM is not mandated to enforce US sanctions on exporting petroleum products to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, however.[lxxxix]

A Yemeni journalist reported on July 22 that the Houthis lost at least $1.8 million in local currency from US airstrikes that targeted Houthi money storage facilities in Saada Governorate in late March 2025.[xc] The Houthi-controlled Sanaa exchange rate was 540 Yemeni rials to one US dollar on July 23.[xci] One billion Yemeni Rials under the Sanaa exchange rate is $1.8 million. The Yemeni journalist reported the Houthis lost ”billions” of rials in the strikes.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.