Iran Update, January 29, 2026

The Critical  Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

Iran is likely trying to deter US military action against Iran by deploying forces and conducting naval exercises in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated outlet Defa Press claimed on January 29 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy deployed “hundreds of fast, missile-launching, and support vessels in close proximity” to the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier, which is operating in the Arabian Sea.[i] Commercially available satellite imagery also showed that the IRGC Navy’s “Shahid Bagheri” drone carrier is currently six kilometers off the coast of Bandar Abbas, a major port city that is located on the Strait of Hormuz.[ii] The IRGC Navy’s deployment of fast attack craft (FAC) and “missile-launching” vessels is consistent with Iran’s asymmetric naval strategy that counters larger and more technologically advanced naval forces through high speed and short-range missile capabilities.[iii]  Western media outlets separately reported on January 29 that the IRGC Navy will conduct a two-day, live-fire exercise in the Strait of Hormuz on February 1 and 2.[iv] The IRGC Navy’s upcoming live-fire exercise is likely a response  to the USS Abraham Lincoln’s arrival in the Middle East and likely meant to deter the United States from attacking Iran. The deployment of naval assets and the upcoming exercise are also notable because Iran did not use any naval assets during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. IRGC Spokesperson Ali Mohammad Naeini claimed in November 2025 that Iran did not use its naval forces during the war because there was “no need” to expand the war.[v]

Iran could respond to potential US military action by threatening US naval assets and obstructing international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials have long threatened to disrupt shipping in the Strait as a way to deter the United States from implementing sanctions or taking military action against Iran.[vi] One of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advisers to the Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani, warned Iranian adversaries in October 2025 that Iran’s response to any escalation in the Strait would not be “limited.”[vii] Some regime-affiliated outlets have expressed support for disrupting international shipping to inflict an economic cost on the United States.[viii] One such outlet claimed that Iran could increase the price of oil to such a degree that it would “collapse” the US economy.[ix] Iran responded to the United States’ maximum pressure campaign in 2019 by threatening international shipping, including by seizing a British oil tanker, harassing vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and conducting an attack targeting Saudi oil facilities.[x]

Iranian media outlets circulated a January 29 Al Jazeera report that claimed that the Iranian Navy will hold a joint military exercise with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia in the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean “in the coming days.”[xi] The reports did not specify whether the Artesh or IRGC Navy will participate in the exercise. Iran, the PRC, and Russia have held annual naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman in recent years, usually in the month of March.[xii] Russian and Chinese media have not confirmed the exercise at the time of this writing.  

Iran is continuing to rebuild its nuclear facilities and trying to fortify them against future attacks.  Recent US intelligence found that Iran is trying to rebuild its nuclear facilities “deeper underground,” according to a person familiar with recent US intelligence speaking to CNN on January 29. [xiii] It is unclear which specific nuclear facilities Iran is trying to rebuild “deeper underground.” It is possible that the facilities include the Mount Kolang Gaz La (Pickaxe Mountain) facility near the Natanz Nuclear Facility in Esfahan Province, although the United States and Israel have not targeted this facility and Iran would therefore not need to “rebuild” it. Unspecified analysts told the Washington Post in September 2025 that the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility’s underground halls may be between 260 and 330 feet deep, which is deeper than Fordow.[xiv] The International Atomic Energy Agency has never inspected this facility, which indicates that Iran could seek to limit international visibility into the site’s purpose.[xv] The Iranian regime is likely rebuilding its nuclear facilities deeper underground to reduce their vulnerability to deep-penetration munitions, such as the GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator (MOP). The United States dropped 12 30,000-pound GBU-57 MOPs on Fordow in June 2025, targeting the site’s ventilation shafts that led to a centrifuge cascade hall located at least 200 feet underground.[xvi] 

The CNN report comes as Iran has taken steps to rebuild parts of its nuclear program that could potentially support the development of a nuclear weapon. Iran is encasing a newly built facility at Taleghan 2 at the Parchin Military Complex with a concrete “sarcophagus” to harden the facility against potential airstrikes, according to the Institute for Science and International Security. [xvii] Iran previously used Taleghan 2 to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before it suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[xviii] Iran’s efforts to rebuild its nuclear facilities come as the 2026 National Defense Strategy noted that the Iranian regime has “left open the possibility that [it] will try again to obtain a nuclear weapon.”[xix]

Iran likely seeks Chinese support to strengthen its domestic security and repressive capabilities, which signals the regime’s continued concern about renewed unrest. AFGS-affiliated media reported that Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan met with the PRC ambassador to Iran in Tehran on January 29 to finalize a security memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the LEC and the PRC's Public Security Ministry.[xx] The LEC serves as Iran’s primary internal security force and acts as the regime’s first line of defense against unrest. The MoU aims to strengthen bilateral cooperation between the two institutions on public and political security.[xxi] Iran has repeatedly sought Chinese assistance to expand its domestic repression apparatus. The US Department of Justice announced in February 2020 that Chinese company Huawei has supported Iran’s domestic surveillance efforts since at least the 2009 Green Movement protests.[xxii] Radan met with Chinese Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong in 2023 and 2024 and signed a law enforcement cooperation MoU during their 2024 meeting.[xxiii] CTP previously assessed that Iran also likely modeled its digital authoritarian practices on the Chinese Communist Party’s approach to social control.[xxiv] The Iranian regime imposed a nationwide internet shutdown on January 8 to conceal its unprecedentedly brutal crackdown on protests and prevent Iranians from being able to organize protests.[xxv] The regime has sustained its extreme securitization efforts, which reflects its concerns over renewed protests.[xxvi]

The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are expected to announce the details of their January 27 agreement by January 31 at the latest. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi reportedly reached an “understanding” on January 27, agreeing to a ceasefire on all fronts and to the deployment of Syrian internal security forces to Hasakah City, Qamishli, and other Kurdish-majority areas.[xxvii] A Western journalist based in Qamishli reported that Abdi arrived in Damascus on January 29 to sign a “comprehensive accord” with Shara.[xxviii] An Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) official told Kurdish media on January 29 that an SDF-Damascus deal is expected to be officially announced within the next 24 to 48 hours.[xxix] The terms of the agreement outlined by the AANES official largely mirror those published by Syrian media on January 27, with one modification.[xxx] This modification stipulates that the SDF and the Syrian government will jointly administer border crossings and airports, which differs from the January 27 Syrian media report that the government would solely control border crossings.[xxxi] A Syrian government and US source involved in the January 27 negotiations told a Washington-based Syria researcher on January 29 that the SDF is expected to hand over control of border crossings, oil and natural gas facilities, as well as prisons and camps to the Syrian government under the agreement, however.[xxxii]

There have been multiple incidents of SDF fighters acting independently, which indicate that there may be some fracturing within the SDF. CTP-ISW continues to assess that the SDF’s leadership may fracture over a decision to agree to Shara’s terms for the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state, which would risk instigating serious conflict between government forces and Kurdish fighters.[xxxiii] SDF fighters acting independently have previously jeopardized agreements between the Syrian government and the SDF on multiple occasions.[xxxiv] SDF fighters ambushed a Syrian Defense Ministry patrol in Maskana, Aleppo Province, on January 17 shortly after the SDF agreed to withdraw from its positions in Deir Hafer and Maskana.[xxxv] The SDF fighters’ ambush invalidated the withdrawal agreement and set conditions for the MoD’s offensive across SDF territory.[xxxvi] SDF-affiliated Asayish fighters also continued fighting and refused to withdraw from Kurdish-majority neighborhoods in Aleppo City on January 9, which violated a January 8 US-mediated ceasefire between the Syrian government and the SDF.[xxxvii] SDF fighters who reject any agreement Abdi makes with the Syrian government to integrate into the Syrian army could similarly take independent action and conduct attacks on government forces, which would risk igniting a broader conflict between government forces and Syrian Kurds.  

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Naval Activity: Iran is likely trying to deter US military action against Iran by deploying forces and conducting naval exercises in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran could respond to potential US military action by threatening US naval assets and obstructing international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
• Iranian-Chinese-Russian Naval Cooperation: Iranian outlets circulated a January 29 Al Jazeera report that claimed that the Iranian Navy will hold a joint military exercise with the People’s Republic of China and Russia in the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean “in the coming days.” Russian and Chinese media have not confirmed the exercise at the time of this writing.  
• Iran’s Nuclear Program: Iran is continuing to rebuild its nuclear facilities and trying to fortify them against future attacks. Iran has taken steps to rebuild parts of its nuclear program that could potentially support the development of a nuclear weapon.
• Iranian-Chinese Security Relations: Iran likely seeks Chinese support to strengthen its domestic security and repressive capabilities, which signals the regime’s continued concern about renewed unrest.
• Syrian Government-SDF Conflict: The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are expected to announce the details of their January 27 agreement by January 31 at the latest. There have been multiple incidents of SDF fighters acting independently, which indicate that there may be some fracturing within the SDF.

Iran

Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami announced the allocation of 1,000 drones to the Artesh’s four service branches on January 29.[xxxviii] Iranian media reported that the drones include reconnaissance and electronic warfare drones designed to target fixed and mobile objects on land, in the air, and at sea.[xxxix] Hatami claimed that the Artesh will continue to enhance its “strategic advantages” to enable rapid combat operations and to respond to “any aggressor.”[xl] Israel previously intercepted around 99.99 percent of Iranian drones during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[xli] Iranian drones could be more effective in different circumstances, such as shorter-range shore-to-sea attacks, however. 

The European Union designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization on January 29.[xlii] This designation requires the European Union to "ensure that funds, financial assets or economic resources...will not be made available, directly or indirectly" to the IRGC.[xliii] The European Union also sanctioned 15 Iranian individuals and six entities on January 29 for their involvement in the regime’s brutal crackdown on protesters.[xliv] The sanctioned individuals include Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni, Prosecutor General Mohammad Movahedi Azad, as well as several IRGC commanders and senior LEC officers. The sanctioned entities include companies involved in the regime’s censorship and misinformation efforts.[xlv]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

Syrian internal security forces reportedly prevented another breakout attempt at al Hol internally displaced persons (IDP) camp on January 28 amid the Islamic State’s (IS) calls for Syrians to free detainees from the camp.[xlvi] Syrian General Security Service (GSS) forces reportedly prevented an escape attempt by al Hol residents on January 28 and deployed additional officers to the camp to prevent further escape attempts.[xlvii] A Washington-based Syria expert on al Hol reported, citing video evidence, that some residents did escape the camp on January 28, however.[xlviii] CTP-ISW has not observed any videos of detainees escaping from al Hol on January 28 as of this writing. Breakout attempts at al Hol highlight how Syrian government forces will need time to develop an understanding of the camp and learn how to prevent breakouts following the handover of control of the camp from the SDF to the government.

The IS’s call to action to free detainees from the camp could threaten the camp’s security and challenge the government’s ability to prevent breakouts. IS’s weekly publication, al Naba, called on Syrians on January 29 to free women detained at al Hol and other camps that hold Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) detainees.[xlix] IS often uses al Naba to guide and shape ISIS and its supporters’ militant activities.[l] The IS publication did not suggest that ISIS itself plans to assist in escape attempts or launch an assault on al Hol, however.[li] ISIS has not claimed an attack in Syria since Syrian forces began their offensive against the SDF on January 12.[lii]   

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Hezbollah is reportedly attempting to downplay Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem’s recent warning that Hezbollah would not remain “neutral” if the United States attacked Iran.[liii] Hezbollah's efforts to downplay this warning are consistent with CTP-ISW's recent assessment that Hezbollah likely does not seek to engage Israel or the United States in a direct conflict at this time.[liv] Lebanese media reported on January 29 that Hezbollah told Lebanese President Joseph Aoun via unofficial channels that Qassem’s remarks were “purely religious, not political” and reiterated that the group does not want to start a war.[lv] Aoun reportedly deemed Hezbollah’s message “insufficient” and stated that he will not meet with any Hezbollah officials until Hezbollah issues an official clarification about Qassem’s statement.[lvi] Aoun and several other Lebanese officials previously condemned and expressed outrage over Qassem’s January 26 statement.[lvii] A source close to Hezbollah also told Saudi media on January 29 that Hezbollah’s response to any US strike on Iran would be “one of solidarity.”[lviii]

Hezbollah’s efforts to downplay Qassem’s warning come amid ongoing Israeli preparations for a potential operation in Lebanon. Israeli officials have repeatedly warned in recent weeks that Israel will launch an operation in Lebanon if Hezbollah does not disarm.[lix] Unspecified Western sources warned on January 4 that Israel would conduct “broad and deep” airstrikes against Hezbollah if the group launches an attack in response to a strike on Iran.[lx] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to prepare for a potential operation in Lebanon. Israeli media reported on January 22 that the Israeli government was planning to approve a mobilization of approximately 280,000 reservists to ”continue IDF operations in combat sectors.”[lxi] It is unclear if the government has approved the mobilization, however. Israel has continued to conduct military exercises and reportedly deployed unspecified special rapid intervention units along the Israel-Lebanon border in order to “preemptively intervene” in the event of any development on Israel’s northern front.[lxii] The Israeli government, however, has not issued any warnings for northern Israeli civilians to leave northern Israel and urged northern Israeli citizens in December 2025 to return to their towns, many of which remain unoccupied.[lxiii] Israel previously evacuated northern Israeli communities along the Israel-Lebanon border in October 2023 as the likelihood of escalation increased and its cross-border engagements with Hezbollah intensified.[lxiv]

Hezbollah’s attempt to downplay Qassem’s warning further underscores that the group likely seeks to avoid escalation due to its weaker position and the inherent unpredictability of military escalation, which could rapidly spiral out of Hezbollah’s control.[lxv] Hezbollah likely opposes any intervention in a potential US-Iran conflict that would threaten the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement because such action would undermine Hezbollah’s objectives of limiting Israel’s presence and operational scope in Lebanon.[lxvi] A US or Israeli response against Hezbollah would also likely disrupt Hezbollah’s current efforts to reconstitute its forces and weapons stockpiles.[lxvii]

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