Iran Update, January 23, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) may agree to extend the US-mediated ceasefire, according to Kurdish sources and mediators. The Syrian government and SDF agreed to a ceasefire on January 20 that gave SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi four days to secure other SDF leaders’ agreement to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s terms, which include the integration of the SDF and its remaining territory into the Syrian state.[i] Abdi has around 24 hours remaining, as of the time of this writing, to “develop a detailed plan” to integrate the SDF and its territory into the Syrian state. Unspecified Kurdish political sources affiliated with the SDF and the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) told Qatari-owned, UK-based media on January 23 that Abdi and US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack reached an “understanding” to extend the ceasefire between Syrian government forces and the SDF.[ii] Barrack and Abdi met in Erbil, Iraq, on January 22.[iii] The sources said that Barrack and Abdi gave “mutual assurances” that there will be “no return to war.”[iv] A spokesperson for KRG President Nechirvan Barzani, who facilitated the January 22 meeting, told Kurdish media on January 22 that Barzani has urged US mediators and Syrian officials to extend the truce and warned that a short ceasefire of “two to four days” is “insufficient” to resolve the conflict.[v] Abdi and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria Foreign Affairs Co-Chair Ilham Ahmed support the ceasefire extension, according to Barzani’s spokesperson.[vi] Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told Turkish media on January 23 that extending the ceasefire “may be considered” given that the US transfer of Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) detainees from Syria to Iraq is still underway, suggesting that Ankara could also support an extension.[vii]

Abdi may not be able to secure support from other SDF leaders for Shara’s terms, even if the ceasefire is extended to allow him more time to consult with SDF leadership. CTP-ISW assessed on January 21 that the most likely course of action entails Abdi and a subset of more moderate SDF leaders agreeing to Shara’s terms while some hardline SDF leaders refuse to capitulate and continue to fight.[viii] It also remains unclear whether the Syrian government would support the ceasefire’s extension. A Syrian government official told Reuters on January 23 that Syrian and SDF officials have not discussed a ceasefire extension.[ix] The official also said that the government has not yet received a response from Abdi about the SDF’s integration plan.[x]

The ceasefire is facilitating US forces’ transfer of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq and enabling Syrian government forces to secure detention facilities and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps that house ISIS supporters. US forces have continued to transfer ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq since the ceasefire went into effect on January 20, according to Syrian media.[xi] The United States may transfer up to 7,000 ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraqi-controlled facilities, according to US Central Command (CENTCOM).[xii] The US transfer of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq mitigates some of the very grave risks that uncoordinated handovers of detention facilities present to US and Syrian counter-ISIS efforts. A successful transfer of all or most of the ISIS detainees will take longer than the 24 hours remaining in the ceasefire, however.[xiii]

An extended ceasefire would enable Syrian government forces to better secure Syrian IDP camps that house ISIS supporters. Syrian Interior Ministry forces deployed on January 21 to al Hol camp, which hosts 14,500 Syrians, 3,700 Iraqis, and 6,000 third country nationals, many of whom are ISIS supporters.[xiv] Certain sections of al Hol camp are functionally under ISIS control.[xv] The SDF and Syrian government did not coordinate the handover of al Hol camp, and the camp’s director said that “many” detainees escaped from al Hol in the chaos as the Syrian army advanced on the camp.[xvi] The SDF still controls al Roj camp, which houses about 2,500 detainees.[xvii] An unspecified senior Syrian official said on January 21 that the Syrian government is engaging with the United States over a possible coordinated handover of al Roj camp.[xviii] Syrian forces have advanced to  within 24 kilometers of al Roj camp as of January 23. The success of US efforts to ensure that the government offensive does not inflict lasting harm on US counter-ISIS objectives in northeastern Syria is conditional upon stable conditions on the ground in order for Syrian government forces to deploy to and secure these facilities.

The brief pause in fighting has also enabled the Syrian government and SDF to successfully arrange the handover of Aqtan Prison, which is an ISIS detention facility near Raqqa City.[xix] The Syrian government assumed control over the prison from the SDF on January 23 after a four-day siege on SDF units inside the prison.[xx] A Syrian government source said that an “internationally-sponsored agreement” facilitated the handover.[xxi] About 800 SDF fighters withdrew from the facility to Kobani under the agreement.[xxii]  The fighting for control over Aqtan Prison bore similarities to SDF-government fighting at al Shaddadi Prison, which resulted in the release of over 100 ISIS fighters into the surrounding area on January 19.[xxiii] Forces in the area were still searching for about 30 released ISIS fighters as of January 21, according to a Syrian security service member.[xxiv]

Both the SDF and Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continue to send reinforcements to contact lines in Hasakah Province despite indications that the ceasefire could be extended beyond January 24. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the SDF could use the four-day ceasefire to reorganize itself and prepare its hardened, ideological Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) to defend Kurdish villages and cities against future government attacks.[xxv] Kurdish forces reportedly deployed from Qamishli to Hasakah City and contact lines in southern Hasakah Province on January 23.[xxvi] Kurdish residents in Qamishli, Hasakah City, and Tal Tamr have mobilized and organized themselves into popular battalions in anticipation of the government‘s offensive resuming.[xxvii] Kurds are also arriving in Syria from Iraq ”of their own accord” to defend Syrian Kurds, according to an analyst who focuses on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict..[xxviii]  Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani stated on January 23 that he would send Kurdish Peshmerga forces to Kobani if given the ”opportunity.”[xxix] It is extremely unlikely that Barzani will have the “opportunity“ to deploy the Peshmerga to Kobani because Kobani is surrounded by Turkish and Syrian actors who would be very unlikely to allow the passage of Peshmerga forces into the exclave. Iraqi Kurdish reinforcements reached Kobani through Turkey in 2014 during the campaign against ISIS only after significant US pressure on Turkey.[xxx] The MoD also deployed additional reinforcements to Hasakah Province on January 23.[xxxi]

The Syrian government has deployed at least three Aleppo-based Syrian divisions along Kobani frontlines that contain militias or fighters that have participated in Turkish-backed offensives targeting the YPG in northern Syria and, in some cases, committed human rights abuses against Kurdish civilians.[xxxii] Turkey launched three successive campaigns in northern Syria against the Kurds during the civil war. These operations, executed with support from Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) factions, forcibly displaced Kurdish civilians and replaced them with Syrian refugees living in Turkey, which constitutes ethnic cleansing.[xxxiii] The Syrian army has surrounded SDF fighters in Kobani as of January 22, likely as the first part of a multi-stage operation to reduce the SDF forces there.[xxxiv] The units currently deployed along Kobani frontlines would presumably participate in a government assault on Kobani. Syrian army divisions are comprised of re-flagged opposition militias in addition to new recruits, and CTP-ISW cannot confirm with high confidence the individual militias or fighters that are deployed near Kobani. CTP-ISW assesses that there are likely elements of at least three Syrian divisions currently deployed along Kobani frontlines as of January 23:

1. The 72nd Division is reportedly operating near Sarrin, south of Kobani.[xxxv] Likely former Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) commander Brigadier General Aqil Mohammad al Amer commands the division, but it is unclear which 72nd Division units are present near Kobani.[xxxvi] The 72nd Division contains elements from several SNA militias that participated in Turkish-backed offensives targeting Kurdish fighters in northern Syria, including the Sultan Murad Division and Sultan Mehmed Fatih Division.[xxxvii] The Sultan Murad Division committed human rights abuses against Kurdish civilians and detainees throughout the civil war, and the European Union recently sanctioned the Sultan Murad Division in May 2025 for its involvement in human rights abuses on the Syrian coast in March 2025.[xxxviii] The 72nd Division reportedly secured the Sarrin Airport, south of Kobani, on January 23, possibly after deploying to the area from its positions near Tal Abyad, which is in the former SNA-controlled Peace Spring region.[xxxix] Assistant Defense Minister Fahim Issa visited 72nd Division units in the Peace Spring region on December 23 to discuss ”military readiness” and may have discussed coordination for an army offensive against SDF-held territory.[xl]
2. The 76th Division is reportedly operating along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, north of Sarrin.[xli] The division is dominated by the Hamza Division, which is a Turkish-backed Syrian faction that the United States sanctioned in 2023 for committing abuses against Syrian Kurds.[xlii] The Hamza Division also conducted arbitrary killings, torture, and other targeted violence against Alawites in early March 2025.[xliii] The United States and European Union have sanctioned 76th Division commander Brigadier General Sayf al Din Boulad (Sayf Abu Bakr) for committing human rights abuses as commander of the Hamza Division.[xliv] Abu Bakr and the Hamza Division have fought in several Turkish operations against the YPG in northern Syria.[xlv] Syrian media reported that Abu Bakr and the 76th Division secured Tishreen Dam on January 19 and later secured the former site of the Suleiman Shah mausoleum near the Qara Qozak Bridge on January 20.[xlvi] Local media later circulated reports that the 76th Division was operating along government-SDF frontlines near al Shuyoukh, along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[xlvii]
3. The 80th Division is reportedly operating in the southern Kobani countryside.[xlviii] Brigadier General Ahmed Mohammad Rizq commands the 80th Division.[xlix] Rizq is a prominent commander within Harakat Nour al Din al Zenki, which is an Aleppo-based militia that HTS co-opted and subordinated to itself in 2019.[l] The unit contains numerous former Harakat Nour al Din al Zenki fighters, but also likely contains the Mutasim Division, which is a former SNA militia that participated in Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016.[li] Syrian media reported on January 23 that the 80th Division's Third Brigade is also deployed in the Kobani countryside.[lii] Elements of the 80th Division recently participated in government forces’ assault on Deir Hafer.[liii]

Reports of atrocities and summary executions in northeastern Syria risk causing a resumption of intense government-SDF fighting or broader ethnic violence. There continue to be reports of SDF violence against Arab civilians and captured combatants in the Kobani and Hasakah regions.[liv] The Syrian government acknowledged the violence and called on Arab tribes in northeastern Syria to refrain from conducting reprisal attacks.[lv] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s Tribal Affairs Adviser, Jihad Issa al Sheikh, said that ethnic-motivated “separatist organizations” intend to “drag Arab tribes into war with the Kurds” and warned the tribes not to deviate from the government’s orders.[lvi] The government has also attempted to address atrocities and extrajudicial violence by creating reporting mechanisms to “redress any injustice or harm” in Deir ez Zor, Raqqa, and Hasakah provinces.[lvii] The SDF has continued to spread evidence of MoD abuses and atrocities against Kurds during the offensive.[lviii]

The Iranian regime has decided to restore international internet access nationwide over the next 24 hours, according to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media on January 23.[lix] The regime may assess that the internet shutdown’s negative economic consequences are more likely to reignite protests than allowing Iranian citizens to access the internet. IRGC-affiliated media reported that the regime began restoring international internet access in unspecified locations in Esfahan and Fars provinces on January 22 and would “gradually” restore internet in other provinces.[lx] Internet monitor NetBlocks also observed a “slight rise” in internet connectivity in Iran on January 22.[lxi] Regime elements, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, previously indicated the regime’s awareness of the internet shutdown’s negative impact on the Iranian economy.[lxii] An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel warned on January 21 that the economic consequences of the shutdown risked “stirring discontent.” Netblocks estimates that the countrywide internet shutdown costs the Iranian economy over $37 million USD per day.[lxiii] The secretary of the Iranian National Security Council told Iranian media on January 21 that this council and the Supreme National Security Council were prioritizing “security” over the economy in regard to the shutdown.[lxiv] These decision-making bodies may have concluded that continuing the internet shutdown poses a greater threat to Iran’s internal security than restoring internet access.

It remains unclear whether the regime will restore international internet access to the whole population, however. Internet monitor Filterwatch reported on January 15 that the Iranian regime is planning to provide international internet access only to individuals with “security clearance.”[lxv] Such a plan would significantly limit the number of Iranian citizens who could interact with internet users outside Iran. Filterwatch added that “users’ access to international internet will never return to its previous form,” which suggests that the regime may restrict who can access the international internet or further restrict the content that Iranians can view online even after it has claimed to “reopen” the international internet.[lxvi]

The Iranian regime is continuing to fail to provide its population with basic services, such as water and energy, which could increase the population’s grievances toward the regime.  Iran continues to face a nationwide shortage of natural gas, which is essential for heating systems during winter months. Several provinces across Iran announced the closure of schools, government offices, and banks on January 24 to conserve natural gas.[lxvii] The regime-owned National Iranian Gas Company reported that natural gas consumption reached a record high and called on Iranians to manage their national gas consumption, particularly in northern and northeastern Iran, on January 23.[lxviii] Gas shortages during the winter have previously triggered protests in northern Iran.[lxix]

The regime has also failed to address ongoing water shortages. Reservoirs across Iran are, on average, 35 percent full.[lxx] Iran’s water crisis is particularly acute in Tehran, where four of the reservoirs that provide water to the city are six percent full and therefore unusable..[lxxi] Commercially available satellite imagery between September 2024 and January 2026 corroborates Iranian media reports about decreasing water levels at the Karaj and Latyan reservoirs near Tehran City.[lxxii] The regime attempted to source more water in August 2025 by connecting eastern Tehran City to the Taleghan Reservoir in Alborz Province via a pipeline.[lxxiii] The Taleghan Reservoir’s water levels remain low too, however. Regime-affiliated media reported on January 23 that the reservoir’s water levels have decreased by 56 percent since 2024 and is only 23 percent full.[lxxiv] The only solution that regime officials have provided for the water crisis in Tehran City has been to evacuate residents to another location. Evacuating Tehran’s almost 15 million residents would be a tremendous undertaking and would require the regime to have a place to send citizens that has water, energy, and other basic necessities. The regime has neither stated where it would send Tehran residents nor presented a plan or made visible preparations to evacuate the city. The regime’s continued failure to address the energy and water crises sets Iran on a trajectory toward a possible humanitarian crisis and further popular unrest.

The United States threatened to limit the Iraqi federal government's access to its oil revenue as part of a broader US effort to curb Iranian influence within the Iraqi government. Four unspecified sources told Western media on January 23 that the United States recently threatened senior Iraqi officials with US sanctions, including sanctions targeting Iraq’s oil revenue account at the New York Federal Reserve, if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are included in the next government.[lxxv] The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has managed an account at the New York Federal Reserve on behalf of the Iraqi Finance Ministry since 2003 that holds the Iraqi federal government’s revenue from oil exports in US dollars.[lxxvi] Oil revenue accounts for about 90 percent of Iraq’s state budget.[lxxvii] Curtailing Iraqi government access to its oil revenue account would very likely hinder the Iraqi government's ability to fund domestic spending and provide liquidity for Iraqi banks.

This US threat is part of a broader US effort to limit Iranian influence in Iraq by pressuring the Iraqi government to exclude Iranian-backed Iraqi political actors from Iraq’s government. Five Iraqi officials told Qatari media in December 2025 that the United States told the Shia Coordination Framework and the Iraqi federal government that it will not engage with any prime minister or appointee to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, Counterterrorism Service, National Intelligence Service, or Iraqi Army Chief of Staff position who has ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lxxviii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Five unspecified sources told the Financial Times on January 3 that US officials demanded the replacement of newly-elected Iraqi First Deputy Parliament Speaker Adnan Fayhan, who is a member of Sadiqoun, the political bloc of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq.[lxxix]

Key Takeaways

• The SDF-Syrian Government Ceasefire: The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) may agree to extend the US-mediated ceasefire, according to Kurdish sources and mediators. The ceasefire is facilitating US forces’ transfer of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq and enabling Syrian government forces to secure detention facilities and internally displaced persons camps that house ISIS supporters.
• Syrian Government Forces near Kobani: The Syrian government has deployed at least three Aleppo-based Syrian divisions along Kobani frontlines that contain militias or fighters that have participated in Turkish-backed offensives targeting the YPG in northern Syria and, in some cases, committed human rights abuses against Kurdish civilians.
• Internet Shutdown in Iran: The Iranian regime has decided to restore international internet access nationwide over the next 24 hours, according to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media on January 23. The regime may assess that the internet shutdown’s negative economic consequences are more likely to reignite protests than allowing Iranian citizens to access the internet. It remains unclear whether the regime will restore international internet access to the whole population, however.
• Iran’s Social Service Failures: The Iranian regime is continuing to fail to provide its population with basic services, such as water and energy, which could increase the population’s grievances toward the regime. The regime’s continued failure to address the energy and water crises sets Iran on a trajectory toward a possible humanitarian crisis and further popular unrest.
• Iranian Influence in Iraq: The United States threatened to limit the Iraqi federal government's access to its oil revenue as part of a broader US effort to curb Iranian influence within the Iraqi government.

Iran

Prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid directly challenged the regime’s narrative about the recent protests in his sermon on January 23 by confirming that the regime killed thousands of Iranian civilians during the protests.[lxxx] Abdol Hamid stated that the death toll from the recent protests has “astonished and stunned” Iranians and the world.[lxxxi] Abdol Hamid added that the protesters whom the regime killed were Iranians, not “foreigners,” which challenges the regime’s narrative that the individuals who participated in the protests were “terrorists” backed by foreign actors.[lxxxii]  Abdol Hamid also called for the release of detained protesters and the immediate restoration of the international internet.[lxxxiii] Abdol Hamid often criticizes the regime in his weekly sermons and has been a catalyst for protests in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Zahedan residents started conducting weekly protests after Abdol Hamid’s sermons after the regime violently cracked down on protesters in September 2022 in an incident that became known as “Bloody Friday.”[lxxxiv] Zahedan residents continued to hold weekly protests long after the Mahsa Amini movement had culminated in other parts of Iran.[lxxxv] CTP-ISW did not record any protests in Zahedan on January 23. A human rights organization that monitors developments in Sistan and Baluchistan Province reported on January 23 a large presence of military and security forces near Makki Mosque, where Abdol Hamid leads Friday prayers.[lxxxvi]

An anti-regime social media account that has monitored the recent protests in Iran and a BBC Persian reporter reported on January 22 that Iranian authorities executed Ali Rahbar, presumably for participating in the protests.[lxxxvii] The BBC Persian journalist reported that Iranian authorities arrested Rahbar 10 days ago, citing information he obtained from Rahbar’s relatives.[lxxxviii] Rahbar's relatives told the journalist that they do not have any details about the charges that led to his execution.[lxxxix] CTP-ISW can neither verify these reports nor confirm that Rahbar was arrested for participating in the protests.

The US Treasury Department sanctioned eight shipping companies and nine shadow fleet vessels for transporting “hundreds of millions of dollars” worth of Iranian oil to foreign markets [xc] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent emphasized that the new US sanctions target a "critical component of how Iran generates the funds used to repress its own people.”[xci] The US Treasury Department stated that it is increasing pressure on Iran’s shadow fleet because this fleet generates revenue that the Iranian regime uses to fund the Axis of Resistance, its weapons programs, and Iranian security services.[xcii]

Iraq

US and Iraqi officials told the Associated Press on January 22 that the Iraqi federal government “proactively” requested the transfer of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq in an effort to avoid ISIS detainees escaping from SDF-controlled detention facilities amid Syrian government-SDF fighting in northeastern Syria.[xciii] A Syrian Foreign Ministry official told the Associated Press that the plan to transfer ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq had been under discussion for months.[xciv] CENTCOM announced on January 21 that US forces moved 150 fighters from a Hasakah facility to an unspecified “secure facility” in Iraq.[xcv] The United States may transfer up to 7,000 ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraqi-controlled facilities, according to CENTCOM.[xcvi] CENTCOM’s announcement followed fighting between the Syrian government and the SDF that resulted in over 100 ISIS fighters escaping from Shaddadi Prison in northeastern Syria into the surrounding area on January 19.[xcvii] Iraqi officials have taken steps to enhance Iraq-Syria border security in recent days due to concerns that instability in Syria will cause the threat of ISIS to spill over into Iraq.[xcviii]

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.