Iran Update, January 22, 2026

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

The Syrian government surrounded Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters in Kobani, likely as the first part of a multi-stage operation to reduce the SDF forces there. Civilians have fled to Kobani as fighting approached their villages south of Kobani, leading to a larger than standard population there.[i] Civilians in Kobani have no access to electricity or water, though it is unclear at this time whether SDF shelling caused electricity and water infrastructure to fail or if the government deliberately cut Kobani’s access to those resources.[ii] The government claims that SDF caused the outages by damaging energy infrastructure near Tishreen Dam.[iii] This explanation is questionable because such damage would presumably cause outages throughout northern Syria, depending on which infrastructure received damage. The SDF also claimed that the government cut off internet access. Syrian forces and the SDF engaged each other in the entire southern and southwestern countryside of Kobani on January 22 despite the ceasefire.[iv] Syrian government forces appear to control the east-west M4 highway as of January 20, which will also aid their deployment to Kobani and cut off an SDF retreat from Kobani in the absence of a negotiated settlement.[v] A YPJ commander confirmed on January 22 that Kobani is surrounded by government forces and that the SDF is unable to receive reinforcements.[vi]

The next phases of this operation may include the opening of an evacuation route to enable civilians to leave before the main assault. The pattern of events and government deployments around Kobani resembles recent government isolate-and-reduce operations against the SDF in Aleppo City and Deir Hafer, which suggests the Syrian military will employ a similar concept of operations. The Syrian military forced the surrender of SDF-held territory, including the Kurdish exclaves of Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo City, in early January 2026 by cutting off electricity to Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud on January 4, offering an evacuation route on January 7, and surrounding the territory with three divisions by January 8.[vii] The Syrian military then forced the surrender of SDF-held Deir Hafer days later by cutting off electricity to the town on January 12, surrounding it with several divisions by January 13, and announcing an evacuation option on January 14.[viii] The final assault began in Aleppo on January 8 and in Deir Hafer on January 17.[ix] The Deir Hafer and Aleppo cases suggest that the government will open the evacuation corridor sometime in the next several days, and the assault will occur several days after that, probably after the ceasefire (assuming it fails). The Syrian Interior Ministry posted a video of its personnel ready to “deploy to Kobani” on January 22, suggesting that it expects to enter the city soon.[x]

Government forces operating in northeastern Syria have committed isolated violations against local populations, which could trigger the resumption of intense fighting between Kurdish and government forces or broader ethnic violence.[xi] The Military Security and Police Command at the Ministry of Defense acknowledged on January 20 that its fighters had committed violations during the last week, so fighting “despite the clear directives and instructions that were circulated to all relevant units and entities.”[xii] The government has begun legal proceedings against the violators and removed them from the frontlines.[xiii] The government’s public reiteration of its expectations will not be sufficient to stop future violations, however. Violations continue to be a concern because Shara has deployed divisions to the northeast containing abusive militias that have previously launched unsanctioned attacks on minority communities, including Kurds, and significantly destabilized the situation by doing so.[xiv] Reports of violations by elements of the SDF continue to spread on social media and can also trigger reprisals from Syrian government forces.[xv] A series of coordinated attacks that Alawite insurgents launched on government positions on the Syrian coast in March 2025 triggered violent reprisals from Syrian security forces and non-government militias that do not answer to the government’s orders.[xvi] A scenario in which Syrian government forces advance into dense Kurdish areas, such as Kobani, and confront both Kurdish fighters and civilians could lead to another catastrophic round of communal-based violence.

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi held “productive and constructive” discussions with US officials in Erbil on January 22 about the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state.[xvii] Abdi and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria Foreign Affairs Co-Chair Ilham Ahmed met with US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack and US Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper.[xviii] Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government President Nechirvan Barzani facilitated the meeting.[xix] The Syrian government and SDF are currently parties to a ceasefire that allows Abdi four days to secure their agreement to Shara’s terms, which include the integration of the SDF and its remaining territory into the Syrian state.[xx] Abdi’s meetings in Erbil are likely part of his efforts to ”develop a detailed plan” to integrate the SDF and its territory into the Syrian state. The current SDF-government ceasefire gives Abdi about 48 remaining hours to continue these consultations, as of this writing.[xxi]

Neither Abdi nor US officials indicated that any progress has been made towards a permanent ceasefire between the SDF and the Syrian government. Barrack said in a statement after his meeting with Abdi that the United States fully supports “advancing the integration process outlined in the January 18 agreement.”[xxii] The January 18 agreement, which Abdi and Shara both agreed to before Abdi backed out the next day, outlined broad SDF concessions on several of the demands that the SDF has made over the past year, including a clause requiring that the SDF integrates ”on an individual basis” into the Syrian defense and interior ministries.[xxiii] The SDF has long demanded that its fighters integrate as a ”bloc” into the Syrian army, for example.[xxiv] Kurdish media reported that Abdi and Barrack’s meeting resulted in a ”preliminary framework” that integrates Kurdish areas into the Syrian state while retaining some local Kurdish governing authority, citing a participant in the meeting.[xxv] The parties reportedly discussed integrating SDF fighters into the Syrian army under a ”collective structure” rather than individually, as the January 18 agreement specified.[xxvi] Abdi also spoke with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani on January 22.[xxvii] The phone call went ”smoothly,” according to two unspecified sources familiar with the negotiations.[xxviii]

The Iranian regime is trying to downplay the scale of its brutal crackdown on the protests, despite implicitly admitting its crackdown has been the deadliest in Iran’s modern history. The Iranian National Security Council (NSC) claimed on January 21 that the death toll of the recent protests is 3,117 and that 2,427 of those are the deaths of security forces and “innocent” civilians who were caught in the crosshairs of “terrorist attacks.”[xxix] The regime killed about 1,500 and 550 people during the 2019 and 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, respectively.[xxx] The regime’s claimed death toll for the current wave of protests exceeds the previous two protest death tolls combined, even if the regime’s numbers are accurate. The regime’s numbers are almost certainly lower than the real death toll, however. United Nations Special Representative for Human Rights in Iran Mai Soto estimated on January 19 that the death toll is at least 5,000, adding that reports from doctors inside Iran stated that the number could be 20,000 or more.[xxxi] The regime is also trying to inflate the number of security force deaths by conflating civilians with police. Anti-regime media reported on January 21 that security forces compelled the family of a deceased protester to claim that their son was a Basij member in exchange for his body, which allows the regime to portray itself as the victims of “terrorists.”[xxxii] The regime is also concerned with controlling the outflow of information regarding the death tolls. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated during a meeting with Iranian medical professionals on January 21 that it is very important to “convince” the medical community about the regime’s narrative on the protests because it would help reduce tensions and control “social consequences.”[xxxiii] Iranian doctors and hospitals can correctly assess the true death toll in Iran and have reported it to Western media.[xxxiv]

Some Iranian security personnel have been reluctant or refused to violently suppress protests. Security forces’ willingness to suppress protests will be a determining factor in the regime’s ability to contain future unrest. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization previously issued a statement on January 9 that it is “dealing with possible acts of abandonment,” which may indicate concerns about refusal of orders, desertion, or defection.[xxxv] Anti-regime media, citing unspecified sources in Iran, reported on January 22 that “many” Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) members are “unhappy with the situation,” and are being forced to show up at work under threat of harm.[xxxvi] The LEC is Iran’s national police force and is the regime’s first line of defense during unrest.[xxxvii] Recent reporting also suggests some Iranian security personnel have refused orders, including reports that authorities arrested “dozens” of security forces in Kermanshah Province for refusing to fire on protesters, according to Norway-based human rights group Hengaw on January 8.[xxxviii] An Israeli media outlet separately reported on January 20 that hundreds of junior and mid-level IRGC and Basij officers have defected, according to Western intelligence agencies.[xxxix] It is unclear why these Western intelligence sources would give information to an Israeli outlet before giving this information to a Western outlet, though it is not implausible that they would do so. Norway-based Human Rights media reported on January 21 that Iranian authorities sentenced conscript Javid Khales to death for refusing an order to shoot at protesters, which suggests an effort by the regime to deter others from refusing similar orders.[xl] The regime is unlikely to lose the ability to deploy the LEC, Basij, and IRGC forces, but it could lose the willingness of some personnel to use lethal force, which could make repression less consistent across different locations in the future.

The Shia Coordination Framework continues to debate State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s nomination as prime minister. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. National State Forces Alliance head Ammar al Hakim and Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali continue to oppose Maliki obtaining the position.[xli] Maliki held separate meetings with Hakim and Khazali on January 18 and 20, almost certainly to gain their support for his premiership bid.[xlii] Current Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reportedly conditioned his withdrawal from the race on January 12 on Maliki meeting a list of conditions that Maliki is unlikely to meet at the time of this writing.[xliii] Maliki needs to receive the approval from all framework leaders, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr, and unspecified Kurdish and Sunni political parties in order to win another term, according to information that unspecified actors leaked to Kurdish media.[xliv] CTP-ISW assessed on January 13 that Sudani may be wagering that Maliki will fail to meet these reported conditions, as Sudani would reportedly receive the premiership with the framework’s backing if this occurs.[xlv] Iraqi media noted that recent tweets by Progress Party head Mohammad al Halbousi indicate that Halbousi opposes Maliki serving another term, which means that Maliki may fail to meet another of Sudani’s reported conditions.[xlvi] Iraqi government formation historically includes competition between rival political blocs for power and resources, which is reflected in the framework’s continued debates over the selection of the next prime minister.[xlvii]

Iran has publicly and privately weighed in on Iraqi government formation, including the selection of the prime minister, but the regime’s preferred scenario is unclear. Political sources told Iraqi media on January 22 that different groups within the framework are interpreting a recent Iranian message regarding the premiership differently.[xlviii] An unspecified framework group in support of Maliki said that Iran’s message endorsed Maliki’s selection.[xlix] A framework member aligned with Hakim said in a recent interview that the Iranian message advocated for framework consensus but did not support a particular candidate.[l] A source from the framework “camp” that is neutral regarding Maliki’s bid for the premiership denied that Iran has intervened at all due to its preoccupation with “internal and regional affairs.”[li] Lebanese media similarly noted contradictory reports regarding Iranian messaging. Unspecified political sources told Hezbollah-affiliated al Akhbar news on January 22 that unspecified framework leaders recently sent a request to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali al Khamenei for intervention “on behalf of a compromise candidate.”[lii] Khamenei responded by calling for a consensus candidate without endorsing a specific name, according to the same unspecified framework leaders.[liii] “Informed sources” separately told al Akhbar on January 22 that Khamenei sent a message via IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani that endorsed Maliki for prime minister.[liv] Ghaani last visited Baghdad on January 8, when he met with unspecified Iranian-backed militia leaders to discuss militia disarmament.[lv] Iran has vaguely expressed that Iraqi government formation should “support stability and strengthen the [Iraqi] political process” via a letter Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi sent to Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein on January 6.[lvi]

The threat of instability in Syria spreading to Iraq could stoke further opposition to Maliki obtaining another term as prime minister. Unidentified political sources told Iraqi media on January 21 that unspecified framework parties have argued that security events on the Iraq-Syria border necessitate a review of the framework’s mechanism for nominating the prime minister, due to concerns about Maliki serving another term.[lvii] The Iraqi federal government, especially Sudani, has taken several steps to enhance border security amid the Syrian government’s offensive against the SDF, which includes mobilizing Iraqi army and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units along the border.[lviii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that is primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias who answer to Iran instead of the prime minister.[lix] The unidentified framework parties are reportedly concerned that Iraqi Sunnis and the Syrian government could view appointing Maliki to the premiership as a “provocative message,” due to Maliki's ongoing opposition to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara as well as Maliki’s historic relationship with the former Assad regime.[lx] Maliki publicly criticized Sudani’s invitation for Shara to attend the Arab Summit in Baghdad in May 2025.[lxi] Maliki also exacerbated Sunni grievances towards the Shia-dominated Iraqi federal government while in office, which explains why some framework parties think Iraqi Sunnis would view him serving another term negatively.[lxii] Maliki’s sectarian tendencies have even caused tension with other framework members. Maliki attempted to try to prevent the implementation of a law favored by Sunnis in February 2025, despite consensus by Iran and the rest of the framework to support the law’s implementation to prevent conflict between Shia and Sunni parties in Iraq.[lxiii] 

Key Takeaways

• Syrian Government Operations in Kobani: The Syrian government surrounded Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters in Kobani, likely as the first part of a multi-stage operation to reduce the SDF forces there. The next phases of this operation may include the opening of an evacuation route to enable civilians to leave before the main assault.
• Syrian Government Violence Against Civilians: Government forces operating in northeastern Syria have committed isolated violations against local populations, which could trigger the resumption of intense fighting between Kurdish and government forces or broader ethnic violence. The Military Security and Police Command at the Ministry of Defense acknowledged on January 20 that its fighters had committed violations during the last week, so fighting “despite the clear directives and instructions that were circulated to all relevant units and entities.”
• SDF-US Discussions: SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi held “productive and constructive” discussions with US officials in Erbil on January 22 about the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state. Neither Abdi nor US officials indicated that any progress has been made towards a permanent ceasefire between the SDF and the Syrian government. Barrack said in a statement after his meeting with Abdi that the United States fully supports “advancing the integration process outlined in the January 18 agreement.
• Iran's Protest Crackdown: The Iranian regime is trying to downplay the scale of its brutal crackdown on the protests, despite implicitly admitting its crackdown has been the deadliest in Iran’s modern history. Some Iranian security personnel have been reluctant or refused to violently suppress protests. Security forces’ willingness to suppress protests will be a determining factor in the regime’s ability to contain future unrest.
• Iraqi Government Formation: The Shia Coordination Framework continues to debate State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s nomination as prime minister. The threat of instability in Syria spreading to Iraq could stoke further opposition to Maliki obtaining another term as prime minister.

Iran

Iranian regime decision-making bodies have not yet agreed on the timing or terms of lifting the internet shutdown amid the regime’s continued concerns that restoring internet access could reignite future protests. The regime’s apprehension about restoring internet access aligns with CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment that the regime's refusal to address the protesters’ demands for economic reform risks future protests.[lxiv] The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the SNSC’s sub-committee, National Security Council (NSC), are prioritizing “security” over the economy, according to the NSC Secretary and Deputy Interior Minister for security and law enforcement matters, Ali Akbar Pourjamshidian, on January 21.[lxv] He made this comment as he discussed the internet shutdown, which suggests that the regime will continue to prioritize security by maintaining the internet shutdown rather than lifting the internet shutdown to alleviate Iran’s economic challenges.  The NSC ordered the internet shutdown on January 8, and the SNSC has overseen this policy.[lxvi]  Pourjamshidian is almost certainly referring to the regime prioritizing the prevention of future protests. Pourjamshidian did not provide a timeline for when the NSC would lift the shutdown.[lxvii] Regime officials are reportedly planning to provide full internet access only to Iranian personnel with top security clearances, according to information acquired by an anti-regime censorship platform on January 15, however.[lxviii]

President Masoud Pezeshkian and two of his political appointees, in contrast, recently signaled support for easing internet restrictions, largely due to concerns about the shutdown’s negative economic impact.[lxix] Pezeshkian serves as the SNSC chairman.[lxx] Some Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) elements similarly expressed support for lifting the shutdown due to economic concerns on January 21.[lxxi] These elements are also possibly concerned about shutdown limitations on IRGC activities.

Iraq

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Ali al Askari expressed doubt that the United States withdrew from Ain al Asad Airbase, likely in an effort to justify the continued existence of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lxxii] Askari released a statement on January 21 that claimed that the US withdrawal from Ain al Asad is the “third of its kind” in the past two years and accused the United States of repeatedly and intentionally misleading Iraqis by announcing withdrawals but only ”repositioning” forces in the past.[lxxiii]  US-led international coalition forces completed their planned withdrawal from Ain al Asad on January 17, which marked the end of the first phase of the US withdrawal from Iraq.[lxxiv] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from federal Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw from the country by the end of 2026.[lxxv] The United States reduced its military personnel in Iraq from 2,500 to less than 2,000 in September 2025 and redeployed most of the remaining personnel to Iraqi Kurdistan.[lxxvi]  About 250 to 350 US “military advisors and support personnel” remained at Ain al Asad until January 17, 2025, to support US operations against ISIS in Syria, however.[lxxvii]  The US withdrawal is occurring amid policy conversations in Iraq about the disarmament of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, who commonly use the US presence in Iraq as a justification for their existence.[lxxviii]

Askari also downplayed concerns about instability from Syria spreading to Iraq and called on the Iraqi security establishment to confront the threat of ISIS.[lxxix] Askari said that the weak financial, organizational, and military situation of the Syrian government prevents Syrian forces from operating outside of Syrian territory.[lxxx] Askari added that the Iraqi security services must be ready to combat a potential increase in “cross-border operations” by vague ”elements” associated with the Syrian government, which presumably refers to ISIS and other Salafi-jihadist terrorist organizations. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors tend to consider Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and the Syrian government to be “terrorists” and see it as an “ISIS government“ due to Shara’s past with al Qaeda in Iraq, Shara’s current opposition to both al Qaeda and ISIS notwithstanding.[lxxxi] I

The Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council announced on January 22 that it had launched legal proceedings to try Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) detainees transferred from Syria to Iraq.[lxxxii] US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on January 21 that US forces moved 150 fighters from a Hasakah facility to an unspecified “secure facility” in Iraq.[lxxxiii] The United States may transfer up to 7,000 ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraqi-controlled facilities, according to CENTCOM.[lxxxiv] Iraqi Armed Forces Spokesperson Major General Sabah al Numan confirmed on January 22 that Iraq’s acceptance of the 150 ISIS fighters.[lxxxv] The Supreme Judicial Council manages the Iraqi judiciary.[lxxxvi] Iraq has previously tried to repel foreign ISIS fighters.[lxxxvii]

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Recent Israeli airstrikes and Syrian smuggling interdictions indicate that Hezbollah is likely continuing to smuggle weaponry that it would use to defend against Israeli ground operations in Lebanon. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) struck four smuggling routes near Hawsh Sayed Ali, northeastern Lebanon, on January 21 that Hezbollah used to smuggle weaponry into the country.[lxxxviii] Hezbollah has frequently used smuggling routes between al Qusayr, Syria, and Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley that transit through Hawsh Sayed Ali to smuggle weapons into Lebanon.[lxxxix] The Lebanese Armed Forces previously deployed a limited number of forces to Hawsh Sayed Ali in March 2025 in an attempt to close illegal border crossings in the area.[xc] The Lebanese government estimated in July 2025 that there are about 136 illegal crossing points on the Lebanon-Syria border.[xci] The IDF also reported on January 21 that it killed a prominent Hezbollah weapons smuggler in the Sidon district, southern Lebanon.[xcii] The smuggler reportedly ran a weapons smuggling network that transported weapons from Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.[xciii] Syrian authorities have seized multiple smuggled weapons shipments in western Syria in December 2025 that were likely bound for Hezbollah, which included around 100 rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and 1,250 landmines equipped with detonators.[xciv] The specific weaponry seized by the Syrian authorities suggests that Hezbollah continues to attempt to smuggle munitions necessary to defend against any possible Israeli ground operation in Lebanon. Hezbollah widely uses both mines and RPGs.[xcv] The Syrian authorities’ repeated interdictions in northwestern Syria demonstrate that Syrian authorities are continuing to conduct counter-smuggling efforts in these areas, but these interdictions almost certainly represent a small percentage of total smuggling activity between Syria and Lebanon.