Indicators of Iranian Regime Collapse: Special Report

Updated: January 14, 9:00 AM ET

The ongoing protests in Iran mark the most serious domestic unrest that the Islamic Republic has faced. The protests could alter the character of the regime fundamentally or even topple it.

CTP-ISW currently assesses that the unprecedentedly brutal crackdown that the regime is conducting has broadly suppressed protest activity and may get the protests under control if no other factors intervene. The internet blackout, now extended to efforts to find and confiscate Starlink and other satellite communications dishes, makes assessing the current extent of protest activity difficult, but indirect indicators strongly suggest that more protests are taking place than CTP-ISW can document. The regime has responded to this protest wave with much more force and lethality than in any previous wave, indicating its fear that it can lose control of the situation. It remains unclear whether the regime will be able to sustain the current levels of oppression long enough to end this protest wave. CTP-ISW will not attempt to forecast the effects of possible US or other international action in support of the protesters at this time, since the nature and likelihood of such action remains extremely unclear. CTP-ISW has observed indicators that separatist militias are seeking to take advantage of the protest movement to position themselves for post-regime pushes for autonomy and independence, highlighting the importance of thoughtful and careful planning for post-regime scenarios.

This document identifies indicators of reduced regime stability and the degree to which we have observed evidence that those indicators have been tripped (that is, that a given indicator now points toward regime instability). Indicators are presented as tripped, partially tripped, or unobserved. When indicators are shown as unobserved, that simply means that we have not seen evidence using open source information.

This document highlights what open source information reveals about the protests and their implications for regime stability. This document is not an assessment of the likelihood of distinct scenarios, however. The regime could transform fundamentally or collapse without many of the indicators tripped. Conversely, the regime could retain power and persist in its current form even after most indicators have tripped. Indeed, many of the indicators presented here have tripped in previous major protest waves in Iran without significantly affecting the regime. The indicators that we have observed should therefore be understood as signs of regime instability that could increase the likelihood of some kind of regime change in Iran but that may also fall short of generating major change. Forecasting how the security situation in Iran will evolve is difficult at this moment especially due to the unique circumstances. The regime has never before faced large-scale protests and the simultaneous risk of military escalation with the United States and Israel. This situation could change how both protesters and the regime act in ways that make some of these indicators misleading. We will try to forecast where the regime is headed based on open source information, nevertheless. Our running assessments and forecasts can be found above and in our daily Iran update here.

Our analysis focuses on the Iranian internal security apparatus, which the regime has spent decades optimizing for domestic repression. Our core assumption is that the regime will survive as long as its leaders and security forces retain the ability and willingness to suppress domestic unrest. The ability and willingness of the security forces to suppress protests violently and lethally are thus among the most significant factors in determining the trajectory of the regime. The officers involved in protest crackdowns are generally part of one of three security services: the Law Enforcement Command (LEC), Basij Organization, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[i] The first regime line of defense is the LEC, which is the national police force. If regular police officers cannot contain protests, the LEC deploys the Special Units, which are its highly trained anti-riot force. The LEC has around 200,000-300,000 members, though it is unclear how many belong to the Special Units.[ii] The Basij is a paramilitary force responsible for civil defense and social control. In the early stages of protests, the regime often deploys its low-level Basij units to supplement the LEC and conduct intelligence and protest suppression functions. The Basij has an estimated 450,000 personnel, many of whom are not fit for protest suppression, such as those who manage propaganda and socio-cultural programs for the regime.[iii] If the LEC and low-level Basij are insufficient to control protests, the regime will deploy its elite Basij units, which receive extensive ideological training and are designed for brutal repression. In the most extreme cases, the regime deploys the IRGC Ground Forces—conventional military units that are dispersed across major cities and towns—to apply extreme force against protesters. The IRGC Ground Forces have around 150,000 members distributed across 32 regional units.[iv] The only remaining force that the regime has at its disposal beyond those already identified is the conventional military known as the Artesh. The Artesh Ground Forces consist of around 350,000 personnel.[v] The regime has in some cases deployed Artesh members to guard key facilities during countrywide protests in order to create bandwidth for the other security services to focus on repression. Iranian leaders have long hesitated to involve the Artesh further in protest crackdowns, however, because the Artesh has been a significantly less ideological force and does not receive extensive training in crowd control.

Indicators that the regime is losing the ability or willingness to control the population through force

Tripped:

1. Security personnel defecting or refusing to repress protests—indicates that the regime has lost control of some security forces
2. Security forces withdrawing or retreating from protest scenes—indicates that security forces lack the will or ability to control certain protests
3. Deployment of IRGC conventional units for repression—indicates that the LEC and Basij have failed to control the protests or are not available in sufficient numbers to do so
4. Deployment of foreign militias for repression—indicates that the regime seeks to free bandwidth for security forces or is concerned about security personnel defections
5. Simultaneous protests in major cities and rural areas—indicates that protests could strain the bandwidth of security forces
6. Unusually high rate of security force casualties—indicates that protesters are increasingly violent or capable
7. Senior officials engaging Chinese, Russia, or North Korean representatives—indicates that the regime is seeking help with repression
8. Damning leaks about regime activities and data—indicates that there is dissent among some regime personnel
9. Regime framing of protesters in extreme terms, such as “terrorists”—indicates that the regime is trying to generate buy-in among reluctant security personnel or generate a sense of fear among protesters and security personnel considering defection

Partially tripped:

1. Destruction of key facilities or regime symbols—indicates that security forces are degraded under mounting strain
2. Expanding insurgent operations in border regions—indicates that security forces are degraded under mounting strain
3. Deployment of the Artesh to guard key locations—indicates that the regime seeks to free bandwidth for security forces

Unobserved:

• Deployment of elite Basij units for repression—would indicate that the LEC has failed to control the protests
• Deployment of the Artesh for repression—would indicate that the regime has become desperate and willing to risk using an untrained and less ideological force
• Deployment of IRGC units outside the Ground Forces for repression—would indicate that the regime has become desperate and willing to risk using an untrained force
• New appointments for critical military and security positions—would indicate that the regime is dissatisfied or has some critical issue with the incumbents in those positions
• Protesters occupying city centers for extended periods or accessing sensitive locations—indicates that security forces lack the ability to control certain protests
• Sustained protests without an accompanying crackdown—would indicate that security forces lack the will or ability to control certain protests
• Regime encouraging vigilantism to suppress protests—would indicate that security forces are degraded under mounting strain
• Elevated rates of non-protest-related crime—could indicate that security forces are degraded under mounting strain
• Protesters communicating and coordinating across cities and provinces—would indicate that the protesters have some form or organization
• Protesters using sophisticated weapons or tactics—would indicate that protesters are increasingly capable
• Protesters identifying themselves under certain banners or labels—would indicate that the protesters have some form or organization
• Significant protest activity appearing rapidly in unusual areas—could indicate that protesters are planning and coordinating
• Senior officials breaking from regime rhetoric and talking points—would indicate that there are divisions in regime leadership
• Senior officials leaving Iran for unusual business—could indicate that some are fleeing or preparing to do so
• Damning leaks of highly sensitive regime information—would indicate that there is dissent among the seniormost Iranian officials
• Regime offering salary increases or other financial incentives to security personnel—could indicate that the regime is concerned about the morale of security forces
• Senior officials meeting with low-level security personnel—would indicate that the regime is concerned about the morale of security forces
• Easing the internet shutdown without reduced protest activity—could indicate that there are defections among regime personnel responsible for the shutdown
• State media publishing anti-regime content or information that is sympathetic to protesters—would indicate that there are defections among state media personnel

Evidence for tripped and partially tripped indicators

Tripped:

1. Security personnel defecting or refusing to repress protests
   1. The regime reportedly arrested “dozens” of security forces in Kermanshah who refused to fire at protesters.[vi] The IRGC Intelligence Organization separately stated that it is “dealing with possible acts of abandonment,” which suggests that some Iranian security personnel may have defected or that the regime is concerned about this possibility.[vii]
2. Security forces withdrawing or retreating from protest scenes
   1. Security Forces have retreated from protests in Bushehr City, Bushehr Province, and Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province, due to the size and intensity of protests.[viii]
3. Deployment of IRGC conventional units for repression
   1. The regime has deployed the IRGC Ground Forces 29th Nabi Akram Division to suppress protests in Kermanshah.[ix] The regime may have deployed conventional IRGC units to suppress protests elsewhere, such as Bukan, West Azerbaijan Province, and Ilam Province, as well.[x] Armed Forces General Staff-run media threatened to deploy the IRGC Saberin Special Forces Brigade and units under the IRGC Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base to suppress protests.[xi]
4. Deployment of foreign militias for repression
   1. Anti-regime media reported that around 800 Iranian-backed Iraqi militiamen have traveled to Iran to suppress protests.[xii] A Fox News correspondent similarly reported that Iranian officials have asked Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to intervene in support of the regime.[xiii]
5. Simultaneous protests in major cities and rural areas
   1. CTP-ISW has published daily protest maps since December 29, 2025, showing how protests have fluctuated across major cities, such as Tehran and Mashhad, and less-populated areas simultaneously.
6. Unusually high rate of security force casualties
   1. IRGC-affiliated media reported 121 regime security personnel deaths as of January 12.[xiv] Some estimates indicate that the security forces have incurred as many as 500 personnel deaths. This represents a dramatic escalation from the 2022-23 Mahsa Amini protests, during which around 70 security personnel died.[xv] The Mahsa Amini protests had been the deadliest protest wave for security personnel until the current protests.
7. Senior officials engaging Chinese, Russia, or North Korean representatives
   1. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani held a phone call with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, almost certainly to discuss the ongoing protests in Iran.[xvi]
8. Damning leaks about regime activities and data
   1. An LEC officer from an unspecified Kurdish-majority city in northwestern Iran told TIME that security forces disagree over whether a “massive” regime crackdown on protests will contain the protests or incite further unrest. The officer said that all of the officers at his station believe the regime is collapsing.[xvii] Iranian sources, including some from the Presidential Office and Supreme National Security Council, have spoken to Western media, reporting extremely high protest death numbers. Such leaks likely reflect dissent among regime personnel.[xviii]
9. Regime framing of protesters in extreme terms, such as “terrorists”
   1. Iranian officials and state media have repeatedly described protesters as “armed terrorists.”[xix]

Partially Tripped:

1. Destruction of key facilities or regime symbols

   1. Protesters have set fire to government buildings and institutions across Iran.[xx] Protesters have also set fire to regime symbols, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran flag and statues of regime figures.[xxi]

2. Expanding insurgent operations in border regions

   1. The Mobarizoun Popular Front has conducted two attacks targeting Iranian security officers in Sistan and Baluchistan Province in response to regime repression.[xxii]
   2. The Kurdistan National Guard announced that its “Zagros Tornado units” attacked an IRGC base in Nourabad, Lorestan Province, and injured three IRGC members.[xxiii]

3. Deployment of the Artesh to guard key locations

   1. An Iranian social media user published a video of Artesh forces deployed in Karaj, Alborz Province.[xxiv]