Iran Update, February 26, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

Iran is unlikely to accept reported US demands to destroy its nuclear facilities, send its highly enriched uranium to the US, and commit to a permanent deal. US officials have previously stated that the US would strike Iran if the two sides cannot reach a deal.[i] The United States and Iran held a third round of nuclear talks on February 26 in Geneva, Switzerland.[ii] Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi stated that there was “significant progress” during the talks and that both sides will hold technical-level discussions in Vienna next week.[iii]  US officials’ accounts of the talks suggest that Iran is unlikely to accept reported US demands, however. US officials told the Wall Street Journal on February 26 that US negotiators demanded that Iran dismantle its Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan nuclear facilities, deliver all of its enriched uranium to the United States, and agree to a permanent deal without sunset clauses.[iv] The officials also said that US negotiators reiterated their zero-enrichment demand but ”could be open” to a scenario in which Iran can enrich a very low level of uranium “for medical purposes.”[v] These accounts are consistent with previous reporting that the US negotiators would consider a proposal that includes “token enrichment” if Iran credibly proved that it could not support building a nuclear weapon.[vi] US negotiators reportedly offered only “minimal sanctions relief,” which contradicts Iranian demands for a more substantial relief package.[vii] An unspecified Iranian source with knowledge of the discussions told CNN on February 26 that ending all US and UNSC sanctions is ”key” in order to reach any deal.[viii] The source added that Iran is not willing to destroy its nuclear facilities, enrich uranium in compliance with the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification process, or ship enriched uranium out of the country.[ix] US President Donald Trump warned Iran of “bad things” on February 24 if the two sides fail to reach a deal.[x] 

The Iranian proposal does not meet core US demands. US officials told the Wall Street Journal that Iran’s proposal would force Iran to reduce enrichment to as low as 1.5 percent, pause enrichment for a number of years, and process its enriched uranium through an Iran-based regional consortium.[xi] Four unspecified Iranian officials told the New York Times on February 26 that Iran would also offer to dilute its 400 kg of 60 percent-enriched uranium in phases and allow IAEA inspectors to oversee all steps.[xii] Diluting enriched uranium in Iran does not meet the stated US demand that Iran transfer all of its nuclear material to the United States. Iran has also previously refused to cooperate with IAEA inspections, which the United States supports to verify Iranian compliance with nuclear enrichment.[xiii] US Vice President JD Vance stated on February 25 that the Trump administration has “seen evidence” that Iran is trying to rebuild its nuclear weapons program.[xiv] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio separately stated on February 25 that Iran is “trying to rebuild elements” of its nuclear program.[xv]

Iran is also trying to offer economic incentives that are unrelated to US demands in order to extract concessions from the United States. Unspecified sources told the Financial Times on February 26 that Iran will offer the United States investments in Iranian oil and gas reserves, mining rights, and critical minerals in an effort to convince US President Donald Trump to agree to a nuclear deal.[xvi] One of the sources added that Iran is examining Venezuela as a case study.[xvii] Iranian officials have publicly stated that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei granted permission for Iranian negotiators to propose allowing American companies to enter Iran and that Iran’s proposal to the United States would include a pledge to buy American goods.[xviii] These reports are consistent with a member of the Iranian negotiating team’s description of US-Iran discussions on economic cooperation in the fields of oil, gas, and minerals at the first round of US-Iran nuclear talks on February 6.[xix] Iran appears to calculate that the United States is more willing to focus solely on Iran’s nuclear program or concede on its enrichment demand in the ongoing talks if Iran offers economic incentives. 

Iran likely remains unwilling to discuss its ballistic missile program and support for its partners and proxies in the region with the United States. US officials told the Wall Street Journal on February 26 that the United States wants Iran to limit its ballistic missile program and support for proxies, but that the talks in Geneva will focus on the nuclear issue.[xx]  US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 25 that Iran's unwillingness to discuss ballistic missiles with the United States is a “big problem” and that talks would eventually need to expand beyond the nuclear program.[xxi] Iranian officials have repeatedly ruled out any negotiations on Iran’s ballistic missile program.[xxii] Iran’s ballistic missile program constitutes a fundamental part of Iran’s defense and deterrence strategy. A Middle Eastern source with knowledge of the US-Iran negotiations told Fox News on February 20 that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has refused to allow Iranian negotiators to discuss any concessions on the ballistic missile program because any Iranian concessions on its missile program would be viewed within the regime as ”equivalent to losing a war.”[xxiii]

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 25 that Iran is “trying to achieve intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).”[xxiv] The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) released a public assessment in 2025 that Iran has the capability to develop an ICBM by 2035.[xxv] Rubio added that Iran has tried to launch satellites into space.[xxvi] CTP-ISW assessed in July 2025 that Iran’s efforts to develop its space program could support the development of ICBMs.[xxvii]   

Iran continues to undergo efforts to rebuild other aspects of its ballistic missile program.[xxviii] Bloomberg identified on February 25 protective structures surrounding the Khojir Missile Production Complex in Hajarabad, Tehran Province, to prevent chain reactions from explosions.[xxix] Iran is also encasing a newly-built facility at Taleghan 2 at the Parchin Military Complex with a concrete “sarcophagus” to harden the facility against potential airstrikes, according to the Institute for Science and International Security.[xxx] Israel struck Taleghan 2 in October 2024 and Khojir during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[xxxi]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened Iraqi Kurdistan’s “security and future” if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) supports a US or Israeli attack on Iran.[xxxii] Kataib Hezbollah called on its members on February 26 to prepare for a “war of attrition that may be protracted” and threatened the United States with “irreparable” loss if it strikes Iran.[xxxiii] Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari separately said on February 23 that the United States is preparing to attack Iran, which would include passing through Iraqi Kurdistan, and called on Iraqi Kurds to act “rationally.”[xxxiv] Askari’s statements are implied threats to attack the Kurdistan Region in the event of a war between the United States and Iran. The KRG issued a statement on February 23 that Iraqi Kurdistan will not be used as a “launchpad” to attack neighboring countries, in reference to Iran.[xxxv] Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have both previously conducted attacks targeting Iraqi Kurdistan, including during the 2023-2025 Gaza War.[xxxvi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias operating under the Islamic Resistance in Iraq moniker launched multiple drones and rockets targeting US forces based in Erbil from October 2023 to January 2024 in response to Israel’s operations in the Gaza Strip.[xxxvii] Iran conducted a ballistic missile attack in Erbil in January 2024 in retaliation for an Israeli strike in Syria that killed three Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps members in December 2023.[xxxviii] Iran claimed that the January 2024 strike targeted a Mossad facility. The KRG denied Iran’s allegations.[xxxix]

Kataib Hezbollah is the first major Iranian-backed Iraqi militia to threaten the United States over possible US strikes on Iran. Kataib Hezbollah is almost certainly one of the four Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee that has reportedly decided to provide military support to Iran and “open fronts” in a potential conflict between Iran and the United States. A senior Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee source told al Araby al Jadeed on February 22 that the militias’ participation would depend on “developments on the ground, the nature of the confrontation, and its scope.”[xl] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee includes Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Harakat Ansar Awfiya, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and an affiliated front group, according to the committee’s last statement on January 4.[xli] Kataib Hezbollah, unlike some other groups in the Shia Coordination Framework and the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, is a member of both the framework and the coordination committee. Kataib Hezbollah appears to be prioritizing its relationship with Iran and its role in the broader Axis of Resistance over domestic political and economic considerations in Iraq. Kataib Hezbollah, unlike many of the Shia Coordination Framework factions, takes a much more transnational view of regional affairs, given its close relationship with Iran.

Kataib Hezbollah’s threat supports CTP-ISW's February 23 assessment that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could target US forces in Iraqi Kurdistan in the event of a US or Israeli attack on Iran.[xlii] US-led international coalition forces redeployed from federal Iraq to Iraqi Kurdistan in late 2025 as part of the first phase of the planned US withdrawal from Iraq.[xliii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have long attacked US forces in Iraq in response to US or Israeli actions.[xliv] The militias would likely be more willing to target US forces in Iraqi Kurdistan than other US interests, such as the US Embassy in Baghdad, given that a strike on the latter could hurt the militias’ economic interests by deterring economic investment in Baghdad. This demonstrates that even some of the most ideologically motivated Iraqi militias still value their domestic economic and business dealings.

Iranians continued to hold anti-regime protests during 40-day mourning ceremonies across the country. CTP-ISW recorded 11 protests at 40-day ceremonies across five provinces, including five large protests on February 26.[xlv] CTP-ISW defines large protests as protests that it estimates have over 1,000 individuals. The 40th day of mourning marks the end of the initial mourning period and is often observed with public commemorations and gatherings in Shia Islam. These 40-day ceremonies have served as catalysts for renewed demonstrations in recent weeks.[xlvi]

CTP-ISW did not record any protests at Iranian universities on February 26, which is a sudden decline from the rate of campus protests in recent days.[xlvii] CTP-ISW is considering several reasons that could explain the lack of observable university protest activity. Both Iranian security forces and university administrations have increased legal and academic pressure on students in recent days by conducting arrests, summoning students before disciplinary bodies, and issuing temporary suspensions.[xlviii] Iran’s academic schedule may also have contributed to a decline in campus protest activity on a Thursday, which is a weekend in Iran. Many students live in university dormitories and would therefore presumably still be able to organize protests on the weekend, however. Multiple Iranian universities have also moved instruction online until late March 2026, likely in an effort to reduce in-person participation and opportunities for protests.[xlix] Any of these individual factors or a combination of the above could explain the lack of campus protest activity on February 26, particularly given that protests continue at 40-day mourning ceremonies.

Key Takeaways

• US-Iran Nuclear Talks: Iran is unlikely to accept reported US demands to destroy its nuclear facilities, send its highly enriched uranium to the US, and commit to a permanent deal. The United States and Iran held a third round of nuclear talks in Geneva on February 26. The Iranian proposal does not meet core US demands, and Iran is trying to offer economic incentives that are unrelated to US demands in order to extract concessions from the United States. US officials have previously stated that the US would strike Iran if the two sides cannot reach a deal.
• Iranian Missile Program: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 25 that Iran is “trying to achieve intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).” The US Defense Intelligence Agency released a public assessment in 2025 that Iran has the capability to develop an ICBM by 2035. Iran continues to undergo efforts to rebuild other aspects of its ballistic missile program.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militia Warnings: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened Iraqi Kurdistan’s “security and future” if the Kurdistan Regional Government supports a US or Israeli attack on Iran. Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have both previously conducted attacks targeting Iraqi Kurdistan, including during the 2023-2025 Gaza War. Kataib Hezbollah is the first major Iranian-backed Iraqi militia to threaten the United States over possible US strikes on Iran. Kataib Hezbollah appears to be prioritizing its relationship with Iran and its role in the broader Axis of Resistance over domestic political and economic considerations in Iraq.
• Iranian Protest Activity: Iranians continued to hold anti-regime protests during 40-day mourning ceremonies across the country. These 40-day ceremonies have served as catalysts for renewed demonstrations in recent weeks. CTP-ISW did not record any protests at Iranian universities on February 26, which is a sudden decline from the rate of campus protests in recent days. CTP-ISW is considering several reasons that could explain the lack of observable university protest activity.
• Syrian Government’s Southern Strategy: The Syrian government is pursuing negotiations with the current authorities in Suwayda as it simultaneously employs a strategy that is likely designed to politically weaken and then subordinate Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri’s coalition to the government over time. The United States is reportedly mediating back-channel negotiations between the Syrian government and unspecified Druze leaders to integrate Suwayda Province under Syrian government control, which is likely a government attempt to reduce support for Hijri and his followers.

Iran

Iran security forces conducted counterterrorism operations against anti-regime Baloch militias in southeastern Iran between February 23 and 26. The Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF)—a coalition of anti-regime Baloch militias formed in December 2025—announced on February 24 that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) forces killed six of its members the day prior in the vicinity of Saravan City, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[l] The MPF has conducted several attacks against security personnel in Sistan and Baluchistan Province since the protests started in late December 2025.[li] The IRGC separately reported on February 25 that IRGC, provincial intelligence, and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Border Guard forces engaged unspecified fighters along Iran’s southeastern border, killing three fighters and arresting eight others.[lii] Regime-affiliated media accused the involved fighters of killing security personnel at a checkpoint in Fahraj, Kerman Province, in December 2025.[liii] Ansar al Furqan – an anti-regime Baloch that is not a member of the MPF – claimed responsibility for the December 2025 attack on a checkpoint in Fahraj as the group’s second attack of 2025 as part of Ansar al Furqan’s ongoing operation targeting regime personnel.[liv] LEC Border Guard forces also raided an unspecified “terrorist” hideout in Zabol, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, near the Iran-Pakistan border, on February 26 and discovered suicide vests and materials for improvised explosive devices.[lv] The LEC Border Guard units are still searching for the fighters, who fled the scene of the raid.[lvi]

The United States sanctioned more than 30 individuals, entities, and vessels on February 25 for enabling illicit Iranian oil exports and supporting Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs.[lvii] The US Treasury sanctioned 12 vessels and multiple shipping companies linked to Iran’s “shadow fleet” that generates revenue for the Iranian regime’s domestic repression, regional proxy activities, and weapons programs, which include Iran’s missile and drone procurement networks.[lviii] The US Treasury also sanctioned three Turkey-based firms for supporting ”sensitive machinery” procurement worth ”hundreds of thousands” of US dollars.[lix] The US Treasury also sanctioned an Iran-based firm, a United Arab Emirates-based firm, and four individuals that are tied to Qods Aviation Industries, for the procurement of sodium perchlorate. Qods Aviation Industries is part of the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, and sodium perchlorate is a key precursor for solid propellant for missiles.[lx]

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

US efforts to mediate between the Syrian government and the Suwayda National Guard are yielding limited cooperation between the two parties. The Syrian government and Suwayda National Guard exchanged 86 detainees on February 26, which marks the first time since the July 2025 Suwayda violence that the two sides have exchanged detainees.[lxi] The United States mediated the exchange.[lxii] The Syrian government exchanged 61 Suwaydawi detainees for 25 Syrian army and Interior Ministry detainees that the National Guard captured in July 2025.[lxiii] The Syrian government Suwayda Governor Mustafa al Bakour and pro-government Druze notables Laith al Balous and Hassan al Atrash oversaw the exchange.[lxiv] Atrash’s appearance at the exchange is notable given that he recently fled from Suwayda Province to the Syrian government on February 16 in order to avoid a “plot“ to kill his family.[lxv]

The Syrian government is pursuing negotiations with the current authorities in Suwayda as it simultaneously employs a strategy that is likely designed to politically weaken and then subordinate Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri’s coalition to the government over time. The Syrian government likely views reported divisions in Suwayda as an opportunity to gradually weaken and subordinate Druze factions through political actions that ultimately weaken Druze factions in both negotiations or ahead of a possible military operation. The Syrian government has co-opted several Suwaydawi Druze notables to undermine Hirji’s authority, including Suwayda internal security commander Sulieman Abd al Baqi, Laith al Balous, and Hassan al Atrash, as noted above.[lxvi] A Druze source told UK-based Saudi media that many in Suwayda Province oppose Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri or his son, Salman, taking control, but fear voicing dissent.[lxvii] Hijri’s National Guard has previously conducted politically motivated killings in Suwayda Province in December 2025 against dissenting Druze figures.[lxviii]

The Syrian government is also attempting to reduce support for Hijri and his followers through US-backed dialogue with other Druze leaders. The United States is reportedly mediating back-channel negotiations between the Syrian government and unspecified Druze leaders to integrate Suwayda Province under Syrian government control.[lxix] Israeli and Arab media that reported on the negotiations did not clarify whether the Druze leaders were affiliated with prominent Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, who has led the efforts from within the province to establish a ”independent Druze region” that remains independent from the Syrian government.[lxx] A Syrian security source said that the dialogue aims to ”reduc[e] the influence” of Hijri and his followers, which suggests that the US and Syrian government are engaging other prominent Druze leaders within Suwayda Province that are not affiliated with Hijri.[lxxi]

The Syrian government appears to be attempting to achieve its own objectives for re-integrating Suwayda Province through these back-channel talks with Druze leaders. The “basis of the talks” is to grant local Suwaydawi authorities broad security and administrative powers in exchange for some Druze parties abandoning their demands for autonomy and integrating Suwayda Province under government control, according to Israeli media on February 24.[lxxii] The negotiations’ stated goal of integrating all territory under state control aligns with the Syrian government’s objective but is unlikely to satisfy the Suwayda Supreme Legal Committee's demand for full autonomy.[lxxiii] The Supreme Legal Committee is the autonomous governing authority currently providing administrative services to Suwayda Province.[lxxiv] Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, who formed the committee in August 2025 and retains wide influence over certain armed groups in Suwayda Province, has called for “not only self-administration but an independent Druze region.”[lxxv]

The Syrian government may seek to exploit divisions within Suwayda Province in order to encourage dissatisfied Druze factions to turn on Hijri if negotiations to integrate Suwayda Province fail and conflict erupts. The Syrian government’s media relations director for Suwayda Province told UK-based Saudi media on February 25 that the government will integrate Suwayda Province by “implementing the scenario used in northeastern Syria within the next two months.”[lxxvi] He added that Damascus aims to peacefully integrate Suwayda Province into the state and does not want to repeat the violence seen in July 2025, however.[lxxvii] The “northeastern Syria scenario” refers to the Syrian government's efforts to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which began with negotiations but turned to military action when those negotiations failed to produce results.[lxxviii] The Syrian government may seek to pursue the same strategy in Suwayda Province by employing a combination of diplomatic engagement, political undermining, and military pressure. The Internal Security commander for Suwayda City, Suleiman Abdul Baqi, said on February 16 that the government would enter the province “soon” after he spoke with Suwaydawi civilians.[lxxix] 

The Syrian army disarmed a car bomb or vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the historically Kurdish Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood of Aleppo City on February 25.[lxxx] The Syrian army and Syrian media have not named a perpetrator or group responsible for the IED at the time of this writing. The unidentified perpetrators likely aimed to undermine the January 30 agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government by targeting a sensitive Kurdish neighborhood in government-held territory.[lxxxi] The Syrian army took control of Sheikh Maqsoud from SDF-affiliated internal security forces on January 10.[lxxxii] CTP-ISW cannot confirm from the available evidence whether the IED was a car bomb or a VBIED. The Syrian army seized at least two IED-laden vehicles, presumably planted by SDF-affiliated security forces, during government operations in Sheikh Maqsoud and neighboring Ashrafieh in January 2026.[lxxxiii] A VBIED cell was previously active between December 2024 and February 2025 in SDF-held areas of the northeastern Aleppo countryside before the fall of the regime.[lxxxiv] 

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The Lebanese government is continuing to pressure Hezbollah not intervene in a potential conflict between Iran and the United States or Israel. Saudi media reported on February 26 that Lebanese President Joseph Aoun informed Hezbollah that it will face “decisive action from the state” if it participates in any future conflict between Iran and the United States or Israel.[lxxxv] Aoun’s message follows Israeli warnings to the Lebanese government that Israel would conduct “hard” strikes against Lebanon if Hezbollah participates in a potential conflict.[lxxxvi] The Lebanese government and its officials, including Aoun and Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri, have been working by “all means” to prevent Hezbollah’s participation.[lxxxvii] Hezbollah reportedly has told the Lebanese state that it will abide by “combat neutrality” and will not confront the United States or Israel.[lxxxviii] Hezbollah officials, including the group’s secretary general, have recently defined an attack targeting Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as Hezbollah’s “red line,” however.[lxxxix] A war that causes the collapse of the Iranian regime would be a major setback for Hezbollah and its regional goals since Hezbollah still relies on the regime for substantial financial support and explicitly subordinates itself to the supreme leader.[xc]

Israel did not send any representatives to the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire monitoring committee’s February 25 meeting, which marked the first time that any party has not sent a representative to a meeting since the committee was created in November 2024.[xci] The ceasefire monitoring committee held a meeting on February 25 that reportedly did not lead to any new decisions or results.[xcii] The ceasefire monitoring committee has recently halted its frequent meetings, reportedly due to disagreements among its members over the mechanism’s role and Hezbollah’s disarmament.[xciii] A Lebanese official source told Saudi media that Israel’s absence aimed to signal its “clear unease with the Lebanese army’s movements in [southern Lebanon] and its decisive decision to establish new observation posts.”[xciv] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) ordered soldiers on February 24 to “respond” to an Israeli drone after the drone fired upon soldiers establishing a post in Marjaayoun, southeastern Lebanon.[xcv] The LAF has recently established a new position along the Israel-Lebanon border to maintain security.[xcvi] The LAF’s establishment of border positions suggests that it is attempting to improve border security, though the LAF did not elaborate on or specify the exact purpose of the border positions.

[i] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/vp-vance-says-us-sees-evidence-iran-is-trying-rebuild-nuclear-weapon-2026-02-25/

[ii] https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/us-iran-nuclear-talks-trump-military-buildup-attack-missiles-rcna260764

[iii] https://x.com/badralbusaidi/status/2027089708392579576

[iv] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-brings-tough-demands-to-iran-nuclear-talks-8aab06ad?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqfJ0DxdhSOzrfgSG2MO0C3-mswsGbfRlrq4vz2lYvdbQEbz8PJtpny02y0LBKY%3D&gaa_ts=69a0551f&gaa_sig=8GGBD3YBoBo3KhJxhKRE6sjfk0d2U5yXJ4PiqJoASAEMDxEJTGnzRRoxpyGoL4pDMwJ7UluooKVo-9qPRYkt4g%3D%3D

[v] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-brings-tough-demands-to-iran-nuclear-talks-8aab06ad?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqfJ0DxdhSOzrfgSG2MO0C3-mswsGbfRlrq4vz2lYvdbQEbz8PJtpny02y0LBKY%3D&gaa_ts=69a0551f&gaa_sig=8GGBD3YBoBo3KhJxhKRE6sjfk0d2U5yXJ4PiqJoASAEMDxEJTGnzRRoxpyGoL4pDMwJ7UluooKVo-9qPRYkt4g%3D%3D

[vi] https://www.axios.com/2026/02/21/trump-iran-plan-kill-khamenei-regime-change-deal

[vii] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-brings-tough-demands-to-iran-nuclear-talks-8aab06ad?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqfJ0DxdhSOzrfgSG2MO0C3-mswsGbfRlrq4vz2lYvdbQEbz8PJtpny02y0LBKY%3D&gaa_ts=69a0551f&gaa_sig=8GGBD3YBoBo3KhJxhKRE6sjfk0d2U5yXJ4PiqJoASAEMDxEJTGnzRRoxpyGoL4pDMwJ7UluooKVo-9qPRYkt4g%3D%3D

[viii] https://x.com/fpleitgenCNN/status/2027090634545230215?s=20

[ix] https://x.com/fpleitgenCNN/status/2027090634545230215?s=20

[x] https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/25/us-iran-talks-nuclear-trump-oil-prices-war-conflict.html

[xi] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-brings-tough-demands-to-iran-nuclear-talks-8aab06ad?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqfJ0DxdhSOzrfgSG2MO0C3-mswsGbfRlrq4vz2lYvdbQEbz8PJtpny02y0LBKY%3D&gaa_ts=69a0551f&gaa_sig=8GGBD3YBoBo3KhJxhKRE6sjfk0d2U5yXJ4PiqJoASAEMDxEJTGnzRRoxpyGoL4pDMwJ7UluooKVo-9qPRYkt4g%3D%3D

[xii] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/26/world/middleeast/iran-us-nuclear-talks.html

[xiii] https://www.iranintl.com/202511193175  ; https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-East/Irans-Hidden-Nuclear-Push-Resumes-Under-Pickaxe-Mountain.html ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-20-2025

[xiv] https://x.com/disclosetv/status/2026784185294241809?s=20

[xv] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/vp-vance-says-us-sees-evidence-iran-is-trying-rebuild-nuclear-weapon-2026-02-25/

[xvi] https://www.ft.com/content/27f02d44-a223-4934-8f2b-7cfd8772b181

[xvii] https://www.ft.com/content/27f02d44-a223-4934-8f2b-7cfd8772b181

[xviii] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/26/world/middleeast/iran-us-nuclear-talks.html

[xix] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/909876/

[xx] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-brings-tough-demands-to-iran-nuclear-talks-8aab06ad?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqfJ0DxdhSOzrfgSG2MO0C3-mswsGbfRlrq4vz2lYvdbQEbz8PJtpny02y0LBKY%3D&gaa_ts=69a0551f&gaa_sig=8GGBD3YBoBo3KhJxhKRE6sjfk0d2U5yXJ4PiqJoASAEMDxEJTGnzRRoxpyGoL4pDMwJ7UluooKVo-9qPRYkt4g%3D%3D

[xxi] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/vp-vance-says-us-sees-evidence-iran-is-trying-rebuild-nuclear-weapon-2026-02-25/

[xxii] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2026/2/13/شمخاني-للجزيرة-نت-قدراتنا-الصاروخية ; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2026/2/7/iran-says-oman-mediated-talks-with-us-a-good-start

[xxiii] https://www.foxnews.com/world/trump-gives-iran-10-day-ultimatum-experts-signal-talks-may-buying-time-strike

[xxiv] https://x.com/Osint613/status/2026802222839840818

[xxv] https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/golden_dome.pdf

[xxvi] https://x.com/Osint613/status/2026802222839840818

[xxvii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-july-21-2025/

[xxviii] https://www.foxnews.com/world/trump-gives-iran-10-day-ultimatum-experts-signal-talks-may-buying-time-strike

[xxix] https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2026-iran-protects-nuclear-sites/  ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-18-2025-morning-edition/

[xxx] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/imagery-update-concrete-sarcophagus-at-taleghan-2-nears-completion

[xxxi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-18-2025-morning-edition/ ; https://x.com/Faytuks/status/1935121393034686556 ; https://x.com/ayatsubzero/status/1935119451776762181 ; https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1935270463145414717 ; https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility

[xxxii] https://t.me/centerkaf/5508

[xxxiii] https://t.me/centerkaf/5508

[xxxiv] https://t.me/abualaskary/144

[xxxv] https://x.com/thenewregion/status/2025662008151183443

[xxxvi] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis

[xxxvii] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis

[xxxviii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-say-they-have-attacked-espionage-centers-iraqs-erbil-2024-01-15/

[xxxix] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-say-they-have-attacked-espionage-centers-iraqs-erbil-2024-01-15/

[xl] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/العراق-احتمالات-انخراط-الفصائل-في-صراع-واشنطن-وطهران

[xli] https://t.me/centerkaf/5388 ; https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250917

[xlii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-23-2026/

[xliii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pentagon-says-iraq-mission-being-scaled-back-2025-10-01/ ; https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-announcing-the-timeline-for-the-end-of-the-military-mission-of-the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis-in-iraq ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/

[xliv] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-iraq-after-the-israel-iran-war-june-13-july-3-2025/

[xlv] https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/2026998393357124088?s=20 ;

https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/2027006472178020626?s=20 ;

https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2027023426003591179?s=20 ;

https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/2027025089158430810?s=20 ;

https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2027027850138619912?s=20 ;

https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/2027033550642352394?s=20 ;

https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2027039114176991534?s=20 ;

https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2027049783672610849?s=20 ;

https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2027043884291752370?s=20 ;

https://t.me/anjmotahed/9024?single ;

https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2027100673171493018?s=20

[xlvi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-20-2026/

[xlvii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-23-2026/ ;

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-24-2026/ ;

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-25-2026/

[xlviii] https://x.com/RadioFarda_/status/2026678527341252917?s=20 ;

https://x.com/HengawO/status/2026997422925201865?s=20 ;

https://x.com/RadioFarda_/status/2026564730899329324?s=20

[xlix] https://t.me/s/anjmotahed/8975 ;

https://t.me/anjmotahed/8977 ;

https://iranwire.com/en/features/149536-as-students-protest-authorities-respond-with-entry-bans-and-threats-of-online-classes/

[l] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-24-2026/; https://t.me/jmmfront/171; https://t.me/jmmfront/10 ; SITE Intelligence Group, “Charter of Jaysh al-Adl-Affiliated MPF Lists Constituent Member Groups, Mentions Goal as “Deep Political Change” in Iran,” December 12, 2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.

[li] https://t.me/jmmfront/149; https://t.me/jmmfront/142; https://www dot radiozamaneh.com/874567/; https://t.me/jmmfront/119 ; https://t.me/jmmfront/106 ; https://t.me/jmmfront/104

[lii] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/12/06/3525789 ; https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/277848; https://farsnews dot ir/Rahgozar_b/1772023165546020909

[liii] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/12/06/3525789 ; https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/277848; https://farsnews dot ir/Rahgozar_b/1772023165546020909

[liv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-17-2025/; SITE Intelligence Group, “Ansar al-Furqan Claims 16 Casualties in Operation Involving 43 Fighters on Iranian Police Checkpoint” December 16, 2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.

[lv] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/815138  

[lvi] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/815138  

[lvii] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0405

[lviii] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0405

[lix] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0405

[lx] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0405

[lxi] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/797439/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%af%d9%84-%d9%85%d9%88%d9%82%d9%88%d9%81%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a9-%d9%88/ ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2026972838675001527

[lxii] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/797439/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%af%d9%84-%d9%85%d9%88%d9%82%d9%88%d9%81%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a9-%d9%88/ ; https://www.enabbaladi dot net/797211/%d9%85%d9%81%d8%a7%d9%88%d8%b6%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%af%d9%84-%d9%85%d8%ad%d8%aa%d8%ac%d8%b2%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a9-%d9%88%d9%81/

[lxiii] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/797439/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%af%d9%84-%d9%85%d9%88%d9%82%d9%88%d9%81%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a9-%d9%88/ ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2026972838675001527

[lxiv] https://t.me/syrianmoi/29324

[lxv] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/796343/%d8%ad%d8%b3%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d8%b7%d8%b1%d8%b4-%d9%8a%d9%88%d8%b6%d8%ad-%d8%a3%d8%b3%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d8%ae%d8%b1%d9%88%d8%ac%d9%87-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%a7/

[lxvi] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/796343/%d8%ad%d8%b3%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d8%b7%d8%b1%d8%b4-%d9%8a%d9%88%d8%b6%d8%ad-%d8%a3%d8%b3%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d8%ae%d8%b1%d9%88%d8%ac%d9%87-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%a7/ ; https://jamestown.org/laith-al-balous-damascuss-man-in-suweida/ ; https://levant24 dot com/news/2025/09/abdulbaqi-appointed-to-lead-suwayda-security-file/

[lxvii] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5244769-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B5-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89

[lxviii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-2-2025/

[lxix] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/797439/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%af%d9%84-%d9%85%d9%88%d9%82%d9%88%d9%81%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a9-%d9%88/

[lxx] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-4-2026/

[lxxi] https://www.i24news dot tv/ar/أخبار/middle-east/artc-78b54fc5

[lxxii] https://www.i24news dot tv/ar/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/middle-east/artc-78b54fc5

[lxxiii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-7-2025/

[lxxiv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-7-2025/

[lxxv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-4-2026/

[lxxvi] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5244769-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B5-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89

[lxxvii] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5244769-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B5-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89

[lxxviii] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5244769-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B5-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89

[lxxix] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/184MvoaTk6/

[lxxx] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2026750530635112632

[lxxxi] https://www.majalla.com/node/329453/%D9%88%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%82-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%80%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF

[lxxxii] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/11/world/middleeast/syria-military-aleppo.html

[lxxxiii] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2009901573137207300; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/74598

[lxxxiv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-3-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-8-2025/

[lxxxv] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/2026950111314452958?s=20

[lxxxvi] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-warns-lebanon-it-would-hit-hard-if-hezbollah-gets-involved-any-us-iran-2026-02-24/  

[lxxxvii] https://x.com/YoussefRaggi/status/2026301459470385583  ; https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/318493-report-berri-led-contacts-with-hezbollah-seek-to-prevent-it-from-backing-iran-militarily   ; https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5242834-official-contacts-aim-keep-lebanon-out-war-iran-israel-raises-readiness-northern

[lxxxviii] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/318616-reports-hezbollah-reassures-state-presidency-threatens-hezbollah  ; https://www.sawtbeirut dot com/press/لبنان-يترقّب-نتائج-جنيف-رسائل-تهدئة/

[lxxxix] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/article/512087/   ; https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/318611-hezbollah-official-says-group-won-t-intervene-in-event-of-limited-us-strikes-on-iran

[xc] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-26-2025 ; https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-881050      

[xci] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/318619-israel-boycotts-mechanism-meeting ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5245097-تجميد-المفاوضات-المدنية-بين-لبنان-وإسرائيل  

[xcii] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/318619-israel-boycotts-mechanism-meeting ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5245097-تجميد-المفاوضات-المدنية-بين-لبنان-وإسرائيل  

[xciii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-20-2026/

[xciv] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5245097-تجميد-المفاوضات-المدنية-بين-لبنان-وإسرائيل  

[xcv] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/2026270911918112941 ;   https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2026/2/24/lebanons-army-tells-soldiers-to-act-after-post-comes-under-israeli-fire

[xcvi] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5245141-الجيش-اللبناني-يوسع-انتشاره-في-الجنوب-تلازم-بين-القرارين