April 07, 2026

Iran Update Evening Special Report: April 7, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

 

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. 

Key Takeaways:

  • The United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan on April 7 and will begin negotiations in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 11. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council announced that the regime agreed to the ceasefire on April 7, several hours after US President Donald Trump announced that he had agreed to the ceasefire on the condition that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed Iran’s acceptance of the ceasefire and stated that Iran will allow the “safe passage” of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz during the two-week period “via coordination with Iran’s armed forces and with due consideration of technical limitations.”
  • Israel has reportedly agreed to cease operations against Iran and Hezbollah if Iran halts its operations in the Strait of Hormuz. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif posted on X on April 7 that Iran and the United States’ allies, presumably referring to Iran’s Axis of Resistance and Israel, respectively, have agreed to an immediate ceasefire “everywhere, including [in] Lebanon and elsewhere.”
  • Combined force strikes on Iranian railways and roads may have cut off several Iranian lines of transportation to move weapons, including missiles and missile launchers or components, across Iran. The IDF struck eight rail bridges and road segments that the Iranian regime uses to move weapons and other military equipment.
  • Russia may be helping Iran conduct attacks on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz by providing Iran with satellite imagery of the strait. Reuters reported on April 7 that Russian satellites are “actively surveying" the Strait of Hormuz, according to Ukrainian intelligence. Russia has provided Iran with satellite imagery of US, Gulf, and Turkish military assets in the Middle East to help Iran conduct attacks since the war began.
  • Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are reportedly driving decisions related to Iran’s kinetic response to the US and Israeli air campaign, according to two sources close to President Masoud Pezeshkian’s office speaking to anti-regime media on April 7.

Toplines

The United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan on April 7 and will begin negotiations in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 11.[i] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council announced that the regime agreed to the ceasefire on April 7, several hours after US President Donald Trump announced that he had agreed to the ceasefire on the condition that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz.[ii] Trump made his announcement around three hours after Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced on X that diplomatic efforts toward a US-Iran agreement were “progressing steadily, strongly, and powerfully.”[iii] Sharif called on Iran to “open” the Strait of Hormuz as a goodwill gesture and urged all warring parties to observe a ceasefire during the two-week period to facilitate a “conclusive” end to the war.[iv] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed Iran’s acceptance of the ceasefire and stated that Iran will allow the “safe passage” of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz during the two-week period “via coordination with Iran’s armed forces and with due consideration of technical limitations.”[v]   

President Trump described Iran’s 10-point counterproposal that it sent to the United States on April 5 as “a workable basis on which to negotiate.”[vi] Iran’s demands included a permanent end to the war with guarantees that the United States or Israel will not attack Iran again.[vii] Iran also demanded the lifting of all primary and secondary sanctions on Iran, the termination of all UN Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolutions against Iran, the payment of reparations to Iran, the withdrawal of US forces from the region, and the cessation of war on all fronts, including Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[viii] Iran also reportedly stated that it will charge vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz a fee of up to $2 million US dollars, the revenue from which it will split with Oman and use for post-war reconstruction.[ix] Iran’s proposal to charge vessels that transit the Strait of Hormuz highlights Iran’s attempt to use the strait as a point of leverage and for its financial gain.

Israel has reportedly agreed to cease operations against Iran and Hezbollah if Iran halts its operations in the Strait of Hormuz.[x] Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif posted on X on April 7 that Iran and the United States’ allies, presumably referring to Iran’s Axis of Resistance and Israel, respectively, have agreed to an immediate ceasefire “everywhere, including [in] Lebanon and elsewhere.”[xi] Israel and members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance have not commented on the ceasefire at the time of this writing.

Combined force strikes on Iranian railways and roads may have cut off several Iranian lines of transportation to move weapons, including missiles and missile launchers or components, across Iran. The IDF struck eight rail bridges and road segments that the Iranian regime uses to move weapons and other military equipment.[xii] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF struck routes that Iran has used to transport missile launchers across Iran in order to evade combined force targeting.[xiii] These strikes primarily appear to impact transport routes in northwestern and central Iran, which mirrors the combined force’s strikes on Iranian missile infrastructure primarily in western and central Iran. The destruction of key railway and road infrastructure may also have multiple secondary effects, such as further disrupting Iran’s economy or limiting the regime’s ability to move military and security forces across the country.

Several of the strikes appear to have been designed to disrupt the movement of missiles or other weapons to Iran’s northwest by severing key Iranian railways connecting Tehran, Zanjan, and Tabriz.  It is unclear how heavily Iranian forces rely on railways to transfer this equipment, however. Geolocated images show a cratered railway bridge in Chaharbagh, west of Karaj.[xiv] This railway connects Tehran to the Caspian Sea through Gilan Province and to other rail lines that lead to Tabriz and Urmia, the capitals of Iran’s East Azerbaijan and West Azerbaijan provinces. Iran has two prominent missile bases located near Tabriz—the Southwest Tabriz and Amand missile bases—that the combined force has struck several times in this conflict.[xv] Iran has increasingly launched missiles from central Iran as the combined force has degraded its ability to launch missiles from western Iran. Iran may seek to transfer missiles to western Iran that do not have a sufficient range to reach Israel if they are launched from central Iran. OSINT accounts on X reported that the combined force struck a railway bridge in Aminabad, Zanjan Province.[xvi] Anti-regime media claimed that there is an ammunition and missile depot located near this bridge.[xvii]

Israeli strikes on roadways and overpasses along routes that connect Tehran to western Iran may have also aimed to disrupt Iranian transfers of missile launchers or other weapons to these areas. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account posted footage on X of a combined force strike that destroyed an overpass along a highway in eastern Karaj.[xviii] This strike reportedly took place along a highway that connects Karaj and Tehran to western Iran, and the strike took place around five kilometers south of Karaj’s B1 (Bileghan) Bridge, which is located along the same route. US forces struck the B1 Bridge on April 2 to disrupt Iran’s ability to transfer missiles to western Iran.[xix] The IDF also struck a bridge along the Hashtroud-Tabriz highway in East Azerbaijan Province.[xx] The Hashtroud-Tabriz highway is the main highway that links Tehran to Tabriz through Zanjan. There are presumably alternative routes that Iranian forces could theoretically use, however.

The strikes may also disrupt to some degree Iranian movement of equipment by rail or road between Tehran and central Iran, including in Esfahan. An Israeli journalist posted footage of a reported strike on a railway bridge in Kashan, Esfahan Province, along the main rail line that connects Esfahan City to Qom to the north and ultimately, Tehran.[xxi] This strike appears to have severed a key rail line between Tehran and not only Esfahan, but also Shiraz and Kerman. Anti-regime media and OSINT accounts on X reported that the combined force struck an unspecified bridge in Qom City, Qom Province.[xxii] The combined force also struck a rail bridge near Qaleh No, Tehran Province, along the railway that connects Tehran to Mashhad in northeastern Iran.[xxiii]

Russia may be helping Iran conduct attacks on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz by providing Iran with satellite imagery of the strait.[xxiv] Reuters reported on April 7 that Russian satellites are “actively surveying" the Strait of Hormuz, according to Ukrainian intelligence.[xxv] Russia has provided Iran with satellite imagery of US, Gulf, and Turkish military assets in the Middle East to help Iran conduct attacks since the war began.[xxvi] Russia previously provided the Houthis with targeting intelligence in 2024 to support their attacks targeting international shipping.[xxvii] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has received 28 reports of attacks or incidents affecting civilian vessels transiting the strait since the war began.[xxviii] A source familiar with Ukrainian intelligence separately told Israeli media on April 7 that Russia provided Iran with a list of 55 critical energy infrastructure targets in Israel.[xxix]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are reportedly driving decisions related to Iran’s kinetic response to the US and Israeli air campaign, according to two sources close to President Masoud Pezeshkian’s office speaking to anti-regime media on April 7.[xxx] Pezeshkian accused both commanders on April 4 of acting unilaterally and fueling escalation through attacks on regional countries, according to the sources.[xxxi] These internal tensions come amid a separate British media report on April 6 that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is incapacitated and receiving medical treatment in Qom, citing a diplomatic memo based on US and Israeli intelligence shared with Gulf allies.[xxxii]

US-Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities to maintain air dominance over parts of Iran, with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reporting on April 7 that it destroyed over 130 Iranian air defense systems.[xxxiii] The IDF published a video on April 7 of an airstrike on an S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) transporter erector launcher (TEL) in Kahrizak, Tehran Province.[xxxiv] An S-300 battery consists of engagement and detection radars, command-and-control centers, fire-control units, and launchers to operate as a functional SAM system.[xxxv] The IDF struck the S-300 SAM site in Kahrizak on April 4.[xxxvi] The IDF video also showed strikes on at least six other unidentified air defense systems in unspecified areas across Iran.[xxxvii]  

The IDF continued to target Iranian petrochemical facilities. The IDF reported that it struck a Shiraz Petrochemical Company facility in Shiraz, Fars Province, on April 6.[xxxviii] The IDF reported that the site produced nitric acid, which is used in ballistic missile production, including to produce explosives.[xxxix]  The US Treasury Department sanctioned the Shiraz Petrochemical Company in 2024 for being involved in the sale of Iranian petrochemicals.[xl] The IDF has struck multiple Iranian petrochemical facilities in recent days, including petrochemical facilities linked to Iran’s ballistic missile program at the South Pars Complex in Asaluyeh, Bushehr Province, on April 6.[xli]

The combined force also struck several other Iranian defense industrial sites to degrade Iran’s ability to produce military equipment, including aircraft and naval vessels. Multiple OSINT accounts and anti-regime media published geolocated footage on April 6 of a combined force strike on the Soffeh Weapons Depot in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province.[xlii] The combined force previously struck this site with bunker buster munitions on March 31.[xliii] Anti-regime media separately reported on April 7 that the combined force struck a building associated with Iran’s aviation industry in Ekbatan, Tehran, which is located next to Tehran’s Mehrabad International Airport.[xliv] The combined force likely targeted an Iranian Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO) facility, or a subsidiary of IAIO, such as the Fajr Aerospace Industries and Composite Materials Company, which are both located in Ekbatan.[xlv] The combined force previously struck IAIO sites in Ekbatan on March 7 and 29.[xlvi] The Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) oversees IAIO.[xlvii] The European Union sanctioned IAIO in 2010 for its involvement in Iran’s nuclear program, including the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.[xlviii] Multiple OSINT accounts also published geolocated footage of large smoke plumes emanating from a building in Tehran associated with Iran’s Aerospace Research Institute.[xlix] The Aerospace Research Institute is also associated with MODAFL and Iran’s Space Agency and develops space launch systems, which are a dual-use technology that can support Iran’s ballistic missile program.[l] The IDF also struck Iran’s main sonar and underwater detection system production site in Shiraz, Fars Province, on April 6.[li] CTP-ISW's analysis of the IDF imagery indicates that the sonar production site is located within the Shiraz Electronics Industries complex. The combined force has repeatedly struck buildings at the Shiraz Electronics Industries complex since the start of the campaign.[lii] Shiraz Electronics Industries is subordinate to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).[liii] The United States sanctioned Shiraz Electronics Industries in September 2008 for producing electronic equipment for the Iranian armed forces.[liv] The IDF also reported that it struck multiple naval cruise missile and air defense system production sites in Karaj, Alborz Province.[lv]

The IDF continued to target IRGC headquarters in Tehran. The IDF struck an IRGC headquarters in Shahrak-e Valfajr, Tehran City, on April 6. There are several military and internal security sites in this area, including the IRGC General Command Headquarters.[lvi] The IDF previously struck the IRGC General Command Headquarters on March 4 and damaged at least four buildings.[lvii] The IRGC is the primary body responsible for controlling the Iranian missile and drone arsenals and managing and supporting Iran’s Axis of Resistance.[lviii] The IRGC also oversees the IRGC Ground Forces, which has historically played a role in maintaining internal security.

The IDF said that it also struck an IRGC site that "served the armed forces responsible for suppressing the civilian population in Iran."[lix] CTP-ISW could not confirm the exact site that was struck, but there are several IRGC facilities located near the targeted area, including the IRGC Intelligence Protection Organization and IRGC Ground Forces Headquarters.

US forces “restruck” Iranian military targets on Kharg Island on April 7.[lx] The United States reportedly conducted over 90 strikes on military infrastructure on Kharg Island on April 7.[lxi] A US official told the New York Times that the US strikes were “restrikes” targeting previously targeted military sites on the island.[lxii] The United States struck bunkers, ammunition storage facilities, a radar station, and other military targets.[lxiii] The United States previously struck military targets on Kharg Island on March 13.[lxiv] The United States did not target oil infrastructure or port facilities in either the March 13 or April 7 strikes.[lxv] The most recent strikes on Kharg Island come after unspecified sources familiar with US intelligence reports told CNN on March 26 that Iran has reinforced Kharg Island with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and other military equipment in recent weeks.[lxvi]

Iranian Response

IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Majid Mousavi claimed on April 7 that Iran has begun a “new phase” of the war in which Iran will use a new “twin-launch” system for its medium-range ballistic missiles to increase Iran’s strike rate.[lxvii] This statement was likely an attempt to deter the combined force from intensifying strikes against Iran. Mousavi claimed that the new “twin-launch” system will double the number of Iranian ballistic missile strikes against US assets, Israel, and other countries.[lxviii]

Iran has fired at least seven missiles targeting Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on April 6.[lxix] At least two of the missiles contained cluster munitions.[lxx] Israeli media reported multiple cluster munition impacts in central Israel, including in Bnei Brak.[lxxi] An Israeli journalist reported that debris from an intercepted Iranian missile injured one person in southern Israel.[lxxii]

Iran continued to conduct drone and missile attacks against the Gulf states. Iran fired 22 drones and 11 ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia between 2:00 PM ET on April 6 and 2:00 PM ET on April 7.[lxxiii] The Saudi Defense Ministry reported that debris from seven intercepted Iranian ballistic missiles fell near Saudi energy facilities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.[lxxiv] Multiple media outlets and OSINT accounts published footage of an explosion at the Jubail Industrial City in eastern Saudi Arabia.[lxxv] The IRGC claimed that it launched missiles and drones targeting US energy companies located in Jubail.[lxxvi] Saudi Arabia closed the King Fahd Causeway, the only road that links Saudi Arabia to Bahrain, due to the threat of further Iranian attacks targeting the Eastern Province.[lxxvii] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) recorded the lowest number of Iranian drone launches at the UAE since March 26 and the lowest number of ballistic missile launches at the UAE since March 25 (see below).[lxxviii] An OSINT account reported that an Iranian ballistic missile injured two Pakistani nationals and damaged a Thuraya Telecommunications Company building in Shajarah Governorate, the UAE, on April 7.[lxxix] The Kuwaiti Army reported that it intercepted 17 drones targeting Kuwait in the past 24 hours.[lxxx] This is a notable decrease from the 14 ballistic missiles, two cruise missiles, and 46 drones that the Kuwaiti Army intercepted on April 6.[lxxxi]

Iran conducted an attack on a vessel in the Persian Gulf for the first time since March 31. UKMTO reported on April 7 that an unspecified projectile hit an unspecified cargo vessel 25 nautical miles south of Kish Island, Iran.[lxxxii] The projectile struck the vessel above the water line and did not cause any casualties.[lxxxiii] Iranian regime media claimed on April 7 that Iran struck a container ship linked to Israel that was transporting Israeli military equipment.[lxxxiv] This cargo vessel is the first vessel that Iran has attacked since March 31.[lxxxv]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah has conducted 56 attacks against Israeli targets since 2:00 PM ET on April 6, which is the highest number of attacks targeting Israel that Hezbollah has claimed in a 24-hour period since the conflict began.[lxxxvi] Hezbollah claimed several drone and rocket attacks targeting IDF positions in northern Israel.[lxxxvii] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah fired roughly 40 rockets targeting northern Israel on April 7.[lxxxviii] Hezbollah claimed 27 attacks targeting northern Israeli communities between 2:00 PM ET on April 6 and 2:00 PM ET on April 7.[lxxxix] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah rockets impacted in the Galilee Panhandle, Kiryat Shmona, and Nahariya in northern Israel.[xc] Hezbollah is likely continuing to attempt to displace northern Israeli residents from their homes by targeting northern Israeli towns in order to increase political pressure on the Israeli government to halt its war effort against Iran.

Hezbollah has conducted 41 attacks targeting IDF forces in southern Lebanon since 2:00 PM ET on April 6.[xci] Hezbollah claimed several drone and rocket attacks targeting IDF forces across southern Lebanon.[xcii] Hezbollah claimed that its fighters used light and medium weapons in a direct engagement with Israeli forces in Bint Jbeil, southern Lebanon, on April 7 while Hezbollah fighters simultaneously fired rockets and mortars at the Israeli forces.[xciii] Hezbollah claimed that it fired four surface-to-air missiles (SAM) targeting two Israeli helicopters and two Israeli aircraft in southern Lebanon on April 7.[xciv] Hezbollah previously launched a SAM targeting an Israeli drone, which the IDF confirmed on April 1.[xcv] Hezbollah also published footage on April 7 that shows a first-person view (FPV) drone attack targeting an IDF personnel carrier in Ainata, southern Lebanon, on March 31.[xcvi]

Hezbollah published a video of fighters launching a Scud-B ballistic missile, which marks the first time that Hezbollah has released footage that confirms that it possesses Scud-type missiles.[xcvii] Hezbollah claimed that it used a Scud-B missile to attack IDF infrastructure in Krayot, northern Israel, on March 31.[xcviii] A Scud-B missile is a Russian-made ballistic missile with a range of 300 kilometers and can carry various warheads.[xcix] Syria reportedly transferred an unknown number of Scud missiles to Hezbollah in the late 2000s, but there was previously no evidence that Hezbollah possessed these missiles.[c]

The IDF has continued to conduct ground operations targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and fighters across southern Lebanon. The IDF 91st Territorial Division killed a Hezbollah anti-tank guided missile unit and destroyed the unit’s compound in southern Lebanon on April 7.[ci] The 769th (Hiram) Territorial Brigade (91st Territorial Division) directed an Israeli Air Force (IAF) strike on a Hezbollah fighter in southern Lebanon on April 7.[cii] The 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Territorial Division) killed members of a Hezbollah cell and discovered large quantities of Hezbollah weapons, including explosive devices, rifles, and ammunition, in southern Lebanon on April 7.[ciii] The IDF reported that the 146th Reserve Division has killed 130 Hezbollah fighters and destroyed 1,000 Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanon thus far.[civ] The IDF announced that Israeli forces have established an “anti-tank line” several kilometers into southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah from being able to fire anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) into Israel.[cv] Metula Local Council Chairman David Azoulai stated that Metula is still under threat from Hezbollah ATGM fire despite the IDF’s announcement.[cvi] Metula is located along the Israel-Lebanon border and is surrounded by various ridges that Hezbollah can use to launch ATGMs from. Israeli media reported on April 7 that IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir approved the implementation of the “Panda” robotic explosion method, which the IDF has previously used in the Gaza Strip, to help Israeli forces destroy Hezbollah tunnels, buildings, and headquarters in southern Lebanon.[cvii]

The IDF announced on April 7 that the IDF 98th Paratrooper Division has deployed and begun operations in southern Lebanon.[cviii] There are now six IDF divisions involved in Israel’s ground campaign against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The IDF noted that the 146th Reserve Division and 162nd Armored Division are operating in southwestern Lebanon, and the 91st Territorial Division and 36th Armored Division are operating in southeastern Lebanon.[cix] The 210th Territorial Division is operating in the Mount Hermon area of southern Lebanon.[cx] The following brigades are currently operating in southern Lebanon:

  • 300th Infantry Territorial Brigade (146th Reserve Division). The IDF 300th Infantry Territorial Brigade typically operates under the IDF 91st Territorial Division but is currently operating under the IDF 146th Reserve Division.[cxi] The IDF reported that the brigade discovered Hezbollah rocket launch platforms in Ramyeh, southwestern Lebanon, on March 31.[cxii]
  • 613th Hasmonean Infantry Brigade (146th Reserve Division). The IDF reported on March 23 that the 613th Hasmonean Infantry Brigade is operating in southern Lebanon for the first time.[cxiii] It is unclear where specifically this brigade is operating. A geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) analyst reported on April 2 that the 146th Reserve Division has largely cleared Chamaa, southwestern Lebanon, however.[cxiv]
  • 226th Reserve Paratrooper Brigade (146th Reserve Division).[cxv] A GEOINT analyst reported on March 29 that the 226th Reserve Paratrooper Brigade advanced further along the coastal road toward Tyre and secured control over al Bayada in southwestern Lebanon.[cxvi] An OSINT account posted geolocated images of the brigade operating near the al Bayada-Chama road on April 3.[cxvii]
  • 35th Paratrooper Brigade (146th Reserve Division). The IDF 35th Paratrooper Brigade typically operates under the IDF 98th Paratrooper Division but elements of the brigade are currently operating under the 226th Reserve Paratrooper Brigade within the 146th Reserve Division.[cxviii] The 35th Paratrooper Brigade was operating in Naqoura and al Bayada, southwestern Lebanon, in conjunction with the 226th Reserve Paratrooper Brigade, as of March 29.[cxix]
  • 213th Reserve Artillery Brigade (146th Reserve Division). A GEOINT analyst reported that the 213th Reserve Artillery Brigade destroyed a building in Mansouri, southwestern Lebanon, on March 30.[cxx] The brigade directed an IAF strike on a Hezbollah cell in Majdal Zoun, southeast of Mansouri, on April 3.[cxxi]
  • 810th Mountain Infantry Brigade (210th Territorial Division). A GEOINT analyst reported on March 22 that the brigade was operating in Kfarchouba, southeastern Lebanon, and controls Jabal Sedana, which is located west of Mount Hermon.[cxxii] The IDF reported on March 24 that the IDF 810th Mountain Infantry Brigade was conducting targeted raids in the Mount Hermon area of southern Lebanon.[cxxiii] A GEOINT analyst reported on March 24 that the brigade started conducting combing operations in the eastern outskirts of Chebaa and expanded its presence in southwestern areas of Kfarchouba.[cxxiv] The analyst reported on March 29 that the brigade conducted raids in eastern Kfarchouba and Chebaa, and that the brigade’s Alpinist Unit conducted cross-border raids near Mount Hermon.[cxxv]
  • 89th Infantry Brigade (210th Territorial Division). The 89th Infantry Brigade typically operates under the IDF 98th Paratrooper Division but elements of the brigade are currently operating under the 210th Territorial Division.[cxxvi] Forces from the 89th Infantry Brigade’s Egoz Unit conducted an operation near Mount Betarim in southeastern Lebanon and arrested a Hezbollah-affiliated commander on March 24.[cxxvii]
  • 188th Armored Brigade (36th Armored Division). A GEOINT analyst reported on March 24 that the 188th Armored Brigade largely controls Taybeh, southeastern Lebanon, and has started conducting large-scale demolitions in the area.[cxxviii] The analyst reported on March 25 that the brigade may be involved in the IDF 36th Armored Division’s advance from northern Taybeh to Deir Seryan, southeastern Lebanon.[cxxix]
  • 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division). The IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade has been operating in Taybeh, southeastern Lebanon, since March 24.[cxxx] An OSINT account reported on March 24 that the brigade destroyed buildings near the Taybeh Mosque.[cxxxi] The brigade discovered a large number of Hezbollah weapons and military equipment in Taybeh on April 5.[cxxxii] A GEOINT analyst reported on March 29 that the brigade was also conducting operations in Deir Seryan and east of Qoussair, which are both located west of Taybeh.[cxxxiii] Deir Seryan is a tactically and operationally significant location for Israeli forces in southeastern Lebanon as it is located on a hill that overlooks the Litani River.[cxxxiv]
  • 7th Armored Brigade (36th Armored Division). The IDF noted on March 9 that the IDF 36th Armored Division, including the 7th Armored Brigade, conducted a targeted raid in Rab el Thalathine, southeastern Lebanon.[cxxxv] A GEOINT analyst reported on March 25 that the brigade launched an armored assault from al Muhaysibat Hill, south of Taybeh, and advanced toward the entrance of Qantara, southwestern Lebanon.[cxxxvi]
  • 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Territorial Division). The IDF 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade typically operates under the IDF 162nd Armored Division but is currently operating under the IDF 91st Territorial Division.[cxxxvii] The 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade has been operating in Khiam, southeastern Lebanon, since at least March 24 and has seized the majority of the town.[cxxxviii] A GEOINT analyst reported that the brigade began an operation to advance into Aainata on March 28 in order to flank Bint Jbeil, southwestern Lebanon.[cxxxix] The brigade directed an IAF strike on Hezbollah fighters and located various Hezbollah weapons in Aainata on April 3.[cxl]
  • 401st Armored Brigade (91st Territorial Division). The IDF 401st Armored Brigade typically operates under the IDF 162nd Armored Division but is currently operating under the IDF 91st Territorial Division.[cxli] A GEOINT analyst reported on March 25 that the 401st Armored Brigade has largely taken control over Qouzah, southwestern Lebanon.[cxlii] The brigade began advancing from Qouzah toward the outskirts of Rachaf on March 27.[cxliii] The brigade is also involved in the Israeli operation to advance toward Aainata and reached Friz Hill in northeastern Aainata on March 31.[cxliv]
  • 7338th Artillery Brigade (91st Territorial Division). Israeli media reported on March 13 that the 7338th Artillery Brigade directed an Israeli airstrike against Hezbollah fighters in Tyre, southwestern Lebanon.[cxlv]
  • 769th (Hiram) Territorial Brigade (91st Territorial Division). The 769th (Hiram) Territorial Brigade directed an IAF strike against Hezbollah fighters in Ibl el Saqi, southeastern Lebanon, on March 29.[cxlvi]
  • 8th Reserve Armored Brigade (91st Territorial Division). The 8th Reserve Armored Brigade destroyed a Hezbollah building in Aitaroun, southeastern Lebanon, on April 1.[cxlvii] The IDF reported on April 5 that the brigade engaged in direct combat with Hezbollah fighters and conducted targeted raids on Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[cxlviii]
  • 5th Infantry Brigade (91st Territorial Division). The IDF reported on March 26 that the 5th Infantry Brigade has killed over 30 Hezbollah fighters during its operations in southern Lebanon.[cxlix] An OSINT account reported that the brigade destroyed a building in Mays al Jabal, southeastern Lebanon, on March 26.[cl]
  • 933rd (Nahal) Infantry Brigade (162nd Armored Division). A GEOINT analyst reported on March 31 that elements of the 933rd (Nahal) Infantry Brigade advanced from Ramyeh and Qouzah toward the south of Beit Lif, southwestern Lebanon.[cli] The analyst reported on April 2 that the brigade infiltrated the southern neighborhoods of Beit Lif and advanced toward the center of the town, during which Israeli forces engaged in direct combat with Hezbollah fighters.[clii] The IDF confirmed on April 2 that the brigade killed a Hezbollah fighter in direct combat and located Hezbollah military equipment after the engagement.[cliii]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon. The IDF struck a bridge in central Lebanon on April 6 that Hezbollah used to transport weapons and fighters from northern to southern Lebanon.[cliv] This strike marks the seventh bridge that the IDF has struck since the war started.[clv] The IDF reportedly conducted an FPV drone attack targeting a Hezbollah fighter on a motorcycle in southwestern Lebanon on April 7.[clvi] The IDF has not previously used an FPV drone against Hezbollah in this war.

The IDF issued a warning to all naval vessels in the maritime area between Tyre and Ras al Naqoura on April 7. The IDF stated on April 7 that Hezbollah’s activities expose naval vessels off the coast of Tyre and Ras al Naqoura to danger.[clvii] Hezbollah claimed that it launched anti-ship cruise missiles targeting an Israeli warship located 68 nautical miles off the coast of Lebanon on April 5.[clviii] An Israeli journalist reported that Israel assesses that the ship was damaged.[clix]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah released US journalist Shelly Kittleson on April 7 in exchange for the Iraqi federal government’s release of multiple imprisoned Kataib Hezbollah members.[clx] Kataib Hezbollah said that it released Kittleson, whom the group kidnapped on March 31, following mediation efforts by Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[clxi] Iraqi security sources told the New York Times on March 7 that Kataib Hezbollah offered to release Kittleson the day after kidnapping her in exchange for the release of imprisoned Kataib Hezbollah members.[clxii] Iraqi security sources also told Iraqi media on March 7 that Kataib Hezbollah held Kittleson in Jurf al Sakhr, which is a Kataib Hezbollah stronghold in Babil Province that the Iraqi federal government is unable to enter.[clxiii] Three Iraqi officials told the Associated Press that Iraqi authorities experienced obstacles in rescuing Kittleson because Kataib Hezbollah leaders, with whom the Iraqi federal government would have negotiated, are in hiding.[clxiv] US-Israeli combined force strikes have targeted Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders since the start of the war.[clxv] A combined force strike in Baghdad killed former Kataib Hezbollah Security Chief and Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari on March 16.[clxvi]

The Iraqi Defense Ministry intercepted multiple likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drones on April 7. The Iraqi Defense Ministry said that it intercepted a drone targeting a radar at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province.[clxvii] US-led international coalition forces completed their withdrawal from this base in January 2026 and transferred control of the base to the Iraqi federal government.[clxviii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly targeted Iraqi military sites during the war that formerly hosted US forces.[clxix] The Iraqi Defense Ministry also said that it intercepted two drones in Kirkuk Province.[clxx] The Erbil governor separately announced on April 6 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia strikes targeting unidentified sites in Erbil killed two civilians.[clxxi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have also repeatedly attacked US and foreign sites in Iraqi Kurdistan during the war.[clxxii] Saraya Awliya al Dam, which is considered a front group for Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, posted footage of an attack on a US base in Qasrak, Syria.[clxxiii] A Syrian military source told AFP on April 7 that four drones originating from Iraq targeted the base.[clxxiv] Air defenses intercepted three of the drones and a fourth fell in an open area near the base.[clxxv] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have claimed multiple attacks targeting the base during the war.[clxxvi]

Combined force strikes have targeted Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) positions in Anbar, Salah al Din, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Basra provinces since 2:00 PM ET on April 6. Strikes targeted a 13th PMF Brigade communications and operations headquarters, as well as artillery units, near al Qaim on April 6, but did not cause casualties.[clxxvii] The 13th Brigade is controlled by Liwa al Tafuf, which is affiliated with Kataib Hezbollah.[clxxviii] A security source told Iraqi media on April 7 that strikes also targeted the headquarters of an unspecified PMF brigade in Amirli, Salah al Din Province.[clxxix] Combined force strikes separately struck sites belonging to the 16th and 40th PMF brigades in Kirkuk Province on April 7.[clxxx] The 16th PMF Brigade is affiliated with the Badr Organization, while the 40th PMF Brigade is affiliated with Kataib al Imam Ali.[clxxxi] A security source told Iraqi media on April 7 that strikes targeted an engineering site at the Badr Organization’s Camp Ashraf near al Khalis, Diyala Province.[clxxxii] An OSINT account published footage of explosions at the camp.[clxxxiii] Another strike reportedly launched from Kuwait killed five individuals at a house belonging to an unidentified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia in Khor al Zubair, Basra Province, on April 7, according to an Iraqi security source.[clxxxiv]

Other Activity

Bahrain’s proposed UN Security Council resolution authorizing countries to use “all necessary means” to reopen the Strait of Hormuz failed to pass.[clxxxv] Russia and China vetoed the resolution, while Pakistan and Colombia abstained from voting, leaving the final vote at 11–2.[clxxxvi]


[i] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/116365796713313030 ; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/405954; . https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/1024503/; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/405965 ; https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/04/07/world/iran-war-trump-news/5b2ee614-5e03-59c0-9d06-3cfcf8132c8e?smid=url-share

 

[ii] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/405954 ; https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/116365796713313030

[iii] https://x.com/CMShehbaz/status/2041596151108137363?s=20

[iv] https://x.com/CMShehbaz/status/2041596151108137363?s=20

 

[v] https://x.com/araghchi/status/2041655156215799821?s=20

[vi] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/116365796713313030

[vii] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/06/world/middleeast/iran-10-point-proposal.html; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/405958

[viii] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/405958

[ix] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/06/world/middleeast/iran-10-point-proposal.html; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/405958

[x] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/apr/07/trump-iran-war-ceasefire; https://www.ynet.co dot il/news/blogs/article/r1a00e1q2bg; https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/1024503 ; https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/04/07/world/iran-war-trump-news/5b2ee614-5e03-59c0-9d06-3cfcf8132c8e?smid=url-share

[xi] https://x.com/CMShehbaz/status/2041665043423752651

[xii] https://x.com/IDF/status/2041523615531749516

[xiii] https://t.me/moriahdoron/29628

[xiv] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2041578903425200455

[xv] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2028185206406955490 ; https://x.com/sam_lair/status/2028983683961766147   ; https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2036362665245687879

 

[xvi] https://x.com/Osint613/status/2041487406839341288?s=20

[xvii] https://x.com/Osint613/status/2041487406839341288?s=20

[xviii] https://x.com/Archer83Able/status/2041602677277122840 

[xix] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/02/trump-iran-bridge-stone-age ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-2-2026#_edna423cdcf1498aac55d0abd75e3f8d498d258b62dae23a72836420fbfcfb6b46122

[xx] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041487474325680598?s=20 ;            https://x.com/Osint613/status/2041481193493774607 ;            https://x.com/Osint613/status/2041431265245556749

[xxi] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2041475734443594181?s=20

[xxii] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604070610?source=share-link

[xxiii] https://t.me/mehrnews/369054

[xxiv] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-supplies-iran-with-cyber-support-spy-imagery-hone-attacks-ukraine-says-2026-04-07/

[xxv] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-supplies-iran-with-cyber-support-spy-imagery-hone-attacks-ukraine-says-2026-04-07/

[xxvi] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-29-2026

[xxvii] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-provided-targeting-data-for-houthi-assault-on-global-shipping-eabc2c2b?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqdisppibEVXJupyUEr5WHYEhzkFIvPUDfcm-7rEDOrGQE4t2RN-KyaH&gaa_ts=69d562a6&gaa_sig=6MXKj2BehrE_M7u5n6-1KW3qXWEPISzDEA2i1WMnaLrGNAYDrpDqwQdGOoaF26t_vYfUUjRFvlV_-hWeKPTHYw%3D%3D

[xxviii] https://www.ukmto.org/recent-incidents#22b1cf89-7ce8-4dc7-95c5-9e1b98fa0efa

[xxix] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-892256

 

[xxx] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604074692?source=share-link

[xxxi] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604074692?source=share-link

[xxxii] https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran/article/iran-supreme-leader-mojtaba-khamenei-qom-war-latest-c2th5xgqb

[xxxiii] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041419723825389607

[xxxiv] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041419723825389607 ; https://x.com/benreuter_IMINT/status/2041440246345134368 https://x.com/A_z_im/status/2041422098166387060 ; https://www.armyrecognition.com/military-products/army/air-defense-systems/air-defense-vehicles/5p85te-tel-s-300-pmu2

[xxxv] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Harmer_Strategic_Impact_S-300_Iran.pdf

[xxxvi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-4-2026/

https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040305473895711206 ; https://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.512003&lon=51.375589&z=16&m=w&show=/18783057/%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B6%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B8%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-&search=35.514120%2C%2051.37451178 

[xxxvii] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041419723825389607

[xxxviii] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041411248353341611

[xxxix] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041411248353341611

[xl] https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=40883 ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2644

[xli] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041182298662465605?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2040482500397396031?s=20 ; https://x.com/Tasnimnews_EN/status/2040340811959644573 ; https://twitter.com/Iran/status/2040344958398345527?s=20

[xlii] https://x.com/Mitch_Ulrich/status/2041281600416022827?s=20 ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2041260042708463705?s=20 ; https://t.me/BenTzionM/7370;%20https:/x.com/Osint613/status/2041267093471977573%20;%20https:/x.com/IranIntl/status/2041281939487793440

[xliii] ttps://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038775621304697265?s=20; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2038897202576101608?s=20; https://x.com/Osint613/status/2038935246549245972; https://x.com/Mitch_Ulrich/status/2038817557247840624; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2038761383022432351?s=20; https://t.me/BenTzionM/7305; https://x.com/TrumpDailyPosts/status/2038781791071588855

[xliv] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2041478828959379917

[xlv] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/iran-aviation-industries-organization-iaio ; https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/fajr-aviation-composite-industries

[xlvi] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038761216366018920?s=20 ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030359675724574768

[xlvii] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/iran-aviation-industries-organization-iaio

[xlviii] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/iran-aviation-industries-organization-iaio

[xlix] https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2041422306078036255?s=20 ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2041414529188327811?s=20 ; https://x.com/EndlessWint_r/status/2041434024577568991?s=20

[l] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/aerospace-research-institute

[li] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2041576702032408806?s=20 ;

[lii] https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2041122711477325912 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-4-2026 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-7-2026 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-february-28-2026
[36] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1145 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2038178856998187295?s=20

[liii] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shiraz-electronics-industries-sei

[liv] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1145

[lv] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2041576702032408806?s=20

[lvi] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041222782017507469?s=20

[lvii] https://x.com/IDF/status/2029246755921871302

[lviii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces

[lix] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041222782017507469?s=20

[lx] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/07/us/politics/us-israel-iran-strikes-kharg-trump.html ; https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/2041468742291317015?s=20 ; https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/2041477775379345486?s=20 ; https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2041476986049036588?s=20 ; https://x.com/JenGriffinFNC/status/2041480208839020996?s=20

[lxi] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/07/us/politics/us-israel-iran-strikes-kharg-trump.html

[lxii] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/07/us/politics/us-israel-iran-strikes-kharg-trump.html

[lxiii] https://x.com/JenGriffinFNC/status/2041480208839020996?s=20

[lxiv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-14-2026/

[lxv] https://x.com/DOWResponse/status/2032591643694739823 ; https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/2041477775379345486?s=20

[lxvi] https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/25/politics/iran-kharg-island-us-military-ground-troops

[lxvii] https://t.me/defapress_ir/55178

[lxviii] https://t.me/defapress_ir/55178

[lxix] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041311652558049759?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041396189120090333 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041396949585104979?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041456053963878785?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041503200293839146?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041535524070977659?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041540818222150088?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041544062482715118?s=20 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/29649

[lxx] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041401856253960593?s=20

[lxxi] https://t.me/N12chat/200233 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2041407962132943351?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041461184012927307?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041459800731431377?s=20

[lxxii] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041514697476776173

[lxxiii] https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2041268878924300727 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2041287030705959341 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2041382041623593010 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2041503688984834323

 

[lxxiv] https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2041287030705959341

[lxxv] https://x.com/Faytuks/status/2041287585079640546 ; https://x.com/Faytuks/status/2041291037054804257 ; https://x.com/Mitch_Ulrich/status/2041325173844971603?s=20

[lxxvi] https://t.me/defapress_ir/55170

[lxxvii] https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-trump-deadline-power-plants-bridges-ceasefire-push-air-force-rescue/#post-update-91e6a9e4

[lxxviii] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2041472757557534950?s=20

[lxxix] https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2041496552485568560

[lxxx] https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2041527687823380969

[lxxxi] https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2041165307595604372

[lxxxii] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2041452380743475691?s=20

[lxxxiii] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2041452380743475691?s=20

[lxxxiv] https://t.me/defapress_ir/55170

[lxxxv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-31-2026/

[lxxxvi] https://t.me/mmirleb/14383 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14385 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14387 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14389 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14391 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14393 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14395 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14397 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14399 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14401 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14403 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14405 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14410 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14412 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14414 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14416 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14418 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14426 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14428 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14432 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14436 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14438 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14440 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14442 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14454 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14456 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14460 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14462 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14464 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14466 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14468 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14478 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14480 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14482 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14486 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14487 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14504 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14525 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14527 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14529 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14536 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14538 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14540 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14547

[lxxxvii] https://t.me/mmirleb/14385 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14387 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14401 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14432 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14436 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14442 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14442

[lxxxviii] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2041446698057097270?s=20

[lxxxix] https://t.me/mmirleb/14389 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14391 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14393 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14395 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14399 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14414 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14454 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14456 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14460 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14462 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14464 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14466 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14468 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14478 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14480 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14482 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14486 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14504 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14525 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14536

[xc] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/2-people-lightly-injured-in-latest-iranian-hezbollah-salvos/ ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/hezbollah-rocket-fired-from-lebanon-hits-kiryat-shmona-home-no-injuries/ ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/woman-lightly-wounded-in-hezbollah-rocket-attack-in-nahariya/

[xci] https://t.me/mmirleb/14420 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14422 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14424 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14430 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14434 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14438 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14442 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14444 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14446 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14458 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14470 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14472 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14474 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14476 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14489 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14491 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14496 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14498 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14500 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14502 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14506 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14511 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14513 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14515 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14517 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14519 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14521 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14523 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14534 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14542 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14549https://t.me/mmirleb/14551

[xcii] https://t.me/mmirleb/14420 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14430 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14444 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14472 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14476

[xciii] https://t.me/mmirleb/14511

[xciv] https://t.me/mmirleb/14470 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14489 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14506

[xcv] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2039195832843436300?s=20

[xcvi] https://t.me/mmirleb/14554

[xcvii] https://t.me/mmirleb/14508 ; https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/2041531954902819049 ; https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2041548460646617566

[xcviii] https://t.me/mmirleb/14508

 

[xcix] https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/scud/

[c] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/arming-hezbollah-syrias-alleged-scud-missile-transfer ; https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2041548460646617566

[ci] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041391980685492426

[cii] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041391980685492426

[ciii] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041391980685492426

[civ] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041571031295426925

[cv] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041397765138166177?s=20

[cvi] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2041537243223830611?s=20

[cvii] https://news dot walla.co.il/item/3828783

[cviii]  https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041400157598626050

[cix] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041397765138166177?s=20

[cx] https://www.idf dot il/335205

[cxi] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2034201035523178696   

[cxii] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2038993222974808208

[cxiii] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2036000844001231302    

[cxiv] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2039849122954420322

[cxv] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2039015740506816591

[cxvi] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2038407122732404957

[cxvii] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2040053356308365798

[cxviii] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2038407122732404957

[cxix] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2038407122732404957 ; https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2038126072664137826

[cxx] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2039165878642880873

[cxxi] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2039947961912664285 ; https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2040048119224979949

[cxxii] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2035870384919130479  

[cxxiii] https://www.idf dot il/335205

[cxxiv] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505782200766682

[cxxv] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2038407144899272804

[cxxvi] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2036830735923904631

[cxxvii] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2036830735923904631

[cxxviii] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505794368143655?s=20   

[cxxix] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036973153243512969

[cxxx] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505794368143655?s=20   ; https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2041138611878572344?s=20

[cxxxi] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2036437717484269799

[cxxxii] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2040827908479139879?s=20

[cxxxiii] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2038407136376500590

[cxxxiv] https://x.com/lorienttoday/status/2040353682387329419

[cxxxv] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-889323 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030933349712228629?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2030933458936041944   

[cxxxvi] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036973153243512969

[cxxxvii] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505788986851688   

[cxxxviii] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505788986851688   ; https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2037510491963084891 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2037526681515085831 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2037497293478285707

[cxxxix] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2039112886573031888

[cxl] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039976419866894510 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2039980987384311822?s=20

[cxli] https://www.idf dot il/333464

[cxlii] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036973166371672108

[cxliii] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2037510491963084891

[cxliv] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2039112886573031888

[cxlv] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/r1gwyc119wg#google_vignette

[cxlvi] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2038277936500154381 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2038278505121649012

[cxlvii] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2039265889485464052

[cxlviii] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2040806578954088663

[cxlix] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2037155756353409419

[cl] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2037216035590574331

[cli] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2039112881216643498

[clii] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2039849122954420322

[cliii] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2039688220313555109

[cliv] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041444161484636625

[clv] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041444161484636625

[clvi] https://t.me/BenTzionM/7373 ; https://x.com/N12News/status/2041416917387288921

[clvii] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041547248656351311

[clviii] https://t.me/mmirleb/14255   

[clix] https://t.me/HallelBittonRosen/11102   

[clx] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/07/world/middleeast/shelly-kittleson-journalist-iraq.html

[clxi] https://t.me/centerkaf/5615

[clxii] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/07/world/middleeast/shelly-kittleson-journalist-iraq.html

[clxiii] https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2041243144533028894 ; https://alhurra dot com/en/14420

[clxiv] https://apnews.com/article/journalist-kidnapped-iraq-shelly-kittleson-3e1a3a8e96656629abd1152c098e9caf

[clxv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-17-2026/

[clxvi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-17-2026/

[clxvii] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/الدفاع-العراقية-تعلن-اعتراض-مسيرة-مجهولة-استهدفت-رادارا-داخل-قاعدة-عين-ال-سد-الجوية

[clxviii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-20-2026/

[clxix] https://t.me/awlialdm/340 ; https://x.com/sentdefender/status/2038394415983493163 ; https://shafaq dot com/en/Security/Iraq-foils-back-to-back-strikes-on-Saladin-s-Balad-Air-Base

[clxx] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/حباط-هجوم-بطا-رتين-مسي-رتين-في-كركوك

[clxxi] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2041300663565500881?s=20

[clxxii] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/حباط-هجوم-جديد-بمسيرتين-قرب-مطار-ربيل ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2032257902489075975

[clxxiii] https://t.me/awlialdm/350 ; https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2033841863354892748

[clxxiv] https://www.newarab dot com/news/drones-iraq-targeted-area-near-us-base-northeast-syria

[clxxv] https://www.newarab dot com/news/drones-iraq-targeted-area-near-us-base-northeast-syria

[clxxvi] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2040430940888141967 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2039358122406670837

[clxxvii] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2041268835634794563 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/ضربات-جوية-تستهدف-ثلاثة-مقار-قيادية-للحشد-الشعبي-في-ال-نبار; https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/قصف-جوي-يستهدف-مقرا-للحشد-الشعبي-في-ال-نبار

[clxxviii] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-liwa-al-tafuf-13th-pmf-brigade

[clxxix] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/استهداف-مقر-للحشد-ب-طراف-مرلي-شرق-صلاح-الدين-وال-دارة-المحلية-ت-عطل-دوام-المدارس

[clxxx] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/غارتان-جويتان-تستهدفان-موقعين-للحشد-الشعبي-جنوبي-كركوك ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/قصف-جوي-يستهدف-مقرا-للحشد-الشعبي-في-كركوك

[clxxxi] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Iraq20-20ISF20PMF20Orders20of20Battle_0_0.pdf pg 18, 44

[clxxxii] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89

[clxxxiii] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2041571628249755780?s=20

[clxxxiv] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AE-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD

[clxxxv] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/04/china-and-russia-veto-un-resolution-protecting-hormuz-shipping ; https://apnews.com/article/strait-of-hormuz-iran-us-trump-israel-172e6f41b0e4af99881ca8ef2f69ed17

[clxxxvi] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/04/china-and-russia-veto-un-resolution-protecting-hormuz-shipping

 [AB1]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMzYO

 [AB2]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMzYP

 [KC3]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMzWe

 [KC4]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMzXZ

 [PH5]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMzTo

 [PH6]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMzTB

 [PH7]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMzTL

 [PH8]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMzTX

 [AB9]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMzPy

 [KC10]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMzWZ

 [AB11]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMzP0

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