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April 02, 2026
Iran Update Evening Special Report: April 2, 2026
Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways:
- The combined force has begun striking targets in Iran beyond narrowly-defined military targets, such as military vehicles or ammunition depots. The combined force struck the Darou Pakhsh Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company and the Pasteur Institute of Iran in Tehran Province on April 1 and 2. The Japanese government has listed Darou Pakhsh and the Pasteur Institute of Iran as entities associated with Iranian biological and chemical weapons activities. The combined force has also recently targeted Iranian steel factories, which are critical for both Iran’s military production capabilities and the Iranian economy.
- US President Donald Trump stated that the United States’ "strategic objectives" for the war are “nearing completion” during a press conference on April 1. Trump said that the United States will continue the war effort until US objectives are “fully achieved.” Trump said that the United States will strike Iran over the “next two to three weeks” while indirect talks between the United States and Iran continue.
- US forces struck the B1 (Bileghan) Bridge connecting Tehran and Karaj, Alborz Province, on April 2 to disrupt Iran’s ability to transfer missiles to western Iran. A US official told Axios on April 2 that Iran used the bridge to transport missiles and missile components from Tehran to launch sites in western Iran. Iran has increasingly launched missiles from central Iran as the combined force has degraded its ability to launch missiles from western Iran. Iran may seek to transfer missiles to western Iran that do not have a sufficient range to reach Israel if they are launched from central Iran.
- Hezbollah may be increasing fire at Israel during Passover to impose psychological impacts on Israeli civilians. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on April 2 that Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem will pay a “very heavy price” for “the intensified fire toward Israeli civilians as they...celebrate Passover.”
Toplines
The combined force has begun striking targets in Iran beyond narrowly-defined military targets, such as military vehicles or ammunition depots. The combined force struck the Darou Pakhsh Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company and the Pasteur Institute of Iran in Tehran Province on April 1 and 2.[i] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) previously struck Tofigh Daru, which is a research and development facility located in the same complex as Darou Pakhsh, on March 31.[ii] The IDF stated that Tofigh Daru supplied chemical materials to the Iranian regime and functioned as a central supplier of fentanyl-based compounds to the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND).[iii] The Japanese government has listed Darou Pakhsh and the Pasteur Institute of Iran as entities associated with Iranian biological and chemical weapons activities.[iv] The US Department of Justice also reported in March 2014 that the Pasteur Institute of Iran has received illegally exported laboratory equipment and noted that the institute has been listed as an entity of concern for biological and chemical weapons development by several foreign governments.[v] Iran has conducted long-term research on pharmaceutical-based agents, particularly fentanyl and medetomidine, and has explored how to synthesize, aerosolize, and deliver these compounds through munitions such as grenades, anti-riot rounds, and potentially drones.[vi] These strikes suggest that the combined force has begun targeting a relatively niche set of dual-use facilities linked to Iran’s biological and chemical weapons development.
The combined force has also recently targeted Iranian steel factories, which are critical for both Iran’s military production capabilities and the Iranian economy. The combined force struck several Iranian steel plants on March 27, including the Khuzestan Steel Company in Khuzestan Province as well as the Mobarakeh Steel Company and Saba Steel Plant in Esfahan Province.[vii] The combined force also struck the Kavir Steel Company in Esfahan Province on March 28.[viii] An Israeli journalist reported on March 31 that the IDF’s strikes on the Khuzestan Steel Company and the Mobarakeh Steel Company were meant to disrupt Iran’s ability to produce metals used in ballistic missiles but that the strikes on the companies will have the secondary effect of hurting Iran’s economy.[ix] Iranian media reported on April 1 that the damage to the Khuzestan Steel Company will require at least six months and up to one year to repair.[x] The Mobarakeh Steel Company separately announced on April 2 that strikes on the company have forced it to shut down its production lines.[xi]
US President Donald Trump stated that the United States’ "strategic objectives" for the war are “nearing completion” during a press conference on April 1.[xii] Trump said that the United States will continue the war effort until US objectives are “fully achieved.” Trump noted that the Strait of Hormuz will “open up naturally” when the conflict is over. Trump said that the United States will strike Iran over the “next two to three weeks” while indirect talks between the United States and Iran continue. Trump threatened to strike Iranian electricity plants “very hard” if Iran does not agree to a deal with the United States. Trump announced on March 26 that the United States will refrain from attacking Iranian energy plants until April 6 at the Iranian regime’s request.[xiii]
US-Israeli Air Campaign
The combined force continued to target Iranian military bases and missile sites. The IDF stated on April 2 that it struck the Artesh Joint Staff headquarters in Tehran.[xiv] The Artesh Joint Staff coordinates between the Artesh’s service branches, determines the Artesh’s logistical requirements, and reviews the Artesh’s proposed budget, among other tasks.[xv] Satellite imagery from March 29 confirms that the combined force struck the IRGC Navy Besat Barracks in Shiraz, Fars Province.[xvi] The Besat Barracks houses anti-ship missiles and supports IRGC Navy forces in southern Iran, including in Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lengeh, and Bushehr.[xvii] The strike on this base is likely part of the combined force's ongoing effort to degrade Iran's ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Anti-regime media separately reported on April 2 that the combined force struck the IRGC Quds Barracks near Mashhad Airport in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi.[xviii] The combined force conducted strikes in Mashhad for the first time on March 25.[xix] The IDF also stated on April 2 that it struck an unspecified ballistic missile storage site in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province.[xx] The combined force previously struck the Amand Missile Base near Tabriz on February 28.[xxi]
US forces struck the B1 (Bileghan) Bridge connecting Tehran and Karaj, Alborz Province, on April 2 to disrupt Iran’s ability to transfer missiles to western Iran.[xxii] US President Donald Trump stated on April 2 that US strikes destroyed the bridge and warned Iran to “make a deal before it’s too late.”[xxiii] A US official told Axios on April 2 that Iran used the bridge to transport missiles and missile components from Tehran to launch sites in western Iran.[xxiv] The combined force has significantly degraded Iran’s ability to launch missiles from western Iran since the war began on February 28. Iran has increasingly launched missiles from central Iran as the combined force has degraded its ability to launch missiles from western Iran. Iran may seek to transfer missiles to western Iran that do not have a sufficient range to reach Israel if they are launched from central Iran.[xxv] Haj Qassem (1,400-kilometer range), Fattah (1,400-kilometer range), and Kheibar Shekan (1,450-kilometer range) ballistic missiles cannot reach Israel from Esfahan in central Iran due to their shorter ranges, for example.[xxvi]
The combined force conducted several strikes targeting islands in the Persian Gulf on April 1 and 2. The combined force likely struck warehouses at a port in eastern Qeshm Island on April 1.[xxvii] Satellite imagery from April 2 showed a large smoke plume rising from the port.[xxviii] It is unclear what the warehouses stored, but Iran stores naval assets on Qeshm Island that it can use to attack vessels in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, such as uncrewed vessels.[xxix] Iranian media also reported that the combined force struck a building and docked vessels on Hengam Island.[xxx] Hengam is a smaller island located south of Qeshm.
The combined force has continued its decapitation campaign against Iranian military, intelligence, and political officials. The combined force has targeted the following individuals since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff:
- Ali Montazeri: Montazeri was an Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) official and reportedly an Intelligence Ministry officer.[xxxi]
- Kamal Kharrazi: The combined force targeted Strategic Council on Foreign Relations Chairman Kamal Kharrazi at his home in Tehran Province on April 1, severely injuring Kharrazi, according to Iranian media.[xxxii] Kharrazi was a senior and trusted member of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s inner circle.[xxxiii]
- Mokkarram Azimi: The IDF announced on April 2 that it killed the commander of a central ballistic missile unit in Kermanshah Province, Mokkarram Azimi, as well as several battalion commanders in the same unit who were responsible for dozens of missile launches at Israel.[xxxiv] Strikes on missile unit commanders such as Azimi likely explain, in part, why Iran has struggled to conduct large-scale missile barrages at Israel.
- Mohammad Ali Fathali Zadeh: The combined force killed Fatehin Battalions Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Fathali Zadeh.[xxxv] The Fatehin Battalions are special forces within the Basij Organization that participate in crackdowns on protests, including in January 2026.[xxxvi] Fatehin Battalions personnel deployed to Syria to defend the Assad regime.[xxxvii]

Iranian Response
Iran launched over 20 missiles targeting Israel between April 1 and 2.[xxxviii] The IDF said on April 2 that Iran launched about 20 missiles within a 24-hour period.[xxxix] One ballistic missile impacted in Petah Tikva, central Israel, on April 2.[xl] At least two of the missiles that Iran launched during the 24-hour period contained warheads with cluster munitions.[xli] The launch of 20 missiles within a 24-hour period represents a slight uptick in the volume of Iranian fire targeting Israel in recent days. Iran has fired around 10 to 15 missiles targeting Israel per day in recent weeks.[xlii] The IDF assessed that Iran tried to launch “dozens” more ballistic missiles during the 24-hour period but that IDF airstrikes thwarted these efforts.[xliii]

Iran continued to conduct drone and missile attacks against the Gulf states. The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted 26 drones and nine ballistic missiles on April 2.[xliv] The Kuwaiti Armed Forces said that it intercepted 13 drones and two cruise missiles on April 2.[xlv] The Bahrain Defense Force reported that it intercepted 10 drones and two missiles on April 2.[xlvi] The Qatari Defense Ministry also said that it intercepted several Iranian drones on April 2.[xlvii] The Saudi Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted four drones on April 2.[xlviii] CTP-ISW has observed a slight decrease in Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia since March 23 (see below). Iran reportedly decided to limit its attacks on Saudi Arabia due to concerns that continued strikes could trigger a direct Saudi military response, according to two sources speaking to Israeli media on March 22.[xlix]




The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs announced that Iran agreed to allow Philippine-affiliated vessels to safely transit through the Strait of Hormuz.[l] The Philippines’ Foreign Affairs Secretary, Ma Theresa P. Lazaro, spoke with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on April 2.[li] Araghchi told Lazaro that Iran will allow the safe passage of Philippine-flagged vessels, energy sources, and Filipino sailors through the strait.[lii] Araghchi reiterated on April 1 that Iran will only allow vessels that are not ”involved” in the US-Israeli war effort against Iran to transit the strait.[liii] Senior officials in Tehran have signaled that they seek to use the Strait of Hormuz and energy flows around it as points of leverage that Iran can use after the war to extract concessions and secure its strategic aims.[liv]
Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response
Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 28 attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on April 1 and 2:00 PM ET on April 2.[lv] Hezbollah claimed that it attacked IDF units operating in southern Lebanon, particularly near Ainata, Bint Jbeil District, and Qantara and Taybeh, both in Marjaayoun District, with anti-tank guided missiles, mortar fire, and rockets.[lvi] Hezbollah also claimed that it conducted an attack targeting an IDF Merkava tank with an improvised explosive device near Ainata, Bint Jbeil District.[lvii] Israeli media reported on April 2 that Hezbollah has increasingly begun using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to attack Israeli forces and tanks in southern Lebanon.[lviii] Fiber-optic FPV drones are immune to jamming and can be outfitted with strike capabilities to conduct precise targeting.[lix] The drones have small ranges and generally carry small payloads.[lx] Russia and Ukraine have extensively used FPV drones in their war.[lxi] Hezbollah did not claim any FPV drone attacks against the IDF between 2:00 PM ET on April 1 and 2:00 PM ET on April 2. Hezbollah previously claimed six FPV drone attacks against IDF armored vehicles between March 31 and April 1.[lxii]

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 32 attacks targeting IDF infrastructure and Israeli communities in northern Israel between 2:00 PM ET on April 1 and 2:00 PM ET on April 2.[lxiii] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted multiple IDF positions and bases in northern Israel, including the 146th Reserve Division Headquarters in Jaatoun and the IDF Northern Command Headquarters in Safed.[lxiv] 146th Reserve Division units are operating in southwestern Lebanon near Naqoura, according to a geospatial analyst on March 24.[lxv]

Hezbollah may be increasing fire at Israel during Passover to impose psychological impacts on Israeli civilians. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on April 2 that Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem will pay a “very heavy price” for “the intensified fire toward Israeli civilians as they...celebrate Passover.”[lxvi] Hezbollah claimed that it launched rocket barrages at multiple northern Israeli towns, including Krayot, Kiryat Shmona, Shlomi, Metula, and Nahariya.[lxvii] Israeli media reported on April 2 that multiple Hezbollah rocket attacks on northern Israeli towns caused damage and injuries, including Hezbollah rocket attacks that injured two people in Kiryat Shmona and two people in Biina.[lxviii]
CTP-ISW has also observed a slight uptick in the volume of Iranian ballistic missile fire targeting Israel coinciding with Passover (see above). It is unclear if this uptick indicates a concerted Iranian effort to increase its rate of missile fire at Israel during Passover, however.
The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah sites and personnel throughout Lebanon. The IDF announced that the IAF struck dozens of Hezbollah headquarters, weapons depots, launch sites, and anti-tank missile launch positions and killed 40 Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon over the past 24 hours.[lxix] The IDF Navy also “precisely attacked” a Hezbollah weapons depot in southern Lebanon.[lxx] An Israeli military correspondent reported on April 2 that the IDF has killed around 1,000 Hezbollah operatives, including hundreds of Radwan Force members, since the start of Israeli operations in Lebanon on March 2.[lxxi]
The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon on April 2:
- Southeastern Lebanon: The IDF reported on April 2 that 91st Territorial Division units killed members of a Hezbollah cell and destroyed dozens of Hezbollah sites, including observation posts and anti-tank missile launch sites.[lxxii] A geospatial analyst reported that the 91st Division’s 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade and 401st Armored Brigade advanced toward Ainata, Bint Jbeil District, on March 28.[lxxiii] 36th Division forces engaged three Hezbollah fighters on motorcycles in southern Lebanon.[lxxiv] The 36th Division has killed around 10 Hezbollah fighters and destroyed dozens of Hezbollah sites in the past 24 hours, according to the IDF.[lxxv] 36th Division units are operating in Taybeh, Marjaayoun District, according to a geospatial intelligence analyst on March 24.[lxxvi]
- Central Southern Lebanon: The 401st Armored Brigade and 933rd (Nahal) Brigade, which both operate under the 162nd Division, located numerous Hezbollah weapons caches that included anti-tank missiles, Kalashnikov rifles, ammunition, and grenades.[lxxvii] The IDF separately reported on April 2 that two Nahal Brigade soldiers were ”lightly wounded” during an engagement with a Hezbollah fighter in southern Lebanon.[lxxviii] The Nahal Brigade soldiers engaged the Hezbollah fighter at close range and killed the fighter. The Nahal Brigade soldiers seized weapons, including grenades, and vests from the engagement site.[lxxix] An OSINT source claimed that IDF units entered Beit Lif and Rachaf, both in Bint Jbeil District, on April 2.[lxxx]
- Southwestern Lebanon: The IDF reported that the 146th Division has destroyed more than 180 Hezbollah sites, including anti-tank missile launch sites, observation posts, underground shelters, and weapons depots, since the start of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon.[lxxxi] The 146th Division has reportedly advanced near al Biyyadah, Tyre District, in southwestern Lebanon, according to a geospatial analyst on March 27.[lxxxii]
Other Axis of Resistance Response
The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting southern Israel on April 2.[lxxxiii] The IDF intercepted the missile, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[lxxxiv] The Houthis claimed that they coordinated the missile attack with Hezbollah and Iran.[lxxxv] This attack marks the fifth time that the Houthis have attacked Israel since entering the conflict on March 28.[lxxxvi] The Houthis‘ involvement in the war thus far appears calibrated to try to avoid an immediate escalation with the United States and Israel.[lxxxvii] Unspecified European officials told Bloomberg on March 30 that Iran is pushing the Houthis to prepare for a renewed campaign against international shipping in the Red Sea if the United States “further escalat[es]” against Iran.[lxxxviii]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and militia front groups continue to claim attacks against US targets in Iraq and the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on April 1 that it conducted 41 drone attacks against US bases in Iraq and the region.[lxxxix] Likely front group Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed on April 1 that it conducted six attacks against US bases in Iraq and the region.[xc] The US State Department issued a warning on April 2 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may conduct attacks targeting US citizens and interests in central Baghdad in the next 24-48 hours.[xci]
The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee issued a statement on April 2 that demanded that the Iraqi government “punish” Jordan for allegedly allowing the United States to launch strikes targeting Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units from Jordanian territory by closing the land border crossing between Iraq and Jordan.[xcii] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee includes Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Harakat Ansar Allah Awfiya, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada.[xciii] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Coordination Committee members, control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[xciv] The combined force has repeatedly struck units controlled by Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee members since the start of the conflict.[xcv]
The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks against US interests and Israel. The combined force struck two Tribal Mobilization Forces brigades in Anbar and Ninewa provinces on April 2.[xcvi] Tribal Mobilization Forces brigades are typically largely comprised of Sunnis.[xcvii]
Likely Kataib Hezbollah front group Alwiyat al Waad al Haq threatened on April 1 to attack the Emirati Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in Abu Dhabi, the UAE, due to the Emirati government’s alleged support for the US-Israeli campaign against Iran.[xcviii] This group previously claimed several drone attacks against Emirati targets in 2021 and 2022.[xcix]

[i] https://x.com/mamlekate/status/2039338658923167946 ;
https://t.me/defapress_ir/54463 ;
https://x.com/indypersian/status/2039621353137975702
[ii] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2039100457218380264
[iii] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2039100457218380264
[iv] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/pasteur-institute-iran ;
https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/law_document/tutatu/t09kaisei/120801EUL/t09kaisei_kaiteikasho.pdf
[v] https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/nsd/legacy/2014/07/23/export-case-fact-sheet-201403.pdf
[vi] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/the-islamic-republics-work-on-pharmaceutical-based-agents
[vii] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037533868060807418 ;
[viii] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2037710612168314981 ;
https://x.com/IranIntlbrk/status/2037881664471171078
[ix] https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2038964538851168373?s=20
[x] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/307049 ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2039696649392377924
[xi] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1153657
[xii] https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-transcript-address-iran-war-b5970011fe934dde84d95d650bda56a9
[xiii] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116297295543838717
[xiv] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2039724913351647556?s=20
[xv] https://web.archive.org/web/20211006074809/http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/91404
[xvi] https://x.com/WillUnderhill23/status/2039603997539983424?s=20
[xvii] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/31154074.html ; https://x.com/WillUnderhill23/status/2039603997539983424?s=20
[xviii] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039648176706089390?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2039617393668792429
[xix] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-26-2026/
[xx] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2039609334477287722
[xxi] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2027663326864392699?s=20
[xxii] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/02/trump-iran-bridge-stone-age
[xxiii] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116336091138489301
[xxiv] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2039755384420786195?s=20
[xxv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-21-2025-evening-edition/
[xxvi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-21-2025-evening-edition/
[xxvii] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2039410085345054752; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/403701
[xxviii] https://x.com/tom_bike/status/2039786019470352544 ; https://x.com/supbrow/status/2039759078000611512; https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2039790631569240409
[xxix] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-evolving-approach-asymmetric-naval-warfare-strategy-and-capabilities-persian
[xxx] https://www.bbc.com/persian/live/c70dnnxwpq8t?at_bbc_team=editorial&at_link_id=69099E20-2DF9-11F1-B5D6-A7D800F09364&at_campaign_type=owned&at_link_origin=bbcpersian&at_ptr_name=twitter&at_medium=social&at_campaign=Social_Flow&at_format=link&at_link_type=web_link&post=asset%3Aacd7609a-c8fe-481c-b5fe-dde4a6131514&post=asset%3Aacd7609a-c8fe-481c-b5fe-dde4a6131514#asset:acd7609a-c8fe-481c-b5fe-dde4a6131514
[xxxi] https://x.com/Philipp27960841/status/2039422386693448155?s=20 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/823935
[xxxii] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/344355
[xxxiii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-leader-khamenei-sees-his-inner-circle-hollowed-out-by-israel-2025-06-17/
[xxxiv] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039757065531559941 ;
https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2039755597898240352?s=20
[xxxv] https://t.me/defapress_ir/54453
[xxxvi] https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cw0ww7k1edxo ;
https://x.com/riazipour/status/2014379078120276309
[xxxvii] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-basij-mull-wider-domestic-and-regional-role ;
https://www.longwarjournal dot org/archives/2016/10/irgc-to-expand-basij-special-forces.php
[xxxviii] https://t.me/manniefabian/57309; https://t.me/manniefabian/57314
[xxxix] https://t.me/manniefabian/57309
[xl] https://t.me/manniefabian/57316
[xli] https://t.me/manniefabian/57309
[xlii] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038904965956038878?s=20
[xliii] https://t.me/manniefabian/57309
[xliv] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2039665931136512488
[xlv] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2039665931136512488
[xlvi] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2039630309042381031
[xlvii] https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2039716865438556252
[xlviii] https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2039569527810216347
[xlix] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-890833
[l] https://x.com/DFAPHL/status/2039629341932622288/photo/1
[li] https://x.com/DFAPHL/status/2039629341932622288/photo/1
[lii] https://x.com/DFAPHL/status/2039629341932622288/photo/1
[liii] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/403745
[liv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-1-2026/
[lv] Data upon request.
[lvi] https://t.me/mmirleb/13924 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13926 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13928 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13930 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13932 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13944 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13946 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13948 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13952 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13988 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/61475 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14011 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14022 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14022
[lvii] https://t.me/mmirleb/13932
[lviii] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/hezbollah-increasingly-relying-on-drone-technology-used-by-russia-in-ukraine-to-attack-idf/
[lix] https://www.armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/russia-ukraine-war-2022/electronic-warfare-how-fiber-optic-fpv-drones-are-redefining-the-ukrainian-battlefield
[lx] https://www.armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/russia-ukraine-war-2022/electronic-warfare-how-fiber-optic-fpv-drones-are-redefining-the-ukrainian-battlefield
[lxi] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/defense-taiwan-ukrainian-characteristics-lessons-war-ukraine-western-pacific
[lxii] https://t.me/mmirleb/13881 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13822 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13710 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13720 ;
[lxiii] Data upon request.
[lxiv] https://t.me/mmirleb/13934 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13982 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14040
[lxv] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505805827219650
[lxvi] https://t.me/manniefabian/57298
[lxvii] https://t.me/mmirleb/14002 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14033 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13968 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14006 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14009
[lxviii] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039613609743958214 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039730276880789712 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039679852463190184 ; https://t.me/N12_News/37637
[lxix] https://www.idf dot il/336422 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039635748538798089
[lxx] https://www.idf dot il/336422 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039635748538798089
[lxxi] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2039723308195705325
[lxxii] https://www.idf dot il/336422
[lxxiii] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2039112886573031888
[lxxiv] https://www.idf dot il/336422
[lxxv] https://www.idf dot il/336422
[lxxvi] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505794368143655?s=20 ; https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2036437717484269799
[lxxvii] https://www.idf dot il/336422
[lxxviii] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039687496640917522
[lxxix] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2039687496640917522?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E2039687496640917522%7Ctwgr%5Edbf7db7a61f821dbc93f2fae18054f4eafc68d2f%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.timesofisrael.com%2Fliveblog_entry%2Ftwo-troops-wounded-in-exchange-of-fire-with-hezbollah-operative-in-southern-lebanon%2F
[lxxx] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2039671079984038359
[lxxxi] https://www.idf.il/336422
[lxxxii] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2037510472614699252
[lxxxiii] https://t.me/manniefabian/57319 ; https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2039774880833392809
[lxxxiv] https://t.me/manniefabian/57319
[lxxxv] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2039774880833392809
[lxxxvi] ttps://t.me/army21ye/3506 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2038417361154228228 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-28-2026/ ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2038468746398888338 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2038381168307867899 ;
[lxxxvii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-28-2026#_ednfb86ca531a54b4989e07239cc11260852aa32cd39d3190333a5f7d7945261d891
[lxxxviii] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-30/iran-presses-houthis-on-red-sea-shipping-european-officials-say
[lxxxix] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1620
[xc] https://t.me/awlialdm/337
[xci] https://x.com/TravelGov/status/2039588779443569016
[xcii] https://t.me/centerkaf/5610
[xciii] https://t.me/centerkaf/5388
[xciv] https://t.me/centerkaf/5388 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/
[xcv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-14-2026/ ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/كثر-من-120-قتيلا-وجريحا-بارتفاع-حصيلة-القصف-على-الحشد-في-ال-نبار ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/جرحى-ثر-قصف-استهدف-لوا-12-في-الحشد-شمال-بغداد
[xcvi] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/قصف-جوي-يستهدف-موقعا-للحشد-العشا-ري-جنوب-الموصل ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/قصف-جوي-يطال-لوا-57-بالحشد-الشعبي-في-ال-نبار
[xcvii] https://tcf.org/content/report/sunnis-iraqs-shia-paramilitary-powerhouse/
[xcviii] https://t.me/alwwadalhaaq/16 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-alwiyat-al-waad-al-haq
[xcix] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/kataib-hezbollahs-facade-group-threatens-gulf-states-again ; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2022/2/3/true-promise-brigades-iraqi-militia-attacks-uae
[KC1]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMyF0
[KC2]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMyHE
[NM3]CD link: https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMx4m
[NM4]CD link: https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMx4n
[NM5]CD link: https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMx4o
[NM6]CD link: https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMx4l
[PH7]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMx7I
[PH8]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMx5z