June 04, 2026

Ethiopia Holds Elections; IS in Northwestern Nigeria: Africa File, June 4, 2026

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Key Takeaways:

Ethiopia. Ethiopia held federal elections in which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s party is expected to secure an overwhelming victory, although doubts about the elections’ inclusiveness and disruptions by armed ethno-nationalist groups have undermined the elections. Abiy would likely use an electoral victory as a renewed mandate to further centralize power domestically and pursue maximalist aims on key issues regionally, such as sea access and use of the Nile River, although growing domestic and regional opposition threaten his agenda and could spark conflict.
Nigeria. IS claimed responsibility for IS Sahel Province’s (ISSP) activity in northwestern Nigeria for the first time. The attacks were not ISSP’s first attacks in the area, and the claims likely aim to demonstrate the organization’s resolve and strength in the region despite recent losses from US-Nigeria operations in northeastern Nigeria against IS West Africa Province.
Benin. Benin is working to increase counterinsurgency coordination with its neighbors, including joint operations with Nigeria and diplomatic efforts to repair frayed ties with Alliance of Sahel States members Burkina Faso and Niger.

Figure 1. Africa File, June 4, 2026

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Ethiopia

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr

Ethiopia held federal parliamentary elections on June 1 in which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party (PP) is expected to secure an overwhelming victory amid doubts over the election’s inclusiveness. The PP is a big-tent party formed when the largest ethnic-based regional parties in Ethiopia merged in 2019 and has since dominated Ethiopian politics, winning 96 percent of available parliamentary seats in the 2021 elections.^[1] The PP emphasized Ethiopia’s economic growth, which is projected to be over 9 percent in 2026, and other development metrics in its reelection campaign.^[2] Ethiopian authorities are expected to announce the election results by June 11.[3]

The federal government obstructed several influential opposition parties from participating. The federal government revoked the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s (TPLF’s) legal standing as a political party in May 2025, preventing the TPLF from contesting federal and regional elections.^[4] The TPLF has repeatedly refused to join the PP as part of broader disagreements over Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system, which sparked the Tigray war in 2020, and the TPLF remains more influential than the PP in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region.^[5] The federal government effectively fractured the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)—one of the primary political parties in southeastern Ethiopia’s Somali region—in the lead-up to the elections, only permitting a splinter faction to participate.^[6] The federal government also conducted widespread arrests of members of the Oromo Liberation Front—one of the main political parties in Oromia, the most populous region of Ethiopia—throughout 2025.^[7] The federal government separately prevented the registration of candidates from different non-ethnic opposition coalitions in certain areas, even arresting some opposition members and candidates.^[8]

There are doubts regarding the independence of opposition parties that were allowed to participate in elections. Ethiopia’s election board permitted 48 opposition parties to contest the elections, although many of the parties are fragmented and have not formed coalitions that seriously challenge the PP.^[9] Some of the larger opposition parties contesting the elections are tacitly allied with the PP, creating the appearance of a legitimate opposition without seriously challenging the PP.^[10] The PP deliberately chose not to contest seats in certain areas to allow these tacitly allied parties to gain symbolic representation.^[11] The PP had already employed this strategy during the 2021 elections.^[12]

The federal government restricted independent observers from covering and monitoring the election. The federal government cracked down on international news outlets throughout 2025 and the first part of 2026, revoking or refusing to renew journalists’ credentials from the BBC, Deutsche Welle, and Reuters.^[13] The federal government also targeted major domestic news outlets, revoking licenses of Wazema Radio and the Addis Standard and increasing repression efforts against individual journalists, which Ethiopian journalists claim has caused limited preelection coverage and widespread self-censorship.^[14] The federal government eventually prohibited Addis Standard journalists from reporting on the election from the ground.^[15] Ethiopian authorities separately required that all media organizations swear a vaguely-worded oath to comply with election board ethical directives and not publish “false information about the Board” to cover elections.[16] The election board then announced on May 26 that no international actors aside from the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development would observe the elections.^[17]

Ethiopia has struggled to hold free and fair elections since introducing multiparty elections in 1992. The TPLF-led Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) ruling coalition sponsored five national elections from 1995 to 2015, but only the 2005 elections were considered competitive.^[18] The EPRDF won sweeping majorities in every other election, using government resources and repression of the opposition to ensure that it maintained power.^[19] The PP-dominated 2021 elections saw further repression and subsequent opposition boycotts, along with suspended elections in three regions due to insecurity.^[20]

Insecurity related to ethno-nationalist rebel groups disrupted the elections in certain areas. The federal government did not hold any elections in Tigray amid the escalating political dispute with the TPLF. Relations between the two sides have steadily deteriorated since March 2025, when the TPLF launched a de facto coup against the federal government-backed Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) over the implementation of the Pretoria peace agreement, which ended the Tigray war in 2022.^[21] Tigray is currently outside of institutional control, as the federal government revoked the TPLF’s legal standing in May 2025, and the TPLF fully sidelined the TIA by reinstating its prewar regional government and appointing a new cabinet in May and June 2026.^[22] The two sides also had their first large-scale clashes in January 2026 since the end of the Tigray war and have subsequently been in a military standoff on the Tigray regional border.^[23] The election board cited “unfavorable conditions” resulting from the dispute between the federal government and TPLF when explaining the lack of elections in Tigray.^[24]

Amhara Fano militias have conducted offensives to limit the federal government’s ability to hold elections in northern Ethiopia’s Amhara region, which is the second-most populous region in Ethiopia. The Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM), which is the strongest Fano faction, issued a statement in March 2026 threatening those who support the elections.^[25] Fano proceeded to intensify offensives across Amhara through May, targeting election infrastructure.^[26] The election board announced on May 26 that the federal government would not hold elections in eight constituencies in Amhara due to the Fano offensives.^[27] The AFNM then declared a road blockade in Amhara from May 29 to June 2 to disrupt elections.^[28] Fano reportedly clashed with the Ethiopian military (ENDF) across all administrative zones in Amhara on June 1.^[29] The election board stated that dozens of voting centers did not open and others closed early due to Fano operations.^[30]

Figure 2. Fano and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) Target Ethiopian Elections

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Oromia mirrored Fano’s actions. The OLA declared a blockade of roads on May 29.^[31] The OLA claimed on June 2 that it had enforced the blockade and disrupted the transportation of election materials.^[32] The OLA also reported operations against the ENDF and election facilities across Oromia from May 31 to June 1.^[33] The election board similarly stated that some voting centers did not open and others closed early due to OLA operations.^[34]

Abiy would likely use a PP victory as a renewed mandate to pursue a further centralization of power domestically and maximalist aims on key regional issues. The federal government’s “Prosperity” agenda and broader ideology under Abiy calls for “synergy,” to justify asserting ultimate authority to transform Ethiopia into a cultural, economic, and military powerhouse in the Horn of Africa.^[35] Abiy has already used the PP to centralize power by eroding Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system. The PP has co-opted many regional parties and given the national leadership significant leverage over regional affiliates.^[36] The federal government has marginalized parties and groups who refuse to integrate into the PP.^[37]

Abiy has pursued naval and commercial access to the Red Sea and favorable Nile River access as necessary to his “Prosperity” agenda. Abiy has denounced Ethiopia’s landlocked status as a “geographic prison” that must change to meet Ethiopia’s economic and security needs and growing regional role.^[38] Ethiopia has homed in on Eritrea’s port of Assab as its preferred access point due to its historic claims to and usage of the port, although Ethiopia also signed a now-stalled deal with the breakaway Somaliland region in 2024 to gain access near the port of Berbera.^[39] Ethiopia has separately operationalized the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Africa’s largest dam, which will substantially increase electricity access in the country and make Ethiopia the key energy exporter in the region.^[40] Ethiopia announced in March 2026 the start of new projects to build more dams on the Nile.^[41]

Increasing domestic and regional opposition threatens Abiy’s agenda and presents flashpoints for conflict. Ethno-nationalist groups view Abiy’s centralization as a threat to their own interests and have only entrenched their armed opposition to the federal government. The TPLF has emphasized that it views federal control over Tigray via the TIA and the entire Pretoria process as illegitimate and invalid by reinstating the prewar regional government. The TPLF’s move sets up a showdown with the federal government over control of Tigray, which was the primary cause of the first Tigray war.

Figure 3. Military Buildup in Northern Ethiopia

Note: “TDF” stands for Tigray Defense Forces, “EDF” stands for Eritrean Defense Forces, and “ENDF” stands for Ethiopian National Defense Force.

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo; Anahita Asudani; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Fano militias launched their insurgency in April 2023 in response to the federal government centralizing control over Amhara regional forces, although the militias did not have a central leadership or platform and struggled with fragmentation.^[42] Several major Fano factions unified throughout 2025 and early 2026, however.^[43] Reconciliation among the factions has allowed Fano to record all-time highs in its activity and sustain an elevated rate into mid-2026.^[44]

The TPLF, Fano, and other ethno-nationalist groups are discussing an anti-Abiy alliance, but past disputes and a lack of ideological alignment beyond a shared enemy pose obstacles to substantive collaboration.^[45] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence recently reported that the TPLF, Fano, the OLA, and the ONLF have discussed allying with each other as part of a coalition labeled Tsmido, which means “united.” Tsmido effectively aims to resemble the multiethnic TPLF-led coalition that overthrew the Marxist Derg regime that governed Ethiopia in 1991.^[46] There are major fissures between the different ethno-nationalist groups, however, as Fano militias fought against the TPLF and OLA in the Tigray war and have continued land disputes with both.^[47]

Other countries in the region, mainly Egypt and Eritrea, are taking assertive stances against Ethiopia’s regional ambitions, which increases the risk of regional escalation. Eritrea views Ethiopia’s interest in the Eritrean port city of Assab as a threat to its sovereignty and has refused to negotiate on the issue.^[48] Eritrea has instead supported ethno-nationalist Ethiopian rebel groups, including Fano and the TPLF, the latter of which was a longtime adversary of Eritrea.^[49] Africa Intelligence reported in 2025 that Eritrea has pledged to defend the TPLF if conflict breaks out with the Ethiopian federal government.^[50] Eritrea is also reportedly facilitating Tsmido meetings with Sudan, a close ally.^[51]

Egypt views Ethiopia’s Nile dams as an existential threat to its water security and Ethiopian naval access as another unwanted risk, leading it to partner with neighboring states to contain Ethiopia.^[52] Egypt and Eritrea signed an agreement in May 2026 in which the two countries will link their Red Sea ports and Egypt will invest in Eritrea’s infrastructure, potentially in exchange for naval access at Assab.^[53] Egypt strengthened ties with Somalia after Ethiopia signed a 2024 port deal with Somaliland and has bolstered its strategic partnership with Somalia in 2026 to undermine Ethiopian influence in what Ethiopia views as its backyard.^[54] This partnership includes Egyptian troop deployments to Somalia for stated counterterrorism purposes.^[55]

Nigeria

Author: Liam Karr

IS claimed responsibility for IS Sahel Province’s (ISSP) activity in northwestern Nigeria for the first time. IS’s weekly al Naba newsletter, released on May 28, claimed two ISSP attacks in Nigeria. The newsletter ex post facto claimed an ambush from March 24, when ISSP militants killed 12 Nigerian forces near Giro Masa locality in Kebbi state.[56] The second claim was from a more recent ambush near Rumji locality in Sokoto state on May 15 that killed seven soldiers.[57] ISSP later released its own photos of the May 15 ambush on June 1.[58]

Figure 4. IS Sahel Province (ISSP) Announces Arrival in Northwestern Nigeria

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data; Liam Karr.

The attacks are not ISSP’s first in the area, as a faction linked to the group has been kinetically active since at least late 2024 without claiming its attacks. The al Naba article framed the attacks as an expansion of IS activity but noted that “these attacks were not the first of their kind in the area, as others took place but were not announced for security reasons.”[59] A faction of ISSP militants known as Lakurawa have operated in northwestern Nigeria and along the Niger-Nigeria border for several years.[60] Locals use the term Lakurawa to refer to any militant of Sahelian or Francophone origin, but references to ISSP’s Lakurawa faction specifically to refer to ISSP-linked militants operating in Niger and across the Nigerian border in northern Nigeria’s Kebbi and Sokoto states. The IS-linked fighters have been in the area since 2018, serving primarily as a support network linking the IS groups in the Sahel and Lake Chad, but CTP previously assessed that the militants likely began operationalizing support networks in response to increased counterinsurgency pressure in late 2024.[61]

Figure 5. IS Sahel Province (ISSP) Lakurawa Increases Attacks Along Niger-Nigeria Border

Note: Attacks include all ISSP acts of political violence and looting in Nigeria and Niger’s Dosso region and Birni N’Konni department. Attacks in 2026 include projections based on current attacks as of May 28, 2026.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The claims likely aim to demonstrate strength and resolve in response to recent IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) setbacks in northeastern Nigeria from US-Nigerian operations, which have killed hundreds of fighters, eliminated major leadership figures, and disrupted ISWAP’s media operations. US and Nigerian forces killed veteran Nigerian jihadist and prominent ISWAP commander Abu Bilal al Mainuki in a joint raid on May 15.[62] Al Mainuki was believed to be head of IS’s West Africa regional office overseeing ISWAP and ISSP and had possibly taken on broader responsibilities in 2026 overseeing all IS regional offices as head of IS’s Global Directorate of Provinces, according to some UN member states.[63] Al Mainuki was also previously deputy to ISWAP head Abu Musab al Barnawi, who may have died in 2023, although conflicting reports claim he is still alive.[64] US and Nigerian officials claimed that other operations in the Lake Chad area had killed between 140 and 175 fighters.[65]

IS released the claims on northwestern Nigeria amid a two-week gap in ISWAP media activity caused by the US-Nigeria operations. ISWAP did not make any attack claims in the two weeks after Mainuki’s death, with the first claim coming on June 1.[66] IS itself tried to downplay al Mainuki’s significance in the May 28 al Naba publication by implying that the US raid that killed al Mainuki was an attack on “a newly established media headquarters.”[67] The al Naba publication also directly referenced the attacks in the northwest as evidence of the group’s strength despite the setbacks in the northeast, saying that “the Nigerian tyrant now has to work to collect the corpses of its troops in Borno [state] in the east and Sokoto [state] in the west.”[68]

Continued US-Nigerian pressure has further disrupted al Mainuki’s succession process, which could spark a succession struggle that fuels distrust and factionalism within ISWAP’s ranks. Nigerian investigative outlet Human Angle reported that US-Nigerian operations may have killed Mainuki’s most likely successor, Baba (Ba) Shuwa.[69] Nigerian security monitor Zagazola claimed that Shuwa is alive but is “reluctant” to accept the role due to fear of the ongoing decapitation campaign targeting ISWAP leadership.[70] The Nigerian military claimed on June 3 that recent airstrikes targeting ISWAP island strongholds in Lake Chad killed another 50 ISWAP militants, including Khalifa Umar, who was a Shura Council member and possibly the group’s senior-most judge.[71] Local researchers and reporters have noted that tensions between local and foreign fighters have possibly created human intelligence breaches that security forces are exploiting in their ongoing operations, while a succession crisis could further fuel ethnic rivalries among the local fighters.[72]

Benin

Author: Liam Karr

Beninese and Nigerian forces, with likely French support, have carried out large counterterrorism operations on their shared border in recent months targeting likely al Qaeda–linked fighters and other armed militants. Nigerian and Beninese forces with local militias launched an operation to clear militant support zones in several villages along the Benin-Nigeria border between May 26 and 31.[73] Nigerian security forces claimed to ambush and kill 200 militants on May 31 as part of the operations.[74] A local researcher claimed that the militants were reportedly returning to their bases in Benin and Nigeria’s Kwara state after a meeting with a senior Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) commander from Mali in the Borgu reserve, which is in Nigeria’s Niger state within the larger Kainji Lake National Park.[75] Beninese and Nigerian forces with Benin-based French air support had already escalated operations targeting al Qaeda–linked militants in the Kainji National Park area near the Benin-Nigeria border in April.[76]

The operations are explicitly targeting Salafi-jihadi militants with likely connections to al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate JNIM along the Benin-Nigeria border.[77] JNIM claimed its first attacks in Nigeria in Kwara state in 2025, and an al Qaeda–linked Salafi-jihadi faction known as Mahmuda—named after their now-captured veteran jihadi leader Mallam Mahmuda—has been present in the Kainji Park area in Niger state since 2021.[78] CTP has previously reported on the substantial circumstantial evidence linking the faction to JNIM’s entrance into northwestern Nigeria, including the faction’s links with al Qaeda’s small Nigerian affiliate Ansaru, reported contact between Mahmuda and JNIM factions in Burkina Faso, and the arrival of Francophone militants in the Kainji Park area since 2021.[79] Several other loosely affiliated Salafi-jihadi militants with ties to Boko Haram and the Islamic State are also based in the Kainji Park area, which has contributed to the surge in militant activity along the Benin-Niger-Nigeria border areas since 2024.[80]

Figure 6. Salafi-Jihadi Militants Expand Along Benin-Niger-Nigeria Border

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Newly elected Beninese President Romuald Wadagni has also sought to follow through on campaign promises to reengage Burkina Faso and Niger to address border security. Wadagni met with Nigerien junta leader Abdourahmane Tiani in Niger’s capital, Niamey, on June 2 on his first official tour of neighboring West African countries.[81] Nigerien Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine had attended Wadagni’s inauguration on May 24, when Zeine said that the new president was “a new path opening up…to strengthen our ties and ensure that we can work together.”[82] Wadagni then traveled to Ouagadougou later on June 2 and met with Burkinabé junta leader Ibrahim Traoré.[83] The French outlet Jeune Afrique reported that the meetings aimed to reestablish dialogue channels to normalize diplomatic relations and work toward resuming greater defense and trade cooperation, particularly regarding reopening the border with Niger.[84]

Strained relations between Benin and its Alliance of Sahel States (AES) neighbors have disrupted regional counterterrorism coordination along their shared borders. Benin and Niger have not had formal diplomatic relations since the Nigerien junta took power in 2023, after which former Beninese president Patrice Talon supported Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sanctions against Niger and shut their border.[85] The Niger-Benin relationship continued to erode in subsequent years due to disputes over border closures and access to a China-backed oil pipeline that carries crude oil from Niger.[86] Anonymous Beninese and Nigerien sources claimed that Niger had advanced knowledge of the thwarted coup plot in Benin in December 2025, and Niger accused Benin of being involved in the IS attack on the Niamey airport in January 2026.[87] Beninese-Burkinabé relations have not been as acrimonious, but Benin’s tensions with Niger and the broader AES-ECOWAS split have still hampered security coordination along their border.

Africa File Data Cutoff: June 4, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

[1] https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46905

[2] https://www.imf.org/en/countries/eth; https://africacenter.org/spotlight/en-elections-2026/ethiopia

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopian-election-expected-hand-leader-abiys-party-landslide-win-2026-06-01

[4] https://addisstandard dot com/ethiopias-election-board-revokes-tplfs-legal-status

[5] https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46905

[6] https://addisstandard dot com/onlf-rejects-jigjiga-conference-by-state-backed-group-as-orchestrated-takeover-warns-of-consequences; https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/ethiopia-is-about-to-hold-another-sham-election

[7] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ethiopia-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-oromos-the-oromo-liberation-front-and-the-oromo-liberation-army-ethiopia-march-2022-accessible

[8] https://addisstandard dot com/coalition-for-ethiopian-unity-denounces-electoral-process-cites-widespread-irregularities

[9] https://africacenter.org/spotlight/en-elections-2026/ethiopia; https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/05/ethiopia-needs-more-election-calm-internal-and-regional-conflict; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopian-election-expected-hand-leader-abiys-party-landslide-win-2026-06-01; https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-votes-as-ruling-party-eyes-landslide-win/a-77369637

[10] https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/16036/abiys-prosperity-party-is-set-for-another-crushing-majority; https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/31/africa/ethiopia-election-abiy-division-intl; https://addisstandard dot com/coalition-for-ethiopian-unity-denounces-electoral-process-cites-widespread-irregularities

[11] https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/05/28/abiy-ahmed-s-token-electoral-gestures-keep-opposition-on-tight-leash,110774367-art; https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/31/africa/ethiopia-election-abiy-division-intl; https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/16036/abiys-prosperity-party-is-set-for-another-crushing-majority; https://addisstandard dot com/coalition-for-ethiopian-unity-denounces-electoral-process-cites-widespread-irregularities

[12] https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/05/28/abiy-ahmed-s-token-electoral-gestures-keep-opposition-on-tight-leash,110774367-art

[13] https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-faces-renewed-strain-with-tigray-and-eritrea/a-76056011; https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/ethiopia-revokes-accreditation-reuters-journalists-2026-02-14; https://cpj.org/2026/02/ethiopia-revokes-reuters-journalists-accreditation-following-investigative-report

[14] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/05/ethiopian-authorities-have-intensified-their-crackdown-on-press-freedom; https://cpj.org/2026/02/ethiopia-revokes-reuters-journalists-accreditation-following-investigative-report; https://addisstandard dot com/ethiopian-media-authority-revokes-addis-standards-online-media-registration-editor-in-chief-disputes-claims

[15] https://addisstandard dot com/response-to-our-readers-requesting-election-day-reporting-from-addis-standard

[16] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/05/ethiopian-authorities-have-intensified-their-crackdown-on-press-freedom

[17] https://ethiopianreporter dot com/156423

[18] https://www.jstor.org/stable/41757576; https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10150894; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/22/ethiopias-ruling-party-win-clean-sweep-general-election; https://freedomhouse.org/article/us-wrong-endorse-ethiopias-elections

[19] https://www.bbc.com/news/10153216; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/22/ethiopias-ruling-party-win-clean-sweep-general-election; https://freedomhouse.org/article/us-wrong-endorse-ethiopias-elections

[20] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2021/7/10/ethiopias-ruling-party-wins-national-election-in-landslide

[21] https://acleddata.com/update/ethiopia-situation-update-19-march-2025

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/mar/21/tigray-mekelle-coup-war-ethiopia-eritrea-assab-port-abiy-ahmed; https://acleddata.com/update/two-years-after-pretoria-agreement-unrest-still-looms-tigray-october-2024

[22] https://addisstandard dot com/ethiopias-election-board-revokes-tplfs-legal-status; https://www.facebook.com/tplf.officia/posts/pfbid02Q4vwgdKc3qhoacoFgqE51L8pwY5T9DidfptLu9S2Uf85tFRWSABydcFN9o78xjzal; https://wegahtafacts.substack.com/p/tigrays-pre-war-council-holds-second; https://addisstandard dot com/tplf-reinstated-pre-war-tigray-council-approves-senior-appointments-names-amanuel-assefa-vice-president

[23] https://acleddata.com/expert-comment/ethiopia-fresh-clashes-renew-fears-return-conflict-expert-comment; https://www.crisisgroup.org/anb/africa/ethiopia-eritrea/flare-tigray-highlights-risk-more-war-northern-ethiopia; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-19/risk-of-ethiopia-war-mounts-as-troops-deploy-near-eritrea-border; https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-faces-renewed-strain-with-tigray-and-eritrea/a-76056011

[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopian-election-expected-hand-leader-abiys-party-landslide-win-2026-06-01

[25] https://x.com/tesfanews/status/2033306169125884182; https://addisstandard dot com/amid-voter-registration-in-amhara-region-fano-warns-political-parties-others-against-participating-in-elections

[26] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data database, https://acleddata.com/conflict-data/data-export-tool

[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopian-leader-abiys-party-set-dominate-elections-despite-insecurity-2026-05-28; https://www.ethiopiaobserver dot com/2026/05/26/elections-will-not-be-held-in-46-constituencies-across-the-amhara-and-tigray-regions

[28] https://x.com/AFNM_FA/status/2060078546849042553

[29] https://x.com/AmharaWarUpdate/status/2061671997692637313; https://x.com/neby_G/status/2061452777163718690; https://x.com/neby_G/status/2061851614932046078; https://x.com/neby_G/status/2061366676562620857; https://x.com/neby_G/status/2061351176084291983; https://x.com/neby_G/status/2061340447109226740; https://x.com/neby_G/status/2061361530151539147

[30] https://addisstandard dot com/election-board-says-143-polling-stations-failed-to-open-over-security-problems-voting-interrupted-in-certain-areas-of-oromia-and-amhara-regions; https://www.madamasr dot com/en/2026/06/03/feature/politics/abiy-to-win-re-appointment-in-vote-marred-by-insurgency-ballot-fraud-shadow-of-civil-war

[31] https://x.com/OLF_OLA/status/2060362222472233328

[32] https://x.com/OLF_OLA/status/2061446099148193874; https://x.com/OLF_OLA/status/2061833961685352811

[33] https://x.com/OLF_OLA/status/2061019861883474057; https://x.com/OLF_OLA/status/2061381674496131509

[34] https://addisstandard dot com/election-board-says-143-polling-stations-failed-to-open-over-security-problems-voting-interrupted-in-certain-areas-of-oromia-and-amhara-regions; https://www.madamasr dot com/en/2026/06/03/feature/politics/abiy-to-win-re-appointment-in-vote-marred-by-insurgency-ballot-fraud-shadow-of-civil-war

[35] Tom Gardner, The Abiy Project, p. 207; https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X25100955; https://www.ena dot et/web/eng/w/eng_8320934

[36] https://acleddata.com/profile/ethiopia-actor-profiles; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/ethiopia/283-keeping-ethiopias-transition-rails; https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2026-05/PB_Managed_elections_unmanaged_conflicts.pdf

[37] https://freedomhouse.org/country/ethiopia/freedom-world/2026; https://addisstandard dot com/ethiopias-election-board-revokes-tplfs-legal-status; https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/ethiopia-is-about-to-hold-another-sham-election; https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ethiopia-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-oromos-the-oromo-liberation-front-and-the-oromo-liberation-army-ethiopia-march-2022-accessible

[38] https://addisstandard dot com/feature-a-population-of-150-million-cant-live-in-a-geographic-prison-pm-abiy-ahmed; https://www.ena dot et/web/eng/w/eng_3458629; https://allafrica dot com/stories/202507030491.html; https://www.ifa.gov dot et/2025/11/13/understanding-ethiopias-quest-to-sea-access-the-strategic-cost-of-being-landlocked

[39] https://addisstandard dot com/pm-abiy-says-no-official-record-exists-on-decision-that-made-ethiopia-landlocked-links-tensions-with-eritrea-to-pretoria-agreement; https://addisstandard dot com/ethiopia-accuses-eritrea-of-territorial-violations-armed-group-support-reaffirms-assab-as-strategic-priority-warns-military-restraint-is-limited; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/how-ethiopias-quarrel-with-somalia-could-destabilise-horn-africa-2024-01-24

[40] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ethiopia-gerd-dam-to-open-sudan-egypt-nile-water-supply; https://www.addisinsight dot net/2025/09/08/gerd-to-generate-1-billion-a-year-ethiopias-energy-ambition-realized

[41] https://www.newarab dot com/news/egyptian-outrage-ethiopia-plans-more-dams-blue-nile; https://www.madamasr dot com/en/2026/03/26/news/u/ethiopia-unveils-3-new-hydropower-projects-on-nile-stoking-concerns-in-cairo

[42] https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/01/19/epo-december-2023-monthly-the-fano-insurgency-main-hurdles-to-unifying-fano; https://riftvalley dot net/publication/understanding-the-fano-insurgency-in-ethiopias-amhara-region; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b194-ethiopias-ominous-new-war-amhara

[43] https://apanews dot net/rebel-forces-in-ethiopias-amhara-region-announce-merger; https://www.amharaamerica.org/post/statement-issued-regarding-the-establishment-of-the-amhara-fano-national-movement-afnm

[44] ACLED database, https://acleddata.com/conflict-data/data-export-tool

[45] https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/06/01/distrust-clouds-tsimdo-the-growing-anti-abiy-front,110777076-art

[46] https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/ethiopia/20956.htm; https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46905

[47] https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/08/26/oromia-and-amhara-rebels-finding-common-cause,110514543-art; https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/06/01/distrust-clouds-tsimdo-the-growing-anti-abiy-front,110777076-art; ACLED database, https://acleddata.com/conflict-data/data-export-tool

[48] https://shabait dot com/2025/11/01/facts-not-fabrications

[49] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68654ef66569be0acf74db74/ETH_CPIN_Amhara_and_Amhara_opposition_groups.pdf; https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/02/24/tigray-leaders-dangerously-torn-between-addis-ababa-and-asmara,110378687-eve; https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/11/13/ethiopia-is-perilously-close-to-another-war; https://www.eepa.be/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-694-15-January-2025.pdf

[50] https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/02/24/tigray-leaders-dangerously-torn-between-addis-ababa-and-asmara,110378687-eve

[51] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/11/13/ethiopia-is-perilously-close-to-another-war; https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/02/24/tigray-leaders-dangerously-torn-between-addis-ababa-and-asmara,110378687-eve; https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/06/01/distrust-clouds-tsimdo-the-growing-anti-abiy-front,110777076-art

[52] https://addisstandard dot com/egypt-signals-support-for-ethiopias-red-sea-access-if-nile-dispute-eases-report; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/12/29/egypt-ethiopia-nile-dam-warning; https://www.BBC.com/somali/articles/cqjevrpjvnlo; https://www.BBC.com/amharic/articles/ce9rmpxe88do

[53] https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/red-sea-trade-corridor-takes-shape-as-egypt-and-eritrea-launch-new-shipping-line/vnv8gcf; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/12/24/egypt-increases-pressure-on-ethiopia-through-port-deals-with-eritrea-and-djibouti; https://addisstandard dot com/egypt-has-agreed-to-develop-assab-and-doraleh-considered-as-pressure-on-ethiopia

[54] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/somalia-egypt-sign-defense-pact-to-bolster-security-cooperation/3303837; https://sis dot gov.eg/en/international-relations/bilateral-relations/somalia; https://sonna dot so/en/somalia-egypt-advance-strategic-partnership

[55] https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2024/08/29/ethiopia-alarmed-as-egypt-sends-special-forces-and-arms-to-somalia; https://www.dw.com/en/why-is-egypt-bolstering-ties-with-somalia-now/a-75958140

[56] SITE Intelligence Group, “Expanding to New Areas in Nigeria, IS Claims Deadly Attacks on Government Troops and Iraqi Counterterrorism Forces in an-Naba,” May 28, 2026, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com; https://punchng dot com/gunmen-ambush-military-police-in-kebbi-kill-several

[57] SITE Intelligence Group, “Expanding to New Areas in Nigeria, IS Claims Deadly Attacks on Government Troops and Iraqi Counterterrorism Forces in an-Naba.”

[58] SITE Intelligence Group, “IS Sahel Provides Photo Documentation With Bloody Images for Previously Claimed Ambush on Army in New Area of Nigeria,” June 1, 2026, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.

[59] Expanding to New Areas in Nigeria, IS Claims Deadly Attacks on Government Troops and Iraqi Counterterrorism Forces in an-Naba (May 28)

[60] https://jihadology.net/2025/10/15/guest-post-who-are-nigerias-newest-jihadist-militants

[61] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-areas-of-operation-in-west-africa-interactive-map-and-campaign-analysis#SahelNWNigeria

[62] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/16/world/africa/trump-isis-nigeria-al-minuki.html

[63] https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/92; https://2021-2025.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-isis-general-directorate-of-provinces-leaders; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n26/000/41/pdf/n2600041.pdf; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-general-directorate-of-provinces-managing-the-islamic-states-global-network

[64] https://x.com/jh_barnett/status/2055563273974554997?s=20; https://humanglemedia dot com/ideology-blood-and-war-rethinking-the-origins-of-boko-haram

[65] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/18/world/africa/us-airstrikes-isis-nigeria.html; https://apnews.com/article/nigeria-us-joint-strikes-islamic-state-24451eafc0ff312580cc0ab650e024f0

[66] https://x.com/Boswall_Jacob/status/2062071043817091105?s=20; https://x.com/Sazedek/status/2061538931414315154?s=20

[67] SITE Intelligence Group, IS Downplays Significance of Official Killed in Joint U.S.-Nigeria Military Operation, May 29, 2026, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.

[68] SITE Intelligence Group, “Expanding to New Areas in Nigeria, IS Claims Deadly Attacks on Government Troops and Iraqi Counterterrorism Forces in an-Naba.”

[69] https://humanglemedia dot com/the-men-lining-up-to-replace-al-minuki

[70] https://zagazola.org/index.php/breaking-news/nigeria-s-iswap-leader-ba-a-shuwa-reluctant-to-accept-new-isis-appointment-after-mainok-s-death-in-nigeria-us-strike

[71] https://yen.ng/yen2/2026/06/military-kills-50-terrorists-top-iswap-commander-in-north-east; https://x.com/VincentFoucher/status/2062171875296330071?s=20; https://x.com/VincentFoucher/status/1328823184758624259?s=20

[72] https://gga.org/abu-bilal-al-minuki-how-is-fighters-are-tearing-iswap-apart-from-within; https://humanglemedia dot com/the-men-lining-up-to-replace-al-minuki

[73] https://x.com/AfricaaTT/status/2061482624896450701?s=20; https://x.com/TojuWes/status/2061829529002201464?s=20; https://zagazola.org/index.php/breaking-news/troops-clear-gulbi-community-in-kebbi-recover-weapons-motorcycles-after-encounter-with-terrorists

[74] https://thesun dot ng/niger-community-celebrates-as-military-eliminates-200-terrorists

[75] https://x.com/Sazedek/status/2061748663278358685?s=20

[76] https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-ouest/2026/04/27/comment-paris-soutient-abuja-et-cotonou-contre-les-groupes-djihadistes,110711976-eve

[77] https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-ouest/2026/04/27/comment-paris-soutient-abuja-et-cotonou-contre-les-groupes-djihadistes,110711976-eve

[78] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/al-qaeda-linked-jnim-says-it-killed-soldier-first-nigeria-attack-2025-10-31; https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2024/dangerous-liaisons; https://www.hudson.org/sahelian-or-littoral-crisis-examining-widening-nigerias-boko-haram-conflict

[79] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/boko-haram-nigeria-tplf-ethiopia-red-sea-drc-m23-rwanda-isis-niger-saf-rsf-sudan-africa-file-february-5-2026#boko-haram-nigeria; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/kachallas-and-kinship-understanding-jihadi-expansion-and-diffusion-in-nigeria

[80] https://acleddata.com/qa/qa-why-jihadist-violence-escalating-benin-niger-and-nigeria-border-triangle; https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/is-borgu-kainji-becoming-the-next-hub-of-sahel-and-lake-chad-extremists