Congo War Security Review
An in-depth review of activity related to the war in the eastern DRC between M23 and its Rwandan backers and pro-Congolese government forces every week. Map shapefiles are available by request via email at [email protected].
Data Cutoff: May 1, 2026, at 1 P.M. EST
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Key Takeaway: The United States sanctioned former DRC President Joseph Kabila for his ties to M23. The Congolese government is reportedly stalling progress on commitments made with M23 in mid-April peace talks. The Congolese army claimed that it shot down an M23 drone in the South Kivu highlands. Aid convoys arrived in Minembwe town in South Kivu as part of efforts to expand humanitarian access.

Kinetic Activity in M23-Controlled Areas
Nothing significant to report.
Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia
Nothing significant to report.
Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie
The Congolese army (FARDC) claimed that it shot down an M23 drone in the South Kivu highlands. The FARDC claimed on April 27 that it shot down a M23-operated drone over Point Zéro near Minembwe town on April 25.[1] The FARDC claimed that the drone was launched from Rwandan territory.[2]
M23 clashed with pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters north of Bukavu in Kabare district in South Kivu. M23 reportedly clashed with Wazalendo fighters in the Bugorhe group, about six miles north of the Kavumu airport on the outskirts of Katana on the RN2, on April 28.[3]
The two sides also clashed further north in Kalehe district in South Kivu. Congolese media reported that fighting took place between M23 and Wazalendos near Chambombo—roughly 13 miles southwest of Numbi, a mineral trading center, on a local road—in northern Kalehe near the border with North Kivu on April 29.[4]


Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani
Nothing significant to report.
Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu
Nothing significant to report.
Major Political Developments
The United States sanctioned former DRC President Joseph Kabila for his ties to M23. The US Treasury Department said in a press release that it imposed sanctions on Kabila for supporting M23 and M23’s political umbrella, Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), on April 30.[5] Kabila was president of the DRC from 2001 to 2019. Kabila had returned to the DRC through M23-controlled territory after a multiyear hiatus in mid-2025. The Treasury Department said that it sanctioned Kabila for providing financial and political support to AFC and M23 with the intent to “destabilize” the Congolese government.[6] The Treasury Department said that Kabila encouraged FARDC troops to defect and join M23 and sought unsuccessfully to launch a military campaign against the FARDC in the eastern DRC from an unspecified neighboring country, possibly Zambia.[7] The Treasury Department also said that Kabila “worked to put in place a candidate opposed” to DRC President Félix Tshisekedi with the aim to “regain influence” over the Congolese government.[8] The US State Department said in a separate press release on April 30 that it sanctioned Kabila for “providing material support to armed groups destabilizing the eastern DRC.”[9]
Deadlines from commitments made between the Congolese government and M23 in mid-April peace talks have gone unmet. The two sides convened for peace talks under the framework of the Doha process in Switzerland in mid-April and signed new technical agreements related to two confidence-building measures—a ceasefire verification mechanism and prisoner exchange.[10] The DRC and M23, along with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to operationalize and add M23 officers to the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM) under the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+).[11] The ICGLR committed to discuss and start planning the first verification mission for the COVM by April 24, although the organization has not released a statement indicating that this has occurred.[12] The DRC and M23 also signed a prisoner transfer MOU outlining specific procedures in line with the prisoner exchange agreement from September 2025.[13] The two sides agreed to release the prisoners in line with the latest MOU by April 28.[14]
The Congolese government is reportedly stalling the prisoner exchange progress. M23 has said that it is prepared to conduct the swaps.[15] The French state media outlet Radio France Internationale (RFI) reported on April 29 that the Congolese government has not “given its signal” to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which is facilitating the swaps, to conduct the exchange, despite finalizing the technical details.[16] RFI cited diplomatic sources who said that the ICRC cannot perform the transfer without the DRC’s “explicit agreement.”[17] French media reported that Congolese law and “regulatory procedures” are delaying the release of government-held M23 prisoners—the exact number of which is not “fixed” and some of whom the DRC is unwilling to release due to the government’s “delicate political position.”[18] Congolese media reported on April 30 that the location of the exchange could also be an issue hindering the exchange.[19] Independent French journalist Christophe Riguad had reported on social media on April 23 that M23 requested to conduct the handover in Uganda near the border with North Kivu, while the Congolese government preferred Beni town.[20]
ICRC aid convoys arrived in Minembwe town in South Kivu as part of efforts to expand humanitarian access. Humanitarian workers from the ICRC reportedly arrived to distribute aid to residents in Minembwe on April 30.[21] The Congolese government and M23 had negotiated humanitarian access as part of peace talks in Switzerland in mid-April. M23 had discussed humanitarian access to this part of South Kivu when the head of the UN force, James Swan, met with M23 officials in Goma in late April.[22]
M23 claimed that it finished training over 500 new parallel administration officials. The group announced on April 30 that it finished ideological training for what the group claimed was 534 political and administrative cadres at a training center in Rutshuru district.[23] Sultani Makenga, M23’s operational commander, presided over the ceremony.[24] This is the second round of training the group has finished for new cadres in the last two weeks. M23 had claimed that it trained nearly 400 new parallel administration officials in late April.[25]
Significant US-Backed Regional Economic Activity
Nothing significant to report.
[1] https://lepotentiel dot cd/2026/04/26/rdc-larmee-annonce-avoir-abattu-un-drone-rwandais-dans-lest-du-pays; https://ouragan dot cd/2026/04/un-drone-rwandais-abbatu-par-larmee-congolaise-a-minembwe; https://actualite dot cd/2026/04/26/sud-kivu-un-drone-des-rebelles-de-lafcm23-detruit-par-les-fardc-dans-les-hauts-plateaux; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2026/04/27/actualite/securite/les-fardc-annoncent-avoir-abattu-un-drone-dans-les-hauts-plateaux-de; https://buniaactualite dot cd/les-fardc-abattent-un-drone-de-la-coalition-m23-twirwaneho-red-tabara-a-minembwe; https://x.com/FMLarousse/status/2048471532452888587; https://x.com/acprdcongo/status/2048421134379397443; https://x.com/afrikarabia/status/2048371402273653248; https://x.com/acprdcongo/status/2048422504876712320;
https://x.com/michombero/status/2048132836167717246;
https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2048343311937618126; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2048253590033035506; https://x.com/FredMASTAKI6/status/2048133521328247189;
https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2048108443974750373;
https://x.com/DRCNewsToday/status/2048062351908209004;
https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2048009295044739077;
https://x.com/GeorgesKisando/status/2048006430574223538;
https://x.com/michombero/status/2047960008931823664
[2] https://www.radiookapi dot net/2026/04/27/actualite/securite/les-fardc-annoncent-avoir-abattu-un-drone-dans-les-hauts-plateaux-de
[3] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2049097463470932480; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2049101728264409460; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2049109206628700646
[4] https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/04/30/kalehe-un-directeur-decole-tue-a-chambombo-dans-des-combats-entre-wazalendo-et-afc-m23; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2049527366880313366
[5] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0480
[6] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0480
[7] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0480
[8] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0480
[9] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/u-s-sanctions-on-former-drc-president-for-support-of-armed-group
[10] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/april-24-2026
[11] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/joint-statement-on-progress-between-the-representatives-of-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-of-the-alliance-fleuve-congo-march-23-movement-afc-m23-on-the-protoc; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260422-en-rdc-le-cessez-le-feu-act%C3%A9-sur-le-papier-encore-loin-d-%C3%AAtre-appliqu%C3%A9-sur-le-terrain
[12] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/joint-statement-on-progress-between-the-representatives-of-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-of-the-alliance-fleuve-congo-march-23-movement-afc-m23-on-the-protoc
[13] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/joint-statement-on-progress-between-the-representatives-of-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-of-the-alliance-fleuve-congo-march-23-movement-afc-m23-on-the-protoc; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260415-rdc-signature-d-un-protocole-d-accord-entre-l-afc-m23-et-le-cicr-pour-un-transfert-de-militaires; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2044416117939081539; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2044405766614843566; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2044343113796243688; https://x.com/BenMbonimpa/status/2045187702602019002
[14] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/joint-statement-on-progress-between-the-representatives-of-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-of-the-alliance-fleuve-congo-march-23-movement-afc-m23-on-the-protoc; https://www.newtimes.co dot rw/article/35000/news/africa/what-next-after-afcm23-kinshasa-talks-in-switzerland; https://x.com/afrikarabia/status/2047282876794761514; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260429-rdc-afc-m23-malgr%C3%A9-les-engagements-de-montreux-aucun-d%C3%A9tenu-n-a-%C3%A9t%C3%A9-lib%C3%A9r%C3%A9-dans-le-d%C3%A9lai-imparti
[15] https://www.newtimes.co dot rw/article/35235/news/africa/dr-congo-deadline-elapses-for-prisoner-release; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260429-rdc-afc-m23-malgr%C3%A9-les-engagements-de-montreux-aucun-d%C3%A9tenu-n-a-%C3%A9t%C3%A9-lib%C3%A9r%C3%A9-dans-le-d%C3%A9lai-imparti; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1792689/politique/entre-la-rdc-et-lafc-m23-qui-freine-lechange-de-prisonniers-decide-en-suisse
[16] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260429-rdc-afc-m23-malgr%C3%A9-les-engagements-de-montreux-aucun-d%C3%A9tenu-n-a-%C3%A9t%C3%A9-lib%C3%A9r%C3%A9-dans-le-d%C3%A9lai-imparti
[17] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260429-rdc-afc-m23-malgr%C3%A9-les-engagements-de-montreux-aucun-d%C3%A9tenu-n-a-%C3%A9t%C3%A9-lib%C3%A9r%C3%A9-dans-le-d%C3%A9lai-imparti
[18] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260429-rdc-afc-m23-malgr%C3%A9-les-engagements-de-montreux-aucun-d%C3%A9tenu-n-a-%C3%A9t%C3%A9-lib%C3%A9r%C3%A9-dans-le-d%C3%A9lai-imparti; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1792689/politique/entre-la-rdc-et-lafc-m23-qui-freine-lechange-de-prisonniers-decide-en-suisse
[19] https://www.radiookapi dot net/2026/04/30/actualite/securite/blocage-sur-lechange-de-prisonniers-entre-le-gouvernement-et-lafcm23
[20] https://x.com/afrikarabia/status/2047282876794761514
[21] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2049945374157050174; https://x.com/MahoroMpa/status/2049935122443764043; https://x.com/Delphino12/status/2049933831931617443
[22] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/april-24-2026
[23] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2049939056931344832; https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2049884755240312904; https://x.com/NordKivu4716/status/2049896321536897513; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2049878502287999113
[24] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2049884755240312904
[25] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/april-24-2026