Trump’s Dual Opportunity in Sudan

President Donald Trump has a major opportunity in Sudan to win a key security objective, a humanitarian victory, and some bonus points with Congress in one fell swoop. By helping end Sudan’s civil war, the President can advance his security objectives in the Red Sea and bring relief to millions of suffering Sudanese—a move that would further strengthen his claim for a Nobel Peace Prize.

The conflict is the world’s largest humanitarian and refugee crisis, with more than half of Sudan’s 50 million citizens in need of humanitarian aid and 12 million displaced. The war has also created opportunities for Iran and Russia to expand their influence in the strategically vital Red Sea, where they aim to make use of Sudan’s more than 500 miles of coastline.

Trump has recognized what is at stake in Sudan and signaled his interest in restarting abandoned US-led peace talks. Trump’s team has experience navigating turbulent conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Syria—experience that they should draw on to inform their approach to Sudan.

What this looks like in practice is a combination of negotiations with the external actors fueling the conflict and conditional engagement with local factions.

In the DRC, the US has engaged with the DRC and Rwanda as the first step of a broader peace process. Successful US diplomacy between the two countries has, for now, limited fighting in their conflict-stricken border area. With external support limited, US partners, including Qatar and the African Union, are leading efforts to engage Congolese stakeholders in a more comprehensive peace process.

US-hosted talks with Emirati, Egyptian, and Saudi leaders is a strong first step to similarly engage the key actors fueling conflict in Sudan. The United Arab Emirates is the main backer of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which are fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The SAF is supported by countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

US officials should, and have ample leverage to, strike a deal that leads these partners to cut support to the warring factions. The UAE is a major U.S. defense partner, and the US also has strong relationships with the countries backing the SAF. Stemming external support would help limit violence and push the warring sides toward more comprehensive negotiations involving a variety of Sudanese stakeholders, which US partners can help lead.

The Trump administration should also use its conditional engagement with Syria’s new leaders as a model for engagement with the Sudanese factions, namely the SAF. Neither the RSF nor the SAF are ideal partners. Both have committed war crimes and are undemocratic. The SAF also has substantial ties to hardline Islamist factions, Iran, and Russia.

However, inaction or blanket targeting both sides will only continue to prolong human suffering in the country and allow these challenges to fester. Despite its many flaws, the United States should engage with the SAF, given that it is a more widely recognized in Sudan and abroad as legitimate and capable institution in Sudan than the genocidal militias that compose the RSF.

In Syria, the Trump administration has cautiously engaged with the country’s new leaders, given their former ties with al Qaeda. Despite these challenges, the administration realized it would have been a mistake not to engage at all, as this would only cede space for extremists, Iran, and Russia to rebuild their influence.

The administration has instead smartly conditioned American engagement on Syria’s new leaders working to normalize ties with Israel, cutting its ties with foreign fighters, and working with the United States to contain ISIS. The results have been more successful than what giving Syria the cold shoulder would have yielded.

The United States should use this conditional engagement model with the SAF. The SAF would benefit greatly from US diplomatic support, and US investment could help rebuild the country.

The United States and its regional partners have a shared interest in ensuring there is no hardline Islamist return in Sudan. An Islamist takeover could revive Sudan’s status as an extremist incubator for al Qaeda, IS, and the Muslim Brotherhood. It could also further revive the previous regime’s partnerships with Iran and Russia and prompt the nation to withdraw from the Abraham Accords—all of which would undermine US interests. The current Islamist-SAF partnership seems to be more opportunistic than ideological, and de-escalating the war could help sideline Islamist factions.

Looking further down the line, the United States should help Sudan lay the groundwork for a gradual transition to civilian rule. A quick transition is unrealistic for many reasons, including the fact that Sudan’s civilian coalition is severely fragmented. However, bringing the SAF and Sudan’s strong civil society together is key to long-term peace and prosperity.

President Trump has framed himself as a peacemaker, and he has a prime opportunity to strengthen his legacy in Sudan. Peace in Sudan will not come easily and will necessarily involve engaging actors that have inflicted unspeakable harm on the Sudanese people. The US should weigh these choices in the context of pursuing peace, which would be a respite that allows aid to reach millions of suffering Sudanese. Eventually, justice for the evils done during this civil war will be critical to prevent future conflict. But, for now, Trump’s straightforward approach could be what is needed to make the first steps toward ending the suffering and setting the stage for peace.