Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 9, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on September 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian territorial gains have become less costly over the last four months compared to Spring 2025 as Russian forces are sustaining a lower casualty rate per square kilometer seized. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on September 9 that Russian forces have suffered 299,210 causalities since January 2025.[i] ISW assesses that Russian forces gained a total of 1,910.39 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine in May, June, July, and August 2025, and the Ukrainian General Staff's daily Russian casualty reports indicate that Russian forces suffered 130,160 casualties in that same time frame - averaging to 68 casualties per square kilometer seized  between May and August 2025. ISW assesses that Russian forces seized 2025. [ii] This means that Russian forces averaged roughly 71 casualties per square kilometer in May 2025; 70 casualties per square kilometer in June 2025; 75 casualties per square kilometer in July 2025; and 68 casualties per square kilometer in August 2025. Russian casualty rates per square kilometer gained have substantially decreased over the last four months compared to January through April 2025, when Russian forces were losing 99 casualties per square kilometer.[iii]

Russian casualty rates per square kilometer peaked in the first four months of 2025 as Russian forces fought to maintain the intensified pace of offensive operations they began in Fall 2024. Russian forces lost an estimated average of 59 casualties per square kilometer gained during the first four months of their intensified 2024 offensive campaign (between September and December 2024).[iv] Russian forces concentrated their offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast in Fall 2024 and made tactically significant advances in the Kursk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove (now Novopavlivka), and Velyka Novosilka (now Velykomykhailivka) areas.[v] Russian forces were still frequently using armored vehicles to advance during Fall 2024, which likely helped preserve some Russian lives.[vi] Russian forces were mainly advancing in small infantry assaults during Fall 2024 as they are as of August 2025, but Russian forces largely abandoned use of armored vehicles in late 2024 and early Spring 2025, and this change in tactics likely contributed to increased Russian casualty rates in the first few months of 2025.

Russian advances began to slow during the first four months of 2025 as Russian casualties remained consistent – resulting in a higher Russian casualty rate between January and April 2025. Russian forces suffered an average of 99 casualties per square kilometer gained in January, February, March, and April 2025.[vii] Russian advances significantly increased in March 2025 with the elimination of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast which coincided with the temporary cessation of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine, although Russian advances on average decreased between January, February, and April 2025. Russian gains also slowed as Russian forces came up against better-defended Ukrainian positions in and around larger towns such as Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk during Spring 2025. Russian gains slowed by 45 percent between January and April 2025 compared to gains between September and December 2024, although Russian casualty rates only deceased by 10 percent during those four months. Russian forces also began to more frequently use unarmored vehicles such as motorcycles and open-air buggies during this time and therefore began to suffer a higher killed-in-action (KIA) to wounded-in-action (WIA) ratio.[viii]

Russian forces began to make quicker gains in May 2025 and have sustained a faster rate of advance over the last four months as Russian casualties marginally decreased, although Russian forces continue to advance at footpace. Russian forces have mainly focused on advancing in western Donetsk Oblast and pushing into southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during Summer 2025. Russian forces are currently suffering an average of 68 casualties per square kilometer gained – indicating that Russian gains have become less costly in recent months as the frontline has become increasingly porous in key sectors in western Donetsk Oblast. ISW has previously noted that frontline positions change hands more frequently and Russian and Ukrainian forces are able to conduct infiltration missions into rear areas[ix] Other frontline to be more densely manned and likely require Russian forces to expend more casualties in order to advance, and the density of both Russian and Ukrainian manpower along the frontline likely varies significantly sector to sector. The more porous frontline areas have resulted in Russian forces making gains in the face of a more sparsely manned Ukrainian defense, allowing Russia to sustain fewer casualties. Russia's technological adaptations and significant investment in frontline unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities have also played a significant role in decreasing Russia's casualty rates and helping Russian forces exploit these new battlefield realities.

Russian casualty rates have likely decreased in Ukraine due to Russia's renewed emphasis on using UAVs to generate some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI), largely led by UAV operators of Russia's Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies. Russia’s recently formed UAV training and innovation program, the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, has represented a turning point in Russia’s tactical UAV capabilities.[x] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly established the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies in August 2024 and reportedly deployed Rubikon UAV units to Kursk Oblast in early 2025, where Rubikon fiber optic UAV operators played a significant role in eliminating the remnants of the Ukrainian salient.[xi] Rubikon reportedly develops, tests, and integrates advanced robotic systems in the Russian Armed Forces, and has an analytical center that develops proposals to improve the efficiency the Russia's unmanned systems.[xii] Russia began to proliferate Rubikon UAV units across the frontline in April and May 2025, and ISW has observed reports of Rubikon units operating in Kursk Oblast and throughout eastern Ukraine from northeastern Kharkiv Oblast to the Velykomykhailivka direction in western Donetsk Oblast.[xiii] This proliferation of Rubikon coincides with the comparative decrease in Russian casualties suffered per square kilometer gained between May and August 2025 and is likely a contributing factor.

Russian forces are also achieving ome BAI effects by using UAVs to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). BAI is s. Russian forces are leveraging tactical UAVs to complicate Ukrainian defensive operations in we Donetsk Oblast, particularly in the Pokrovsk direction and Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.[xv] Russian forces began to systematically target Ukrainian GLOCs and other operationally significant targets with tactical first-person view (FPV) UAVs and loitering munitions across the entire frontline in early 2025 and have become increasingly effective at using these UAVs to interdict Ukrainian logistics. Russia interdiction efforts have almost certainly played a role in Russia's ability to make recent gains in the Lyman, Siversk, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions.[xvi] Russian forces have not yet achieved the ability to conduct full BAI across all sectors of the front and have primarily concentrated such partial BAI efforts in western Donetsk Oblast.

Recent Russian UAV and counter-UAV innovations have contributed to these partial BAI effects. Russian forces have scaled the production of fiber optic UAVs that are more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and have increased the tactical depth of their fiber optic UAVs to around roughly seven kilometers in early Spring 2025 and to around 20 kilometers in Summer 2025.[xviii] Russian forces are also using fiber optic UAVs to neutralize Ukrainian EW systems before launching other FPV UAV strikes.[xix] Russian forces are also testing UAV interceptors, thermal imaging sighting systems, and lasers in order to counter Ukrainian UAV operations - the backbone of Ukraine's defensive operations in the face of Russia's manpower advantage[xx] Infantry remains the main vector of movement and change on the battlefield, although Russia's and Ukraine's ongoing technological race continues to alter the effectiveness of infantry on an increasingly transparent battlefield.

Recent Russian polling suggests that support among the Russian population for the war remains high despite growing casualties and relatively slow advances on the battlefield. Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center reported on September 9 that polling from August 2025 shows that 78 percent of respondents support the Russian military's actions in Ukraine.[xxi] The August 2025 results cohere with previous Levada polling from between January and July 2025 showing that support for the war has remained relatively stable at 74 to 80 percent The August 2025 poll showed that 66 percent of respondents believed that Russia should move to peace talks now, whereas 27 percent stated that Russia should continue fighting. Levada reported that 39 percent stated that they think the war will continue for over a year (an increase of seven percent from January 2025) and that 20 percent stated that they think the war will end in six months to one year (a decrease of seven points from January 2025). Levada found that 58 percent of respondents stated that the war in Ukraine has affected their lives or the lives of their families in some way. Thirty percent of respondents who stated that the war has affected them cited the death of a loved one as the reason and 28 percent cited a relative's or friend's participation in the war as affecting them. The polling showed that 22 percent of respondents stated that the war in Ukraine has severely affected their lives, with 31 percent of these respondents being less well-off and 26 percent of them from rural areas.

Levada's August 2025 polling suggests that support for the war has remained stable and high since US President Donald Trump entered office in January 2025 and began efforts to end the war. The polling also shows that a majority of Russians support peace talks but are increasingly skeptical that the war will actually end in the near future. The fact that the majority of surveyed Russians stated that the war has affected their lives yet continue to support the war effort generally suggests that the high casualties that Russian forces have been incurring on the battlefield are not swaying Russian public opinion. The Kremlin hashand.[xxii] The Kremlin has undertaken widespread censorship efforts to limit and control the information that the population consumes about the war while spreading narratives claiming that Russian victory is inevitable but that the Russian population will need to make sacrifices in order to achieve such a victory.[xxiii]

Ukraine continues to strike Russian energy infrastructure. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that the USF struck and severely damaged Transneft's Vtorovo oil pumping station in Penkino, Vladimir Oblast on September 7.[xxiv] Brovdi reported that the Vtorovo station pumped diesel fuel to the Moscow Ring Oil Product Pipeline. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence Telegram channel reported that satellite imagery collected on September 9 shows damage to at least two tanks at the pumping station.[xxv] Sources in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian outlets that at least four explosions in Zheleznodorozhnyy Raion, Penza City on the night of September 8 to 9 damaged and stopped the operation of two pipes of an unspecified main oil pipeline, which has a capacity of two million barrels per day.[xxvi] The GUR sources stated that two more regional gas pipelines sustained damage at the same location and that both pipelines supported the Russian military in Ukraine. Local Russian sources claimed that Transneft Druzhba (a subsidiary of Transneft that oversees the Russian section of the Druzhba oil pipeline) and Russian emergency and special services began scheduled exercises to "eliminate the consequences of man-made accidents at oil and gas facilities" in Zheleznodorozhnyy Raion on September 8.[xxvii] Ukrainian intelligence sources also reported to Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that an explosion disabled the Kuibyshev-Lysychansk main oil pipeline in Krasnoarmeysky Raion, Saratov Oblast on the night of September 8 to 9.[xxviii] The pipeline reportedly supplies the Russian military and has an annual capacity of 82 million tons.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a combined strike against three Russian command posts in and near occupied Donetsk City on September 8. Ukrainian military experts and Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces launched an unspecified number of missiles and drones against three command posts in and near occupied Donetsk City, largely targeting and striking the Topaz industrial plant.[xxix] The plant reportedly served as an army-level command post, and Ukrainian forces also struck command posts of the 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD). Geolocated footage indicates that the Ukrainian strike damaged the Topaz plant.[xxx]  The Russian military command has largely deployed elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division to the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas and elements of the 41st CAA to the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions.

Russian State Duma officials are engaging in a top-down Kremlin-organized effort to threaten Finland. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed on September 9 that Finland is becoming a "real hotbed of fascism faster than Ukraine" and that "nothing can be ruled out," p[xxxi] Kartapolov claimed that the current Finnish authorities' "incompetent" policies may lead to "some tragic consequences" and that Russia "know[s] how to protect [its] interests" and "is ready for any scenario." Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa similarly claimed on September 8 that Finnish authorities are responsible for the "hotbed of tension" on the Russian-Finnish border.[xxxii] Chepa claimed that Finland, which joined NATO in 2023 due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, will deploy weapons against Russia, which Chepa claimed will "expose [Finland] to danger" and create "new hotbeds of tension." Chepa stated that Russia "naturally...will not ignore this and will respond" to any such NATO actions. Chepa claimed that some European states opposed Finland's NATO membership because they "understood" that this would pose a threat of Russia's security, which Chepa claimed was one of the "root causes" of Russia's war against Ukraine.[xxxiii] Kartapolov's and Chepa's threats follow Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's September 8 threats against Finland that used language that directly mirrored the Kremlin's false justifications for its invasions of Ukraine.[xxxiv] Medvedev – like Chepa – also invoked the phrase "root causes" (which Kremlin officials often use to reiterate Russia's original war goals in Ukraine) to describe the situation in Finland. Medvedev’s threat against Finland was not unique but followed similar threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev in late 2023 and early 2025, respectively. Kartapolov's and Chepa's claims further demonstrate that these threats are a top-down, coordinated Kremlin approach intent on disseminating this narrative throughout the upper levels of the Russian government, possibly in order to justify future Russian aggression against a NATO member state.

Russian forces conducted a strike against a mobile pension dispersal point in Donetsk Oblast that killed and wounded dozens of mostly elderly civilians. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reported on September 9 that Russian forces launched a guided glide bomb against Yarova, Donetsk Oblast while local government officials were distributing pensions to civilians.[xxxv] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike killed 24 civilians and injured 19 others. Russia's strike very likely constitutes a flagrant violation of the international legal principle of distinction that requires parties to always distinguish between combatants and civilians.[xxxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian territorial gains have become less costly over the last four months compared to Spring 2025 as Russian forces are sustaining a lower casualty rate per square kilometer seized.
• Russian casualty rates per square kilometer peaked in the first four months of 2025 as Russian forces fought to maintain the intensified pace of offensive operations they began in Fall 2024.
• Russian advances began to slow during the first four months of 2025 as Russian casualties remained consistent – resulting in a higher Russian casualty rate between January and April 2025.
• Russian forces began to make quicker gains in May 2025 and have sustained a faster rate of advance over the last four months as Russian casualties marginally decreased, although Russian forces continue to advance at footpace.
• Russian casualty rates have likely decreased in Ukraine due to Russia's renewed emphasis on using UAVs to generate some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI), largely led by UAV operators of Russia's Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies.
• Recent Russian polling suggests that support among the Russian population for the war remains high despite growing casualties and relatively slow advances on the battlefield.
• Ukraine continues to strike Russian energy infrastructure.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a combined strike against three Russian command posts in and near occupied Donetsk City on September 8.
• Russian State Duma officials are engaging in a top-down Kremlin-organized effort to threaten Finland.
• Russian forces conducted a strike against a mobile pension dispersal point in Donetsk Oblast that killed and wounded dozens of mostly elderly civilians.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy and Kursk oblasts on September 9 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Ukrainian military observer stated on September 8 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xxxvii]  A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 9 that Russian forces have not yet fully seized Yunakivka.[xxxix]

Russian forces attacked in northern Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on September 8 and 9. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Varachyne (all north of Sumy City).

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[xliii] Elements of the 76th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[xliv] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction and the Sumy Oblast border area, respectively.[xlv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Synelnykove and on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River within Vovchansk (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[xlvi]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on September 8 and 9. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the left bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk.[xlviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[xlix]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 9.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern, eastern, southeastern, and western Kupyansk .

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Myrove; northwest of Kupyansk toward Tyshchenkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Stroivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane; and southwest of Kupyansk toward Novoplatonivka on September 8 and 9.[li]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD] reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[lii]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on September 9.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on September 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in Zarichne (east of Lyman), of Derylove (northwest of Lyman), and north of and to the outskirts of Yampil (southeast of Lyman). A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized all of the Serebryanske forest (southeast of Lyman).[liv]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Derylove, Shandryholove, and Serednie, and toward Korovyi Yar; north of Lyman near Hlushchenkove and Karpivka and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, , and Novomykhailivka; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil on September 8 and 9.[lv]

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Lyman direction reported that forces were able to retake over half of Zarichne after surprising Russian forces defending the settlement.[lvi] The chief of staff reported that Ukrainian forces took Russian prisoners of war (POW) in the settlement, a majority of which had only received between three days to two weeks of training before deployment and many of whom admitted that they are mainly motivated to fight for financial benefit.

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian Hyperion Battalion of the 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in Zarichne.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups entered the industrial zone near northern Siversk.[lviii]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebyranka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka and toward Bondarne on September 8 and 9.[lix]

A Ukrainian servicemember reported on September 8 that Russian forces are conducting first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against vehicles on the T-2122 Izyum-Barvinkove highway (west of Siversk) roughly 40 to 50 kilometers from the frontline.[lx] The servicemember suggested that Russian forces are using mothership drones that "drop" FPV drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear. .[lxi]

Order of Battle: Artillery of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[lxii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Footage published on September 8 and geolocated on September 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Katerynivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxiii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy roughly 60 percent of Predtechyne (east Kostyantynivka) and that the rest of the settlement is a contested "gray" zone that Ukrainian forces regularly enter.[lxiv] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing near Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxv]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka;  east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Bila Hora, Oleksandro-Shultyne, Kleban Byk, Nelipivka, Toretsk, Shcherbynivka, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzkhivka near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on September 8 and 9.[lxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Predtechyne.[lxvii]

The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhikva tactical area reported that Russian forces continue to use small group infiltration tactics with fireteams of up to six to advance through plantings and foliage.[lxviii] The commander noted that the Russian military command is not accumulating forces or using armored vehicles and that Russian drones now operate with a range of 25 to 30 kilometers. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted against Druzhikvka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk – all part of Ukraine's critical fortress belt north of Kostyantynivka.[lxix] The milblogger noted that the Russian military command will likely apply tactics developed in other urban areas of the front in an effort to seize the fortress belt. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile against an industrial facility in Druzkhivka.[lxx]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Sova FPV unit of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Katerynivka.[lxxi] Elements of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing east of Dobropillya within central Shakhove  and that Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) is a contested "gray" zone.[lxxiii]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on September 8 and 9.[lxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 9 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing east of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[lxxv]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk toward Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske and Novopidhorodne on September 8 and 9.[lxxvi]

An intelligence officer of a Ukrainian detachment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to accumulate infantry and noted that attacking Russian soldiers lack basic armor and have minimal weapons and ammunition.[lxxvii] The officer reported that Russian forces have stopped using motorcycles and other equipment in the Pokrovsk direction. The officer noted that Russian soldiers are attempting to reach basements to wait for supply deliveries and that Russian soldiers are using the Alpinequest phone application to coordinate troop movements.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Balahan (east of Pokrovsk).[lxxviii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[lxxix]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Tovste on September 8 and 9.[lxxx]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that Russian forces are trying to find gaps in Ukrainian defenses and are sending "very large forces" to attack Zelenyi Hai.[lxxxi] The spokesperson stated that attacking Russian forces in the area have different levels of equipment, with some having modern communication systems and equipment, while others do not even have plate carriers.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[lxxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Ternove and towards Novomykolaivka (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka).

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne and toward Lisne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad, Sichneve, and Novoselivka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Ternove, Maliivka, Novoheorhiivka, Zaporizske, Komyshuvakha, Sosnivka, and Novomykolaivka on September 8 and 9.[lxxxiv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sosnivka.[lxxxv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Ternove.[lxxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole, Obratne, Olhivske, Poltavka, and Novoivanivka on September 8 and 9 but did not advance.[lxxxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 9 but did not advance.

Russian milbloggers claimed on September 9 that Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske.[lxxxviii]

A communications officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported on September 9 that Russian forces continue to attack in waves of small infantry groups and sometimes in pairs.[lxxxix] The officer noted that Russian forces are more active during rainy weather conditions because poor weather conditions complicate Ukrainian drone operations and provide Russian forces with concealment.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Nemets group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly struck a Ukrainian vehicle in Zaporizhia Oblast.[xc] Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[xci]

Russian forces continued assaults near the Antonivskyi Bridge (northeast of Kherson City) on September 8 and 9 but did not make confirmed advances.[xcii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a limited cross-border raid and temporarily landed on the right (west) bank of Kherson Oblast.[xciii] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim or other sources amplifying this claim, however.

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 9 that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces struck a Russian Podlyot radar station and a module of a Nebo-M radar station in occupied Crimea.[xciv]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 84 Shahed and other drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[xcv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed or suppressed 60 drones and that 23 other drones struck 10 locations in Ukraine. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces downed 12 drones over Odesa Oblast and that drone debris caused several fires.[xcvi]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.