Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on September 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev directly threatened Finland and used language that directly mirrors the Kremlin's false justifications for its invasions of Ukraine. Medvedev claimed in an opinion piece for Kremlin newswire TASS on September 8 that the "main thing" that Finland should not "forget" is that confrontation with Russia “could lead to the collapse of Finnish statehood forever.”[i] Medvedev claimed that Finland is historically tied to Nazi Germany and that Finnish authorities in the 1940s wanted to expand Finland's borders to include Eastern Karelia, Leningrad (modern-day St. Petersburg), and the Kola Peninsula – areas in modern-day Russia. Medvedev claimed that the current Finnish government is “Russophobic,” and that “the thirst for profit at the expense of Russia was installed in Finnish minds back in the days of Hitler.” Medvedev claimed that Finnish authorities historically attempted to erase the “historical and cultural identity” of ethnic Russians and to commit genocide against the Slavic population. Medvedev claimed that Finland joined NATO under the "guise" of defense but is actually preparing for war against Russia - ignoring the fact that Finland abandoned its long held military neutrality to join NATO in direct response to Russia's full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine in 2022. Medvedev claimed that NATO will use Finland as “a springboard for an attack" on Russia.

Medvedev's September 8 claims about Finland's alleged persecution of ethnic Russians, destruction of Russian culture, ties to Nazism, and threat to Russia's security directly parallel claims that the Kremlin has used to justify its invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. Medvedev claimed that the "root causes" of the current state of Russian-Finnish relations go back to the Second World War.[ii] Medvedev's use of the phrase "root causes" mirrors that which Kremlin officials have repeatedly invoked to justify Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin officials have claimed that any future peace settlement in Ukraine must eliminate the "root causes" of the war, which Kremlin oers.[iii]

Medvedev's threat against Finland is not unique but rather part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to threaten NATO states and justify future Russian aggression. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev similarly claimed on March 13 that Finland tried to "exterminate" the Slavic population and that the West is "again turning [Finland] into a springboard" for aggression against Russia.[iv] Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened Finland in December 2023, claiming that NATO "dragged" Finland into the alliance and that "there will be problems" with Finland.[v] Russian officials have been increasingly invoking narratives about Finland's historic ties to Russia, and Russian information operations targeting Finland have long covered topics such as Finland's history as a Nazi ally during the Second World War, Finnish intent to gain lost territories, and the West's preparations to use Finland to threaten northwestern Russia.[vi]  The Kremlin has been employing the same playbook that it used against Ukraine towards NATO states, such as Finland and the Baltics, to set informational conditionaggression.[vii]

Russia continues to expand its defense industrial base (DIB) and take measures to safeguard defense industrial enterprises against long-range Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on September 7 that Russia plans to produce 2,500 high-precision missiles, including Iskander cruise and ballistic missiles and Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles in 2025.[viii] Skibitskyi noted that the GUR has observed a significant increase in Russian drone production, especially Geran (Russian analogues of the Iranian Shahed drone), Garpiya (Shahed analogues with components from the Peoples' Republic of China [PRC]), and first-person view (FPV) drones, and that Ukrainian military intelligence indicates that the Russian military has a rearmament plan for 2026 to 2037. Skibitskyi reported that most of the "powerful" Russian defense enterprises are located 750 kilometers or further away from the Ukrainian border and that only 25 percent at within the 250-to-500-kilometer range. Skibitskyi stated that Ukraine has not observed signs that Russia is relocating defense industrial enterprises but that Russia is building its new defense industrial enterprises 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Skibitskyi stated that Russia has diversified its defense industrial production such that more than 100 enterprises can be involved in the production of one type of weapon. The construction of defense industrial enterprises far from the Ukrainian border are attempts to protect the DIB from long-range Ukrainian strikes, and Russia's diversification of its production line likely aims to prevent Ukrainian strikes from interrupting the entire production process.

Russia is also reportedly increasing its production of FPVs with fiber optic cables, which Russian forces have successfully leveraged in recent months to achieve some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) in Ukraine. Ushkuynik Scientific and Production Center General Director Alexey Chadayev claimed on September 6 that Russia produces more than 50,000 fiber optic drones every month.[ix] Chadayev claimed that Russia's fiber optic drone production doubled in 2025. Chadayev claimed that Russia has established production in three unspecified regions, with more than one factory in each region. The proliferation of Russia's use of fiber optic drones, which are resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) and jamming, has given Russian forces important advantages on the battlefield.[x] Fiber optic drones, which Russia has been able to scale up in 2025 due the drone's simplicity, have enabled Russian forces to conduct precision strikes against Ukrainian armored equipment, ground lines of communication (GLOCs), troop movements, and EW systems. Russia's use of fiber optic drones has also allowed Russian forces to improve their ability to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs in forested areas, such as the Serebryanske forest area.

The Kremlin appears set to institutionalize its long-held practice of torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners and prisoners of war (POWs).  Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a bill to the Russian State Duma on September 8 that would denounce the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.[xi]  The convention calls for internationalters and prisons.[xii] The bill's explanatory note cited Russia's lack of representation in the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment since 2023 as the reason for the denouncement.ssian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed that the Duma will consider the bill as a “matter of priority,” signifying that the bill will likely pass the Duma and that Russia will likely withdraw from the convention in the near future.[xiv] Russia, however, has already been barring international inspectors from its prisons holding Ukrainian civilian prisoners and POWs - likely to cover up Russia's s and torture of Ukrainians.[xv] ISW has also observed numerous indications that the Russian military command is endorsing war crimes on the battlefield, including the execution of Ukrainian POWs.[xvi] Russia’s denouncement of the convention and likely subsequent withdrawal will further formalize these already systemic practices and prevent international efforts to expose them.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev directly threatened Finland and used language that directly mirrors the Kremlin's false justifications for its invasions of Ukraine.
• Medvedev's threat against Finland is not unique but rather part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to threaten NATO states and justify future Russian aggression.
• Russia continues to expand its defense industrial base (DIB) and take measures to safeguard defense industrial enterprises against long-range Ukrainian strikes.
• Russia is also reportedly increasing its production of FPVs with fiber optic cables, which Russian forces have successfully leveraged in recent months to achieve some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin appears set to institutionalize its long-held practice of torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners and prisoners of war (POWs).
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Unknown actors reportedly detonated two explosives near a Russian military base near Khabarovsk City on September 8. Sources in the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that two explosive devices detonated on the morning of September 8 in the parking lot of the headquarters of the Russian 748th Separate Operational Battalion of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia, also known as military unit 6912) in Khabarovsk City.[xvii] GUR sources noted that the explosions resulted in deaths and injuries to Russian military personnel, who were arriving for duty in the morning. Ukrainian investigative journalists noted that servicemembers of 748th Separate Operational Battalion committed war crimes innd Irpin, Kyiv Oblast in early 2022.[xviii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 8 that Ukrainian forces retook Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[xix]

Russian forces attacked within Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Varachyne and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka.[xx] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka, Andriivka, and Novokostyantynivka (all north of Sumy City).[xxi]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command significantly reinforced the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade in the Varachyne direction, but that servicemen are unhappy because that they suspect that the Russian military command will soon order them to conduct assaults on Varachyne.[xxii] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz continue to operate near Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City) but have entrenched themselves in their positions and are not attacking.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 106th VDV Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions along the Kursk-Sumy Oblast international border.[xxiii] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) and of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[xxiv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on September 7 and 8.[xxv]

The e. The chief of staff reported that Russian forces are moderately active and trying to advance toward Ukrainian positions, but that Ukrainian drones hinder Russian advances. The chief of staff reported that Russian forces are tired, and the Russian military command is occasionally supplying forward elements with some supplies using drones. The chief of staff reported that the Russian military command is sending recruits who signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to the most active areas where they are likely to be killed in action so that the Russian government does not have to pay them.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Izi Group of the Chechen 204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[xxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on September 7 and 8 but did not advance[xxviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into northwen Kupyansk and west of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[xxix]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, west of Kupyansk near Myrove, northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on September 7 and 8.[xxx]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle DivKupyansk.[xxxi] Mashovets added that assault elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division are trying to seize Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk). Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka.[xxxii] Elements of the 1st GTA are reportedly conducting MLRS strikes against Ukrainian positions near Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk), and its drone operators are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 7 and 8.[xxxiv]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st GTA, MMD) are attacking from Lozova (northeast of Borova) toward Nova Kruhlyakivka.[xxxv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Zarichne (east of Lyman).[xxxvi]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman), west of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman), north of Zarichne, and within the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[xxxvii]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Derylove, Serednie, and Shandryholove, and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil on September 7 and 8. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near the Shandryholove-Novoselivka area (northwest of Lyman) and near Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman).

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are suffering high losses and that the Russian military command frequently has to bring in fresh company-sized reinforcements with more than 90 percent staffing. The Ukrainian brigade noted that these units continue to conduct assaults until they are completely expended.[xl] The Ukrainian brigade reported that Ukrainian forces sometimes neutralize a Russian company in less than a week.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and southwest of Siversk toward Bondarne on September 7 and 8.[xli]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Katerynivka (south of Kostyantynivka) and advanced north and east of Katerynivka and east of Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[xliii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka, Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and Markove; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Toretsk, Oleksandro-Shultyne, and Dyliivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Kleban-Byk, Nelipivka, and Shcherbynivka; and south of Druzhkivka near Poltavka on September 7 and 8.[xliv]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are launching guided bombs against Kramatorsk (north of Druzhivka) and are mainly targeting the city's industrial zone.[xlv]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating south, west, and east of the Kleban-Byk reservoir and in the area responsibility of the 3r that elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are operating northwest of Dyliivka. Mashovets reported that elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC), with support from elements of the 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC), are operating near Kurdyumivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka). Drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[xlvii] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[xlviii] Reconnaissance elements of the 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and drone operators of the 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[xlix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets reported on September 8 that Ukrainian forces advanced to Pankivka and Mayak (east of Dobropillya).[l] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and east and southeast of the settlement=.[li] One Russian milblogger claimed on September 7 that Ukrainian forces control Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya) and Vilne (east of Dobropillya).[lii] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that almost all of Pankivka  is a contested "gray" zone and that Russian forces maintain positions in Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[liii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, Vilne, and Nove Shakhove; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on September 7 and 8.[liv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapovidne.[lv]

Mashovets reported that the Russian military command had to commit additional manpower and materiel to the area of responsibility  of the 51st CAA (formerly Donetsk People's Republic  [DNR] AC, SMD) in the Dobropillya tactical area after elements of the Russian 110th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) failed to consolidate positions along the Zatyshok-Novotoretske line (southeast of Dobropillya).[lvi] Mashovets reported that the 2nd and 41st CAAs (both CMD) are coordinating with the 51st CAA in the Dobropillya tactical area and that Russian forces continue to struggle to widen its penetration southeast of Dobropillya along the Zapovidne-Mayak-Pankivka-Shakhove line (southeast to east of Dobropillya).

A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command significantly reinforced the Russian force presence in the Dobropillya tactical area and that drones play a critical role in the area.e milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) start to25 kilometers from frontline positions because of elevated drone strike threats against vehicles.

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 110th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades are operating near Pankivka, Mayak, and Novotoretske.[lviii] Drone operators of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Shakhove.[lix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Pokrovsk, northeast of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), north of Leontovychi (southwest of Pokrovsk), and within Troyanda (southwest of Pokrovsk).[lx]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin and toward Novoekonomichne; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske and toward Novopidhorodne on September 7 and 8.[lxi] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Udachne.[lxii]

ty commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on September 8 that Russian forces continue to leverage foliage and small infiltration group tactics to advance and that the Russian military command is subjecting "disposable" soldiers to highly attritional assaults.[lxiii] The deputy commander noted that Russian forces are usually conducting assaults with one to five soldiers but occasionally up to 10 soldiers under the concealment of foliage to advance along windbreaks, plantings, and village roads. The deputy commander reported that Russian drones constantly15 to 20 kilometers into the immediate rear. A Ukrainian military expert reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces operating in the Pokrovsk direction are observing unspecified naval infantry units in the area.[lxiv]

Mashovets reported that the Russian military command of the 2nd and 41st CAAs are likely preparing to assault Pokrovsk.[lxv] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command of the 51st CAA overestimated its abilities and has been unable to break though the Shevchenko-Bilytske-Rodynske-Hryshyne line (northwest to north of Pokrovsk) and interdict GLOCs north of Pokrovsk. Mashovets noted that small infantry and reconnaissance and sabotage groups continue to leverage infiltration tactics to penetrate Ukrainian defenses southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Leontovychi, and Troyanda. Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 2nd CAA are working to improve their tactical positions near the Udachne-Kotlyne area to conduct further assaults.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, GRU) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxvi] Elements of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly providing logistical support in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 8 but did not advance.

forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on September 7 and 8.[lxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Vega Spetsnaz (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, GRU) are reportedly operating in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[lxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advancykhailivka near Ternove, west of Khoroshe, into central Sosnivka, and southwest of Vorone.[lxx]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Komyshuvakha, Zaporizske, Ternove, Novoheorhiivka, and Sosnivka on September 7 and 8.[lxxi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Ternove.[lxxii] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Sosnivka.[lxxiii] Drone operators of the 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[lxxiv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Obratne, Olhivske, Poltavka, and Zelene Pole on September 8.

Order of Battle: Elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Obratne.[lxxvii] Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vysoke (east of Hulyaipole).[lxxviii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[lxxix]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; and west of Orikhiv near Plavni, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on September 7 and 8. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Prymorske.[lxxxi]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported that the intensity of Russian assaults decreased in western Zaporizhia Oblast but that Russian forces are operating many first-person view (FPV) drones.[lxxxii]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi stated on September 8 that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) remains highly unstable with only one of seven main power lines operational and that the reactor's cooling reserve has dropped to 13.4 meters.[lxxxiii] Grossi warned that the ZNPP's cooling system will fail if its cooling reserve drops to 12 meters.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly helping Aerospace Forces (VKS) conduct guided bomb strikes and elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxxiv]   

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in Kherson Oblast, including northeast of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on September 8 but did not advan

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 142 Shahed- and Gerber-type strike and decoy drones, including over 100 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[lxxxvi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed or suppressed 112 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 26 drones struck seven locations throughout Ukraine and that drone debris fell on one location. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 8 that Russian forces are conducting a renewed strike campaign concentrated against Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025-2026.[lxxxvii] Ukrainian officials, including the Ukrainian Energy Ministry, and Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that Russian drones damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Kyiv oblasts.[lxxxviii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.