Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 4, 2025

September 4, 2025, 9:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on September 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The British and French-led Coalition of the Willing and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met in Paris to discuss possible future security guarantees for Ukraine that aim to ensure a just and lasting peace on September 4.[1] The heads of state and leaders of 35 countries and international organizations participated, including French President Emmanuel Macron, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, and US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff.

Macron stated that a strong Ukrainian military must be at the center of any postwar security guarantees. Macron stated that any security guarantees would need to involve commitments to rebuild and bolster the Ukrainian military.[2] Macron reported that the meeting participants agreed that the Coalition of the Willing's primary objective in any potential negotiations is to ensure that Russia does not impose any limits on the size or capabilities of the Ukrainian military.[3] Macron stated that Ukraine's allies must seek to provide Ukraine with the means to restore its military in order to deter and resist future Russian aggression.

Macron stated that 26 states formally agreed to form a "reassurance force" as part of security guarantees for postwar Ukraine. Macron stated that 26 unspecified states agreed to send ground forces to Ukraine or to provide assets to support at sea or in the sky.[4] Macron stated that the forces will be ready to deploy to Ukraine the day after Ukraine and Russia reach a ceasefire or peace agreement in the future. Macron noted that the foreign troops would not deploy to the frontline but to still undecided areas behind the front to prevent future Russian aggression.[5] Macron stated that the United States has been involved in every stage of the security guarantee process and that the Coalition of the Willing will finalize US support for European-led security guarantees in the coming days. France and the UK have previously indicated their willingness to deploy troops to postwar Ukraine.[6] Reuters reported on September 4 that a German government spokesperson stated that Germany will decide on its military engagement "in due course when the framework is clear," including the kind and extent of US involvement and the result of the peace negotiation process.[7]

The Kremlin continues to explicitly reject any foreign troops on Ukrainian territory as part of postwar security guarantees. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on September 4 that Russia will not discuss "any security foreign intervention" in Ukraine "in any form, in any format."[8] Zakharova claimed that such a foreign troop deployment is "fundamentally unacceptable." Zakharova similarly said on August 18 that Russia "categorical[ly] reject[s]" "any scenario that envisages the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries," and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on August 27 that Russia takes a "negative view" of European proposals of security guarantees for Ukraine and will perceive European force deployments to postwar Ukraine as an expansion of NATO's presence.[9] These repeated Kremlin rejections of Western security guarantees are part of Russia's calls for it to have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[10] Russia also previously tried to impose severe restrictions on the size of the Ukrainian military in the 2022 Istanbul draft peace agreement, and Russia has indicated that it continues to view the 2022 Istanbul draft treaty as the basis for any future peace settlement.[11] Russia has repeatedly demonstrated that it remains committed to achieving its original war aims, including the reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself against future Russian attacks.[12]

The Coalition of the Willing also outlined ways for states that are unable to deploy ground, sea, or air assets to participate in security guarantees for postwar Ukraine. Zelensky stated after the meeting that the Coalition of the Willing can also support a strong Ukrainian military with weapons provisions, training, and financing for Ukraine's weapons production.[13] Zelensky stated that states that do not have their own forces can contribute to the security guarantees financially, including by financing Ukrainian weapons production. Starmer stated that he welcomed announcements from unspecified Coalition of the Willing partners that they plan to supply Ukraine with long-range missiles.[14] Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala emphasized that security guarantees are necessary in order to deter Russian aggression and that the Coalition of the Willing is in agreement that Ukraine needs continued defense aid to ensure a just and lasting peace.[15] Fiala announced that Czechia will begin training Ukrainian F-16 pilots on subsonic aircraft and simulators as part of Czechia's aid package to Ukraine. Fiala stated that Czechia will continue to supply Ukraine with ammunition.

The Coalition of the Willing discussed additional sanctions against Russia with US President Donald Trump as part of coordinated Western efforts to deny Russia funding for its war against Ukraine. Reuters reported that a White House official stated that US President Donald Trump spoke with the leaders of the Coalition of the Willing after the meeting and that Trump called on them to stop buying Russian oil as this helps fund Russia's war machine.[16] The White House official stated that Trump also called for European leaders to put economic pressure on the People's Republic of China (PRC) for its involvement in Russia's war effort. Macron confirmed that the coalition spoke with Trump about sanctions and stated that the parties agreed to work more closely on future sanctions, especially those targeting Russia's gas and energy sectors and the PRC.[17] Macron stated that Europe and the United States will impose additional sanctions against Russia if Moscow continues to refuse peace negotiations.

Russian bankers continue to express concerns over the increasingly stagnant Russian economy. Sberbank CEO and Former Russian Minister of Economic Development and Trade, German Gref, claimed on September 4 that the Russian Central Bank will likely lower its key interest rate to 14 percent by the end of 2025, but that this would not be enough to revive the Russian economy.[18] Gref called on the Central Bank to lower the key interest rate to 12 percent or less to stimulate economic growth. The Central Bank already lowered its key interest rate twice in the last three months, from a record high of 21 percent down to 20 percent in June 2025 and to 18 percent in July 2025 - likely as part of a premature effort to maintain the facade of economic stability.[19] Gref acknowledged that the Russian economy is in a ”cooling period” and that Sberbank lowered its forecast for growth in corporate lending from nine to 11 percent to seven to nine percent. Gref added that the Russian ruble will likely weaken by the end of 2025. Russia has been leveraging the strengthened ruble to soften the blow of Western sanctions as parallel imports are cheaper and substitutes are affordable, and the Central Bank used the strengthened ruble to justify lowering its key interest rate in Summer 2025.[20] The Russian economy is already struggling with gasoline price spikes, labor shortages, and wage inflation from increased payments to sustain military recruitment and to augment the defense industrial base's (DIB) labor force.[21] Gref’s proposal to lower the key interest rate even further to 12 percent would flood the Russian economy with money and likely weaken consumer purchasing power, devalue the ruble in the medium-to long-term, and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• The British and French-led Coalition of the Willing and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met in Paris to discuss possible future security guarantees for Ukraine that aim to ensure a just and lasting peace on September 4.
• Macron stated that a strong Ukrainian military must be at the center of any postwar security guarantees.
• Macron stated that 26 states formally agreed to form a "reassurance force" as part of security guarantees for postwar Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues to explicitly reject any foreign troops on Ukrainian territory as part of postwar security guarantees.
• The Coalition of the Willing also outlined ways for states that are unable to deploy ground, sea, or air assets to participate in security guarantees for postwar Ukraine.
• The Coalition of the Willing discussed additional sanctions against Russia with US President Donald Trump as part of coordinated Western efforts to deny Russia funding for its war against Ukraine.
• Russian bankers continue to express concerns over the increasingly stagnant Russian economy.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Siversk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces may have struck two radar systems in Rostov Oblast on the night of September 3 to 4. Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi reported that NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data collected on September 4 showed heat signatures at the Russian South Navigation Radar System-1 in Rostov-on-Don and the grounds of the former Russian 1244th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, which used to operate S-300PS air defense systems, near Nazarov (northeast of Rostov-on-Don).[23] Militarnyi reported that the heat signatures may indicate fires in the area. Militarnyi reported that Russian forces appear to have tried to restore the base of the 1244th Regiment for use in its war against Ukraine and that the site includes a radar station.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published September 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[24]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, Kindrativka, and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on September 3 and 4.[25] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked near Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, and Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[26]

Mashovets reported that Russian forces advanced about half a kilometer north of Varachyne (north of Sumy City) to the O-191504 Varachyne-Oleksiivka highway.[27]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian drones are reducing Russia's manpower and equipment advantage and that Russia's tactic of using small groups to infiltrate and accumulate in the Ukrainian near rear is not effective in the Sumy direction, as Russian forces are unable to bypass Ukrainian positions unnoticed.[28] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command is sending Russian forces to assault Ukrainian positions across open fields on the southern outskirts of Oleksiivka. The milblogger also claimed that elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely part of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are facing difficulties with the supply of ammunition and provisions near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.[29]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly launched a failed assault near Varachyne (north of Sumy City).[30] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) reportedly failed to advance near Kindrativka.[31] Drone operators of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Marine (east of Sumy City).[32] Drone operators of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[33] Drone operators of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Sumy direction.[34] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Chernihiv and Sumy oblast border areas.[35]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Vovchansk and west of Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[36]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and toward Synelnykove on September 3 and 4.[37]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 4.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets implied on September 4 that Ukrainian forces recently regained some positions near the UkrAvtoGaz and TatNeft gas stations on the northern outskirts of Kupyansk and that elements of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are trying to maintain their positions on the outskirts of Kupyansk near the gas stations.[38]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk).[39]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka, north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and toward Kutkivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on September 3 and 4.[40] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the northern and western outskirts of Kupyansk.[41]

Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andriy Kanashevych stated on September 4 that Ukrainian aid workers are facing difficulties evacuating civilians from settlements near Kupyansk due to the danger of Russian strikes.[42] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are using anti-thermal cloaks to move alone or in pairs across the roughly one kilometer toward Ukrainian forward positions at night before concentrating and attacking.[43] The spokesperson noted that Russian infantry is using anti-thermal cloaks instead of motorcycles and buggies to avoid Ukrainian drone strikes.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA, LMD) are operating near Fyholivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and the Dvorichanskyi National Nature Park (north of Kupyansk).[44] Mashovets stated that elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA, LMD) are operating near Kindrashivka.[45] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka.[46] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Smorodivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka, northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and toward Borisivka Andriivka, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 3 and 4.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on September 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Shandryholove and north of Derylove (both northwest of Lyman).[49]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Karpivka, Serednie, and Shandryholove and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Ridkodub, Novomykhailivka, and Novyi Myr; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area and toward Yampil on September 3 and 4.[50]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

 Note: ISW has reorganized its axes in Donetsk Oblast to better analyze and assess the Russian military command's tactical and operational objectives east and west of Ukraine's fortress belt. ISW combined the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions into the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka Tactical Area, given that the previously separate Chasiv Yar and Toretsk axes have now converged into a single tactical area around Kostyantynivka. ISW also created a separate Dobropillya Tactical Area, given that the Dobropillya salient is supporting operations beyond Pokrovsk in the fortress belt area of operations. ISW will continue refining its operational-tactical framework for the fortress belt as the situation evolves.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[51]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk toward Bondarne and Pazeno on September 3 and 4.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Perezine (south of Siversk), Fedorivka (southwest of Siversk), Vyimka, and Novoselivka (east of Siversk).[53]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 6th and 127th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking near Serebryanka and Verkhnokamyaske (east of Siversk).[54]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Katerynivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[55]

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces continue to hold Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[56]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Dyliivka and Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Kleban-Byk, Katerynivka, Nelipivka, and Pleshchiivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on September 3 and 4.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional engagement is ongoing near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shcherbynivka.[58]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within Shcherbynivka and Kleban-Byk.[59] A milblogger denied Russian claims that Russian forces had encircled Ukrainian forces south of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (northwest of Kleban-Byk).[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Oleksandro-Shulytne, and elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Kleban-Byk.[61] Elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in Rusyn Yar.[62] Drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Chervone (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[63] Drone operators of the Afipsa Storm Battalion of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces north of Shcherbynivka.[64] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Yablunivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[65] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka tactical area.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Vilne, Shakhove, and Nove Shakhove and toward Novyi Donbas; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Dorozhnie on September 3 and 4.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a raid on the southeastern outskirts of Shakhove.[68] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Zapovidne.[69] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces continue to hold Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya).[70]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 1st, 114th, and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (all three of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are operating in the Dobropillya tactical area.[71]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[72]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk).[73]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Zatyshok, Fedorivka, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne and toward Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Troyanda, Udachne, Kotlyne, Zvirove, and Leontovychi and toward Molodetske on September 3 and 4.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[75]

Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Belskyi responded to footage online allegedly showing Russian forces trying to enter Pokrovsk through the sewer system, stating that the sewer pipes in the area are only 60 centimeters (about two feet) in diameter and that Ukrainian engineers reassured that Russian forces will not be able to use these pipes to advance due to the small diameter and waste.[76] Mashovets reported that Russian forces have not seized Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk).[77] A drone pilot of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and are having issues with logistics, forcing them to use individual soldiers and buggies to deliver ammunition to frontline positions.[78]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 1st and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, SMD) are attacking along the Rodynske-Bilytske line (north of Pokrovsk) and that elements of the 5th and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) are attacking near Novoekonomichne.[79] Drone operators of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai, Tovste, and Ivanivka on September 3 and 4.[81] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tovste, Ivanivka, and Zelenyi Hai.[82]

A Russian milblogger claimed on September 3 that elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) struck a bridge in Ivanivka.[83]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Novopavlivka, and reconnaissance elements of the 1452nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly identifying targets for strikes against Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka.[84]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 4 shows two Russian servicemembers raising a flag in Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka), and ISW assesses that Russian forces seized the settlement.[85] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) with seizing the settlement.[86]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces seized all of Donetsk Oblast in its area of responsibility (AoR), including Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka).[87] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Khoroshe (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and advanced north of Novoselivka, west of Oleksandrohrad, and south of Vorone (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[88] Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Belskyi denied claims that Russian forces seized Voskresenka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[89]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevstove, east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Sichneve, and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha on September 3 and 4.[90] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka-Klevtsove and Novoselivka.[91]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoselivka.[92] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (VKS, EMD) are reportedly conducting unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[93] Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[94]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces attacked in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske and Novoivanivka on September 4 but did not advance.[95]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Plavni on September 3 and 4.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Plavni.[97]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on September 4 that Russian forces are increasing their activity in the area, including by using more heavy equipment to attack Ukrainian positions, and are seriously preparing for an offensive.[98] The deputy commander reported that Russian forces first deployed first-person view (FPV) drones, including those with fiber optic cables, and reconnaissance drones to strike the Ukrainian forces at forward positions before attacking with armored vehicles. The deputy commander stated that Russian forces are advancing through the 10-kilometer "grey zone" of increased drone operations danger by first driving a trawl tank to demine and clear new routes, followed by Russian infantry advances.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Kamyanske and Stepnohirsk.[99] Drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Stepnohirsk.[100] Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), elements of the Nemets group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), and electronic warfare (EW) elements of the 74th Motorized Rile Regiment (reportedly of the 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[101]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near Antonivka, on September 3 and 4, but did not advance.[102]

 Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 112 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[103] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 84 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 28 drones struck 17 locations and that debris fell in five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts.[104]

 Russian forces conducted a missile strike against a Ukrainian humanitarian mission in Chernihiv Oblast on September 4. The Ukrainian Main Directorate of the National Police in Chernihiv Oblast reported that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against a humanitarian demining mission near Chernihiv City.[105] Geolocated footage published on September 4 shows an explosion near civilian vehicles near Chernihiv City.[106] Chernihiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Chaus reported that the strike killed two humanitarian workers.[107]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.