Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 29, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on September 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin issued the decree to start the semi-annual fall conscription cycle on October 1. Russia holds two conscription cycles in the spring and fall every year, and Putin signed a decree on September 29 authorizing the Fall 2025 cycle, to conscript 135,000 Russian citizens between October 1 and December 31 for 12 months of mandatory military service outside of the active combat zone in Ukraine.[i] Russia conscripted 134,500 Russians in Spring 2022 and 120,000 in Fall 2022; 147,000 in Spring 2023 and 130,000 in Fall 2023; and 150,000 in Spring 2024 and 133,000 in Fall 2024.[ii] The fall cycles have historically conscripted fewer Russians than those in the spring, but the number of conscripts has grown each season since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion. Deputy Chief of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the Russian General Staff Vice Admiral Vladimir Tsimlyansky emphasized on September 22 that the upcoming conscription cycle is not related to the war in Ukraine.[iii] Tsimlyansky stated that conscripts will only serve on Russian territory and will not conduct tasks related to the war - meaning conscripts will also not serve in occupied Ukraine that Russia illegally defines as ”Russian territory.” Tsimlyansky stated that the Russian military command will start sending conscripts to assembly points on October 15 and that a third of the conscripts will receive specialized training in training units and at military bases.[iv] Russian law prohibits the deployment of conscripts to combat, and Russian forces have typically relied on conscripts for border security, including in Bryansk, Belgorod, and Kursk oblasts.[v] Conscript border guards' participation in combat during the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast caused particular discontent in Russian society.[vi]  

Conscripts from Russia’s semi-annual conscription cycles become reservists after their 12 months of service, and Russia can call up reservists in the future. Conscripts that eventually join the inactive reserve are notably different than the active strategic reserve that Russia reportedly has been forming since July 2025 of soldiers who have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[vii] Russian officials continue to deceive and coerce conscripts to sign military contracts with the Russian MoD to increase the number of servicemembers deployed to combat in Ukraine or to the active strategic reserve.[viii] Russia appears to be taking efforts to mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that would slow down Russian involuntary reservist call-ups in the future, including expanding conscription administrative processes to be year-round.[ix]

The Kremlin plans to spend 17 trillion rubles ($183 billion) on national security and defense in 2026 — about 38 percent of its planned annual expenditures. The Russian government submitted to the Russian State Duma on September 29 a draft budget for 2026-2028 that projects federal revenues in 2026 to be roughly 40.3 trillion rubles ($485 billion) and federal expenditures to be roughly 44.1 trillion rubles ($531 billion).[x] The budget calls for 12.9 trillion rubles ($155 billion) to go towards “National Defense” expenditures in 2026 - a decrease from 13.5 trillion rubles ($163 billion) in 2025.[xi] The draft budget projects that defense spending will increase to 13.6 trillion rubles ($164 billion) in 2027 and then decrease to 13 trillion rubles ($156.5 billion) in 2028. The 2026 budget also calls for 3.9 trillion rubles ($47 billion) towards “National Security” - an increase from 3.5 trillion rubles ($42 billion) in 2025. Russia plans to commit roughly 38 percent of its expenditures in 2026 to combined “defense” and “security” expenses - a decrease from 41 percent in 2025.[xii] The budget allocates 58 billion rubles ($698 million) in 2026 to fund compensation payments and social benefits for servicemembers killed or wounded in action and their family members - a decrease from 78 billion rubles ($939 million) spent in 2025.[xiii] The budget also allocated roughly 13.9 billion rubles ($167 million) in 2026 to fund the “Defenders of the Fatherland Fund,” which supports Russian veterans and their families - a decrease from the roughly 34.7 billion rubles ($418 million) spent in 2025.[xiv] Russia is reducing its defense and security spending in 2026 by roughly 200 billion rubles ($2.4 billion) as compared to 2025, despite Russia's ongoing economic struggles. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov claimed on September 18, for example, that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia’s revenues from oil and gas sales funding the Russian federal budget to be about 20 to 22 percent in 2026, which Siluanov noted is a decrease from about 50 percent previously.[xv] The Kremlin recently announced an increase in value-added tax specifically to fund defense and security, which the Russian Finance Ministry estimated will generate about $14.2 billion in additional revenue in 2026.[xvi]

The Russian government is planning to increase funding to televised propaganda - in line with increased restrictions on social media and internet access. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on September 29 that the Russian government plans to spend 106.4 billion rubles ($1.28 billion) on state television channels in 2026 - a significant increase from the previously planned 69.1 billion rubles ($832 million) in 2025.[xvii] The Russian 2025 budget allocated 4.5 billion rubles ($47 million) and 49 million rubles ($511,000) towards the Solovyov Live Telegram channel and Readovka online news aggregator, respectively, likely as part of the Russian government’s efforts to adapt its propaganda to social media.[xviii] The significant rise in funding toward television in 2026 suggests that the Kremlin is returning to traditional methods of disseminating state propaganda, particularly against the backdrop of recent restrictions on social media, and the creation of the Russian state messenger Max.[xix]

US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg acknowledged that Ukraine has US permission to conduct long-range strikes against Russian territory. Kellogg responded in an interview on September 29 with Fox News to a question asking if US President Donald Trump has authorized Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian territory.[xx] Kellogg stated that Trump's, US Vice President JD Vance's, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's statements all indicate that there are no sanctuaries in Russia and that this is why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has requested US Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs). Kellogg stated that it is up to Trump to decide whether the US will provide Ukraine with Tomahawks. ISW has long argued that Russia should not be permitted to leverage sanctuaries that Western restrictions on Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory create.[xxi] Russia has, in the past, been able to amass ground forces, materiel, and subsequently launch new offensives into Ukraine and conduct long-range strikes against Ukraine within the protection of these sanctuaries.

Kremlin officials are trying to preemptively deter the United States from providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov questioned on September 29 whether it would be Ukrainian or American forces that would be launching the Tomahawk missiles into Russia and questioned who would be conducting the targeting for the Ukrainian strikes.[xxii] Peskov claimed that the Kremlin must determine which forces will be involved in the process before it can determine its response. Peskov attempted to downplay the effect Ukrainian Tomahawk strikes could have on the Ukrainian war effort, claiming that Tomahawk missiles will not change battlefield dynamics.[xxiii] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed that US provisions of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine will be a new stage in the war, with the United States becoming a direct participant.[xxiv] Zhuravlev threatened that Russia will respond by moving its Oreshnik ballistic missiles closer to the United States, possibly to Venezuela. Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Alexei Pushkov claimed on September 29 that Ukraine would conduct "dangerous" provocations with US-provided Tomahawk missiles, directly involving the United States in the war.[xxv] The Kremlin is attempting to portray US Tomahawk deliveries to Ukraine as a dangerous escalation to deter the United States from sending such weapons to Ukraine, just as the Kremlin has previously employed similar tactics when the United States was discussing sending the Ukrainian Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), F-16 fighter jets, and Abrams tanks.[xxvi] These efforts are part of Russia's long-standing reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that actually benefit Russia. Previous Ukrainian strikes using US-provided long-range weapons systems did not trigger an escalatory Russian reaction, and the West and Ukraine have repeatedly violated Russia's alleged "red lines" in the past with no resulting escalation, as the Kremlin warned.[xxvii]

European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO airspace. Norwegian Armed Forces Operational Headquarters Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Vegard Finberg reported on September 29 that the Norwegian Armed Forces observed drones near unspecified military facilities in Troms and Finnmark on the evening of September 28.[xxviii] A spokesperson for a Norwegian airline reported that authorities observed unidentified drones within the exclusion zone at Bronnoysund Airport in Nordland on the evening of September 28.[xxix] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported on September 29 that witnesses reported unidentified drones in the Sontea Noua Canal area and that Romanian officials are investigating fallen debris in the area.[xxx] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on September 28 that intelligence indicates that Russian forces are likely launching drones to violate NATO airspace from tankers that are part of the Russian shadow fleet.[xxxi] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on September 29 that Russian forces are leveraging civilian vessels to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage missions in international waters, including targeting underwater cables with anchors.[xxxii]

The pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won a parliamentary majority in the September 28 elections in Moldova, as Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians and Russian officials are preparing to appeal the results and call for protests in the coming days. PAS won 50.2 percent of the vote, securing 55 out of 101 seats in the Moldovan Parliament.[xxxiii] Igor Dodon, a Kremlin-linked former Moldovan president, called on Moldovans to conduct peaceful protests outside of the parliament building in Chisinau on the afternoon of September 29.[xxxiv] The September 29 protests were limited and calm, with about 300 people in attendance and lasting only about 30 minutes.[xxxv] Dodon stated on September 29 that the leaders of the Patriotic bloc, which won 24.17 percent and 26 seats, do not recognize the results and will appeal.[xxxvi] Kremlin-linked Moldovan politician Ilan Shor claimed on Russian state television channel Rossiya 24 that his Pobeda electoral bloc, which Moldovan authorities barred from running in the elections, also does not recognize the results and plans to appeal.[xxxvii] Shor stated that the Pobeda bloc will discuss its plan with unspecified colleagues over the "next day or two" and then will call for protests.[xxxviii]

Kremlin-linked Moldovan and Russian officials are alleging election fraud and procedural violations to set conditions to appeal the results and call for protests. Shor claimed that the elections were "obviously rigged" and that Moldovan authorities intimidated ten to twenty percent of voters to prevent them from voting.[xxxix] Vasile Tarlev, the leader of the Future of Moldova party within the Patriotic bloc, claimed on September 28 that Moldovan authorities restricted observers' and journalists' access to polling stations to "conceal fraud and provocations," including in Transnistria (the pro-Russian parastate in eastern Moldova).[xl] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on September 29 that "some political forces" in Moldova are declaring their disagreement with the election results and are discussing possible election violations.[xli] Peskov claimed that Russia can "confirm" that Moldovan authorities "denied" hundreds of thousands of Moldovans living in Russia the opportunity to vote.[xlii] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Leonid Slutsky claimed on September 29 that Moldovan authorities violated electoral rights and freedoms, falsified the results, and are leading the country "down the path of Ukraine."[xliii] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on September 28 that Western intelligence agencies interfered in the Moldovan elections.[xliv] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been setting conditions to generate (possibly violent) protests to remove Moldovan President Maia Sandu from power after the elections.[xlv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin issued the decree to start the semi-annual fall conscription cycle on October 1.
• The Kremlin plans to spend 17 trillion rubles ($183 billion) on national security and defense in 2026 — about 38 percent of its planned annual expenditures.
• The Russian government is planning to increase funding to televised propaganda - in line with increased restrictions on social media and internet access.
• US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg acknowledged that Ukraine has US permission to conduct long-range strikes against Russian territory.
• Kremlin officials are trying to preemptively deter the United States from providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles.
• European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO airspace.
• The pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won a parliamentary majority in the September 28 elections in Moldova, as Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians and Russian officials are preparing to appeal the results and call for protests in the coming days.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman and in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Lyman, Siversk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces conducted a Neptune missile strike against a Russian defense industrial enterprise. The Ukrainian Navy reported on September 29 that Ukrainian forces conducted a Neptune missile strike against the Elektrodetal plant in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast.[xlvi] Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on September 29 that the plant produces electrical connectors and military equipment for missile control systems, armored vehicles, and command and control (C2) devices.[xlvii] Sources in the Bryansk Oblast Emergency Services told Russian opposition outlet Astra on September 29 that the strike started a fire that damaged the plant’s boiler room building and an electrical connector assembly workshop, forcing the plant to halt operations.[xlviii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xlix]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, on September 28 and 29.[l] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka.[li]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast published footage on September 29 showing Russian drone operators killing two surrendering Russian servicemembers in the area.[lii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[liii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk, in eastern Vovchansk, and west of Synelnykove (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[liv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on September 28 and 29.[lv]

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated on September 29 that Russian forces constantly operate drones above Ukrainian positions and are trying to infiltrate Ukrainian positions.[lvi] The chief of staff stated that Russian forces have not conducted mechanized assaults in the area since August 2025 due to Ukrainian drone strikes. The chief of staff stated that Russian forces are employing small, motorized infantry groups with motorcycles and buggies.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[lvii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on September 28 and 29.[lviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 28 and 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself and northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka on September 28 and 29.[lix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 28 and 29.[lx]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces south of Novoyehorivka (southeast of Borova).[lxi]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northeastern Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[lxii]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 28 and 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Yampil and in northern Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[lxiii]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 29 that Russian forces seized Shandryholove.[lxiv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Shandryholove, north of Zarichne (east of Lyman), and north of Yampil.[lxv]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Derylove, Drobysheve, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka and toward Stavky; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on September 28 and 29.[lxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hlushchenkove, Ridkodub (both north of Lyman), and Karpivka (northwest of Lyman).[lxvii]

A Russian milblogger claimed that northern Yampil is a contested “gray zone.”[lxviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Donetska railroad northwest of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[lxix]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vyimka.[lxx]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Novoselivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Zvanivka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on September 28 and 29.[lxxi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to operate in the Slovyansk (west of Siversk) direction.[lxxii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka).[lxxiii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kostyantynivka toward Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Pleshchiivka and toward Ivanopillya; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Stepanivka and Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on September 28 and 29.[lxxiv]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attacking near Rusyn Yar.[lxxv] Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), with reinforcements from unspecified naval infantry elements, are attacking from Poltavka toward Sofiivka (northwest of Poltavka) and from Popiv Yar (south of Druzhkivka) toward Volodymyrivka (northwest of Popiv Yar). Mashovets reported that elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD), which the Russian military command recently redeployed from southern Ukraine, are operating in the Kramatorsk (north of Kostyantynivka) direction.[lxxvi] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near the Kleban Byk reservoir (south of Kostyantynivka).[lxxvii] Elements of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in central Kostyantynivka.[lxxviii] Drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and elements of the Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[lxxix]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces continue to hold Pankivka and Zapovidne (both southeast of Dobropillya).[lxxx]

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked southeast of Vilne (east of Dobropillya) and pushed Russian forces back toward Nove Shakhove (south of Vilne).[lxxxi] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, SMD) maintain positions in Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya) and in areas north of the settlement up to Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northwest of Kucheriv Yar) and Hruzke (northeast of Kucheriv Yar). A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Boikivka (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxxxii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on September 29.[lxxxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian attacks along the Zapovidne-Suvorove line (southeast of Dobropillya) aim to cut off Ukrainian forces operating west of Boikivka.[lxxxiv] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya), Boikivka, and Novotoretske (just east of Boikivka).[lxxxv]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on September 29 that Ukrainian forces have "surrounded" some Russian units in the Dobropillya direction.[lxxxvi] Syrskyi reported that Russian forces have lost 3,185 personnel, of which 1,769 were irretrievable losses, and 969 pieces of weapons and military equipment, likely since Russian forces launched their penetration in the Dobropillya area in mid-August 2025. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces have liberated roughly 175 square kilometers and cleared almost 195 square kilometers of Russian sabotage groups.

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya area reported that the number of Russian assault groups and the number of soldiers moving in each group have increased.[lxxxvii] The NCO stated that Russian forces are suffering an average of 10 personnel casualties every day – up from an earlier average of two to five at an unspecified time. The NCO stated that Russian naval infantry elements, including elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), recently entered combat in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR), after which the number of Russian assaults and losses increased. The NCO reported that Russian forces in the area are having issues with fuel and lubricant supplies due to Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are attacking along the Novotoretske-Razine line (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxxxviii] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), and possibly 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Caspian Flotilla) to the 51st CAA's AoR in the Dobropillya area but assessed that this redeployment is only temporary before the elements move to the 8th CAA's AoR in the Kostyantynivka direction in the future.[lxxxix] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[xc]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are operating within Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and advanced in Udachne (southeast of Pokrovsk).[xci]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and toward Kozatske and Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka and Lysivka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Zvirove; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on September 28 and 29.[xcii]

Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are trying to advance into Pokrovsk in small groups.[xciii] Trehubov stated that Russian force in the area are poorly trained and are mostly Russian citizens who signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for the financial incentives.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that likely elements of the Russian 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) and 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are attacking in the Fedorivka-Rodynske direction (northeast to north of Pokrovsk) and Krasnyi Lyman-Myrnohrad direction.[xciv] Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), likely with reinforcements from the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), and possible unspecified naval infantry elements, have consolidated in Novoekonomichne. Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA,) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myrnohrad.[xcv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka).[xcvi]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Hrushivske and Zelenyi Hai on September 28 and 29.[xcvii]

The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on September 29, and geolocated footage confirmed, that a Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone downed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter near Kotlyarivka – the second documented time a FPV drone intercepted a helicopter.[xcviii] Ukrainian forces previously used an FPV drone to down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter on July 31, 2024.[xcix]

A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces are repelling Russian attacks and beginning to push Russian forces back in the brigade’s AoR.[c] The servicemember reported that Ukrainian drones are blocking Russian advances along logistics routes and that Russian forces move on foot within 20 kilometers of the frontline to avoid detection by Ukrainian drones. The servicemember stated that only one out of every 10 attacking Russian soldiers reach Ukrainian positions.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Verbove (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[ci]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Verbove, west of Stepove and Kalynivske (both south of Velykomykhailivka).[cii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and Piddubne; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha, Maliivka, Sosnivka, Berezove, Ternove, Zaporizke, and Novomykolaivka;  south of Velykomykhailvika toward Orestopil; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and toward Oleksiivka on September 28 and 29.[ciii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Verbove.[civ]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 28 and 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novoivanivka and Poltavka (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[cv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Poltavka and toward Novohryhorivka on September 28 and 29.[cvi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly identifying targets for Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Pryvilne (northeast of Hulyaipole).[cvii] Drone operators of the Russian 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[cviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske on September 29.[cix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division and sappers of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[cx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on September 28 and 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including west of Kherson City near the Antonivsky Bridge, on September 28 and 29.[cxi]

Open-source investigative outlet Tochnyi reported on September 28 that Russian drone strikes have resulted in over 3,000 Ukrainian civilian casualties in Kherson City since 2023.[cxii]

Ukrainian forces likely struck an oil depot in occupied Crimea. Russian opposition outlets and milbloggers posted footage on September 29 of smoke at the oil depot in occupied Feodosia, Crimea.[cxiii]  Crimean occupation advisor Oleg Kryuchkov claimed that a fire broke out at an empty fuel tank at the oil depot due to a welding violation.[cxiv] Kryuchkov claimed that the Feodosia oil depot was not involved in the fuel and lubricant supply chain for gas stations in occupied Crimea, likely in response to the ongoing gasoline shortages in occupied Crimea due to Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries.[cxv] A Russian milblogger stated that occupation authorities in Crimea are "denying" the strike on the oil depot occurred.[cxvi] The Feodosia oil terminal has a transshipment capacity of about 12 million tons per year and can store up to 250,000 tons of petroleum products at a time.[cxvii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 32 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which roughly 20 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[cxviii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 23 drones and that nine drones struck eight locations throughout Ukraine. Ukrainian officials, including the Ukrainian State Emergency Service, reported that Russian drones struck administrative, educational, and residential buildings in Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, and Sumy oblasts.[cxix] Polish Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Pawel Wronski reported that Russian strikes damaged the Polish embassy in Kyiv City.[cxx] European Union (EU) Ambassador to Ukraine Katarina Mathernova stated that Russian strikes also damaged vehicles at the EU mission in Kyiv City.[cxxi]

Russian forces continue to create new long-range drone launch sites in occupied Ukraine. A Ukrainian strikes monitoring service reported on September 28 that Russian forces launched Shahed-type drones against Ukraine on the night of September 27 to 28 from Kacha Air Base in occupied Crimea for the first time.[cxxii] The monitoring service noted that this is the twelfth known Russian drone launch site and that Kacha Air Base is located on the western Crimean coast, reducing the flight time to Odesa, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.