Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 28, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1 pm ET on September 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US Vice President JD Vance criticized Russia's rejection of American invitations to engage in bilateral or trilateral negotiations as Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate their lack of interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine. Vance stated on September 28 that Russia has “refused to sit down” in any bilateral meeting with Ukraine or a trilateral meeting with Ukraine and the United States over the last few weeks — in direct opposition to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reported agreement with US President Donald Trump on August 18 to hold a bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[1] Vance stated that Russia’s economy is “in shambles,” that Russia is making “little, if any,” gains on the battlefield, and that it is time for Russia to "actually talk seriously about peace.” Vance stated that the "reality on the ground" has changed, with Russia killing and losing a lot of people without “much to show for it.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated on September 28 that Russia is open to starting negotiations to address  the “root causes” of the war — which Kremlin officials have repeatedly claimed are NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers, among other things.[2] Kremlin officials, including Lavrov, have consistently used “root causes” as shorthand to reiterate Russia’s original war demands, which Kremlin officials have continuously asserted Russia will achieve either militarily or diplomatically.[3] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains unwilling to engage in good faith negotiations and is instead repeatedly demanding that Ukraine capitulate and acquiesce to Russia’s maximalist demands.[4]

Russian forces conducted the third largest combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine of the war to date on the night of September 27 to 28 with 643 total projectiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Lipetsk Oblast; 38 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast; two drone-launched Banderol missiles from Kursk Oblast; and eight Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 593 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda and Kacha, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed a total of 611 projectiles, including 566 drones; two drone-launched Banderol missiles; 35 Kh-101 cruise missiles; and eight Kalibr cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five missiles and 31 drones struck 16 locations throughout Ukraine and that drone debris fell on 25 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian drones and missiles primarily struck civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Oblast and Zaporizhia, Khmelnytskyi, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, and Odesa oblasts and that the strikes lasted over 12 hours.[6] Zelensky reported that Russian strikes on Kyiv City killed four civilians and injured at least 40, including children. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that Russian strikes on Kyiv City left over 2,500 civilians without gas and roughly 580 civilians without electricity.[7] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City with at least eight missiles, injuring 42 civilians and damaging civilian infrastructure.[8] Konotop City Mayor Artem Semenikhin reported that Russian forces appear to be adapting their drone strike tactics by circling Shahed-type drones over neighborhoods up to 12 times instead of striking immediately in order to terrify residents.[9] Poland’s Armed Forces Operational Command scrambled two fighter jets and put air defense on high alert on September 27 in response to Russia’s overnight strikes against Ukraine but did not report any violations of Polish airspace.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russian strikes are increasingly and disproportionately impacting civilian areas in Russia's significantly larger-scale strike packages of recent months and that such strikes underscore Ukraine’s need for continued supply of Western air defense systems, especially US-provided Patriot systems.[11]

European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO airspace. The Danish Defense Command reported on September 28 that the Danish Armed Forces observed drones near multiple military facilities on the night of September 27 to 28.[12] A Norwegian police official reported on September 27 that the Norwegian Armed Forces and police officers observed unidentified drones near Norway’s Ørland Air Base, which houses F-35 fighter jets, on the morning of September 26 for a period of two and a half hours.[13]

Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians called for protests in Moldova following the September 28 parliamentary election. Voting has not yet closed in the parliamentary elections as of this writing, and ISW will continue to monitor the results as they become available. Igor Dodon, a Kremlin-linked former Moldovan president, falsely claimed on September 28 that current Moldovan President Maia Sandu spoke about the possibility of annulling the elections — a false claim that Russian state media and milbloggers widely amplified.[14] Dodon called on Moldovans to conduct peaceful protests outside of the parliament building in Chisinau on the afternoon of September 29 in order to prevent Moldovan authorities from annulling their votes. A journalist with Moldovan outlet IPN reported that unspecified sources stated that the Patriotic bloc was calling for people to protest at 22:00 local time in Chisinau and were trying to bring people to the protest from Transnistria (the pro-Russian parastate in eastern Moldova).[15] The Patriotic bloc has already organized some protests near the Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) in Chisinau as of this writing, but the protests appear to be limited, with available footage only showing a few dozen demonstrators so far.[16] The Moldovan Police reported on September 28 that they detained three people who were members of the Transnistrian security forces and were coordinating, monitoring, and providing logistical support to groups preparing to provoke mass unrest in Moldova.[17] The police reported that they found unspecified incendiary devices and flammable materials during the arrest. The Serbian Ministry of the Interior stated on September 26 that police arrested two people whom Serbian authorities accused of organizing and financing "combat-tactical training" for protestors before the Moldovan elections.[18] The Serbian police reported that the trainings occurred between July 16 and September 12 near Loznica, Serbia and that 150 to 170 Moldovan and Romanian nationals participated. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been setting conditions to generate (possibly violent) protests to remove Sandu from power after the elections, including by spreading narratives about the possible annulment of the results.[19]

The parliamentary elections faced large-scale cyberattacks and bomb threats that aimed to disrupt the voting process. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean reported that a large-scale cyberattack targeted election-related infrastructure, including the website of the Moldovan CEC and polling stations abroad, on September 27 and 28.[20] Recean stated that the cyberattacks caused about 4,000 websites to go down and that one distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack came from several countries simultaneously. The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reported bomb alerts at polling stations in Belgium, Italy, Romania, the United States, and Spain.[21] Neither Recean nor the Moldovan MFA commented on the suspected actor behind the cyberattacks and bomb threats, however.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized that Russia will use its upcoming United Nations Security Council (UNSC) presidency to "review" the 1995 Dayton Accords in a likely effort to destabilize the Balkans and divide and distract Europe. Lavrov claimed on September 28 that Russia’s UNSC presidency, set for the month of October 2025, will “review the implementation of the Dayton Accords" (which ended the 1992–1995 Bosnian War), claiming that the accords will likely “collapse” as they infringe on “the rights of the Serbian people.”[22] Lavrov further claimed that there are “flagrant violations of the Dayton Accords” and that the West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence became an attack on Serbia’s statehood.[23] Lavrov accused the West of attempting to disintegrate Bosnia and Herzegovina’s statehood and claimed that there is an attack on “the vital interests of the Serbian people,” including an attack on Serbian Orthodoxy, in both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Kremlin maintains close relations with the Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) and has previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to further influence the Balkans, sow divisions in Europe, and undermine the US-backed Dayton Accords to throw the Balkans into turmoil.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• US Vice President JD Vance criticized Russia's rejection of American invitations to engage in bilateral or trilateral negotiations as Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate their lack of interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted the third largest combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine of the war to date on the night of September 27 to 28 with 643 total projectiles.
• European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO airspace.
• Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians called for protests in Moldova following the September 28 parliamentary election.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized that Russia will use its upcoming United Nations Security Council (UNSC) presidency to "review" the 1995 Dayton Accords in a likely effort to destabilize the Balkans and divide and distract Europe.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on September 27 indicates that Russian claims that Russian forces seized positions southeast of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) are false and that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or advanced in the area.[25]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Sumy and Kursk oblasts on September 27 and 28.[26] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepne (northwest of Sumy City), Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kindrativka (both north of Sumy City).[27]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in Sumy Oblast reported that its electronic warfare (EW) specialists intercepted 2,310 Russian drones, including Mavic, ZALA, and Orlan reconnaissance drones, in the area in September 2025.[28] The brigade reported that conventional first-person view (FPV) drones account for roughly 70 percent of Russian drones in the area. The brigade stated that Russian forces are using fiber optic FPVs drones but are facing limitations in training fiber optic drone operators.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[29]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on September 27 and 28.[30]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vovchansk.[31] Drone operators of the Russian 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Okhotnik (Hunter) Detachment and Vakha Battalion (both reportedly of the 204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Odradne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[33]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne, Milove, and Khatnie on September 28.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Kupyansk near Doroshivka and Kindrashivka, north of Kupyansk toward Kolodyazne, northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on September 27 and 28.[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova toward Bohuslavka on September 27 and 28.[36]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 59th Tank Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Rubtsi (northeast of Lyman) direction.[37]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Zarichne (west of Lyman).[38]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and toward Stavky, east of Lyman near Torske, and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on September 27 and 28.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Yampil.[40]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces have not seized Zarichne but have been conducting infiltration missions into the settlement for months.[41] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are infiltrating in groups of five soldiers — of which on average Ukrainian drone strikes kill three, wounds one (who survives), and one gets lost. The spokesperson stated that the small number of Russian forces hiding within Torske (just east of Zarichne) and Zarichne wait for drones to supply medication and provisions but that the Russian military command often prioritizes sending them Russian flags so the soldiers can film propaganda videos alleging Russian advances. The spokesperson stated that the Russian military command often lies to its soldiers, falsely claiming that Russian tanks are already operating within Torske and that Russian forces have already seized the settlement.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Siversk direction on September 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[42]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on September 27 and 28.[43]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that recent Russian advances in the Siversk direction and Russia's ability to take Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Siversk area under fire control are in part due to command changes in the area (possibly referring to the Russian military command's reported decision to remove several commanders within the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps (LNR AC), Southern Military District (SMD)] in late 2024) and significant advances in the Serebryanske forest area (northeast of Siversk).[44] ISW continues to assess that Russian drone innovations, including the use of fiber optic drones, are enabling Russian forces to advance in forested environments where Russian forces have historically struggled to operate.[45] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the mine on the northern outskirts of Siversk is a contested “gray zone.”[46]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Slovyansk direction (west of Siversk).[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (south of Kostyantynivka).[48]

Russian forces attacked east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky, Oleksandro-Shultyne, and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka, Shcherbynivka, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and toward Novopavlivka on September 27 and 28.[49]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk (southeast of Kostyantynivka) direction reported that Russian forces suffered almost 60,000 casualties in over 14 months of fighting in this direction.[50]

Order of Battle: Reconnaissance elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly coordinating strikes with drone operators of the 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) against Ukrainian forces in Poltavka and Rusyn Yar.[51] Drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in Kostyantynivka.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Nove Shakhove  and south of Zapovidne (both southeast of Dobropillya).[53]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove; northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz; and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie and Zapovidne on September 27 and 28.[54] А Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapovidne.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Myrolyubivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), west of Kotlyne, and on the northwestern outskirts of Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[56]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Sukhetske, Novoekonomichne, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Kozatske and toward Balahan and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Molodetske, and Udachne on September 27 and 28.[57]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian infantry continue to attack in small assault groups once or twice a day.[58] The spokesperson reported that the increasing range of Russian strike drones is expanding the “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) and complicating Ukrainian logistics. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces in the direction also suffer from logistics problems and that Russian forces have to deliver supplies on foot in small groups to avoid detection by Ukrainian drones.[59]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade and the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in the Pokrovsk direction.[60]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[61]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne on September 27 and 28.[62]

Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on September 28 that Russian forces in the Novopavlivka direction continue efforts to infiltrate and bypass Ukrainian defenses in small groups.[63] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are trying to establish footholds in the small settlements along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border. Trehubov stated that the open terrain in the area is unfavorable for assaults and that Russian forces will struggle to find concealment in windbreaks when the foliage begins to fall. Trehubov noted that the Russian military command is redeploying elements from southern Ukraine to eastern Ukraine but that the Russian military command previously redeployed troops to higher priority areas from Russia or the third or fourth lines of defense in occupied Ukraine. Trehubov assessed that this shift indicates that Russia is suffering from a personnel shortage.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Velykomykhailivka direction on September 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Stepove (south of Velykomykhailivka).[64]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevstove and Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Novoselivka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha, Maliivka, Sosnivka, Berezove, and Novomykolaivka; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka toward Oleksiivka on September 27 and 28.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces south of Verbove (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[66]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka and Poltavka and toward Novovasylivske on September 27 and 28.[67]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy (Hulyaipole) direction.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southeast of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka; and west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, Stepnohirsk, Stepove and Prymorske on September 27 and 28.[69]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Orikhiv and Novodanylivka.[70] Sappers of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on September 27 and 28 but did not advance.[72]

Ukrainian forces reportedly caused an explosion at a Russian base in occupied Melitopol. Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 28 that GUR elements set off an explosion at a Russian military base in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast on September 27.[73] The GUR reported that GUR destroyed a vehicle and killed at least four Russian drone operators.

Satellite imagery confirmed recent successful Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea. An open-source analyst reported on September 28 that satellite images taken on September 25 on September 28 confirms that Ukrainian forces destroyed one An-26 transport aircraft and damaged one Be-12 maritime patrol aircraft.[74] The analyst also noted that satellite imagery shows that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Mi-8 helicopter and damaged another at Simferopol Airport.

Russia likely conducted sabotage against a power line at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Greenpeace Ukraine reported on September 27 that satellite imagery shows damage to the last ZNPP power line two to five kilometers north of the ZNPP distribution station but that there was no shelling or strikes against the power line before it lost connection to the ZNPP — suggesting that Russian forces conducted sabotage against the line.[75]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline for information about Russian strikes against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.