Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 27, 2025

September 27, 2025, 4:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on September 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries. Sources in the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on September 27 that the SBU conducted a long-range drone strike against the Tyngovatovo Oil Pumping Station in Konar, Chuvash Republic, approximately 1,000 kilometers from the international border.[1] The SBU sources stated that a drone struck the pumping station and caused a fire, suspending oil transportation through the facility. Chuvash Republic Head Oleg Nikolaev said on September 27 that Ukrainian forces attempted a drone strike against an oil pumping station near Konar and admitted that there is minor damage to the facility and that the facility suspended operations.[2] On September 26, Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov called on Lipetsk Oblast residents to remain calm despite reports of fuel shortages in the oblast and claimed that the shortages are due to logistical difficulties in loading fuel from some refineries.[3] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Lipetsk Oblast residents are complaining about high prices for AI-95 gasoline and that prices reached approximately $3.70 a gallon.[4] The Russian government has historically used subsidies to artificially depress and stabilize domestic gas prices, although recent Ukrainian drone strikes appear to be complicating this policy.[5] The average cost of gasoline in Russia was approximately $2.15 per gallon in September 2023 and $2.40 per gallon in September 2024, and prices have largely stayed below $3.00 a gallon since February 2023.[6] Astra reported that gas stations are starting to sell fuel with fuel cards and that some stations in Moscow, Leningrad, Ryazan, and several Far Eastern oblasts are limiting fuel purchases to 10- to 20-liter increments or are only selling diesel. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on September 27 that the Ukrainian strikes against the Russian oil industry are having limited though painful consequences and that fuel shortages are particularly severe in the Far East, frontline areas of Belgorod Oblast, and occupied Crimea, which is entirely reliant on external oil supplies.[7] The milblogger claimed that gas prices are increasing significantly in Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov, Lipetsk, and Tula oblasts and Krasnodar and Stavropol krais.

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons. The Estonian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on September 27 that Estonia will contribute 10 million euros (roughly $11.7 million) to Ukraine through NATO's Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[8] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on September 27 that Israel supplied Ukraine with a Patriot system in August 2025 and that Ukraine will receive two Patriot air defense systems in Fall 2025.[9]

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova absurdly blamed Ukraine on September 26 for the September 9 to 10 Russian drone incursion in Poland and the September 13 Russian drone incursion in Romania. Zakharova continued to deny Russian involvement in the drone incursions over Poland and Romania and claimed that Ukraine was responsible and orchestrated the incursions in order to frame Russia and provoke a war between NATO and Russia.[10] Zakharova claimed that a third world war will break out imminently if someone confirms Ukraine's alleged involvement in false flag operations in Romania and Poland.[11] Polish and Romanian authorities previously identified the drones that violated their airspaces as Russian.[12]

European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO airspace. The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 27 that Danish Defense Command observed drones near multiple Danish military facilities, including Skrydstrup Air Base and the barracks of the Jutland Dragoon Regiment in Holstebro.[13] The Vilnius Public Security Service reported on September 26 that three unidentified drones disrupted flights at the Vilnius Airport twice on the afternoon of September 26.[14] Finnish outlet Yle reported on September 27 that an unknown entity piloted a drone over the Valajaskoski Power Plant in Rovaniemi, Lapland, in northern Finland.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries
• Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons.
• Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova absurdly blamed Ukraine on September 26 for the September 9 to 10 Russian drone incursion in Poland and the September 13 Russian drone incursion in Romania.
• European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO airspace.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy and western Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area and near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook positions northeast of Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[16]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Sumy and Kursk oblasts on September 26 and 27.[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[18]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 104th, 234th, and 237th VDV regiments, reportedly participated in the claimed seizure of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[19] Drone operators of the Krechet unit of the 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in the Sumy-Kursk border area, and elements of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar Volunteer Detachment) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[20]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[21]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Tykhe, and Synelnykove on September 26 and 27.[22]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on September 26 that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against Bilyi Kolodyaz, Kharkiv Oblast (southeast of Vovchansk), injuring two civilians and damaging a residential building.[23]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vovchansk.[24]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk, near Milove and Khatnie on September 27, but did not advance.[25]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Doroshivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on September 26 and 27.[26]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova toward Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 26 and 27, but did not advance.[27]

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 27 indicates that Russian claims that Russian forces seized eastern Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman) are false and that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or advanced in the area.[28]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novoselivka.[29] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Derylove (northwest of Lyman).[30]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Karpivka, Derylove, Drobysheve, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Stavky and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on September 26 and 27.[31]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on September 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[33]

Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on September 26 and 27.[34]

Geolocated Russian footage published on September 27 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in central Vasyukivka (southwest of Siversk), disproving recent Russian claims that Russian forces advanced in this area.[35]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces continue attacks in the Serebryanske forest area (north of Siversk) and are swimming across the Siverskyi Donets River to attack toward Serebryanka.[36] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are attempting to gain a foothold on the outskirts of Siversk before the onset of the Fall 2025 muddy season. Zaporozhets added that Russian forces are taking advantage of the concealment provided by the Serebryanske forest's foliage to infiltrate Ukrainian positions in small groups of one to two infantrymen. Zaporozhets reported that Ukrainian forces destroy any Russian forces that occasionally reach the outskirts of Siversk.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in central Vasyukivka.[37] Elements of the 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to operate in the Slovyansk direction (west of Siversk).[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Mayske (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka), near Predtechyne and Oleksandro-Shultyne (both east of Kostyantynivka), and Katerynivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[40]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka toward Stupochky; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Kleban-Byk, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Mykolaipillya, Sofiivka, and Volodymyrivka and toward Novopavlivka on September 26 and 27.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Volodymyrivka.[42]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Pleshchiivka.[43] Drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[44] Drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 217th VDV Regiment, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction, including near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[45]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on September 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into eastern Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya).[46]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces fully seized Dorozhnie and advanced northwest of Shakhove and north of Nove Shakhove (both east of Dobropillya) and in northern Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya).[47]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Vilne, Novyi Donbas, Pankivka, and Shakhove; northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz and toward Rubizhne and Stepy; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Ivanivka on September 26 and 27.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pankivka, Zapovidne, Novotoretske, and Mayak (both southeast of Dobropillya).[49]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on September 27 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[50]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized positions in the eastern outskirts of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and in the southern part of Lazurnyi Microraion in southern Pokrovsk.[51]

Russian forces continued assaults near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Sukhetske, Novoekonomiche, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk toward Balahan and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on September 26 and 27.[52]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating near Myrnohrad.[53] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[54] Elements of the Storm Special Forces Detachment of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the outskirts of Pokrovsk.[55]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[56]

Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Horikhove; and south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya on September 26 and 27.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk direction (possibly referring to the Novopavlivka or Velykomykhailivka directions).[58]

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 27 indicates that Russian claims that Russian forces hold positions northwest of Oleksandrohrad (northeast of Velykomykhailivka) are false and that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or advanced in the area.[59]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Stepove (south of Velykomykhailivka).[60]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevstove and Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Novoselivka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha and Maliivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Kalynivske, and Berezove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka toward Oleksiivka on September 26 and 27.[61]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Poltavka and toward Novohryhorivka and Novovasylivka on September 26 and 27.[62]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) dropped a FAB-3000 unguided bomb on a Ukrainian position in Hulyaipole.[63]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advance: Geolocated footage published on September 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook positions south of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[64]

Russian forces attacked near Orikhiv itself; southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Kamyanske, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on September 26 and 27.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.[66] Elements of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kherson Oblast, including near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on September 27.[68]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 115 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other types of drones — of which roughly 70 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[69] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed or suppressed 97 drones and that 17 drones struck six locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck energy and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Odesa, Sumy, and Vinnytsia oblasts.[70]

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha shared additional information on September 27 on the reported incursion by Hungarian drones into Ukrainian airspace over Zakarpattia Oblast.[71] Sybiha reported that one drone only briefly crossed into Ukrainian airspace from eastern Hungary and that another drone traveled roughly 40 kilometers into Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.