Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 23, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on September 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump expressed confidence in Ukraine's ability to fully liberate all of its internationally recognized territory that Russia currently occupies, following a bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Trump stated at a press conference with Zelensky on September 23 that he has “great respect” for Ukraine's resistance to Russia’s invasion and that Ukraine is “doing a very good job” of defending its territory against Russia’s efforts to quickly seize it.[i] Trump affirmed NATO member states' right to shoot down Russian fighter jets violating their airspace, in response to a series of recent Russian incursions into Polish and Estonian airspace. Trump subsequently wrote that he assesses that the Ukrainian military, with the help of the European Union (EU) and NATO, is capable of “[winning] all of Ukraine back in its original form,” likely referring to Ukraine’s internationally recognized 1991 borders.[ii] Trump wrote that Russia’s military shortcomings in Ukraine, despite its large-scale financial investments in military industrial production, make Russia look like a ”’paper tiger’,” and that Ukraine should act now, while Russia is facing economic turmoil, including gasoline shortages. Trump concluded that the United States will continue to supply weapons to NATO‘s Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, through which European states purchase US-made weapons for Ukraine.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) publicly acknowledged Russia's intent to advance further into Kharkiv Oblast should Russian forces seize Kupyansk, supporting ISW's assessment of Russia's operational intent. The Russian MoD claimed in a social media post on September 23 that Russian forces are continuing their offensive operation aimed at seizing Kupyansk and that Russian forces have partially enveloped Ukrainian forces in the city.[iii] ISW has not observed geolocated evidence to support the claim that Russian forces have enveloped Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk as of this report, however. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces intend to leverage the seizure of Kupyansk to attack further into eastern Kharkiv Oblast in several directions simultaneously, including toward Chuhuiv (west of Kupyansk) and Izyum (southwest of Kupyansk) and toward Vovchansk (northwest of Kupyansk). The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian Western and Northern groupings of forces intend to unite the Vovchansk and Kupyansk efforts, which would effectively establish a "buffer zone" near the international border in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that the seizure of Kupyansk will also support Russian efforts to advance toward Slovyansk and Kramatorsk (both south of Kupyansk in Donetsk Oblast) and seize Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.

ISW assessed in February 2024 that the Russian MoD likely intended for Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk and the east (left) bank of the Oskil River to set operational conditions for Russian forces to advance into northern Donetsk Oblast toward Ukraine's fortress belt and/or eastern Kharkiv Oblast toward Kharkiv City.[iv] ISW assessed on July 12, 2025 that Russian forces likely began an offensive operation aimed at connecting Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk), possibly to facilitate ongoing Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border.[v] The Russian MoD's statement confirms these prior assessments of the Russian military command’s operational intent.

The MoD's September 23 statement undermines repeated Russian claims that Russia’s main military objective and territorial demands in Ukraine are limited to Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have long claimed that Russia "only" wants control over Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as a prerequisite for ending the war.[vi] Ongoing Russian efforts to advance into Kharkiv Oblast — an oblast that the Russian government has not illegally annexed and does not currently lay claim to — are an indicator that Russia retains territorial ambitions beyond the four aforementioned oblasts.

The Russian MoD may be issuing this statement about Russian operational intent to justify ongoing Russian operations to seize Kupyansk to Russian society and frontline forces. The Russian MoD has rarely publicized its operational intent as openly as in the September 23 post, and the MoD likely sought to use the post to generate informational effects. Russian forces have been engaged in re-intensified assaults near Kupyansk since late 2024, and the Russian military command may be explicitly outlining its operational intent for the Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman area in order to justify the significant casualties and time that Russian forces have lost over the last year by framing Kupyansk as an important gateway to the rest of Kharkiv Oblast and the fortress belt.[vii] It is notable that the Russian MoD did not provide a timeline or deadline by which Russian forces intended to accomplish these goals. The MoD may be willing to share these goals if the Russian military command assesses with high confidence that Russian forces will be able to accomplish these goals eventually, assuming that Russia continues its war in Ukraine indefinitely under Putin's theory of gradual and attritional Russian victory. Russian efforts to advance toward and seize Kharkiv City and Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast likely remain years-long endeavors, assuming that the West continues to arm Ukraine and empower Ukraine to defend itself.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump expressed confidence in Ukraine's ability to fully liberate all of its internationally recognized territory that Russia currently occupies, following a bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) publicly acknowledged Russia's intent to advance further into Kharkiv Oblast should Russian forces seize Kupyansk, supporting ISW's assessment of Russia's operational intent.
• The Russian MoD's September 23 statement undermines repeated Russian claims that Russia’s main military objective and territorial demands in Ukraine are limited to Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
• The Russian MoD may be issuing this statement about Russian operational intent to justify ongoing Russian operations to seize Kupyansk to Russian society and frontline forces.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, Novopavlivka and in the Dobropillya tactical area and western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Siversk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure on the night of September 22 to 23. Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on September 23 that Ukrainian drone operators struck two Russian linear production and dispatch stations along the main oil pipelines in Bryansk and Samara oblasts.[viii] The USF reported that the pipeline in Bryansk Oblast supplied oil products to the Russian military. Moscow City Mayor Sergei Sobyanin stated that Ukrainian drones also targeted Moscow City, and Russian authorities announced temporary restrictions at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport during the strikes.[ix] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed over 130 drones over Russia and occupied Crimea on September 22 and 23.[x] Russian outlet RBK reported on September 23 that sources close to the Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces also launched an unspecified number of hot air balloons overnight.[xi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Fighting continued in northern Sumy Oblast on September 23, but Russian forces did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing in forests near Varachyne (north of Sumy City).[xii]

Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including near Varachyne and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on September 22 and 23.[xiii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Kindrativka.[xiv]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian border detachment operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported that Russian attacks are less intense compared to recent months and that Russian forces rarely use tanks and armored vehicles.[xv] A milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 23 that the Russian military command should investigate and arrest the commander of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), Alexander Pobokov for issuing "insane" orders leading to high casualties among the brigade.[xvi] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command is considering promoting Pobokov to 44th AC commander or even Chief of Staff of the Russian Army despite his command failings.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC) and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka.[xvii] Elements of the first battalion of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) operating near Tetkino reportedly recently received reinforcements but have poor morale and incompetent battalion leadership.[xviii] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[xix] Elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade and 98th VDV Division and drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and Anvar Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[xx] Elements of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and Russian Aerospace (VKS) Forces are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[xxi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Pivdenna Railroad in northwestern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya, Synelnykove, Tykhe, and within central and western Vovchansk.[xxiii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanskyi Khutory, Synelnykove, and Tykhe on September 22 and 23.[xxiv]

The Ukrainian National Police reported on September 23 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck a civilian vehicle in Prudyanka (north of Kharkiv City).[xxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[xxvi]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on September 22 and 23.[xxvii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk) toward Pishchane (west of Stepova Novoselivka).[xxviii] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Stroivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[xxix]

Russian forces attacked in Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Zapadne and Kutkivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove and toward Sobolivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novselivka on September 22 and 23.[xxx] Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Smorodkivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[xxxi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Svyatogor Group are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk.[xxxii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 22 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions west of Novovodyane (southeast of Borova), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently retook the fields west of the settlement.[xxxiii]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Olhivka, Novoyehorivka, Druzhelyubivka, and Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna and Stepove on September 22 and 23.[xxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on September 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized and advanced southwest of Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[xxxv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Lyman into northern Novoselivka and central Derylove and from Serednie toward Korovyi Yar (northwest of Serednie).[xxxvi]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Serednie, and Shandryholove and toward Korovyi Yar, Derylove, and Dobrysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Novomykhailivka; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on September 22 and 23.[xxxvii]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are attempting to interdict the E-40 Izyum-Slovyansk highway in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics in Donetsk Oblast.[xxxviii] The NCO stated that Russian forces are making significant efforts to advance to the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers. The NCO stated that Russian forces regularly attempt to bypass Ukrainian positions and infiltrate the Ukrainian near rear. The NCO stated that Russian forces regularly transfer reinforcements to the Lyman direction from other unspecified lower-priority directions.

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on September 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Bohdanivka, Luhansk Oblast.[xxxix] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported on September 22 that Russian forces also stored drones, batteries, communication modules, and video transmitters at the warehouse and that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike on August 29.[xl]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 23 indicates that Russian forces seized Pereizne (south of Siversk).[xli] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with seizing the settlement.[xlii] One Russian milblogger, however, claimed that Russian forces seized Pereizne several weeks ago and questioned why the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is just announcing it now.[xliii]

Geolocated footage published on September 23 indicates that Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission north of Siversk.[xliv] ISW does not assess that this infiltration constitutes a confirmed change in control of terrain at this time.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and southeast of Siversk toward Vyimka on September 22 and 23.[xlv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Slovyansk direction (west of Siversk).[xlvi]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southern Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[xlvii] Additional geolocated footage published on September 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced into central Nelipivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[xlviii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Pleshchiivka.[xlix]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka, Kleban-Byk, Shcherbynivka, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Berestok and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on September 22 and 23.[l]

The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Russian forces are massing naval infantry and other elite troops near Kostyantynivka to prepare for operations to envelop Ukraine's fortress belt in the future.[li] The chief sergeant reported that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and are striking Kostyantynivka with artillery, drones, and guided KAB-250 glide bombs. The chief sergeant reported that Russian forces have experienced logistics problems over the last few weeks but are still attacking in small infantry groups of three to five servicemen.[lii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD), and drone operators of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) and the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[liii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into southern Novotoretske and southern Boikivka (both southeast of Dobropillya).[liv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions in Boikivka and Novotoretske.[lv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Vilne; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and toward Dorozhnie on September 22 and 23.[lvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Boikivka, Novotoretske, Mayak (east of Dobropillya), and Zatyshok (southeast of Dobropillya).[lvii]

The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the neighboring Kostyantynivka direction (east of Dobropillya) reported on September 23 that Russian forces are conducting drone strikes from positions in the Dobropillya salient against main roads in Donetsk Oblast, including the T-05-14 Kramatorsk-Dobropillya highway, to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs.[lviii] The chief sergeant added that Ukrainian forces have cut off Russian logistics in the Dobropillya salient.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[lix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, Krasnyi Lyman, and Myrolyubivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Kozatske, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne and toward Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Leontovychi, Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on September 22 and 23.[lx]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to use infiltration tactics to penetrate Ukraine’s near rear and are taking advantage of poor weather conditions to escape detection by Ukrainian drones and avoid engaging Ukrainian infantry in firefights in the area.[lxi] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are reintroducing armored vehicles to the brigade’s area of responsibility (AOR) as motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) are increasingly getting bogged down in muddy terrain.

A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction aim to establish positions within ruined buildings rather than digging new fortifications within settlements and that Russian infantry often fail to fully clear Ukrainian fortifications due to the rushed pace of ground assaults.[lxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces near Myrnohrad.[lxiii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into northern Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[lxiv]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Dachne (southeast of Novopavlivka) and east of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[lxv]

Geolocated footage published on September 23 indicates that Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission within southeastern Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[lxvi] ISW does not assess that this infiltration constitutes a confirmed change in control of terrain at this time.

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka toward Ivanivka on September 22 and 23.[lxvii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on September 23 that Russian forces in this direction continue to infiltrate Ukrainian positions in groups of two to three infantrymen, taking advantage of poor weather conditions.[lxviii] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are most active in the morning and day and usually do not conduct night assaults, while Russian drones and artillery operate at all hours. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs with Molniya loitering munitions and reconnaissance drones as mothership drones to extend the range of first-person view (FPV) drones to 20-25 kilometers behind the frontline.

Russian milbloggers claimed on September 23 that Russian forces conducted an unguided glide bomb strike against a bridge over the Solone River in Novopavlivka, likely to set conditions for future ground assaults.[lxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kalynivske (south of Velykomykhailivka).[lxx]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne and Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Novoselivka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Shevchenko, Sosnivka, Ternove, Vorone, Komyshuvakha, and Novomykolaivka; and south of Velykomykhailivka near Berezove on September 22 and 23.[lxxi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novoivanivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Poltavka, Novoivanivka, and Novohryhorivka on September 22 and 23.[lxxiii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook territory and advanced south of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) to the Stepnohirsk Children’s Music School.[lxxiv]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske on September 22 and 23.[lxxv]

Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on September 23 that Russian forces launched 15 glide bombs within 20 minutes against Zaporizhzhia City on the night of September 22 to 23.[lxxvi] Fedorov reported that Ukrainian air defense downed six glide bombs and that nine glide bombs struck unspecified locations in Zaporizhzhia City.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported that Russian forces occasionally conduct high-attrition assault and reconnaissance missions in the area and replenish personnel losses with mercenaries from Africa or migrant workers who are financially motivated by large military contract payouts.[lxxvii] The spokesperson stated that one of every twenty Russian soldiers survives service in the Orikhiv direction and that the Russian military command lies to their subordinates about Russian advances in this direction in order to convince Russian personnel to conduct assaults.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv, Prymorske, Lukyanivske, Hryhorivka (both west of Orikhiv), Balabyne, and Mahdalynivka (both northwest of Orikhiv).[lxxviii] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions north of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[lxxix]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in Kherson Oblast on September 23.

Geolocated footage published on September 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian battalion command post in occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast.[lxxx]

Satellite imagery taken on September 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian 40th Separate Command and Measuring Complex near occupied Vityne, Crimea.[lxxxi] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on September 22 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian military targets in occupied Crimea, including the Russian 31st Air Defense Division command post near occupied Vityne and a mobile radar installation near occupied Volochaivka, destroyed a Russian radar system, and damaged a Pantsir-S1 air defense system near occupied Donske( just northeast of Simferopol).

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and 115 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and decoy drones, of which approximately 60 were Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[lxxxii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed or suppressed 103 drones, and that three missiles and 12 drones struck six locations, and that debris fell in eight unspecified locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[lxxxiii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.