Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 20, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on September 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Kremlin insider statements continue to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his strategy that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition against Ukraine and the West and that the West has thus far failed to convince Putin to reevaluate his strategy. Bloomberg reported on September 20 that undisclosed people close to the Kremlin stated that Putin has concluded that military escalation is the best way for Russia to force Ukraine into peace negotiations on Putin's terms.[1] The sources stated that Putin assesses that US President Donald Trump is unlikely to "do much" to bolster Ukraine's defense and that the US-Russian talks in Alaska on August 15, 2025, convinced Putin that Trump has no interest in intervening in the war in Ukraine. The sources stated that Putin intends to remain engaged in any ongoing bilateral dialogue with the United States but will continue to act in what he perceives to be Russia's interest. The sources stated that Putin intends to continue targeting Ukraine's energy network and other critical infrastructure. Putin's long-standing theory of victory posits that Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine by indefinitely maintaining the theater-wide initiative and outlasting Western military support for Ukraine.[2] The sources' statements indicate that recent US efforts to mediate a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine have not impacted Putin's calculus and that Putin remains committed to defeating Ukraine militarily, as ISW has continued to assess. Putin's recent actions — including the decision to redeploy more forces to Donetsk Oblast and recent Russian incursions into the airspace of NATO member states — further underscore his commitment to both continued military aggression against Ukraine and future military aggression against NATO member states.[3]

Putin may have allowed these Kremlin sources to share his logic with Bloomberg and likely seeks to leverage Bloomberg's article to exploit friction between European and US officials, to feed into the wider Russian narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, and to create fear in Ukrainian society ahead of Winter 2025-2026. The Kremlin maintains a tight grip on the Russian information space and holds significant influence over most Russian officials and insiders, which suggests that Putin may have orchestrated or at least approved of sources in the Kremlin leaking information to a Western publication.[4] The Kremlin sources' emphasis on the Trump Administration's reported failure to influence Putin's decision making is likely an attempt to seize on friction between US and European officials and to sow further discord between Western allies. The Kremlin has long sought to divide Ukraine's US and European supporters in order to weaken cohesive Western support for Ukraine and has intensified this campaign since Trump's inauguration in January 2025.[5]

Putin likely also intends for this article to feed into the Kremlin's long-running narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that Putin can bring about a Russian victory in Ukraine seemingly by will alone. The Kremlin sources' emphasis on Putin's commitment to a military victory in Ukraine ignores the Russian military's systemic shortcomings and limitations that have thus far denied Putin's ability to achieve Russia’s strategic objectives of politically controlling all of Ukraine, or decisively winning on the battlefield. ISW has repeatedly observed instances of Putin tasking the Russian military with goals far beyond its capabilities, and it is unclear whether Putin is receiving inaccurate information about Russian military capabilities or whether Putin is choosing to ignore Russia's limitations and push on with grinding offensives to further Russian narratives about Russia’s ability to wage war indefinitely, no matter the costs.[6] ISW continues to assess that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is not inevitable, however, and that Ukraine, the United States, and European states maintain agency over the outcome of the war in Ukraine.[7]

Putin likely also intends for this article to generate panic in Ukraine about Russia's long-range strike campaign ahead of Winter 2025-2026. The Kremlin sources' reference to continued Russian strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure is almost certainly intended to invoke the memory of Russia's Fall 2022 and Winter 2022-2023 strike campaign against Ukraine's energy grid and the subsequent power outages that affected Ukraine, particularly civilians.[8] The Kremlin is likely resurfacing this memory in order to create fear amongst Ukrainians and to provoke Ukrainians into demanding that the Ukrainian government negotiate a settlement to the war before Winter 2025-2026. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned in August 2025 that Russia was increasingly targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in order to undermine Ukraine's preparations for the winter heating season.[9] Putin is likely hoping to seize on the uncertainty that recent large-scale long-range Russian strikes have caused in Ukraine in order to exacerbate domestic discontent and increase pressure on the Ukrainian government to end the war.

Russian forces conducted one of the largest drone and missile strikes against Ukraine in recent weeks on the night of September 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 8 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai; 32 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; and 579 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 2 Iskander-M/KN-32 ballistic missiles and 29 Kh-101 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 552 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that an unspecified number of ballistic and cruise missiles and 23 drones struck ten locations and that drone fragments fell in ten locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces conducted a simultaneous strike on targets with large numbers of missiles and drones and that Ukrainian forces used tactical aviation, including F-16s, to intercept the cruise missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces targeted Dnipro City and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast broadly and locations in Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhia, Poltavka, Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts.[11] Zelensky stated that Russian forces directly struck a high-rise residential building in Dnipro City with a missile equipped with cluster munitions.[12] Footage reportedly shows a Kh-101 cruise missile striking the residential building in Dnipro City, underscoring the need to further bolster Ukraine's air defense umbrella.[13] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported that the strike killed one and injured 13 civilians.[14] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported that Russian strikes in Khmelnytskyi Oblast killed one and injured three civilians.[15] Other Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces damaged civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[16]

Russia is intensifying its efforts to test NATO's defensive capabilities and resolve by violating NATO members’ safety zones in the air domain. Polish Border Guards reported on September 19 that two Russian fighter jets performed a low altitude pass over the Polish Lotos Petrobaltic oil and gas drilling platform in the Baltic Sea in direct violation of the platform's safety zone.[17] The Polish state-owned energy company Orlen Petrobaltic owns and operates the Petrobaltic platform and is Poland's only offshore oil platform.[18] Polish Border Guard Spokesperson Katerzyna Przybysz stated, and open-source naval vessel tracking sites indicate, that the Petrobaltic drilling platform is in Poland's exclusive economic zone.[19] It remains unclear whether the Russian jet incursion near the Petrobaltic platform occurred during the September 19 sortie in which three Russian MiG-31 interceptor jets violated Estonia's airspace or if this was a separate incident.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 19 that Russian aircraft did not violate Estonian airspace and that the three Russian jets completed a "scheduled flight" from Karelia airfield to an unspecified airfield in Kaliningrad Oblast in accordance with international law.[21] ISW continues to assess that Russia is deliberately testing the limits of NATO's capabilities with various air incursions in an effort to gather data on the alliance's response measures and political will that Russia may then apply to potential conflicts against NATO.[22]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced the start of Ukraine’s managed weapons exports program. Zelensky announced on September 19 that Ukraine will begin financing its defense industrial base (DIB) funding deficit partly through the managed export of certain Ukrainian weapons.[23] Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian DIB produces surpluses of certain modern weapons systems, such as naval drones and anti-tank weapons, and that Ukraine intends to export these surpluses in order to finance the production of additional drones for Ukrainian forces. Zelensky noted that supplying Ukrainian forces fighting against Russia’s invasion and replenishing domestic weapons stockpiles remain the Ukrainian DIB’s top priorities. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will present three export platforms by October 4: a platform for export and economic interaction with the United States, a second platform for export and interaction with Ukraine’s European partners, and a third platform for Ukraine’s other international partners.

Russian commanders continue to order Russian forces to execute Ukrainian civilians and commit acts of perfidy as part of an ongoing trend of Russian commanders systematizing deliberate war crimes among Russian units. Russian servicemembers from the Russian 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) stated on September 17 that their commanding officer ordered them to dress in civilian clothes (an act of perfidy) and execute any military-age male under 45 that Russian forces encountered in Kupyansk.[24] ISW observed geolocated footage of Russian forces in the Lyman direction wearing civilian clothing on September 16, among other reports of Russian forces committing acts of perfidy.[25] Russian soldiers have notably committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in now-liberated areas of Ukraine and occupied Ukraine, including executions of civilians.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin insider statements continue to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his strategy that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition against Ukraine and the West and that the West has thus far failed to convince Putin to reevaluate his strategy.
• Putin may have allowed these Kremlin sources to share his logic with Bloomberg and likely seeks to leverage Bloomberg's article to exploit friction between European and US officials, to feed into the wider Russian narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, and to create fear in Ukrainian society ahead of Winter 2025-2026.
• Russian forces conducted one of the largest drone and missile strikes against Ukraine in recent weeks on the night of September 19 to 20.
• Russia is intensifying its efforts to test NATO's defensive capabilities and resolve by violating NATO members’ safety zones in the air domain.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced the start of Ukraine’s managed weapons exports program.
• Russian commanders continue to order Russian forces to execute Ukrainian civilians and commit acts of perfidy as part of an ongoing trend of Russian commanders systematizing deliberate war crimes among Russian units.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Lyman, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 20 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), conducted a drone strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov, Saratov Oblast.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the refinery processes over seven million tons of oil annually, which is roughly 2.54 percent of Russia’s total oil processing output. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces also struck Novokuibyshevsk Oil Refinery in Novokuibyshevsk, Samara Oblast, which refines over 8.8 million tons of oil annually. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) struck the Samara Linear Production and Dispatching Station (LPDS) in Prosvet, Samara Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the Samara LPDS facility combines high- and low-sulfur oil from various oil fields to create the Urals crude oil blend and that Urals crude oil accounts for up to 50 percent of Russia’s total exports.[28] Geolocated footage published on September 20 shows Ukrainian drone operators striking the Novokuibyshevsk and Saratov oil refineries.[29] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev acknowledged on September 20 that drones struck fuel and energy facilities in Samara Oblast.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[31]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on September 19 and 20.[32] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, and Varachyne (north of Sumy City).[33]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 20 that North Korean forces operating in the Gornal-Guyevo border area in Kursk Oblast closed the border without notifying Russian forces and subsequently fired on a Russian transport vehicle along an unspecified area of the international border.[34] The milblogger also claimed that elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment reportedly operating in Oleksiivka are complaining about poor operational planning and receiving vague orders from the Russian military command.[35]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[36] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka and Oleksiivka.[37]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the Vovchansk Oil Extraction Plant in western Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[38]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City).[39]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City in Vovchansk, including on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River, and near Tykhe and Synelnykove and toward Bochkove on September 19 and 20.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Travyanske Reservoir north of Kharkiv City.[41]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on September 20 that Russian forces are using fiber-optic drones and other strike drones to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), which complicates Ukrainian rotations, and that the challenges involved in rotating positions have significantly changed over the last year.[42] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces in this direction include foreign servicemembers from the People's Republic of China (PRC), Belarus, and Kenya.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Velykyi Prokhody (north of Kharkiv City).[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Odradne and north of Bolohivka (both east of Velykyi Burluk).[44]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and Milove and toward Khatnie and Bolohivka and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on September 19 and 20.[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the Kupyansk-Pivdennyi railway station (central Kupyansk) and advanced near Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk) and Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[46] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into the Yuvileynyi Microraion (southwestern Kupyansk) and interdicted the P-07 Kupyansk-Kharkiv City highway.[47]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka and Krasne Pershe and toward Petro-Ivanivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and toward Kucherivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka, Hlushkivka, and Pishchane on September 19 and 20.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrove.[49]

Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Belskyi refuted claims that Russian forces entered central Kupyansk and stated that Ukrainian drone interdiction prevents Russian forces from transporting heavy equipment across the Oskil River (east of Kupyansk), forcing Russian forces in northern Kupyansk to rely exclusively on first-person view (FPV) drones for support.[50] Belskyi reported that Russian forces are unable to advance westward from Petropavlivka and that there are few Russian units operating there.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 20 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Hrekivka (southeast of Borova) is a contested “gray zone.”[51]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 19 and 20.[52]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Hrekivka.[53]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within eastern Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[54]

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Serebryanske forest area north of Dronivka (southeast of Lyman) and that Novomykhailivka (north of Lyman) is a contested ”gray zone.”[55] The milblogger partially refuted Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims that Russian forces seized the entire Serebryanske forest area on September 19 and claimed that fighting continues in the western outskirts of the forest near Yampil.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Derylove, Novoselivka, and Serednie and toward Oleksandrivka, Korovii Yar, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on September 19 and 20.[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.[57]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced to the western outskirts of Siversk.[58] The Russian source claimed that Russian forces are advancing in Serebryanka (north of Siversk), in Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk), and from Pereizne toward Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[59]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, north of Siversk near Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on September 19 and 20.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 20 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing along the railway southwest of Oleksandro-Shultyne (east of Kostyantynivka) and near Katerynivka and Kleban-Byk (both southeast of Kostyantynivka).[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka) but the settlement is becoming a contested "gray zone."[62]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Toretsk, Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on September 19 and 20.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking from Popiv Yar toward Volodymyrivka.[64]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka and Sofiivka.[65] Drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are striking Ukrainian positions in Mykolaivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on September 19 and 20.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapovidne and near Pankivka and Mayak (both east of Dobropillya).[68]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on September 19 that Ukrainian forces have cleared 171 square kilometers of territory where Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units were operating during the Ukrainian forces' ongoing counterattacks in the Dobropillya tactical area.[69] Syrskyi reported that Russian forces have suffered 2,456 casualties, including 1,322 killed in action.

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Russian milbloggers acknowledged on September 19 and 20 that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to the northern outskirts of Novotoretske and west of Boikivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely advanced as Russian milbloggers do not have an incentive to acknowledge false Ukrainian gains.[70]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[71]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Kozatske, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka and Novoukrainka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on September 19 and 20.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in western Pokrovsk and near Boikivka and Novotoretske (both northeast of Pokrovsk).[73]

An officer of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on September 20 that Russian forces continue to leverage armored vehicles to transport infantry point-to-point but are not using armored vehicles to assault Ukrainian positions.[74] The officer noted that Russian forces are expending a significant amount of resources to strike Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction. The officer noted that Russian forces are well-equipped in this direction and that Russian soldiers are using anti-thermal imaging cloaks to advance. The officer reported that Russian forces have begun deploying up to two poorly equipped units to distract Ukrainian forces from another well-equipped Russian unit attempting to advance elsewhere.

A Ukrainian open-source analyst reported on September 19 that Ukrainian drone operators struck several facilities used by the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies in occupied Ukrainsk (approximately 32 kilometers southeast of Pokrovsk).[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed clams: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[76]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself, southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Tovste, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on September 19 and 20.[77]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 20 shows Russian servicemembers raising flags in multiple locations in Berezove (south of Velykomykhailivka), indicating that Russian forces likely seized Berezove.[78] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing Berezove.[79]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 500 meters near Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka) and toward Orestopil (immediately south of Velykomykhailivka).[80]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and Piddubne, east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Sichneve, southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha and Maliivka, and south of Velykomykhailivka near Berezove and Kalynivske on September 19 and 20.[81]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novoivanivka and Olhivske and toward Novovasylivske and Novomykhailivka on September 19 and 20.[82]

Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on September 19 that Russian forces struck a civilian vehicle near Hulyaipole with a drone, killing two civilians.[83]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 35th Radiological, Chemical and Biological Protection Regiment (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Chervone (east of Hulyaipole).[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, Novoandriivka, and Stepnohirsk, and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on September 19 and 20.[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Orikhiv.[86]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Kherson direction, including near the Antonivskyi railway and roadway bridges (east of Kherson City), on September 19 and 20.[87]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on September 20 that Russian forces are attacking near the Antonivskyi bridges because they are near the Dnipro River's narrowest point.[88] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces aim to seize positions near the bridges in order to position drone launch sites in the area. Voloshyn noted that Russian forces are constantly trying to conduct landing missions on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.