Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2025

September 2, 2025, 5:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on September 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin leveraged a meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to pretend to offer marginal concessions to US demands while continuing to refuse to meet actual US demands and while blaming Europe and the United States for provoking Russian aggression. Putin claimed to Fico in Beijing on September 2 that Russia has never opposed Ukraine joining the European Union, although Russia remains opposed to Ukraine joining NATO.[i] Putin reiterated his claim that the Western-backed "coup” in Ukraine in 2014 (referring to Ukraine’s democratically-organized Revolution of Dignity) provoked Russia to invade Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 and denied that Russia has any future plans to attack another European country. Putin suggested that Russia could be open to operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) with the United States and Ukraine in the future if "favorable circumstances" arise. Putin is likely presenting these very limited and tangential concessions in order to feign interest in peace negotiations to the Trump Administration, roughly two weeks after US President Donald Trump reiterated on August 21 his desire for direct and serious peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.[ii]

Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, who was present at the Alaska Summit, claimed on September 2 that the United States and Russia have planned another round of consultations and that many issues remained unresolved.[iii] Ushakov claimed that the ongoing US-Russian dialogue is primarily related to the “Ukrainian conflict” and that it is too early to discuss bilateral relations. Ushakov denied on September 1 that the United States and Russia agreed on a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian meeting.[iv] Ushakov’s statements reflect the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to organize a bilateral meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and reject US President Donald Trump’s August 18 statements that officials were planning a bilateral meeting between Zelensky and Putin with a subsequent meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin.[v]

Russia continues to feel the economic impacts of secondary sanctions against Russian oil-and-gas importers and of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries. Bloomberg reported on September 2 that sources who received offers from Russian crude oil exporters stated that Russian exporters are offering Urals crude to Indian importers at a discount of $3 to $4 per barrel, compared to Brent, on a delivered basis for cargo shipments in late September to October 2025.[vi] Bloomberg reported that sources stated that Russian exporters were offering Indian importers a discount of around $2.50 a barrel during the week of August 24 to 30 and a discount of $1 in July 2025. Russia is likely offering Indian importers discounted crude oil to ensure that India continues to purchase crude from Russia despite Western secondary sanctions against India, including a 50 percent US tariff against Indian exports to the United States.[vii] Russia is currently selling crude oil below market price, which will decrease the incoming flow of foreign funds into the Russian economy and deplete Russia's primary source of wealth unless Russia significantly increases its export of crude oil.

Russia and occupied Ukraine are also facing acute gasoline shortages due to Ukrainian strikes.[viii] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration claimed on September 2 that some gas stations in occupied Kherson Oblast are experiencing shortages of AI-92 and AI-95 (premium) gasoline and that gasoline prices are increasing due to shortages.[ix] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Oleksiy Kharchenko reported that occupied Luhansk Oblast is also experiencing shortages of AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline and that the Luhansk Oblast occupation administration claimed that the shortage is due to a reduction in gasoline supply and a simultaneous increase in demand.[x] Kurilsky Municipal Okrug Head Konstantin Istomin reported on August 25 that Russian authorities suspended the sale of A-92 gasoline to residents in the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin Oblast.[xi] The Kremlin extended on August 14 a temporary ban on processed gasoline exports for all exporters through September 2025 and for non-producers through October 2025, a move that seeks to blunt a domestic price surge for gasoline due to Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries.[xii]

North Korea is reportedly planning to send about 6,000 more troops to Russia, likely to serve in supporting roles in the Russian rear. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on September 2 that South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) assessed to the South Korean Parliamentary Intelligence Committee that North Korea is planning to send roughly 6,000 additional soldiers to Russia and that roughly 1,000 North Korean military engineers have already arrived in Russia in the "rear front as reserve forces."[xiii] Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced on June 16 that North Korea would send 6,000 sappers and military engineers to help with reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast.[xiv] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on August 12 that North Korea had agreed to send additional troops to Russia to support reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast.[xv] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 31 that North Korean sappers will soon operate in the Sudzha and Guyevo areas in Kursk Oblast and that Russian commanders received orders to prepare subordinates for the upcoming North Korean deployments to prevent friendly fire incidents or other "misunderstandings."[xvi] The milblogger assessed that North Korean forces are unlikely to conduct combat operations against Ukraine and will likely conduct tasks in the rear, including serving as cooks and cleaners, to free up other Russian personnel for infantry assaults. ISW continues to assess that it is unclear whether North Korean troops will deploy to Ukrainian territory, which would mark a significant inflection, but that North Korean troops operating in Russian border areas would still allow more Russian forces to be deployed to the battlefield in Ukraine.[xvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin leveraged a meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to pretend to offer marginal concessions to US demands while continuing to refuse to meet actual US demands and while blaming Europe and the United States for provoking Russian aggression.
• Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future.
• Russia continues to feel the economic impacts of secondary sanctions against Russian oil-and-gas importers and of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries.
• North Korea is reportedly planning to send about 6,000 more troops to Russia, likely to serve in supporting roles in the Russian rear.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Lyman and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and Yunakivka and in unspecified areas of Sumy and Kursk oblasts on September 1 and 2.[xviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Andriivka.[xix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Pitersk Detachment (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Sumy direction.[xx] Additional drone operators of the 106th VDV Division and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly struck Ukrainian forces near Marine (northeast of Sumy City) on August 29.[xxi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to the Vovcha River in northwestern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are advancing near Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City).[xxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 1 that Russian forces advanced east of Vovchansk and in the Synelnykove forest area (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxiv]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on September 1 and 2.[xxv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Vovchansk and near Synelnykove.[xxvi]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on September 2 that drone usage is intense in the area and that Russian forces attack in small infantry groups of three to five soldiers using motorcycles.[xxvii] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces occasionally try to enter the Ukrainian rear but that Ukrainian drones are defending against Russian infiltration missions. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are constantly fielding improved unmanned systems and that Russian forces continue unsuccessful attempts to cross the Vovcha River.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 2.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kuypansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to central Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk) and likely seized the settlement.[xxviii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Sobolivka (west of Kuypansk) and advanced to the P-79 Kupyansk-Chuhuiv highway (west of Kupyansk).[xxix] Russian sources issued contradictory claims about the seizure of Myrove, in which some sources claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Myrove, while other Russian milbloggers claimed that Myrove remains a contested "gray" zone.[xxx]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, north of Kupyansk near Radkivka and toward Kutkivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on September 1 and 2.[xxxi]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on September 2 that Russian forces are attacking one soldier at a time and rarely use motorcycles or buggies.[xxxii] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are increasingly relying on unmanned ground systems and are constantly striking Ukrainian logistical routes. The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian forces are detecting and disabling Russian fiber-optic drones loitering along logistics routes.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Druzhelyubivka and reached Olhivka (both southeast of Borova).[xxxiii] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing from Hlushchenkove toward Maliivka and Andriivka (all southeast of Borova).[xxxiv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Zarichne (east of Lyman).[xxxv]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing in the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[xxxvi]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie and toward Shandryholove, north of Lyman near Karpivka and Kolodyazi, east of Lyman near Zarichne, and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on September 1 and 2.[xxxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[xxxviii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on September 2 that Russian attacks had recently intensified and that Russian forces are leveraging infiltration tactics and attacking in teams of two to four soldiers.[xxxix] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are changing tactics and attacking from various sides on motorcycles to penetrate deeper into Ukraine's defenses. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are using various drones to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and noted that Russian drone operators receive better training than Russian infantrymen.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Shrama Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zarichne, and drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[xl]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Note: ISW has reorganized its axes in Donetsk Oblast to better analyze and assess the Russian military command's tactical and operational objectives east and west of Ukraine's fortress belt. ISW combined the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions into the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka Tactical Area, given that the previously separate Chasiv Yar and Toretsk axes have now converged into a single tactical area around Kostyantynivka. ISW also created a separate Dobropillya Tactical Area, given that the Dobropillya salient is supporting operations beyond Pokrovsk in the fortress belt area of operations. ISW will continue refining its operational-tactical framework for the fortress belt as the situation evolves.

Russian forces continued assaults in the Siversk direction on September 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 2 that Russian forces seized Fedorivka (southwest of Siversk).[xli] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced in eastern Fedorivka and are attacking in Pereizne (just northeast of Fedorivka).[xlii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and toward Serebryanka and Dronivka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on September 1 and 2.[xliii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in western Serebryanka.[xliv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[xlv]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Mykolaivka and toward Minkivka and Pryvillya; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne, Toretsk, and Nelipivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk and Shcherbynivka; south of Druzhkivka near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Yablunivka and Volodymyrivka on September 1 and 2.[xlvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Predtechyne, Nelipivka, and Oleksandro-Shulytne.[xlvii]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction posted footage on September 1 of Russian forces conducting an unsuccessful reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of five infantry fighting vehicles toward the outskirts of Katerynivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[xlviii] Ukrainian forces destroyed two of the vehicles with mines and drone strikes. Three of the vehicles reached the outskirts of the settlement and dismounted infantry, after which Ukrainian strikes destroyed the remaining vehicles and infantry.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk direction (northeast of Kostyantynivka) reported that Russian forces continue small infantry assaults in Chasiv Yar (northwest of Kostyantynivka) but are struggling to advance due to the Siversky-Donets Donbas canal, which Russian forces can only cross on equipment in limited areas.[xlix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting guided glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka, particularly targeting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and drone operator positions.[l]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kleban-Byk.[li] Elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in Poltavka.[lii] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka directions.[liii] Drone operators of the Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Chasiv Yar.[liv] Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Vilne and southeast of Dobropillya near Volodymyrivka, Shakhove, Mayak, and Zapovidne on September 1 and 2.[lvi]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage from the Ukrainian General Staff published on September 2 shows Ukrainian forces raising a flag in western Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently liberated the settlement.[lvii] Select Russian milbloggers denied that Ukrainian forces seized Udachne, with one milblogger claiming that Russian reconnaissance elements are operating in the settlement and another claiming that Russian forces occupy over 90 percent of the settlement.[lviii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of and within Pokrovsk, northwest of Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk), and east and north of Leontovychi (southwest of Pokrovsk).[lix] A Russian milblogger claimed that small Russian groups are operating in southern Pokrovsk.[lx]

Russian forces attacked within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad and toward Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Troyanda, Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne on September 1 and 2.[lxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoekonomichne.[lxii] Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in unspecified areas west of Pokrovsk.[lxiii] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Novoekonomichne is a contested “gray zone.”[lxiv]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Novopavlivka direction on September 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed Claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces retook Dachne (south of Novopavlivka), although another Russian milblogger claimed that only Russian reconnaissance elements are operating in the settlement.[lxv]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka, Zelenyi Hai, and Tovste on September 1 and 2.[lxvi]

Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on September 2 that Russian forces are attacking in the Dnipropetrovsk direction (likely referring to the Novopavlivka or Velykomykhailivka areas), but that Russian forces have yet to consolidate gains in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[lxvii] Pushilin claimed on September 2 that Russian forces are improving their positions in easternmost Dnipropetrovsk Oblast after advancing in western Donetsk Oblast and that Russian forces are creating a "security zone" in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[lxviii]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed Claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west and northwest of Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[lxix]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad, Novoselivka, Myrne, and Perebudova; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone, Maliivka, Shevchenko, and Komyshuvakha on September 1 and 2.[lxx]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka on September 2 but did not advance.[lxxi]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka, west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk, and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on September 1 and 2.[lxxii]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on September 2 that the outskirts of Prymorske are a contested "gray zone" and neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces can establish defensible positions in the area.[lxxiii] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using a narrow land strip to transport supplies to Prymorske from Plavni or are delivering supplies by drone.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxiv] Drone operators of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near the Orikhiv-Novodanylivka area.[lxxv]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near Antonivka, on September 1 and 2 but did not advance.[lxxvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 1 and 2 and during the day on September 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 150 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, on the night of September 1 to 2.[lxxvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 120 drones and that 30 drones struck nine locations, and debris fell in five locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kyiv City, including a kindergarten and the city center, and Sumy City.[lxxviii] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi cited the eRadar monitoring service and reported that Ukrainian forces detected one Russian Shahed-type drone entering Ukrainian airspace from airspace over Belarus.[lxxix] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces conducted a separate strike later during the day of September 2 and launched 53 Shahed and decoy drones from the northern border between Ukraine and Russia.[lxxx] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 48 drones from the second strike as of 1600 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the majority of the second strike targeted Kyiv City and that Ukrainian forces continue to detect drones in the airspace over Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko met with People's Republic of China (PRC) Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary of the Secretariat Cai Qi on September 2 in Beijing.[lxxxi]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.