Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2026

Assessment as of: 10:00 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

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Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction demonstrates Ukraine’s recent progress in restoring elements of tactical maneuver on the battlefield, enabled in part by Ukraine’s shaping operations and intermediate-range strike campaign that degrades Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi stated on September 17 that a Ukrainian counteroffensive against the Russian salient north of Lyman — Operation Vivaldi — thwarted Russia’s plan to encircle the Fortress Belt from the north through Lyman and Svyatohirsk and the south through Dobropillya.[1] Biletskyi stated that Russian forces intended northern and southern pincers to converge in Barvinkove, Kharkiv Oblast, thereby seizing the whole of Donetsk Oblast. Biletskyi stated that Ukrainian forces operationally defeated the Russian northern pincer in the Lyman direction and that the Vivaldi Operation continues.

The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps reported on September 17 that Ukraine’s systematic intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast has degraded Russian fuel supplies to the frontline and strained Russia’s ability to use drones and EW to protect against Ukrainian drones.[2] EW systems have significant power-consumption requirements, and Russian forces rely on diesel-powered generators to power EW systems to counter Ukrainian drones. Ukraine’s campaign targeting Russian logistics and energy supplies directly supported the suppression of Russian EW systems, aiding Ukrainian efforts to achieve tactical drone overmatch in support of Ukrainian mechanized advances in the Lyman direction.

Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise by leveraging rigorous operational security (OPSEC) and counter-drone operations to degrade Russian forces’ operational awareness. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Deputy Commander Major Maksym Zhorin stated on September 16 that Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction was successful due to strict adherence to informational silence and a lack of reporting on the ongoing counteroffensive, which misled Russian military leadership and facilitated Ukrainian advances. Zhorin stated that Ukrainian forces managed to keep their advances secret thanks in part to a “Protective Drone” system, which consists of various EW systems and helped Ukrainian forces neutralize around 20,000 Russian drones.[3] Ukrainian forces previously leveraged OPSEC to achieve operational surprise during Ukraine’s Spring 2026 Oleksandrivka Counteroffensive, when Ukrainian forces intentionally conducted flag-raising missions at safe distances to conceal the true extent of Ukrainian positions.[4] Ukrainian forces have notably achieved operational surprise during two recent counteroffensives by using rigorous OPSEC. The pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military likely further degrades Russian operational awareness and leads to tactical and operational mistakes due to inaccurate assessments of the real battlefield situation.[5]

Russian forces are transferring armor and drone support assets to the Dobropillya direction for future mechanized assaults in Fall 2026. Ukraine’s 1st Corps (Azov National Guard) Commander Brigadier General Denys Prokopenko stated on September 11 that the Russian 51st and 8th Combined Arms Armies (CAAs, both Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 41st CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) are preparing for future mechanized assaults in the Dobropillya direction in the fall, seeking to exploit seasonal weather changes that are more conducive to mechanized assaults.[6] Prokopenko stated that roughly 1,200 drone crews from Russia’s elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems — about one-third of Rubikon’s total force — are operating in the Dobropillya direction, indicating that Russian forces likely intend to use drones to support battlefield air interdiction to shape the battlefield as well as enable Russian mechanized attacks.[7] Prokopenko added that Russian forces will likely begin reinforcing their existing assault units, which consist roughly of 200 infantry personnel, with mechanized columns of roughly 50 armored vehicles to divert the attention of Ukrainian forces and raise the probability of a successful breakthrough. Prokopenko assessed that the Russian offensive campaign would culminate in September 2026 and that Russian forces would begin to shift their tactics towards attempting mechanized breakthroughs by October 2026, with Russian forces attempting to seize at least one Fortress Belt settlement by the end of their fall campaign to create a bridgehead for further offensives.

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have been experimenting with reintroducing limited elements of mechanized maneuver at the tactical level to break out of positional warfare and restore maneuver on the battlefield, with Ukrainian efforts being significantly more effective so far.[8] Russia’s accumulation of armored assets in the Dobropillya direction indicates that the Russian military command may intend to expand the role of mechanized assaults amid fall weather in an attempt to achieve a breakthrough in the Dobropillya direction and envelop the Fortress Belt from the south.[9]

Ukrainian forces are intensifying their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets, including by conducting a suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in Rostov Oblast. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on September 17 that it struck two Russian An-26 and one An-12 military transport aircraft and three helicopters at the Rostov-Central Airfield in Rostov Oblast (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline).[10] Geolocated footage published on September 16 shows a large explosion at the Rostov Airbase in Rostov Oblast after the Ukrainian strike.[11] Ukrainian forces have been increasingly striking Russian military assets in Rostov Oblast since at least June 2026, including airfields, air bases, and air defense systems, in an effort to degrade Russian strike and air defense capabilities.[12]

Russia continues to rely on North Korea to wage war against Ukraine and alleviate Russian labor shortages. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 17 that North Korea sent between 30,000 and 50,000 soldiers to Russia to receive military training and work with Russian drone operators.[13] Zelensky stated that North Korea decided not to deploy North Korean soldiers to Ukraine in order to avoid taking on a large number of casualties comparable to what North Korean soldiers suffered during Ukraine’s operations in Kursk.[14] Zelensky stated on August 8, 2026, that Russia was preparing to receive as many as 50,000 North Korean troops but did not specify where or when these troops would deploy.[15] The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) — an international coalition formed to monitor and report on violations and evasions of United Nations sanctions against North Korea — reported on September 16 that between 15,000 and 30,000 North Koreans worked at drone factories in Russia, including at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan, as of the end of 2025.[16] The MSMT reported that the Russian government has created a special student visa scheme that camouflages North Korean workers as students. ISW has previously reported on Russia’s efforts to grant fake student visas to North Koreans or otherwise relax Russian visa requirements in an effort to alleviate Russian labor shortages.[17]

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda publicly acknowledged on September 16 that Russia may be deliberately allowing Russian drones to deviate from their intended course and enter NATO airspace in order to punish countries supporting Ukraine. Nauseda stated on September 16 that recent drone incursions into European airspace indicate that Russia is engaging in increasingly aggressive behavior, following his recent statement that a Russian drone entered Lithuanian airspace on the night of September 14 to 15.[18] Nauseda stated that Russia may be deliberately allowing its drones to “deviate” from their intended course and enter the airspace of the Baltic states. Nauseda stated that Russia benefits from the ambiguity of its actions against Europe, regardless of whether Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional, as this ambiguity keeps Baltic societies “in suspense.” Nauseda’s statement echoes Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s August 18 statement that Russia deliberately launches some of its drones into Moldovan and NATO airspace.[19] ISW continues to assess that such drone incursions are part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO, including through Russian false flag provocations, sabotage, EW interference, and overflights.[20]

The US House of Representatives passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on September 16, which authorizes the US to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on the five largest importers of Russian oil and natural gas.[21] US President Donald Trump will need to sign the bill before it comes into force.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction demonstrates Ukraine’s recent progress in restoring elements of tactical maneuver on the battlefield, enabled in part by Ukraine’s shaping operations and intermediate-range strike campaign that degrades Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.
• Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise by leveraging rigorous operational security (OPSEC) and counter-drone operations to degrade Russian forces’ operational awareness.
• Russian forces are transferring armor and drone support assets to the Dobropillya direction for future mechanized assaults in Fall 2026.
• Ukrainian forces are intensifying their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets, including by conducting a suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in Rostov Oblast.
• Russia continues to rely on North Korea to wage war against Ukraine and alleviate Russian labor shortages.
• Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda publicly acknowledged on September 16 that Russia may be deliberately allowing Russian drones to deviate from their intended course and enter NATO airspace in order to punish countries supporting Ukraine.
• The US House of Representatives passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on September 16, which authorizes the US to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on the five largest importers of Russian oil and natural gas.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.
• Russia launched 157 drones, 10 Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions, and an unspecified number of missiles at Ukraine overnight.

ISW has reorganized its axes in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts to better reflect the Russian campaign to seize Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt. ISW will analyze the Russian campaign in Donetsk Oblast in more detail in a forthcoming special edition.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazenyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in Yaroslavl Oblast on the night of September 16 to 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Slavneft-Yanos Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City (roughly 700 kilometers from the international border) overnight, causing a fire at the AVT-3 primary refining unit.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Slavneft-Yanos Oil Refinery is one of the largest oil refineries in Russia, with an annual capacity of about 15 million tons of oil. Geolocated images published on September 17 show fires and plumes of smoke at the refinery and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows multiple heat anomalies at the refinery.[23] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evraev acknowledged on September 17 the Ukrainian strike against the refinery.[24]

See topline text for additional reports on Ukrainian operations in Russia.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in northern Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces hold positions in northwestern Zapsillya (northeast of Sumy City) — in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions — according to geolocated footage published on September 14.[25]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 17 that Ukrainian forces struck two S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems in Vygonychiv Raion, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 83 kilometers from the international border).[26] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian armored vehicle near Bondarev, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 10 kilometers from the international border), according to geolocated footage published on September 17.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 16 and 17 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kharkiv City.[28] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Mala Vovcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[29] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) credited elements of the Russian 126th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of the settlement.[30]

Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Kharkiv Oblast. Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on September 17 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck and killed a civilian near a public transport stop near Kotivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[31] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of FPV drones to strike mainly civilian targets in the Ukrainian near rear is indicative of a pervasive culture within the Russian military that seeks to both weaponize and institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war.[32]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a mechanized assault northeast of Velykyi Burluk. A source reporting on the Russian Northern GoF claimed on September 17 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilkhuvatka using armored vehicles.[33] The sources claimed that Vasylivka, Blahodatne, and Chorne (all northwest of Vilkhuvatka) are contested gray zone, with both Ukrainian and Russian forces operating in the settlements.

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk), according to geolocated footage published on September 16.[34] Russian sources subsequently posted footage on September 17 purportedly taken in the area east of Zapadne to allege Russian control over the area despite evidence to the contrary.[35] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on September 17 that Russian forces abandoned several positions east of Zapadne and that Ukrainian forces advanced slightly along the P-79 Dvorichna-Kupyansk highway that runs just north and east of Zapadne.[36]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Borova on September 16 and 17 but did not advance.[37] The source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that fighting in the Borova direction has become highly positional, with deteriorating weather conditions and reduced foliage making it difficult for small infiltration groups to move discreetly.[38]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical warehouse in occupied Luhansk City (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian manpower concentration in Druzhne (roughly 143 kilometers from the frontline) on September 16 or on the night of September 16 to 17.[39]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Lyman itself on September 16 to 17 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[40]

See topline text for more information about ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks in the Lyman tactical effort.

Russian forces may be attempting to intensify strikes against Ukrainian rear logistics hubs to inhibit continued Ukrainian offensive operations north of Lyman. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are increasing glide bomb strikes against Izyum in response to recent Ukrainian advances north of Lyman, conducting around 40 strikes on September 16.[41]

Russian forces conducted five FAB-500 guided glide bombs against Raihorodok (southwest of Lyman along the T-05-14 Lyman-Slovyansk highway), according to geolocated footage published on September 17.[42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk near Kryva Luka, southeast of Slovyansk toward Yurkivka, and southeast of Kramatorsk near Fedorivka on September 16 and 17 but did not advance.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in and southwest of Kostyantynivka on September 17 and 18 but did not make confirmed advances.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 17 that Russian forces advanced north of Mykolaipillya (west of Kostyantynivka).[45]

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger contested official Russian claims of advances around Kostyantynivka.^[46] The milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain an extensive presence in the area between Kostyantynivka and Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and that Russian forces will not be able to conduct an offensive north of Kostyantynivka and towards Virolyubivka (north of Kostyantynivka and east of Chasiv Yar) without consolidating control over Stinky, Chervone, Mykolaivka, and Podilske (all just northeast of Kostyantynivka). The milblogger also refuted Russian claims that Russian forces control parts of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (just northwest of Kostyantynivka), stating that Russian forces are only present in the areas surrounding Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka and have no presence in Druzhkivka. The milblogger also acknowledged that Russian forces do not have a concentrated presence near Raiske, Petrivka, Novohryhorivka, or Novoandriivka (all southwest of Druzhkivka) and that only scattered infiltration groups operating with drone support are present in the area. Russian official sources, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have claimed as early as June 2026 that Russian forces maintain a presence in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, and the Russian MoD has claimed that Russian forces seized several settlements north and northwest of Kostyantynivka, despite ISW observing no evidence to assess that Russian forces have any presence in those areas.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission south of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position west of Hryshyne (south of Dobropillya) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission based on geolocated footage published on September 17.[48]

See toplines for Ukrainian disruption of Russian efforts to envelop the fortress belt through Dobropillya.

Russian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on September 16 and 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone storage, preparation, and launch site near occupied Donetsk City (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline) as well as material and technical warehouses in Kurakhivka (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline) and Nova Maryivka (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline) on September 16 or on the night of September 16 to 17.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on September 17.

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations southeast of Oleksandrivka toward Berezove and Rybne on September 16 and 17 but did not advance.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 16 and 17 but did not make confirmed advances.[51]

The Russian MoD continues to make exaggerated claims of advances in the Hulyaipole direction. The Russian MoD claimed on September 17 that Russian forces seized Rozivka (northwest of Hulyaipole and at least 13 kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian advances).^[52] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 5th Separate Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the claimed seizure of the settlement.[53] The Russian MoD’s and Russian milbloggers’ reporting patterns are consistent with the Kremlin’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to fabricate claims of Russian tactical successes in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing, contrary to available evidence.[54]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations west and south of Orikhiv on September 16 and 17 but did not advance.[55]

Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Zaporizhia Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported on September 17 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a passenger bus in Zaporizhzhia City, injuring five civilians.[56]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian electrical substation in occupied Melitopol (roughly 64 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 17.[57]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 17.

Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Kherson Oblast. Kherson Oblast Military Administration head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on September 17 that Russian forces struck and killed a civilian riding a moped in Inhulets (northeast of Kherson City).[58]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration in occupied Strilkove (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline) on September 16 or overnight on September 16 to 17.[59]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[60]

Russian forces launched a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Onyx anti-ship missiles from Kursk Oblast; an unspecified number of Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Voronezh oblasts; four Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea; 10 Banderol-type/Dan-T loitering munitions from the airspace over the Sea of Azov; and 157 Shahed-type (including jet-powered) strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[61] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed seven Banderol-type//Dan-T loitering munitions and 124 drones, that an unspecified number of drones and missiles struck 36 locations, and that drone and missile debris fell on five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian, residential, energy, industrial, railway, and logistics infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[62]

Russian forces continue to strike civilian vessels in the Black Sea. Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on September 17 that Russian forces struck a Tanzania-flagged civilian vessel in the Black Sea, killing the captain of the vessel and injuring three crew members.[63]

Ukrainian interceptor drones reportedly intercepted a Russian Shahed-type jet-powered drone overnight on September 16 to 17. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on September 17 that Ukrainian forces successfully intercepted a Russian Shahed-type jet-powered drone using Ukrainian drone interceptors overnight on September 16 to 17 as Ukraine has continued to develop its drone interception capabilities.[64] Jet-powered drones fly significantly faster than non-jet-powered drones, up to 600 kilometers per hour, making it much more difficult for interceptor drones to down as interceptor drones need to be around 25 percent faster than their target.[65]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.