Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on September 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Trump administration reportedly approved its first European-financed foreign military sales to Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative. Reuters reported on September 16 that two familiar sources stated that the Trump administration approved its first weapons package to Ukraine through the PURL initiative, which allows NATO members and partners to finance the supply of American weapons and technology to Ukraine.[i] The sources told Reuters that Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby approved as many as two shipments worth $500 million each that include air defense systems.[ii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 17 that the US package will include Patriot interceptor missiles and HIMARS rockets.[iii]

Senior Russian officials continue to publicly signal the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in negotiations that result in anything less than full Ukrainian capitulation. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on September 17 that territorial exchanges will not "stop" Russia's war in Ukraine, in contradiction to US President Donald Trump's recent statements that peace between Russia and Ukraine will require "land swaps."[iv] Lavrov also asserted that attempts to "entice" Russian President Vladimir Putin with the restoration of US-Russian trade will also not end Russia's war. Lavrov reiterated longstanding Kremlin demands that any future peace settlement eliminate the “root causes” of the war, which Kremlin officials have repeatedly defined as Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers in Ukraine and NATO expansion, among other demands of both Ukraine and NATO.[v] The Kremlin has often used this “root causes” phrase to call for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a Russian puppet government, Ukraine’s commitment to neutrality, and the revocation of NATO’s Open Door Policy.[vi] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on September 17 that Russia remains open to the negotiation process and that Russia's "preferred solution" is a political and diplomatic settlement.[vii] ISW continues to assess that Russia is uninterested in good-faith negotiations that will require Russian concessions and is willing to protract the war in order to achieve its original, maximalist war demands on the battlefield.[viii]

The Kremlin is using the threat of aggression to try to prevent European states from committing troops to postwar Ukraine as part of Western security guarantees. Lavrov claimed that Russia would view any European forces deployed to postwar Ukraine as "legitimate military targets."[ix] Lavrov’s statements follow similar statements from other high-ranking Kremlin officials in recent weeks rejecting post-war Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[x]

Senior Kremlin officials likely with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval likely pushed Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak out of his senior Kremlin position following years of disagreement with Putin's policies about the war in Ukraine. Russian state media outlet RBK reported on September 17 that two familiar sources stated that Kozak “resigned” from his post over the weekend (September 13 to 14) and is considering various offers to move into business.[xi] Russian political scientist Arkady Dubnov similarly reported on September 17 that sources in Moscow stated that Kozak ”voluntarily“ left his position.[xii] Dubnov stated that Kozak was the only participant in the February 21, 2022, Security Council meeting who opposed the launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian journalist Alexey Venediktov confirmed Dubnov's information on September 17.[xiii] Kozak reportedly brokered a deal with Ukraine at the start of the war that would have prevented Ukrainian membership in NATO, but Putin reportedly rejected the deal since Putin also wanted to annex Ukrainian territory.[xiv] The New York Times additionally reported on August 10 that Western and Russian sources indicated that Kozak lost his influence in the Kremlin after Kozak advised Putin in the past few months to immediately stop fighting in Ukraine, start peace negotiations, and reduce the power of Russia’s security services.[xv] Kozak's reported repeated disagreements with Putin suggest that Putin and possibly other Kremlin powerbrokers, such as Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko, removed Kozak from his position or pushed him to "resign" on his own. Putin signed a decree on August 29 abolishing the Presidential Administration’s Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and Department for Cross-Border Cooperation, both of which Kozak supervised, likely in preparation for Kozak's departure.[xvi] The September 17 reports that Kozak is considering offers in business also refute previous reports from late August 2025 that Kozak was a candidate to become the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Northwestern Federal Okrug, suggesting that Putin may have decided in recent weeks to remove Kozak from the government entirely.[xvii]

Kozak was previously one of Putin’s closest advisors and oversaw Kremlin strategy in Ukraine before the Kremlin shifted this responsibility to Kiriyenko in 2022.[xviii] Kiriyenko has also reportedly recently taken over Kozak's management of the Kremlin's Moldova portfolio.[xix] Kozak's move out of the Kremlin will cement Kiriyenko's power and responsibilities within the Presidential Administration. Putin's likely decision to push an established senior Kremlin official from his inner circle after expressing a desire to end the war in Ukraine further indicates that Putin and his advisors are coalescing around their commitment to continue the war in Ukraine and around Putin's maximalist war demands.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) identified the base and commander of Russia's Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies. RFE/RL reported on September 17 that Colonel Sergei Viktorovich Budnikov, who previously served in the 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) and the 9th Artillery Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), is the commander of the Rubikon Center.[xx] RFE/RL reported that Rubikon elements played a role in retaking Kursk Oblast in late 2024 and operated in the Kupyansk and Pokrovsk directions in late January 2025, the Kharkiv and Vuhledar directions in mid-February 2025, and southern Donetsk Oblast in early March 2025. RFL/RE noted that Rubikon has been primarily operating in Donetsk Oblast since early May 2025 as part of Russia’s Summer 2025 offensive. Rubikon has shifted from primarily conducting drone strikes against ground targets to striking Ukrainian drones. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 4 that the number of published cases of Rubikon destroying Ukrainian Baba Yaga drones increased by more than 20 times to over 440 cases between the end of February 2025 to the end of August 2025.[xxi] Rubikon elements have been striking Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOC), including in the Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical areas.[xxii] Rubikon strikes have contributed to Russia's ability to achieve some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) in Ukraine.[xxiii]

RFL/RE identified the location of Rubikon's headquarters in the Patriot Convention and Exhibition Center within Patriot Park in near Moscow City.[xxiv] There are multiple other military units based near Patriot Park, and the Avangard Education and Methodological Center for Youth Military Patriotic Education, which Russia uses to militarize Russian youth, is located in Patriot Park.[xxv] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is directing recruits to the Avangard Center, and Russian forces are reportedly training foreign recruits at Avangard.[xxvi] Russia has been leveraging the Rubikon Center to improve its theater-wide drone capabilities in Ukraine, and Rubikon may be working with the Avangard Center and other military elements at or near Patriot Park to train Russian soldiers and youth in drone operations.

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) command and staff military exercises are occurring in Kyrgyzstan from September 17 to 20. The CSTO and Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the Rubezh-2025 exercise began on September 17 and that military contingents from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan and operational groups of the CSTO Joint Staff and Secretariat are participating in the exercise.[xxvii] The CSTO stated that the core of the Russian contingent consists of elements of the Central Military District (CMD), including from its 201st Military Base in Tajikistan and that a total number of 1,200 personnel and 500 pieces of military equipment, including aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and combat boats, are participating in the exercise. Russia concluded the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises with Belarus on September 16, during which Russia shared with Belarus tactical lessons that Russian forces have learned from their experience fighting in Ukraine, including lessons about drone warfare.[xxviii] Russia will likely share similar lessons during the CSTO Rubezh-2025 exercise.

Key Takeaways:

• The Trump administration reportedly approved its first European-financed foreign military sales to Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative.
• Senior Russian officials continue to publicly signal the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in negotiations that result in anything less than full Ukrainian capitulation.
• The Kremlin is using the threat of aggression to try to prevent European states from committing troops to postwar Ukraine as part of Western security guarantees.
• Senior Kremlin officials likely with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval likely pushed Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak out of his senior Kremlin position following years of disagreement with Putin's policies about the war in Ukraine.
• Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) identified the base and commander of Russia's Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies.
• Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) command and staff military exercises are occurring in Kyrgyzstan from September 17 to 20.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on September 16 and 17.[xxix] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka, Andriivka, Oleksiivka (both north of Sumy City), Yunakivka, Sadky, and Varachyne (both northeast of Sumy City).[xxx]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces have effectively encircled Russian forces in Oleksiivka.[xxxi] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Glushkovo) recently "scraped together” a company’s worth of personnel and equipment to attack Ryzhivka (just south of Tetkino and northwest of Sumy City).[xxxii] The milblogger added that the Russian military command tasked elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade with seizing Varachyne and territory south of the settlement by the end of October but that the brigade's command is submitting false reports about the brigade's territorial control that have likely led the higher command to think that the seizure of Varachyne by the end of October is plausible.[xxxiii] The milblogger claimed that elements of the 5th Battalion of the 234th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) failed to reach their objective near Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City across the international border) after falling under Ukrainian fire. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have repeatedly failed to seize Kindrativka with attacks through the reservoir.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) and 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[xxxiv] Drone operators of the Chechen Khokhla detachment of the Shatun Group (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) and elements of the 106th VDV Division, including elements of its 137th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[xxxv] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and cell towers in border areas of Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts.[xxxvi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in western and central Vovchansk, and west of Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxvii]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on September 16 and 17.[xxxviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove.[xxxix]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kharkiv direction stated that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are attempting to advance by swimming through water barriers and taking positions in forests.[xl] The commander stated that Russian forces have only been seen using armored vehicles to conduct indirect strikes. The commander stated that Russian tactics will change as the weather gets colder as Russian forces will not be as mobile as they are during warmer weather and will not be able to use motorcycles as effectively. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian border service brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction stated that Russian forces are moving in groups of two to three soldiers toward accumulation points before larger groups attack Ukrainian positions.[xli] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are often using fiber optic and conventional first-person view (FPV) drones.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xlii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and Milove and toward Khatnie and east of Velykyi Burluk toward Odradne on September 16 and 17.[xliii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Bolohivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[xliv]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk toward Sobolivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane and Podoly on September 16 and 17.[xlv]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are likely incurring ten times as many casualties as Ukrainian forces.[xlvi] The commander stated that Russian forces are conducting assaults in small infantry groups but that the soldiers are poorly trained and inadequately supplied with food and water.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Bohuslavka; northeast of Borova toward Borivska Andriivka; east of Borova toward Shyikivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, and Druzhelyubivka on September 16 and 17.[xlvii]

Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Butusov reported that former personnel of the Russian 12th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) stated that the acting regiment and division commanders, who the soldiers complained have never been to the frontline, are not sufficiently supplying frontline soldiers with ammunition and weapons.[xlviii] ISW most recently observed reports that elements of the 12th Tank Regiment were operating near Zelenyi Hai (northeast of Borova) as of August 12.[xlix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating near Hrekivka.[l]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on September 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Torske (east of Lyman), in northeastern Yampil, and in the Serebryanske forest area (both southeast of Lyman).[li]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Serednie; north of Lyman near Karpivka and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka and Kolodyazi;, east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on September 16 and 17.[lii]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Shandryholove is a contested "gray zone" and that Ukrainian drone missions are preventing Russian advances near Karpivka.[liii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Ridkodub (north of Lyman) and Novomykhailivka.[liv] Elements of the 1st GTA (MMD) are reportedly operating near Karpivka.[lv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Siversk and on the western outskirts of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[lvi]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and southwest of Siversk near Pereizne and Fedorivka and toward Nykyforivka on September 16 and 17.[lvii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 17 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southwestern Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[lviii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lix]

Russian forces attacked toward Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Fedorivka and Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Mayske, and Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Bila Hora and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Shcherbynivka, and Katerynivka; south of Druzhkivka near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and toward Mykolaypillya on September 16 and 17.[lx]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk (south of Kostyantynivka) direction reported that Russian forces continue to attack in small fireteams consisting of one or two personnel who probe the frontline and try to infiltrate Ukrainian positions – tactics that the spokesperson noted Russian forces first tested in Sumy Oblast.[lxi] The spokesperson stated that Russian force are trying to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and are operating first person view (FPV) drones to strike the Ukrainian near rear and are using longer-range drones, such as Zala and Lancet drones, to strike greater distances.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Mykolaivka and Chervone (both northeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxii] Reconnaissance elements and drone operators of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Volodymyrivka.[lxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Dobropillya near Vilne, Nove Shakhove, and Shakhove; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on September 16 and 17.[lxiv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mayak (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 17 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Troyanda (just south of Pokrovsk) and within southern Pokrovsk.[lxvi]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Kozatske, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on September 16 and 17.[lxvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in Balahan (east of Pokrovsk).[lxviii] Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxix]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[lxx]

Russian forces attacked south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka on September 16 and 17.[lxxi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Novopavlivka.[lxxii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka, Sichneve, and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha, Berezove, Novoheorhiivka, and Maliivka on September 16 and 17.[lxxiii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[lxxiv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern and northeast of Novoivanivka and south of Poltavka (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, Novoivanivka, and Poltavka and toward Okhotnyche on September 16 and 17.[lxxvi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Polohy (Hulyaipole) direction.[lxxvii]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within southern Prymorske (west of Orikhiv).[lxxviii]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk, southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, and southeast of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka and Mala Tokmachka on September 16 and 17.[lxxix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating within Stepnohirsk.[lxxx] Drone operators of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and elements of the 108th and 247th VDV regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Stepnohirsk.[lxxxi]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on September 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi railway and road bridges on September 16 and 17.[lxxxii]

A Russian milblogger posted footage on September 17 showing a Red Cross ambulance that Russian forces struck in Kherson City.[lxxxiii] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces will strike a medical campus in Dniprovskyi Raion, Kherson City.[lxxxiv]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile and an S-300 air defense missile from the airspace over Rostov and Kursk oblasts and 172 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – including roughly 100 Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[lxxxv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 136 drones and that one missile and 36 drones struck 13 locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian Railroads (Ukrzaliznytsia) and Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister for Reconstruction Oleksiy Kuleba reported that Russian forces struck substations in Ukraine that caused train delays in the Odessa and Dnipro directions.[lxxxvi] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck critical infrastructure in Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, and Poltava oblasts.[lxxxvii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.