Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 15, 2025

September 15, 2025, 9:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on September 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is escalating its rhetoric threatening NATO states in parallel with the kinetic escalation of Russia's recent drone incursion into Poland. Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on September 15 on his Russian- and English-language channels that a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine that would allow NATO aircraft to shoot down Russian drones would “mean only one thing – a war between NATO and Russia.”[i] Medvedev also claimed that Russia will "go after" EU states that provide Ukraine with loans backed by Russian assets in "all possible international and national courts." Medvedev threatened that “in some cases, [Russia will] bypass court procedure” - a possible threat to use kinetic action against EU states. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov explicitly claimed on September 15 that “NATO is at war with Russia" and that "NATO is de facto involved in" the war in Ukraine by providing support to Ukraine.[ii] Peskov, like Medvedev, condemned European efforts to seize frozen Russian assets, saying that ”such steps will not go unnoticed.”[iii]

Peskov's and Medvedev's references to a possible Russia-NATO war aim to prevent NATO and European states from taking action to defend themselves and Ukraine against aggressive and threatening Russian behavior, such as the September 9 to 10 drone incursion into Poland. Peskov's and Medvedev's threats come against the background of Russian threats against Serbia and NATO member Norway. Russian Ambassador to Norway Nikolai Korchunov accused Norwegian officials of encroaching on allegedly ”Russian” settlements on sovereign Norwegian land, and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed that European officials are preparing a ”Serbian Maidan,” referencing the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine.[iv] Kremlin officials have routinely invoked narratives mirroring those that Russia has used to try to justify its invasions of Ukraine - including Russian territorial claims in Ukraine and false claims portraying the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution as a "coup" - in order to threaten other neighboring states, including NATO members.[v]  Russia has employed similarly escalatory rhetoric in recent weeks against Finland—another NATO member.[vi]

Russian and Belarusian forces continued the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises on September 15 and appear to be implementing some tactical lessons from Russia's experience in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian and Belarusian forces conducted training exercises at the Borisovsky and 227th Combined Arms training grounds in Minsk Oblast and in Kaliningrad Oblast and the Barents Sea.[vii] Russian forces also conducted exercises in Russia's Far East.[viii] The Russian MoD confirmed that Russian elements of the Leningrad Military District (LMD) practiced deploying nuclear-capable Iskander-M ballistic missiles systems in Kaliningrad Oblast.[ix] The Russian MoD claimed that the nuclear-capable Arkhangelsk submarine practiced launching a missile strike against a naval target and that elements of the Russian Northern Fleet practiced striking a mock enemy nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea.[x] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian Tu-22M3 long-range strategic bombers patrolled ”the neutral waters of the Barents Sea” for four hours.[xi] The Belarusian MoD reported that representatives from 23 countries, including the United States, Hungary, and Turkey, observed Zapad-2025 exercises in Belarus.[xii]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian and Belarusian forces practiced maneuvering with light motor vehicles, such as all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), as rapid movement on such vehicles reduces the time required to cross open areas, decreases the risk of  first-person view (FPV) drone strikes, and allows troops to quickly attack from the flanks. The Russian MoD appears to be implementing lessons it has learned from the war in Ukraine, such as Russian tactics to move near the frontline on ATVs in order to evade Ukrainian drones, and is disseminating such knowledge with Belarus. Such joint exercises also give Russia the opportunity to iterate and institutionalize the lessons it is learning on the battlefield in Ukraine outside of the chaos of the actual combat zone. Russia and Belarus are likely to use Zapad-2025 to improve on their joint interoperability under the conditions of modern warfare.

Russia is using the Zapad-2025 exercises to practice potential future kinetic provocations against neighboring NATO states. Russian forces practiced defending against and using nuclear capabilities in the waters of the Barents Sea, which borders NATO member Norway.[xiii] Russian forces also practiced using nuclear capable missiles in Kaliningrad Oblast, which immediately borders NATO states Lithuania and Poland.[xiv] Russian officials have previously used Kaliningrad Oblast as a launchpad for GPS jamming and spoofing across Europe, and Russia reportedly constructed a Circularly Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA), a military-grade antenna array designed for radio intelligence or communication, just south of Chernyakhovsk, Kaliningrad Oblast and 25 kilometers from the Polish border.[xv] The EU Commissioner for Defense and Space Andrius Kubilius stated on September 15 that 40 percent of all flights in Europe face some form of jamming - likely from Russia.[xvi]  Zapad-2025 is providing both Russia and Belarus a platform with which to refine kinetic escalation techniques, which in themselves serve as a subtle form of pressure against NATO.

The September 12-14 gubernatorial elections in Russia further demonstrated the Kremlin's grip on power throughout the country. Russia held 20 gubernatorial and 11 regional parliamentary elections on September 12 to 14.[xvii] Incumbents won in all of the gubernatorial races, including 19 candidates from the ruling United Russia party and one independent candidate from the A Just Russia Party, whose candidacy Russian President Vladimir Putin’s previously approved. All of the incumbents won with at least 60 percent of the vote, with seven candidates gaining more than 80 percent of the vote.[xviii] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on September 15 that the elections were a success and that the results indicate Russian society's "consolidation...around [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and his team.”[xix] Russian Security Council Chairperson and United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed that the number of electoral violations was "minimal" but that Russian authorities will "deal" with the violations that did occur.[xx] Russia’s Central Election Commission (CEC) claimed that there were 149,717 observers present at polling stations, but Russian opposition outlet Meduza noted that the Kremlin has not allowed independent observers to monitor Russian elections since 2016.[xxi]

The Kremlin continues to build out a loyal cadre of elected officials from veterans of its war against Ukraine. Acting Tambov Oblast Governor and former “Time of Heroes” participant Yevgeny Pervyshov won with 74.3 percent of the vote and highlighted his experience fighting in the war against Ukraine during his election campaign.[xxii]  Russian CEC Chairperson Ella Pamfilova claimed on September 12 that 1,616 Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine ran for positions in various levels of government in the September 12 to 14 elections.[xxiii] The Kremlin has continually used its ”Time of Heroes” program, which handpicks veterans of the war in Ukraine to work in the federal government, and its regional and local analogues to militarize various levels of government in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is escalating its rhetoric threatening NATO states in parallel with the kinetic escalation of Russia's recent drone incursion into Poland.
• Russian and Belarusian forces continued the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises on September 15 and appear to be implementing some tactical lessons from Russia's experience in Ukraine.
• Russia is using the Zapad-2025 exercises to practice potential future kinetic provocations against neighboring NATO states.
• The September 12-14 gubernatorial elections in Russia further demonstrated the Kremlin's grip on power throughout the country.
• The Kremlin continues to build out a loyal cadre of elected officials from veterans of its war against Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Ukrainian regiment operating in Sumy Oblast reported that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces back from positions near Novokostyantynivka and Kostyantynivka (both north of Sumy City).[xxv]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on September 14 and 15.[xxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[xxvii]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command reinforced and replenished elements of 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with soldiers who were alcoholics, are over 50 years old, previously abandoned their units without leave (AWOL), or violated military discipline.[xxviii] The milblogger claimed that these reserve troops are going to replace the 1st Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment near Volodymyrivka and Oleksiivka (both north of Sumy City).

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th and 106th airborne (VDV) divisions are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[xxix] Elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade and 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[xxx]  Elements of the 91st Sapper-Engineer Regiment (reportedly under the operational command of the Northern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating in Sudzhanksy Raion, Kursk Oblast.[xxxi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk and near Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Synelnykove on September 14 and 15.[xxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk), south of Milove, east of Ambarne, and near Khatnie (all northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xxxiv]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and Khatnie and east of Velykyi Burluk toward Odradne on September 14 and 15.[xxxv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage posted on September 14 and 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Kupyansk and southwest of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[xxxvi]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Tyshchenkivka (northwest of Kupyansk) and within Kupyansk along Zarichna Street, Dukhovnyi Alley, and a railroad.[xxxvii]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on September 14 and 15.[xxxviii]

Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Belskyi reported that Russian forces have not entered Kupyansk but are using sabotage groups to infiltrate the town.[xxxix] Belskyi stated that Russian sabotage groups and other Russian forces accumulating on the northern outskirts of Kupyansk are using disguise tactics, such as wearing civilian clothes and presenting false documents, to enter Kupyansk. These acts may amount to perfidy, a war crime under the Geneva Convention to which Russia is a signatory. Belskyi stated that Ukrainian forces still maintain fire control over the gas pipeline that Russian forces recently used to move from Lyman Pershyi (northeast of Kupyansk) to Radkivka.[xl] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces are resorting to perfidy in the area.[xli] The milblogger denied other milblogger claims that Russian forces advanced more than one kilometer within Kupyansk in the past day.[xlii] The milblogger claimed that almost all of Kupyansk is a contested "gray zone."[xliii] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces attempt to infiltrate Kupyansk at night and settle in basements during the day.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Kupyansk.[xliv]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces advanced northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka and toward Borivska Andriivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 14 and 15.[xlv]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Lyman direction on September 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Serednie, and Derylove and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area and toward Yampil on September 14 and 15.[xlvi]

Russian security service sources claimed that Russian forces began striking Ukrainian positions in Izyum (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline and 40 kilometers from Lyman) and have fire control over Ukrainian logistics in and near Izyum.[xlvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[xlviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on September 14 and 15.[xlix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Fedorivka (southeast of Siversk).[l]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating in the Siversk direction stated that small Russian groups are trying to infiltrate Siversk but have not yet entered the town.[li] The commander stated that small Russian infantry groups continue to look for gaps in Ukrainian defense but that Russian forces are not conducting "serious" mechanized assaults. The commander stated that Russian tactics have not changed, with one to three personnel attempting to move to concentration areas, after which 10 to 13 personnel directly attack Ukrainian positions on foot. The commander stated that Russian forces are actively using fiber optic drones, including fiber optic drones equipped with night vision equipment. The commander stated that Russian forces are accumulating personnel in the area but that there is not a "critical buildup."

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne, Bila Hora, Pleshchiivka, and Kleban Byk; south of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka, Shcherbynivka, and Oleksandro-Kalynove; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka on September 14 and 15.[lii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Rusyn Yar.[liii]

A Russian milblogger claimed on September 15 that Russian forces are conducting Geran-2 and first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against Druzhkivka.[liv]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 15 that elements of the Russian 155th and 40th naval infantry brigades (both of the Pacific Fleet), the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), and likely the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are concentrated near Nova Poltavka and Malynivka (in the Russian near rear southwest of Kostyantynivka).[lv] It is unclear if the reported concentration of these recently redeployed naval infantry elements to the Nova Poltavka-Malynivka area is meant to support Russian offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area (north to northeast of the Nova Poltavka-Malynivka area), the Dobropillya tactical area (northwest of the Nova Poltavka-Malynivka area) or the Pokrovsk direction (southwest to west of the Nova Poltavka-Malynivka area).

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics near Kostyantynivka, and reconnaissance and artillery elements of the 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lvi] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka).[lvii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Ukrainian military source reported on September 15 that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Pankivka (east of Dobropillya).[lviii] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces seized Pankivka but claimed that the settlement remains a contested "gray zone."[lix]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the southern outskirts of Vesele; south and east of Hruzke; in western Zolotyi Kolodyaz (all northeast of Dobropillya); in Shakhove; and in southeastern Novyi Donbas (both east of Dobropillya).[lx]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Vilne and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on September 14 and 15.[lxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novotoretske (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxii]

Mashovets reported on September 15 that elements of the 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) reconsolidated previously lost positions in Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[lxiii]

Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Belskyi stated that elements of the Russian 51st CAA are operating near Dobropillya and that the Russian military command massed large amounts of personnel in this direction.[lxiv] Belskyi stated that Russian forces are especially conducting assaults near Kucheriv Yar and that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking along the Zapovidne-Mayak line. Belskyi stated that Russian forces only have one ground line of communication (GLOC) left in the Dobropillya tactical area. Belskyi stated that the Russian reinforcements arriving in the Dobropillya tactical area are low quality, with some of them being former prisoners and some with less than a week's worth of training.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 15 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated on September 15 that Ukrainian forces are fighting for Razine (northeast of Pokrovsk) and that unverified information suggests that Ukrainian forces reached Boikivka (north of Razine) and Fedorivka (northwest of Razine).[lxv]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Zvirove and toward Molodetske and Novopidhorodne on September 14 and 15.[lxvi]

Belskyi stated that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction conduct over 50 assaults per day and that the total number of Russian personnel attacking in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area (roughly 25 kilometers of frontline) is 100,000 to 110,000, with additional forces in reserve.[lxvii]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 1st and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, SMD) and the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Fedorivka.[lxviii] Drone operators of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Rodynske.[lxix]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka).[lxx]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste on September 14 and 15.[lxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Berezove (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and advanced west of Ternove (northeast of Berezove) and Novomykolaivka (south of Berezove).[lxxii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve, Voskresenka, and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha, Vorone, Maliivka, Sosnivka, Ternove, and Berezove on September 14 and 15.[lxxiii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Andriivka-Klevtsove.[lxxiv] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Force [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting glide bomb strikes against Kalynivske (south of Velykomykhailivka).[lxxv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 15 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Olhivske (northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxvi] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 15 that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Olhivske.[lxxvii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced west and south of Olhivske, southwest and northwest of Temyrivka, and toward Novoivanivka (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxviii]  

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Poltavka, Temyrivka, and Obratne  and toward Novoivanivka and Okhotnyche on September 14 and 15.[lxxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk; southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and Kamyanske;and southeast of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka on September 14 and 15.[lxxx]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction stated on September 15 that Russian forces are trying to quickly raise flags at discrete locations and then run away in order to claim that they advanced, but that Ukrainian forces are usually killing the Russian personnel. [lxxxi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mala Tokmachka (southwest of Orikhiv).[lxxxii] Drone operators of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Prymorske.[lxxxiii] Elements of the 247th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Stepnohirsk.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction September 14 and 15 but did not advance.[lxxxv]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and 84 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai – roughly 50 of which were Shahed-type drones.[lxxxvi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down and suppressed 59 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian missiles and 25 strike drones struck 13 locations throughout Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck railway infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast and that missiles hit agricultural infrastructure in Sumy Oblast.[lxxxvii]

Russian forces conducted a "double tap" strike against emergency workers in Chernihiv Oblast on September 14. Nizhyn City Mayor Oleksandr Kodola stated that Russian forces conducted a strike on the afternoon of September 14 that caused a fire at an oil depot and that Russian forces subsequently conducted another strike against the area at night while firefighters were working at the scene.[lxxxviii] Kodola stated that the double tap strike injured three firefighters.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.