Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 13, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on September 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces recently attempted to advance behind Ukrainian positions in Kupyansk via an underground gas pipeline – the third time Russian forces have used this tactic so far in the war. Russia's repeated use of this tactic further indicates that Russian forces are improving their ability to disseminate tactical lessons between various sectors of the frontline. A Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR)-affiliated source reported on September 12 that Russian forces entered a gas pipeline from a wooded area near Lyman Pershyi (northeast of Kupyansk), traveled through the pipe for an estimated four days with electric scooters and modified wheeled stretchers, and exited the pipe near Radkivka (immediately north of Kupyansk).[1] The Ukrainian source reported that Russian forces then advanced toward Kupyansk and the nearby railway line. The Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged that Russian forces conducted the mission and stated that Russian forces are accumulating on the northern outskirts of Kupyansk but have not entered Kupyansk itself.[2] The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Ukrainian forces have since struck and damaged the pipeline and that Russian forces are no longer able to advance through the pipeline.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that it is unclear when Russian forces conducted the mission, and some claimed that Russian forces may have advanced through the gas pipeline in early September 2025, indicating that the footage may be up to a week and a half old.[4] Kupyansk Military Administration Head Andriy Besedin stated on September 13 that Russian forces do not currently hold positions in Kupyansk but that fighting is ongoing near the outskirts of the city.[5]

Russian forces previously leveraged underground pipelines to advance behind Ukrainian defensive positions in Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast in January 2024 and in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast in March 2025. Elements of the Russian 60th Veterany Separate Assault Brigade (Volunteer Assault Corps) reportedly participated in both of the gas pipeline missions in Avdiivka and Sudzha.[6] ISW has not observed reports of the brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction, indicating that the Russian military command is disseminating the brigade's knowledge and success in such missions to other units and formations. ISW noted in January 2025 that the Russian military command appeared to be at least attempting to improve its ability to disseminate lessons learned, given that Russian forces are exhibiting similar operational patterns across the front line.[7] Alternatively, the use of pipelines to enable infiltration may be more reflective of individual Russian units’ on-the-spot tactical innovation and adaptation in the face of proliferated Ukrainian drone capabilities, as such pipelines provide Russian forces with natural cover and concealment that can enable forward movement.

The international community continues to condemn the recent Russian drone incursion into Poland’s airspace. Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Marcin Bosacki presented a joint statement at the United Nations (UN) on September 12, in which nearly 50 countries denounced Russia’s incursion into Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10 with 19 drones.[8] Bosacki stated that Russia purposely violated Poland’s territorial integrity and trespassed against NATO and the EU. Ukrainian Permanent Representative to the UN Andriy Melnyk stated that Ukraine shares Poland’s view that the Russian drone incursion was not a technical error but rather a deliberate act aimed at escalating tensions and testing the international community’s response to ongoing Russian aggression. Melnyk warned leaders that Russia may continue to escalate if the international community fails to respond decisively. US Acting Permanent Representative to the UN Dorothy Shea reiterated that the United States remains committed to defending “every inch of NATO” and noted that Russia’s incursion undermines the ongoing US efforts to broker an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Shea stated that Russia has intensified its air campaign against Ukraine following the US-Russia Alaska Summit on August 15 and that such actions demonstrate “immense disrespect for good faith US efforts” to usher in peace. ISW has also observed a marked intensification in Russia's long-range strikes against Ukraine since mid-August 2025.[9] Shea conveyed that the United States is urging Russia to negotiate directly with Ukraine to demonstrate its seriousness in seeking an immediate end to hostilities and to prevent Russia’s war from expanding.

Russian and Belarusian officials continue to deflect responsibility for Russia's recent drone incursion into Polish airspace. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya claimed on September 12 that Poland “hastened to place the blame on Russia without presenting any evidence linking Russia to the incident.”[10] Nebenzya denied that the drones used in the incursion could be of Russian origin because the range of the drones found in Poland does not exceed 700 kilometers. Nebenzya claimed that Russia "expressed its readiness for a professional dialogue" with Poland after the incursion. Nebenzya proceeded to shift blame onto the West and accused European countries of using the Russian incursion into Polish airspace to spread "an information campaign" aimed at increasing support for Ukraine and guaranteeing new arms deliveries. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed on September 12 that Russia "refuted the speculations... about plans to attack one of the NATO countries" and that such speculations could lead to "an inevitable escalation," which Russia does not want.[11] Belarusian Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission to the UN Artem Tozik claimed that Poland’s accusations against Belarus' involvement in the drone incursion are "baseless," and that Belarus was the first to inform Poland about the approach of drones that "went off course" during the overnight Russian strikes against Ukraine.[12]

Additional information about the Russian drone incursion undermines Nebenzya's and Tozik's statements, however. Sky News published an image on September 11 of one of the Russian Gerbera drones that landed in Poland, and Bosacki shared an image at the UN Security Council meeting showing Cyrillic letters on one of the drones.[13] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi analyzed Sky News' image and determined that the Russian drone was equipped with an Iranian-made Tallysman satellite navigation four-channel controlled reception pattern antenna (CRPA).[14] Militarnyi reported that CRPAs filter out false signal sources from electronic warfare (EW) systems in order to make the drone more resistant to EW. The presence of CRPAs indicates that it is unlikely that these Russian drones flew off course due to EW jamming. The September 9 to 10 incursion of at least 19 drones in a single night is notable and is roughly three times the number of projectiles that have breached Polish airspace during the entirety of Russia’s full-scale invasion. It is extremely unlikely that such a concentrated number of drones could have violated Polish airspace accidentally or due to technical or operator error. ISW has observed other evidence refuting Russian and Belarusian denials, including evidence that the drones had fuel tanks that increased their range to as far as 900 kilometers.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently attempted to advance behind Ukrainian positions in Kupyansk via an underground gas pipeline – the third time Russian forces have used this tactic so far in the war. Russia’s repeated use of this tactic further indicates that Russian forces are improving their ability to disseminate tactical lessons between various sectors of the frontline.
• The international community continues to condemn the recent Russian drone incursion into Poland’s airspace.
• Russian and Belarusian officials continue to deflect responsibility for Russia's recent drone incursion into Polish airspace.
• Additional information about the Russian drone incursion undermines Nebenzya's and Tozik's statements, however.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and gas infrastructure. A Ukrainian military observer stated on September 13 that photos and videos indicate that Ukrainian drones struck the Bashneft-Novoil Oil Refinery in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, and that there is a fire at the processing unit that may disrupt operations.[16] Geolocated footage published on September 13 shows a fire at the refinery.[17] Republic of Bashkortostan Head Radiy Khabirov claimed the fire was caused by falling drone debris, not a direct strike, and called the strike a terrorist act.[18]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City), Kindrativka, and Andriivka (both north of Sumy City).[19]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka on September 12 and 13.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[21]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on September 12 that Ukrainian forces "completely thwarted" Russian offensive operations in Sumy Oblast and that fighting continues in northern Sumy Oblast.[22] Syrskyi told Zelensky that the Russian forces fighting along the northern Sumy Oblast border lost offensive capability after taking unsustainable casualties.

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are the last remaining naval infantry operating in the Sumy direction, and that the brigade is spread thin along different areas of the front.[23] The milblogger claimed that elements of the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade advanced near Kindrativka in August 2025 with the support of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and remain the primary attacking force near Kindrativka. The milblogger claimed that elements of the brigade are also attempting to recapture Andriivka and are now supporting elements of the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call-up) attacking near Oleksiivka and Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City). The milblogger also claimed that there are rumors that the Russian military command is transferring personnel from the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) and the 346th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Mobilization Reserve) to the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC).[24] The milblogger noted that the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment frequently sends newly transferred servicemembers to attack in the first wave of highly attritional infantry assaults.[25]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 106th and 76th airborne (VDV) divisions are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[26] Drone operators of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[27] Elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[28] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in the border areas of Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts.[29]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City).[30]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Slobozhanske and northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove and in western Vovchansk on September 12 and 13.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove and on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River within Vovchansk.[32]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast border areas.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Ambarne and east of Velykyi Burluk toward Odradne on September 12 and 13.[34]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the frontline between Khatnie and Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) is dynamic and shifts daily.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Doroshivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on September 12 and 13.[36]

Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andriy Kanashevych reported that Russian forces recently intensified first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against roads and civilian infrastructure near Kupyansk, complicating Ukrainian civilian evacuation missions.[37] Kanashevych reported that Ukrainian authorities have observed an increase in Russian FPV strikes on civilian cars since September 3.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 12 and 13.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on September 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Novoselivka, and Derylove; north of Lyman toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and the Serebryanske forest area on September 12 and 13.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kolodyazi.[40]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on September 13 that Russian forces are using loitering drones in the Lyman direction, complicating Ukrainian logistics.[41] The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces improved their ability to hide tanks while conducting fire support for small-group motorcycle assaults in this direction and that Russian forces may use these tanks and armored vehicles in future mechanized assaults.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced to Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[42]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk toward Zvanivka on September 12 and 13.[43]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating Russian airstrikes against Ukrainian positions in the Siversk direction.[44]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Oleksandro-Shultyne-Kostyantynivka O-0519 highway in the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[45]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kleban-Byk (south of Kostyantynivka) and advanced southwest of Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka).[46]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka, Nelipivka, Shcherbynivka, Ivanopillya, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Kleban Byk, and Pleshchiivka and toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on September 12 and 13.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksandro-Shultyne.[48]

The Ukrainian National Police reported that Russian forces launched four KAB-250 glide bombs against Kramatorsk (northwest of Kostyantynivka) and two KAB-250 glide bombs against Torske (southwest of Druzhkivka), injuring civilians and damaging residential infrastructure.[49] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported that Russian forces are increasingly relying on glide bomb strikes in the area and recently struck Sofiivka 20 times in one day.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian drone operators in the Kostyantynivka direction are tying ropes to their drones and using these ropes to tangle Ukrainian drones’ blades midair to make them crash.[51]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Mykolaivka and Chervone (both northeast of Kostyantynivka).[52] Drone operators of the 255th and 33rd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[53] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly shelling Ukrainian positions near Berestok.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz, east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne, Zatyshok, and Mayak on September 12 and 13.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[56]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[57]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[58]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne and Myrolyubivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Kozatske, and Mykolaivka and toward Myrnohrad; southeast near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Zvirove, Kotlyne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne on September 12 and 13.[59]

An NCO of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on September 13 that recently redeployed units of unspecified Russian naval infantry brigades from Kursk Oblast have resumed small group assaults after suffering high losses during initial assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[60] The NCO noted that the Russian naval infantry units initially attempted to attack in groups of up to eight soldiers but lost a company’s worth of soldiers within a week (30-150 troops) and returned to conducting small group assaults in fireteams of two to three soldiers. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to use first-person view (FPV) drones and conduct highly attritional assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[61] The commander noted that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are using a high number of drones in the area.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment with FPV drones near Myrnohrad.[62] Drone operators of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[63]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Tovste (southwest of Novopavlivka).[64]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into southern Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[65]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka toward Ivanivka on September 12 and 13.[66]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Novomykolaivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[67]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Novomykolaivka.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Sosnivka and Ternove (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and to eastern Berezove (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[69]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and southeast of Velykomykhailiva near Sosnivka, Vorone, Maliivka, Novomykolaivka, Berezove, Zaporizke, and Ternove on September 12 and 13.[70]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske and Obratne and toward Novoivanivka on September 12 and 13 but did not advance.[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk on September 12 and 13.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[73]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on September 13 that Russian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast recently shifted tactics to rely on small fireteams of two to three infantrymen following a series of failed mechanized assaults in which Russian forces attacked with a blocking force to prevent attacking soldiers from deserting.[74] The officer reported that Russian fire teams attempt to advance to forward Ukrainian positions or infiltrate into the outskirts of Mala Tokmachka in the Ukrainian near rear. The officer added that Russian commanders frequently lie to their subordinates and tell them that Russian forces already have a significant presence in Mala Tokmachka. The officer stated that Russian forces in the direction usually attack at night but that some groups attempt to infiltrate Ukrainian lines in the daytime.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Pioneer crew of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces north of Orikhiv.[75] Elements of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[76]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on September 12 and 13 but did not advance.[77]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have intensively shelled Kherson City for the past three weeks and are increasing their use of Molniya drones in the Kherson direction.[78]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 12 and 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile and 90 Shahed and 74 Gerbera and other unspecified drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[79] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed and suppressed 137 drones and that 27 drones and one missile struck nine locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones damaged civilian and critical infrastructure in Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[80]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian and Belarusian forces continued joint Zapad-2025 military exercises on September 13. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that elements of the Russian Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Moscow Military District [MMD], and Aerospace Forces [VKS] are participating in Zapad-2025 ground, sea, and air defense exercises.[81] The Belarusian and Russian MoD claimed that Russian and Belarusian forces practiced tactical techniques that minimize the risk of detection by an adversary, defensive engineering techniques, drone aerial reconnaissance, and defending hazardous chemical facilities at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground in Barysaw, Minsk Oblast and the Lesishche Training Ground in Minsk Oblast.[82]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.