Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 10, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:35 pm ET on September 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian drones violated Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10 in what NATO and European officials have suggested was an intentional Russian incursion. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on September 10 that at least 19 drones violated Polish airspace overnight and that a significant portion of the drones entered the country from airspace over Belarus.[i] Tusk confirmed that Poland shot down three drones and possibly downed a fourth as of the afternoon of September 10.[ii] Tusk noted that Polish authorities are still confirming the number of drones that violated Polish airspace and the number of downed drones. Tusk reported that the aerial incursion lasted about seven hours, starting at 2330 local time on September 9 until 0630 on September 10. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that as many as 24 Russian drones entered Polish airspace overnight.[iii] NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte reported that NATO scrambled Polish F-16 fighter jets, Dutch F-35 fighter jets, Italian airborne early warning and control (AWACS) planes, and NATO mid-air refueling aircraft in order to intercept the drones over Poland.[iv] NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) reported on September 10 that Polish authorities put German Patriot air defense systems on alert in response to the incursion, and Rutte confirmed that German Patriots participated in efforts to repel the drone incursion.[v] Tusk invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty on the morning of September 10 in response to the incursion.[vi] Article 4 states that a NATO member state can call a meeting to consult on any issue in which the "territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any Parties is threatened" and that fellow member states are encouraged to respond to the situation.[vii] NATO states last invoked Article 4 with the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[viii]

The large number of Russian drones that violated Polish airspace suggests that this was likely an intentional Russian effort. Tusk stated that this is the first time that a significant portion of the drones entered Polish airspace from the direction of Belarus and that the scale of the incursion was unusual.[ix] Tusk stated that previous Russian drone incursions of Polish airspace were due to "mistakes" (possibly referring to operator error), drone disorientation from electronic warfare (EW), or the result of smaller scale Russian provocations. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on September 10 that drones have entered Polish airspace six times during the full-scale invasion, with the first occurrence in November 2022, and that a total of at least seven drones and one missile have fallen on Polish territory during the war.[x] The September 9-10 incursion of at least nineteen drones in a single night is notable and is roughly three times the number of projectiles that have fallen in Poland in the entire war. It is unlikely that such a number of drones could have all entered into Polish airspace by accident or as a result of a technical or operator error.

At least some of the drones that violated Polish airspace were Gerbera decoy drones, and Russia may have been preparing for an incursion of this size into Polish airspace since Summer 2025. A Polish military official stated to Reuters on September 10 that at least some of the Russian drones in Polish airspace were Gerbera drones.[xi] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov posted an image on September 10 of one of the downed drones and reported that it was a non-reconnaissance version of a Gerbera decoy drone without cameras.[xii] The Russian Gerbera drone is a decoy drone designed to mimic Shahed- and Geran-type drones in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.[xiii] Beskrestnov also reported that he has documented Russian Shahed-type drones with Polish SIM cards recently.[xiv] Polish journalist Marek Budzisz reported on July 10 that a report written by unspecified sources and published on July 2 stated that the Ukrainian military had recovered Russian drones with Polish and Lithuanian SIM cards and that these SIM cards could indicate Russian preparations to test strike corridors in Poland and Lithuania.[xv] Russia may have been preparing for the September 9-10 incursion for months, further indicating that the incursion was not an accident or the result of Ukrainian EW interference.

Russian officials denied that the drones came from Russia and attempted to deflect blame onto Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 10 that Russia did not target anything "for destruction" on Polish territory in their overnight strike series and that the maximum flight range of the drones that Russian forces launched overnight against Ukraine was 700 kilometers and therefore could not have violated Polish airspace.[xvi] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that the Russian MoD's claims "debunk" Polish "myths," which the Russian MFA claimed aim to further escalate the war in Ukraine.[xvii] A Ukrainian source reported, however, that Russia may have equipped the drones with auxiliary fuel tanks that could have extended their range beyond 700 kilometers and that Russia may have modified these drones to be different than the ones Russia uses against Ukraine, casting doubts on the Russian MoD's claim about the drone ranges.[xviii] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to the drone incursion into Poland and claimed that the EU and NATO accuse Russia of provocations every day without evidence.[xix] The Polish MFA summoned the Russian Chargé d'affaires to Poland Andrey Ordash in response to the airspace violation.[xx] Ordash claimed to journalists after the meeting that the drones came from the direction of Ukraine, that Russia has not received any evidence that the drones were of Russian origin, and that Russia does not anticipate Poland being able to present any such evidence. Ordash claimed that Poland constantly blames Russia for emergencies in Poland.

Belarusian officials attempted to deny any involvement in the Russian drone incursion despite evidence that the drones entered Polish airspace from the direction of Belarus. The Belarusian MoD posted a statement from Belarusian First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Major General Pavel Muraveiko claiming that Belarusian forces were tracking drones that lost their flight paths due to unspecified electronic warfare (EW) during Russia's and Ukraine's overnight "exchange" of drone strikes.[xxi] Muraveiko claimed that Belarusian forces destroyed some of the "lost" drones over Belarusian territory and exchanged information about the "air and radar situation" with Polish and Lithuanian forces about unknown drones approaching their countries. Muraveiko claimed that this information exchange allowed Poland to respond promptly to the drones and scramble their forces, and that Poland also informed Belarus about a drone approaching Belarus from Ukraine. The Belarusian MoD is implying that the drones may not have been Russian or that Ukrainian EW may have been responsible for the violations of Polish airspace. The Russian drone incursion into Poland notably comes against the backdrop of the upcoming September 12 to 16 Belarusian-Russian Zapad-2025 joint military exercise and Tusk's September 9 announcement to close the Polish-Belarusian border starting September 11 due to the Zapad exercise.[xxii]

Russia is likely attempting to gauge both Poland's and NATO's capabilities and reactions in the hopes of applying lessons learned to future conflict scenarios with the NATO alliance. NATO SHAPE stated that this was the first time that NATO aircraft had engaged potential threats in NATO airspace.[xxiii] Russia is likely trying to probe Poland's and NATO's defensive capabilities and reaction times while observing their command and control (C2) structure in action. Russia likely also aimed to test the interoperability of NATO member states working to neutralize a threat in NATO airspace. Russia has been engaged in a years-long hybrid warfare campaign against Europe, including instances of EW interference and GPS jamming, sabotage missions, arson attacks, and attempted assassinations.[xxiv] Russia has been gradually expanding these hybrid efforts, and Russia's violation of Polish airspace is part of this campaign that aims, in part, to test NATO and NATO states' tactical and rhetorical reactions. The drone incursion likely also aims to gauge the level of domestic support in Poland and other NATO member states for NATO collective defense, particularly at a time when support for Ukraine is a sensitive topic in Poland's domestic information space. ISW continues to assess that Russia is engaged in a multipronged effort to prepare for a potential future Russia-NATO war, including by preparing its society, militarizing its youth, building up its military infrastructure on its western border, and spreading narratives that Russia may try to use to justify future aggression against NATO.[xxv] Efforts to test NATO's technical capabilities and political resolve are likely part of this multipronged campaign, and Russia appears to be growing bolder in terms of what sort of escalation it is willing to test.

Russia is likely also attempting to limit or deter Western military aid to Ukraine. Reuters reported that an unspecified senior military source stated that at least five of the drones' flight paths indicated that they were flying toward Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport in southeastern Poland, which is NATO's main arms supply hub for Ukraine.[xxvi] Russia may have aimed to strike the airport in order to obstruct the delivery of Western aid to Ukraine. Russia may also aim to damage popular support in Poland and Europe more broadly for continued aid provisions to Ukraine out of fear of provoking future Russian strikes. The Kremlin is likely trying to use the official Russian and Belarusian responses to the incursion to accelerate the spread of narratives within Poland itself that this was a Ukrainian provocation.[xxvii] Russia is likely trying to exploit ongoing domestic debates within Poland about support for Ukraine, and Russia notably conducted information operations to try to influence the May 2025 Polish presidential election.[xxviii]

Russian milbloggers amplified various narratives to refute Western reporting about the Russian violation of Polish airspace, many of which cohered with official Russian and Belarusian responses. While milbloggers generally offered various theories about the drone incursion, they largely coalesced around the narrative that Russia was not to blame. Many of the Russian milbloggers responded before the Kremlin, demonstrating the Kremlin's successes in coopting a large portion of the milblogger community and shaping the Russian information space such that the Kremlin's anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives dominate. Russian milbloggers claimed that Polish authorities offered no evidence or weak evidence to prove that the drones were Russian.[xxix] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian EW affected the Russian drones, forcing them to divert from their flight paths.[xxx] Milbloggers also alleged that the drones were Ukrainian or that the incursion was a Ukrainian provocation using Russian Gerbera drones that Russia previously launched against Ukraine in Spring 2025.[xxxi] Select milbloggers directly called for future Russian drone strikes against Poland, including against the Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport, claiming that these strikes would be justified due to Poland's prominent role in producing weapons for and supplying aid to Ukraine.[xxxii] One milblogger threatened Russian strikes on any defense industrial enterprises in Europe that are helping the Ukrainian war effort in the future.[xxxiii] Some milbloggers claimed that the Russian incursion was accidental, but that NATO's response was weak, so Russia should deliberately strike Poland in the future.[xxxiv]

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to pledge military and financial assistance to Ukraine. The Ukraine Defense Contact Group (Ramstein format) held a hybrid meeting on September 9, during which several of Ukraine's partners announced additional assistance packages for Ukraine.[xxxv] European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced on September 9 that the European Union (EU) will provide six billion euros (roughly $7 billion) from interest from frozen Russian assets to support Ukrainian drone production.[xxxvi] EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas announced on September 9 that the EU aims to fulfill its target of providing two million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine by October 2025 and stated that the EU has already provided 80 percent of this goal.[xxxvii] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced on September 9 that Germany is in the process of supplying Ukraine with two Patriot air defense systems and will contribute 300 million euros (roughly $350 million) to an initiative to increase Ukrainian long-range strike drone production.[xxxviii] UK Defense Minister John Healey later announced on September 10 that the UK will produce "thousands" of Ukrainian-designed interceptor drones per month for Ukraine.[xxxix] Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on September 10 that Poland will transfer 10,000 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine in the coming week.[xl]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian drones violated Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10 in what NATO and European officials have suggested was an intentional Russian incursion.
• The large number of Russian drones that violated Polish airspace suggests that this was likely an intentional Russian effort.
• At least some of the drones that violated Polish airspace were Gerbera decoy drones, and Russia may have been preparing for an incursion of this size into Polish airspace since Summer 2025.
• Russian officials denied that the drones came from Russia and attempted to deflect blame onto Ukraine.
• Belarusian officials attempted to deny any involvement in the Russian drone incursion despite evidence that the drones entered Polish airspace from the direction of Belarus.
• Russia is likely attempting to gauge both Poland's and NATO's capabilities and reactions in the hopes of applying lessons learned to future conflict scenarios with the NATO alliance.
• Russia is likely also attempting to limit or deter Western military aid to Ukraine.
• Russian milbloggers amplified various narratives to refute Western reporting about the Russian violation of Polish airspace, many of which cohered with official Russian and Belarusian responses.
• Ukraine’s Western partners continue to pledge military and financial assistance to Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and in the Dobropillya tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of positions near Stepne and Novokostyantynivka (both north of Sumy City).[xli]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka and Tetkino; north of Sumy City near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kindrativka; and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and Yunakivka, on September 9 and 10.[xlii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Kindrativka, Yunakivka, and Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[xliii]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that roughly a brigade's worth of North Korean forces are operating along the international border in Kursk Oblast on the Yelizavetovka-Troitske-Gordeevka line (southeast of Glushkovo).[xliv] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City) continue to experience logistics issues and that Ukrainian drone strikes are preventing Russian reinforcements from reaching positions in Yunakivka.[xlv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Bezsalivka.[xlvi] Elements of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Yunakivka. Drone operators of the 382nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and the Sida Group of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[xlvii] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the border areas of Chernihiv Oblast.[xlviii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Synelnykove and on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River within Vovchansk (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[xlix]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove and Vovchansk on September 9 and 10.[l] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vovchansk and near Synelnykove.[li]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and east of Velykyi Burluk toward Odradne on September 10.[lii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within northeastern Kupyansk.[liii]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Myrove; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on September 9 and 10.[liv]

The Kharkiv Oblast Police reported on September 10 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a civilian car in Blahodativka (west of Kupyansk) and injured five civilians.[lv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Udaya Drone Group of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk.[lvi] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Bolohivka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[lvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova toward Borivska Andriivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 10.[lviii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 10 shows Russian forces raising flags in two locations in northern Zarichne (east of Lyman), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[lix]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to western Zarichne.[lx] A Russian milblogger refuted some Russian claims that Russian forces entered Stavky (north of Lyman) and seized Derylove (northwest of Lyman).[lxi]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Novyi Myr, and Novomykhailivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and the Serebryanske forest area on September 9 and 10.[lxii]

The head of intelligence of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Lyman direction stated on September 10 that Ukrainian forces recaptured Zarichne and that Russian forces entered the settlement by changing into civilian clothes and concealing themselves among the civilian population, which may constitute acts of perfidy (a war crime under the Geneva Convention, to which Russia is a signatory).[lxiii] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces have recently increased the frequency of shelling and ground attacks in this direction.[lxiv] The spokesperson added that the Russian command has concentrated a large number of troops in the direction, many of whom only signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) one month ago.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to transport infantry near Serebryanka and are infiltrating the Ukrainian near rear in small groups in order to create disorganization among Ukrainian forces.[lxv] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions on the C051023 Yampil-Zarichne road, posing a threat to the Ukrainian rear and ground lines of communication (GLOCs).

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[lxvi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka and toward Pazeno on September 9 and 10.[lxvii]

Order of Battle: Fire support elements of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Shrama Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are striking Ukrainian positions northeast of Dronivka.[lxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka) near the O0520 Sofiivka-Kostyantynivka road.[lxix]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Mayske; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Nelipivka, Shcherbynivka, and Pleshchiivka and toward Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka, Yablunivka, and Kleban Byk; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzkhivka near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka on September 9 and 10.[lxx] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Predtechyne and Katerynivka.[lxxi]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported on September 10 that Russian forces are first accumulating near the front before conducting infantry assaults in smaller groups.[lxxii] The commander stated that Russian forces are not using mechanized equipment.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Ivanopillya (south of Kostyantynivka), and elements of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Druzhkivka.[lxxiii] Drone operators of the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mykolaivka and Chervone (both northeast of Kostyantynivka), and drone operators of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps [AC]) and 10th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka direction.[lxxiv] Artillery elements of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces west of Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxxv] Reconnaissance elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly providing drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) with strike coordinates for Ukrainian positions near Rusyn Yar.[lxxvi]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[lxxvii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced west and east of Mayak (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxxviii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Vilne; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Mayak on September 9 and 10.[lxxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novotoretske (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxxx]

An open-source channel on X (formerly Twitter) reported on September 10 that geolocated footage shows elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) in Donetsk City.[lxxxi] ISW last observed reports that elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade were operating in the Kherson direction as of September 6.[lxxxii] ISW also recently observed reports that the Russian military command redeployed elements of several naval infantry units from Kursk Oblast to the Dobropillya area and other unspecified areas of Donetsk Oblast, likely as part of wider redeployment efforts to intensify offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk.[lxxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and south of Krasnyi Lyman (just southeast of Rodynske).[lxxxiv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced in central Rodynske and central Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[lxxxv] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Novoekonomichne, however.[lxxxvi]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations within and near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne, Shevchenko, Troyanda, and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on September 9 and 10.[lxxxvii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Pokrovsk and near Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk), Myrnohrad, Myrne, and Malynivka (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[lxxxviii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxxix] ISW last observed reports that elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade were operating in the Novopavlivka direction on August 29, and the Russian military command likely recently redeployed elements of the brigade to the Pokrovsk area as part of wider redeployment efforts to intensify offensive operations in the area.[xc]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka on September 9 and 10.[xci]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and advanced west of the settlement.[xcii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Ternove (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[xciii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Komyshuvakha, Novomykolaivka, Ternove, and Sosnivka on September 9 and 10.[xciv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near and within Sosnivka.[xcv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske and Novoivanivka on September 9 and 10.[xcvi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 63rd Separate Spetsnaz Company (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Polohy (Hulyaipole) direction.[xcvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and west of Orikhiv near Plavni, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on September 10.[xcviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian ZVENO Reconnaissance Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.[xcix] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating Russian airstrikes against Ukrainian positions near Stepnohirsk.[c]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on September 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kherson City near Antonivka and Sadove on September 10.[ci]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating in the Kherson direction have an insufficient number of drones and that a lack of situational awareness among Russian drone operators, whom the Russian military command recently transferred to this direction, is leading to unnecessary drone attrition that is exacerbating the drone shortage.[cii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 91st Airborne (VDV) Battalion (reportedly of the 31st Separate VDV Brigade) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[ciii] Elements of the 88th Hispaniola Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near the coast of occupied Crimea.[civ]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) facility in occupied Crimea on the night of September 9 to 10. A Russian milblogger posted footage and claimed on September 10 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike near occupied Vityne targeting the Russian Deep Space Communications Center at the 40th Command and Measurement Complex (VKS) on the night of September 9 to 10.[cv] The milblogger claimed that the strike damaged the headquarters building and communications center and that a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system failed to repel the strike. Geolocations of the milblogger's footage confirmed the strike.[cvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for updates on the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast and 42 total Kalibr, Kh-101, and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast and the Black Sea.[cvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 415 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones, including over 250 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 386 drones and 27 cruise missiles and that 16 missiles and 21 drones struck 17 locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that a Russian missile struck a sewing workshop in Volochysk, Khmelnytskyi Oblast, injuring three civilians.[cviii] Ukrainian officials, including Ukraine's State Emergency Services, reported that Russian drones and missiles damaged residential, commercial, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Volyn, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[cix]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.