Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 30, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:30 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:45 AM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

The Kremlin has been rejecting any large-scale frontline ceasefire since Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky offered it in March 2025, despite taking enormous Russian casualties for very limited territorial gains. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated on October 29 that Russia does not want a temporary ceasefire but will only accept a peace settlement.[i] The Kremlin has long rejected proposals for temporary ceasefires, demanding instead that Ukraine and Russia agree on a war termination framework that satisfies Russia's war goals.[ii] Ukraine and the United States first agreed on March 11, 2025 to an immediate 30-day ceasefire along the entire frontline, which Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected on March 13.[iii] Russian forces have suffered 698,740 casualties and gained 4,122 square kilometers (about the total area of Rhode Island) since March 11, 2025.[iv]

An official Ukrainian delegation arrived on October 30 in occupied Oleshky via Gomel, Belarus and Anapa, Russia to facilitate the humanitarian ceasefire in occupied Kherson Oblast.[v] Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets announced that both sides have maintained the localized ceasefire for 80 hours since it came into effect on the morning of October 27.[vi] Lubinets and Russian Human Rights Commissioner Yana Lantratova reported that authorities completely demined the routes in Oleshky to allow humanitarian convoys to enter the city on October 30.[vii] Authorities also began transporting civilians who want to evacuate to Ukrainian-controlled territory on the afternoon of October 30.[viii]

The Kremlin forced independent Russian media source Novaya Gazeta to close as part of the Kremlin's long running effort to gain control over Russia's information space and control the narrative about the war in Ukraine. Novaya Gazeta announced on October 30 that it will cease operations on November 9 following a period of official crackdowns on the publication.[ix] Novaya Gazeta stated that Russian authorities' and intelligence services' actions forced the editorial staff to cease operations and “killed” the publication. Russian authorities in recent years deprived Novaya Gazeta of its ability to receive donations; seized its printing press; declared the publication, its editors, and its journalists foreign agents; raided the publication‘s office and the editor-in-chief's home; and evicted the editorial staff from its Moscow City office.[x] The Kremlin has increased its internet and media censorship campaign since the start of the full-scale invasion and especially after the June 2023 Wagner mutiny as part of its longstanding efforts to control the Russian information space, suppress opposition, and protect the regime from domestic discontent.[xi]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin has been rejecting any large-scale frontline ceasefire since Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky offered it in March 2025, despite taking enormous Russian casualties for very limited territorial gains.
• An official Ukrainian delegation arrived on October 30 in occupied Oleshky via Gomel, Belarus and Anapa, Russia to facilitate the humanitarian ceasefire in occupied Kherson Oblast.
• The Kremlin forced independent Russian media source Novaya Gazeta to close as part of the Kremlin's long running effort to gain control over Russia's information space and control the narrative about the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Oleksandrivka. Russian forces advanced in the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv directions.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on October 29 and 30.
• Russia launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles, four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 113 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Kremlin high-ranking officials are attempting to capitalize on Ukraine's long-range strike against a Russian oil refinery in Samara Oblast on October 30 to inflame tensions between Ukraine and the United States. Ukrainian defense company Fire Point reported on October 30 that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuibyshevsk Oil Refinery in Novokuibyshevsk, Samara Oblast (roughly 787 kilometers from Ukraine’s border).[xii] Geolocated footage published on October 30 shows smoke plumes rising around the refinery following the Ukrainian strike.[xiii] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the Novokuibyshevsk Oil Refinery has an annual processing capacity of 8.8 million tons of oil and produces more than 20 to 30 petroleum product types.[xiv] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov attempted to emphasize that the Ukrainian strike against the Russian oil refinery on October 30 contradicts US President Donald Trump’s request that Ukraine refrain from striking Russian oil refineries.[xv] Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Economic Minister Alexander Novak separately claimed that Ukrainian drones struck three Russian oil refineries and one gas chemical complex on October 30 and noted that Ukraine resumed long-range strikes against Russian oil refineries.[xvi] Kremlin officials are trying to use Ukrainian October 30 strikes to drive a wedge between Ukraine and the United States.

Ukrainian forces also struck Russian ballistic missile capabilities, aviation, and a military rations facility on October 29 or overnight on October 29 to 30. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on October 29 that Ukrainian forces struck an Iskander ballistic missile launcher and destroyed two Russian Su-34 multirole fighter jets.[xvii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck an Iskander-M ballistic missile launcher near Fatezh, Kursk Oblast (roughly 108 kilometers from the international border) on October 29 or overnight on October 29 to 30.[xviii] The Ukrainian Navy reported on October 29 that Ukrainian forces struck the Marinovka Airfield in Volgograd Oblast (roughly 283 kilometers from the international border) with Neptune missiles, destroying two Su-34 fighter-bombers.[xix] The Ukrainian Navy noted that Russian forces routinely use Su-34 fighter-bombers to conduct glide bomb strikes against Ukraine. Astra reported on October 29 that Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Konservsushprod enterprise, which produces rations for the Russian military, near Starodub, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 35 kilometers from the international border).[xx]

A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source provided updated battle damage assessment (BDA) of Ukraine’s strikes against an electrical substation in Krasnodar Krai. A Ukrainian OSINT channel published satellite imagery on October 29 showing the aftermath of the Ukrainian October 24 strike against the Taman electrical substation in Krasnodar Krai that left parts of occupied Crimea without electricity.[xxi] The channel referred to the strike as occurring on September 24, but ISW observed Ukrainian forces striking the Taman electrical substation on October 24, not September 24.[xxii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian milbloggers and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on October 30 that Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced in the area.[xxiii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 29 and 30 but did not advance.[xxiv] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 29 that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are intensifying fighting north and northwest of Kharkiv City.[xxv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in western Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in western Kupyansk, according to geolocated footage published on October 12, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[xxvi]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on October 30 that Russian forces continued offensive ground operations northeast of Borova but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced in the area.[xxvii]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southeast of Lyman. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in western Dibrova (southeast of Lyman), according to geolocated footage published on October 29, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[xxviii] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 29 that Russian forces control key crossings over the Zherebets River near Yampil (southeast of Lyman) and seek to hold the crossings to support logistics for Russian units operating across the river and to draw Ukrainian forces into protracted battles in the forested areas near the river.[xxix]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk on October 29 and 30 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Kramatorsk.[xxx]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Ukrainian forces advanced west of Kostyantynivka. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position in northern Stepanivka (west of Kostyantynivka), according to geolocated footage published on October 26, indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced in the area.[xxxi]

Ukrainian forces have reportedly intensified counterattacks west of Kostyantynivka. A Ukrainian military source reported on October 29 that Ukrainian forces advanced near Mykolaipillya and towards Rozkishne (both west of Kostyantynivka).[xxxii] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 29 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions north of Rusyn Yar (southwest of Mykolaipillya) and are preventing Russian forces from securing Russian logistics near Torske (northwest of Mykolaipillya) and from protecting Russian logistical routes at the seam of the Russian Southern and Central groupings of forces.[xxxiii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on October 29 and 30 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Dobropillya.[xxxiv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 30.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Oleksandrivka. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on October 30 that Ukrainian forces cleared Nove Zaporizhzhia and Ternuvate (both south of Oleksandrivka) of several Russian infantry groups that had previously infiltrated the settlements.[xxxv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces conducted infiltration missions and advanced west and northwest of Hulyaipole as part of the ongoing Russian effort to conduct a wide encirclement of Orikhiv from the east and northeast. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 30 that Russian forward units likely crossed the railroad on the Olenokostyantynivka-Vozdvyzhivka line (northwest of Hulyaipole) and that Russian forces advanced to the north and northeast of Verkhnya Tersa (southwest of the Olenokostyantynivka-Vozdvyzhivka line) with several infilration groups entering the settlement, indicating that Russian forces advanced in the fields north of Tsvitkove (east of Verkhnya Tersa).[xxxvi] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces continue to hold several positions between Staroukrainka and Zaliznychne (both southeast of Verkhnya Tersa), indicating that Russian forces do not control the area between those two settlements. Mashovets stated that several Russian infantry groups advanced north of the T-08-14 Hulyaipole-Orikhiv road and reached farm buildings north of the road, indicating that Russian forces advanced north and northeast of Hulyaipilske (southwest of Zaliznychne). Mashovets stated that Russian forces have been unable to reach Hulyaipilske itself with their forward units, refuting Russian claims that Russian forces control Hulyaipilske. Mashovets stated that Russian forces reached the Verkhnya Tersa River from the direction of Zaliznychne as part of an effort to bypass Hirke from the south and southwest.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, possibly including elements of its 104th or 234th VDV regiments, are operating on the left flank of the 35th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) in the Hulyaipole direction.[xxxvii] ISW last observed reports of elements of the 104th VDV Regiment operating in the Dobropillya direction in mid-July and in the Hulyaipole direction earlier in July.[xxxviii] ISW last observed reports of elements of the 234th VDV Regiment operating in the Hulyaipole direction in early July.[xxxix] It is unclear if elements of the 104th Regiment are currently split between the Dobropillya and Hulyaipole directions. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 50th Varyag Brigade (Unmanned Systems Forces [USF]) are very likely operating in the Hulyaipole direction.[xl] This is the first report ISW has observed of elements of the Varyag Brigade operating in the Hulyaipole direction, although the brigade is currently operating across various sectors of the front while also conducting long-range strikes against the Ukrainian rear.[xli]

Russian forces recently made tactically significant gains east of Orikhiv. Mashovets stated that Russian forces effectively seized Charivne (east of Orikhiv) and that Russian forward units advanced northwest of Luhivske and north of Bilohirya (both southeast of Orikhiv).[xlii] Mashovets stated that Russian infiltration groups maintain an extensive presence in the area between Chervona Krynytsia (northeast of Orikhiv), Charivne, Luhanivske, and Bilohirya. Mashovets stated that these infiltration groups are generally attempting to push towards Omelnyk (north of Chervona Krynytsia and northeast of Orikhiv) and that Ukrainian forces detected a Russian infiltration group near Omelnyk, nearly 19 kilometers from the Russian front line north of Bilohirya.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction.

See topline text for information about the limited ceasefire in occupied Kherson Oblast.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[xliii]

Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic missiles, four cruise missiles, and 113 drones (including 83 jet-powered drones) against Ukraine on the night of October 29 to 30.[xliv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian missile and drone strikes primarily targeted Kyiv, Poltava, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported power outages in Kyiv City and Oblast, and Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kharkiv oblasts due to Russian strikes on October 29 and overnight on October 29 to 30.[xlv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.