1 hour ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 3, 2026

Christina Harward, Kateryna Shymkiv, Nikolai Sundstrom and Karolina Hird

Assessment as of: 4:15 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:45 AM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Five Russian drones, including Banderol loitering munitions, crashed in Moldova on the morning of October 3, exceeding the number of aerial vehicles involved in the last Russian violation of Moldovan airspace. Moldovan President Maia Sandu reported that five Russian “air attack weapons”, including Banderol loitering munitions, violated Moldovan airspace and crashed in Moldova.[1] Moldovan Defense Minister Anatolie Nosatii stated that three “missiles,” likely referring to Russian Banderol loitering munitions, and two drones violated Moldovan airspace.[2] The Moldovan Foreign Ministry reported that drone debris fell in the Causeni, Hincesti, Anenii Noi, and Stefan Voda districts and near Crocmaz.[3] The Moldovan National Army reported that another unspecified object entered Moldovan airspace near Udobne, Odesa Oblast, with a trajectory toward Palanca, Stefan Voda District, and left the airspace after one minute in the direction of Bilyayivka, Odesa Oblast.[4] Russian drones and drone debris have been increasingly violating Moldovan airspace in recent months, with at least 20 violations occurring between February 2022 and July 2026 and seven since August 2026 alone.[5] Most Russian drone incursions, including the most recent violation on September 30, when a likely Russian drone crashed near Hirbovat, Anenii Noi Raion, have involved a single Geran- or Gerbera-type drone, making the October 3 violation a notable increase in the number of aerial vehicles.[6] ISW continues to assess that increasingly intense and frequent Russian drone incursions into Moldovan and NATO airspaces are likely part of Moscow’s efforts to normalize airspace violations with increasingly intense and frequent violations.[7]

Russian forces struck the Northern Bridge in Kyiv City on October 3 as part of Russia’s continued efforts to degrade the city’s traffic across the Dnipro River and cause wider disruptions to Ukraine’s economy and daily civilian life. Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported that Russian forces struck the Northern Bridge over the Dnipro River in Kyiv City on October 3.[8] Russian forces have struck the Southern and Northern bridges in Kyiv City six separate times since the afternoon of October 1, resulting in severe disruptions to civilian transportation and logistics across the Dnipro River as Russian forces continue attempts to physically split Kyiv City.[9] The drone strikes against Kyiv City’s bridges are part of a wider Russian long-range strike campaign to degrade Ukraine’s economy and to make life in major Ukrainian cities difficult in an effort to force Ukraine to capitulate.[10] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a warning on October 3, recommending foreign citizens and diplomats to leave Kyiv City and explicitly stating that Russian forces will continue launching long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine.[11] The Russian MFA statement indicates that Russian forces intend to continue targeting Ukraine’s civilian and critical infrastructure, especially in major cities, aiming to generate a political crisis in Ukraine during Winter 2026-2027 and to degrade Ukraine’s ability to sustain its battlefield successes.[12]

Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on October 3 that Russian forces used one or more mesh network repeaters that provide a temporary local connection through which Russian drone operators can adjust the drone’s trajectory during strikes on Kyiv City’s bridges.[13] Beskrestnov reported that Russian forces used a similar device during the failed September 4 assassination attempt against Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) Head Oleksandr Poklad.[14] The devices that Beskrestnov described function as gateways that receive commands over the internet and convert them into radio-frequency signals for a nearby Russian drone, allowing Russian drone operators to maintain live control of the drone’s trajectory without any other signal-repeating drones or mesh ground control stations around.

Key Takeaways:

  • Five Russian drones, including Banderol loitering munitions, crashed in Moldova on the morning of October 3, exceeding the number of aerial vehicles involved in the last Russian violation of Moldovan airspace.
  • Russian forces struck the Northern Bridge in Kyiv City on October 3 as part of the Russian continued efforts to degrade the city’s traffic across the Dnipro River and cause wider disruptions to Ukraine’s economy and daily civilian life.
  • Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against missile and drone launch sites in Russia. Russia launched 157 drones against Ukraine overnight and Banderol loitering munitions on the morning of October 3.
  • Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Sumy City.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
  • Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazenyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against missile and drone launch sites in Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 3 that Ukrainian forces struck an Iskander ballistic missile launch system in Bryansk Oblast on October 2 or 3.[15] Ukraine’s Strategic Communications Center reported on October 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian strike drone launch complex near Tsimbulova, Oryol Oblast (roughly 175 kilometers from the international border), on the night of October 2 to 3.[16] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from October 2 to 3 shows heat anomalies near Tsimbulova.[17]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position north of Novodmytrivka (southeast of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on October 1, indicating that Russian forces consolidated positions in the area.[18]

 

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 2 and 3 but did not make confirmed advances.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 3 that Russian forces seized Nova Kozacha (north of Kharkiv City).[20] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces credited elements of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion, and the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) with the seizure of Nova Kozacha.[21]

A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 3, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[22]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast.

 

Russian forces maintain a presence within and north of Kupyansk but are reportedly struggling to supply and expand their positions. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 2 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kivsharivka (north of Kupyansk) and control half of the settlement.[23] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces are still operating within Kupyansk itself but that it is almost impossible for them to receive reinforcements.[24] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and Kindrashivka and noted that Russian forces are struggling to supply their forward units north of Kupyansk.[25]

Russian sources reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations north and southeast of Borova on October 2 and 3 but did not advance.[26]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian sources commented on continued Ukrainian counteroffensive activity along the Zherebets River, including near Yampil (southeast of Lyman) and Zarichne (east of Lyman), on October 3.[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Ukrainian attacks likely continue to disrupt Russian plans for frontal assaults against Fortress Belt cities from the east. Russian milbloggers continue to report that fighting is ongoing east of Slovyansk near Mykolaivka, Kryva Luka, and Rai-Oleksandrivka.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also counterattacked east of Kramatorsk toward Vasylivska Pustosh, Vasyutinske, and Pershomarivka.[29] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking near Virolyubivka and Fedorivka (both east of Druzhkivka).[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within, west of, and northwest of Kostyantynivka on October 2 and 3 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Druzhkivka direction.[31]

Russian forces do not currently appear to be using armored vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on October 3 that there are currently no Russian groups using armored vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction.[32] The NCO added that constant Ukrainian reconnaissance and strikes against Russian logistics in the area have complicated Russian attempts to covertly accumulate armored vehicles.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within and east, south, and southwest of Dobropillya and west of Pokrovsk on October 2 and 3 but did not advance.[33]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 3.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on October 2 and 3 but did not advance.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Mokri Yaly River crossing near occupied Novoocheretuvate (roughly seven kilometers from the frontline) on October 2 or overnight on October 2 to 3, likely as part of an effort to disrupt Russian logistics and reinforcement capacity on the western bank of the river.[35]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces recently conducted two infiltration missions in the Hulyaipole direction. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in southern and central Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole), according to geolocated footage published on October 3, after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[36]

 

Russian forces reportedly conducted a platoon-sized mechanized assault west of Hulyaipole on an unspecified date aimed at testing Ukrainian defenses. Ukrainian forces struck Russian armored and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) west of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole) during a Russian mechanized assault on an unspecified date that first aimed to “probe” Ukrainian defenses, according to geolocated footage published on October 2.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within and northwest, west, and directly east of Orikhiv on October 2 and 3 but did not make confirmed advances.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 3 that Russian forces consolidated positions in the eastern part of Omelnyk (northeast of Orikhiv) but noted that there are many Ukrainian drones in the area, suggesting that Ukrainian drone operations are preventing Russian forces from advancing into the central and western parts of the settlement.[39] Another milblogger claimed on October 2 that Russian airborne (VDV) elements gained a foothold south of Novoyakovlivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[40]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on October 2 and 3 but did not advance.[41]

Ukraine’s ongoing intermediate-range strike campaign across occupied southern Ukraine continues to cause power and water issues in occupied Crimea. Crimean occupation energy operator Krymenergo reported on October 3 that it enacted power restrictions throughout Crimea, likely due to continuous Ukrainian strikes against Crimean energy infrastructure.[42] The water volume in Crimean reservoirs decreased by 11 million cubic meters in September 2026, according to the Russian occupation authorities.[43] Ukrainian forces have been striking Crimean energy infrastructure, including power plants and substations, throughout Summer 2026, causing repeated power outages that have subsequently affected water pumping stations at reservoirs.[44]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[45]

See topline text for more reports of Russian strikes against the Northern Bridge in Kyiv City. 

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 2 to 3 and Banderol loitering munition strikes on the morning of October 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 157 Shahed-type strike drones (45 of which were jet-powered), Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[46] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 131 drones; that drones hit 12 locations; and that debris fell at five locations. Ukrainian officials additionally reported that Russian forces struck Odesa Oblast with an unspecified number of Banderol loitering munitions on the morning of October 3, but that most of the Banderols did not reach their intended targets.[47] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile, Shahed and Gerbera-type drones (including jet-powered Shahed-type drones), and guided glide bombs against southern Ukraine at unspecified times between 0800 local time on October 2 and 0900 local time on October 3.[48] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck transport, residential, commercial, and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv oblasts and a vessel in Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast.[49] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Hostomel near Kyiv City overnight, and the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck a logistics center in the area.[50]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have struck at least 27 Ukrainian data centers since September 20, including in some repeat strikes, but the milblogger acknowledged that these hits caused only local and temporary disruptions.[51]

The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is upgrading Russian Garpiya drones to include jet engines, but Ukraine’s new interceptor drones will likely be able to defend against these new drones in the future. Russian forces exhibited new jet-powered versions of the Garpiya strike drone (a version of the Russian-made Geran-type drone) during the Center-2026 Strategic Command and Staff exercises in Chelyabinsk Oblast.[52] Russian forces already extensively use jet-powered Geran-type drones, and the Kremlin is likely expanding its jet-powered drone inventory to boost production and expand use of these faster drones. A Ukrainian source assessed on October 2, however, that production volumes for the modified Garpiya drones are not large and that the Garpiya drones do not currently use mesh modems or cameras for enhanced navigation and strike precision. Ukraine is actively working to test and scale up production of new interceptor drones that can down Russian jet-powered drones and drone-missile hybrids, and the window during which Ukrainian forces are unable to consistently down the jet-powered strike vehicles in high numbers may start to narrow in the near term.[53]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://x.com/sandumaiamd/status/2106288502438801787

 

[2] https://tvrmoldova dot md/article/9e16f417a7258869/nosatii-cele-cinci-incidente-de-sambata-implica-trei-rachete-si-doua-drone.html

[3] https://t.me/maeiexplica/5582

[4] https://t.me/MDNationalArmy/2634

[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/;

[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/

[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/

[8] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7755; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7756; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7757

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/

[11] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2151808/

[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/

[13] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7786

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/

[15] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2106400448680808909 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21182

[16] https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2106274451545375149

[17] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@35.817,53.371,13.699z

[18] https://t.me/tro119ua/132; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13107

[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360

[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/67897

[21] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22367

[22] https://t.me/severnnyi/9503

[23] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48312

[24] https://t.me/severnnyi/9503

[25] https://t.me/dva_majors/99933 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19967

[26] https://t.me/grvZapad/19967; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360

[27] https://t.me/grvZapad/19967; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933

[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/37360; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933

[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/37360

[30] https://t.me/dva_majors/99933

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56463; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933

[32] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHiuKvFUr2w&pp=0gcJCf4LAYcqIYzv; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1418331-na-desatki-kilometriv-uglib-93-ombr-urazae-logistiku-okupantiv-na-kostantinivskomu-napramku/

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42456

[36] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2106289060968800587?s=20; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1460763202650395

[37] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1814; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2106090886203338766?s=20

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56451

[39] https://t.me/voin_dv/21408

[40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56451

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451

[42] https://crimea-energy dot ru/about/news/13607-14-37; https://crimea-energy dot ru/about/news/13600-13-36; https://crimea-energy dot ru/about/news/13598-12-35

 

[43] https://t.me/rian_crimea/105786

[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-6-2026/; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/105596; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1375004-simferopol-kerc-ani-kapu-armansk-feodosia-bez-vodi-u-krimu-die-takoz-obmezenna-elektropostacanna/

[45] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[46] https://t.me/kpszsu/82542

[47] https://www.facebook.com/PvKPivden/posts/pfbid027VCcc9bxf5YLED6TVNePywWbzrkyUvMzHbDzSF2figavsmgxyrNXJ6rhMczVCdJ4l; https://t.me/kpszsu/82542

[48] https://www.facebook.com/PvKPivden/posts/pfbid027VCcc9bxf5YLED6TVNePywWbzrkyUvMzHbDzSF2figavsmgxyrNXJ6rhMczVCdJ4l

[49] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2106400448680808909; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32337; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32339; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32356; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32359; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7755; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7756; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7757; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/76472 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/03/u-gostomeli-cherez-rosijskyj-obstril-postrazhdaly-chetvero-lyudej-sered-nyh-dytyna/; https://t.me/kyivoda/59750; https://t.me/ampu_uspa/613; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1418499-rf-atakuvala-sudno-na-odesini-odin-zagiblij-troe-poranenih/;

[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/67891; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/76472 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/76472 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/03/u-gostomeli-cherez-rosijskyj-obstril-postrazhdaly-chetvero-lyudej-sered-nyh-dytyna/; https://t.me/kyivoda/59750

 

[51] https://t.me/rybar/83671

 

[52] https://t.me/milinfolive/180747; https://t.me/war_home/7720; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/reaktyvnyi-versiyu-garpyya/

[53] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/