Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 29, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:15 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:45 AM ET 

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Russian forces conducted devastating daytime long-range drone and loitering munition strikes against Ukraine on October 29, killing at least 19 and injuring at least 82. Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian jet-powered drone struck a commuter train at the Dnipro City railway station, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing at least 14 and injuring at least 14.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four jet-powered drones against Dnipro City, and that Ukrainian forces intercepted three drones.[2] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also conducted a Banderol loitering munition strike against a residential area in Chernihiv City, Chernihiv Oblast, killing at least two children and injuring at least 31 people, and a drone strike against an apartment building in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast, killing at least three and injuring at least 32, including six children.[3] The Ukrainian Air Force also reported that Russian forces launched 112 Shahed-type strike drones (40 of which were jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones against Ukraine overnight.[4]

The October 29 strikes are part of Russia’s continued effort to launch daytime strikes to make daily life in Ukraine untenable, inflict significant civilian casualties, and damage Ukraine’s economy. Russian forces have increased the brutality and lethality of their strike campaign throughout 2026, including conducting prolonged daytime and nighttime strike packages over several days designed to maximize civilian harm, leveraging vulnerabilities in Ukrainian air defenses, and introducing new technological adaptations like quasi-cruise missiles such as Banderols.[5] Russia’s October 29 long-range strikes, including against the Dnipro City railway station, demonstrate that Russia can inflict severe civilian harm when even a small percentage of drones penetrate Ukrainian defenses. Moscow is attempting to impose additional costs on the Ukrainian population ahead of Winter 2026-2027, as the Kremlin likely assesses that these long-range strikes can distract from Ukraine’s recent battlefield successes and ultimately force Ukraine into capitulation by making daily civilian life untenable.^[6]

Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to falsely portray Ukraine as the party responsible for the humanitarian catastrophe in Russian-occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, where the limited ceasefire continues without reported violations. Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets and Russian Human Rights Commissioner Yana Lantratova reported on October 29 that there have been no ceasefire violations in Russian-occupied Oleshky for 54 hours since the beginning of the ceasefire on the morning of October 27.[7] Putin attempted on October 29 to falsely blame Ukraine for mining approaches to occupied Oleshky and creating a “humanitarian catastrophe.”[8] Russian occupation authorities, on the contrary, are fully responsible for the humanitarian crisis in occupied Oleshky, and Russian forces have been repeatedly and deliberately disrupting humanitarian aid deliveries and evacuation routes into the settlement.[9] Russian occupation officials also refused to abide by their obligations under international law to provide civilians in occupied areas with food and aid during conflict and have suspended food and medicine deliveries since May 2026.[10] The Kremlin’s repeated rejections of three Ukraine-proposed local humanitarian ceasefires forced Ukrainian forces to conduct a drone food delivery to Oleshky residents in September 2026, and Russian forces intentionally shot down the drones carrying these provisions.[11]

The Kremlin is attempting to drive a wedge between European countries in an attempt to undermine Europe’s negotiation position on the war in Ukraine and exclude European representatives from peace talks so long as they refuse to accept Russia’s demands, including NATO’s rollback to its 1997 borders. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on October 29 that Europe does not have a unified and consistent position regarding Russian President Vladimir Putin’s October 27 call with Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store and noted that Russia did not expect this “inconsistency.”^[12] Ushakov also claimed that the current agreement involves only Ukraine-Russia-US trilateral talks, implying that European representatives will not be present at peace negotiations.[13] Ushakov added, however, that Russia will have to negotiate with people whom Russia “does not really like,” when commenting on the possibility of future dialogue with Europe.[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed on October 28 that Russia must support European representatives who understand the need for a dialogue with the Kremlin in the context of peace negotiations.[15] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on October 28 that European leaders continue demonstrating their unwillingness to discuss “Russian interests” and are voicing “unrealistic demands on Moscow.”^[16] The October 28 and 29 Russian officials’ statements indicate that the Kremlin is attempting to deny Europeans a seat at the negotiating table until they accede to Russia’s December 2021 demand that NATO curtail its presence in Europe to its 1997 borders, effectively amounting to the destruction of the NATO alliance and requiring an overhaul of Europe’s security architecture.[17] The Kremlin is also attempting to exploit Putin’s October 27 call with Stubb and Store to sow distrust among European states and thus weaken Europe’s negotiating position on the war in Ukraine.

The Kremlin is also likely setting conditions that would require Ukraine to make unilateral concessions before Russia agrees to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations in any format. Ushakov claimed on October 29 that trilateral negotiations between the United States, Ukraine, and Russia in Abu Dhabi will happen after November 4 (Russian National Unity Day) but noted that the date will depend on the “situation on the battlefield and the overall situation.”^[18] Ushakov also noted that Russia will monitor whether Ukraine conducts large-scale strikes around Russia's November 4 celebration, implying that Russian negotiating position will depend on Ukraine’s halting of long-range strikes despite the fact that the Kremlin has repeatedly refused to accept mutual long-range ceasefire agreements.[19] Kremlin officials have repeatedly weaponized exaggerated claims of Russian battlefield advances as leverage during peace negotiations to extract unilateral concessions from Ukraine, often framing such concessions as prerequisites for any meaningful peace negotiations.[20] It remains unclear exactly what conditionality Ushakov’s October 29 statements refer to, but the Kremlin is likely setting conditions to use establish arbitrary prerequisite demands that require unilateral Ukrainian concessions as conditions for renewing peace talks and frame Ukraine as the obstacle to peace if Ukraine fails to accept those demands.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted devastating daytime long-range drone and loitering munition strikes against Ukraine on October 29, killing at least 19 and injuring at least 82.
• The October 29 strikes are part of Russia’s continued effort to launch daytime strikes to make daily life in Ukraine untenable, inflict significant civilian casualties, and damage Ukraine’s economy.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to falsely portray Ukraine as the party responsible for the humanitarian catastrophe in Russian-occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, where the limited ceasefire continues without reported violations.
• The Kremlin is attempting to drive a wedge between European countries in an attempt to undermine Europe’s negotiation position on the war in Ukraine and exclude European representatives from peace talks so long as they refuse to accept Russia’s demands, including NATO’s rollback to its 1997 borders.
• The Kremlin is also likely setting conditions that would require Ukraine to make unilateral concessions before Russia agrees to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations in any format.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced southeast of Dobropillya.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian strikes have forced Yandex (Russia’s closest analogue to Google) to adjust revenue predictions. Yandex reported on October 29 that the company abandoned previously published revenue forecasts for 2026 following Ukrainian strikes against its data centers.[21] Ukrainian forces have struck Yandex data centers numerous times throughout October 2026 aimed at degrading Russian digital infrastructure, denying Russia the ability to fund its war in Ukraine, and responding to Russian strikes against Ukrainian data centers.[22]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 28 and 29 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[23]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Geran-type strike drone storage depot, an unspecified drone launch point, and a fuel and lubricants warehouse near Navlya (roughly 66 kilometers from the international border) on October 28 or overnight October 28 to 29.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck two Russian radar stations near Starodub (roughly 33 kilometers from the international border) and near Medvedovo (roughly 27 kilometers from the frontline).

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions north and northeast of Kharkiv City. A Ukrainian military source reported on October 28 that Russian forces are actively conducting infiltration missions north and northeast of Alisivka (north of Kharkiv City) and maintain at least partial control over Vysoka Yaruha (also north of Kharkiv City).[25] ISW assesses that Russian forces have likely infiltrated Vysoka Yaruha but do not maintain control over the settlement. A Russian servicemember surrendered to a Ukrainian drone north of Lyman (northeast of Kharkiv City), according to geolocated footage published on October 29, after a likely Russian infiltration mission.[26]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions north of Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian-occupied building in eastern Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv Oblast), according to geolocated footage published on October 28, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area contrary to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claim that Russian forces seized the settlement in September 2026.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 29 that Russian forces entered Tokarivka (north of Kharkiv City).[28]

The Belgorod Oblast government has reportedly started an initiative under which unspecified units within its control are striking Ukrainian drone launch points in order to prevent Ukrainian strikes against Belgorod Oblast. A Russian milblogger amplified claims on October 29 that Belgorod Oblast Governor Alexander Shuvaev started an initiative that established Belgorod Oblast administrative control over an unspecified military unit that is purportedly conducting strikes against Ukrainian drone launch points in Ukrainian territory.[29] The milblogger claimed that this unspecified unit recently struck six Ukrainian drone crews. ISW has not observed further evidence to corroborate these claims.

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Velykyi Burluk. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) stated on October 29 that Russian forces infiltrated Vilkhuvatka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk), but that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking and attempting to dislodge these Russian units.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 28 and 29 but did not advance.[31]

Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian regiment’s command post, likely in the Kupyansk direction. A Ukrainian brigade reported on October 28 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian 26th Tank Regiment’s (47th Tank Division [TD], 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District) command post in a High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) strike following months of surveillance.[32] ISW has observed evidence of the Russian 26th Tank Regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction.

A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that Russian forces continue conducting their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian logistics in the Borova direction to support Russian offensive operations in the area. The source claimed on October 28 that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian logistics and supply lines along the Oskil River near Oskil (southwest of Borova).[33]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)

NB: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 28 and 29 but did not advance.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Slovyansk on October 28 and 29 but did not advance.[35] A humanitarian support organization, the Relief Coordination Centre, reported on October 29 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck one of its civilian evacuation vehicles in Slovyansk, injuring two.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions north of Kostyantynivka. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position on the northern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage posted on October 28, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area contrary to Russian claims.[37] 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently advanced and conducted infiltration missions south and southeast of Dobropillya. A Ukrainian military source reported on October 28 that Russian forces have reached the southern edge of Dobropillya, indicating that Russian forces control Svitle and Vodyanske (both south of Dobropillya) and that Russian forces have infiltrated the area south and southeast of Dobropillya.[38] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets previously reported on October 21 that Russian forward units operating towards Dobropillya reached the line between Svitle and Bilytske (east of Svitle), indicating that Russian forces likely control the area east and southeast of Svitle.[39]

Russian forces continue conducting intensive efforts to facilitate ground advances into Dobropillya. A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya direction reported on October 29 that Russian forces are conducting intensive strike and reconnaissance drone operations and a large number of infiltration missions in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR).[40] The servicemember stated that Russian forces frequently conduct guided glide bomb strikes against Dobropillya itself, undermining Russian claims that Russian forces control Dobropillya.^[41]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Novopavlivka. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position in northeastern Fillya (southwest of Novopavlivka), according to footage published on October 28 and geolocated on October 29, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[42]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on October 28 and 29 but did not advance.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 28 and 29 but did not advance.[44]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations northwest of Orikhiv on October 28 and 29 but did not advance.[45]

See topline text for reporting on the localized ceasefire in occupied Kherson Oblast.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 29.

Russian milbloggers confirmed that Russian forces conducted the October 28 unmanned surface vehicle (USV) strike against a cargo ship off the coast of Bulgaria. Two Russian milbloggers claimed on October 29 that Russian forces struck and sank the Liberian-flagged Contship Jet ship using USVs, emphasizing that the strike served Russian interests.[46]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[47]

See topline text for reporting on Russian forces’ long-range strike campaign against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.