Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 27, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:15 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET

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Russian President Vladimir Putin used his October 27 call with Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store to reiterate Moscow’s longstanding demands in Ukraine and rearticulate Moscow’s claims that NATO expansion is among the “root causes” of the war. Putin also stated that “root causes” must be resolved as preconditions for any future peace negotiations. The October 27 phone call is Stubb’s first direct contact with Putin since becoming the Finnish president in 2024, Store’s first contact with Putin since becoming the Norwegian prime minister in 2021, and Putin’s first direct contact with European leaders since the May 9 meeting with Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico.[1] Store stated that the call was originally scheduled for 20 minutes but lasted for 90 minutes.[2] Putin reportedly provided Stubb and Store with his assessment of the current situation in Ukraine and explained the war’s “root causes,” the Kremlin’s shorthand for Russia’s maximalist war demands that include a puppet regime in Ukraine and retrograding the membership of NATO states that joined the alliance since 1997 — effectively granting Russia a veto over NATO internal policies and curtailing the sovereignty of many European states to choose to join alliances.[3] Putin also reportedly told Stubb and Store that a peace agreement must recognize the “realities on the ground,” another Russian rhetorical line used to demand the recognition of occupied Ukrainian territory as part of Russia as a precondition to any ceasefire or peace agreement in Ukraine.[4] A source close to the Kremlin claimed that Putin’s statement about “ground realities” signifies that Russia would not compromise on its goal of seizing all of Donbas.[5] Putin has repeatedly outlined Russia’s demands that extend far beyond Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and Donetsk Oblast and may include the entire territory of Ukraine.[6]

Stubb, Store, and Putin also discussed ensuring “security and stability” in the Baltic Sea and northern Europe.[7] Stubb and Store likely discussed Russia’s intensifying drone incursions into NATO airspace, sabotage attacks, and other activities that are part of Russia’s phase zero campaign to set information and psychological conditions for a future conflict with NATO and likely sought to deter further Russian malign acts.[8]

Russia and Ukraine began observing a limited ceasefire in Russian-occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, on October 27 to facilitate humanitarian aid deliveries and evacuate civilians from the settlement. Both sides are reportedly abiding by the ceasefire terms as of this writing. Ukrainian and Russian sources confirmed that Russia and Ukraine began observing a limited ceasefire at 0300 local Kyiv time (0400 local Moscow time) on October 27 and noted that the ceasefire will last until 2259 local Kyiv time on November 1.[9] Ukraine’s Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia and Ukraine have not recorded any ceasefire violations.[10] Verkhovna Rada Deputy David Arakhamiya noted on October 27 that the ceasefire agreement is the “largest de-escalation” between Russia and Ukraine since 2022.[11]

It remains unclear how the Russian authorities will treat Ukrainians evacuated from Oleshky and whether Russian occupation authorities will provide the residents a legitimate and duress-free choice to return to Ukrainian government-controlled Ukraine. Putin specifically described Oleshky as a “Russian settlement” in his phone call with Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store on October 27 despite the fact that under international law and Russian treaties that recognized Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders, Oleshky remains a Ukrainian territory under Russian military occupation.[12] People familiar with discussions surrounding the limited ceasefire told Financial Times on October 17 that the Russian authorities will take Oleshky residents to occupied Crimea or de jure Russian territory in the Russian Federation before allowing the residents to return to Ukraine.[13] Russian occupation authorities have long maintained a coercive and oppressive policy towards Ukrainian residents in Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine, including forced deportation, detention, filtration, and coercive passportization policies — whereby Russian occupation authorities force Ukrainian residents to accept Russian passports in exchange for access to healthcare and other social services — and it remains unclear how Russian authorities will treat Oleshky residents.[14] Russian authorities may insist that Ukrainian citizens who lived under Russian occupation in Oleshky and received Russian passports are now Russian citizens without legal recourse to return to Ukraine, for example. The limited ceasefire agreement does not outline how Russian authorities must treat Oleshky residents or where Russian authorities will allow the residents to ultimately return to Ukraine. The disposition of Ukrainian citizens who remained in Oleshky remains unresolved and will need to be addressed in any future ceasefire or peace agreement.

The Russian 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District) operating in the Kupyansk direction is reportedly planning to disband several platoons to create an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) company.[15] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) noted that the restructuring is occurring while the regiment’s battalions are severely depleted and have limited personnel to carry out operations in the Kupyansk direction. ISW cannot independently verify the report, and it remains unclear whether the restructuring is part of a limited Russian effort to reconstitute combat power by dissolving understaffed platoons into a more effective UAS company or whether this is part of a larger effort to provide the Russian regiment with an organic UAS unit to support the regiment’s operations.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin used his October 27 call with Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store to reiterate Moscow’s longstanding demands in Ukraine and rearticulate Moscow’s claims that NATO expansion is among the “root causes” of the war. Putin also stated that “root causes” must be resolved as preconditions for any future peace negotiations.
• Russia and Ukraine began observing a limited ceasefire in Russian-occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, on October 27 to facilitate humanitarian aid deliveries and evacuate civilians from the settlement. Both sides are reportedly abiding by the ceasefire terms as of this writing.
• It remains unclear how the Russian authorities will treat Ukrainians evacuated from Oleshky and whether Russian occupation authorities will provide the residents a legitimate and duress-free choice to return to Ukrainian government-controlled Ukraine.
• The Russian 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District) operating in the Kupyansk direction is reportedly planning to disband several platoons to create an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) company.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on October 27.
• Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles and 280 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources provided updated battlefield damage assessments (BDA) for strikes against Russian military assets. Ukrainian OSINT sources published satellite imagery on October 27 showing damage to the 24th and 25th workshops and a hangar at the Russian 75th Arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) air defense system storage and repair facility in Serpukhov, Moscow Oblast (roughly 371 kilometers from the international border) following a Ukrainian strike overnight on October 21 to 22.[16]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 26 and 27 but did not advance.[17]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 26 and 27 but did not advance.[18]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in central Chuhunivka (northeast of Kharkiv City), according to geolocated footage published on October 26, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[19]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission southeast of Kupyansk on a prior date. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position at a train station in central Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, according to footage likely recorded in August 2026 and geolocated on October 26, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[20]

A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 27, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[21]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)

NB: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 26 and 27 but did not advance.[22]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continue conducting their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian logistics in the Fortress Belt to set conditions for future ground operations. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 27 that Russian forces are employing a “thousand cuts” tactic, a tactic involving strikes against Ukraine’s logistics and rear infrastructure, to degrade Ukraine’s ability to resupply fortified positions in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.[23] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces use airstrikes to degrade Ukrainian ammunition and equipment logistics, damage infrastructure in Ukraine’s rear, and limit Ukrainian forces’ ability to rotate personnel. The milblogger noted that Ukraine’s extensive fortifications and the geography of the cities make direct assaults slow and difficult. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces aim to use glide bomb strikes to gradually destroy Ukrainian fortifications while simultaneously striking Ukrainian logistics to deny Ukrainian forces in the city access to resources required to repair damaged fortifications. Geolocated footage posted on October 26 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kramatorsk to degrade Ukrainian logistics in the city.[24]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction on October 26 and 27 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 27 that Russian forces advanced in western Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka).[25]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Dobropillya on October 26 and 27 but did not make confirmed advances.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 26 that Russian forces advanced north of Serhiivka (southwest of Dobropillya).[27]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on October 26 and 27 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Oleksandrivka.[28]

Ukrainian counterattacks toward Velyka Novosilka (east of Oleksandrivka) could disrupt Russian operations across Zaporizhia Oblast due to the settlement’s role as an operationally significant logistics hub for Russian forces. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 26 that continued Ukrainian counterattacks towards Velyka Novosilka (southeast of Oleksandrivka) could threaten Russian operations across the Russian Eastern GoFs’ area of responsibility (AoR), since Velyka Novosilka serves as an operational logistics hub for Russian forces.[29] The milblogger added that the Russian military leadership deployed elite drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems to the area in an effort to stabilize the situation and counter Ukrainian counterattacks northwest of Velyka Novosilka, according to recent footage published on October 24.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 26 and 27 but did not advance.[31]

See topline text for reporting on the localized ceasefire in occupied Oleshky.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 27.

Russian forces continue to expand their drone infrastructure in occupied Crimea. A Ukrainian OSINT analyst published satellite imagery on October 26 showing that Russia is constructing over 20 small shelters protected with berms and around 40 smaller sites for drone storage, maintenance, and pre-launch preparations at the Hvardiiske Airbase near Hvardiiske, Crimea (roughly 188 kilometers from the frontline).[32] The analyst reported that Russian forces use mobile launch platforms rather than stationary installations for drone launches at the Hvardiiske Airbase, likely to protect launch platforms from Ukrainian strikes. Russian forces have been rapidly expanding their drone launch and storage capacity near Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, and at the Tsimbulova Droneport in Oryol Oblast since Summer 2026, as Russian forces are heavily relying on jet-powered drones to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses at greater operational depths.[33]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[34]

Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles and 280 drones (including 69 jet-powered ones) against Ukraine overnight on October 26 to 27, primarily targeting Kyiv City.[35] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces conducted a double-tap ballistic missile strike targeting emergency services responding to a previous missile strike against the campus of a university in Kyiv City that injured five students and university staff.[36] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported that Russian forces struck the Southern Bridge in Kyiv City, forcing authorities to close traffic on the bridge.[37]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.