Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 24, 2026

Assessment as of: 4:30 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:45 AM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Ukrainian officials are confirming the resumption of unrestricted access to SpaceX’s low-earth orbit satellite communication technology (Starlink and Starshield) without disruptions in Ukraine on October 24. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukrainian Defense Minister Yevheniy Khmara, and sources within the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD), reported on October 24 that Starlink/Starshield terminals are operating at speeds exceeding 161 kilometers per hour (about 100 miles per hour) and that Ukrainian forces are recording speeds of over 400 kilometers per hour (about 248 miles per hour) and reporting stable connections.[1]

Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine overnight on October 23 to 24 caused power outages across occupied Ukrainian oblasts including occupied Crimea. Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed on October 24 that Ukrainian drone debris fell at a substation near Bely, Temryuk raion, Krasnodar Krai (about 69 kilometers from the Ukrainian border).[2] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from October 24 shows heat anomalies at the Taman electrical substation located near Bely, Krasnodar Krai that likely caused power outages in occupied Crimea and across occupied Ukraine, according to Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi.[3] The Taman substation is the main power node connecting all four lines of the Russian energy bridge that transmits electricity from Russia to occupied Crimea.[4] Data from the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) between October 23 and 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck five “power hubs,” likely referring to electrical power stations, as part of Ukraine’s ongoing operation Crimea Switch Off in occupied Crimea.[5]

The Russian Ministry of Energy claimed on October 24 that there are power outages in occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts due to an “external impact” on energy infrastructure facilities.[6] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on October 24 that a Ukrainian drone strike against an unspecified main power grid node outside of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast caused power outages in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[7] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on October 24 that Ukrainian strikes against energy infrastructure outside of Sevastopol caused power outages in Sevastopol and added that public energy facilities are switching to backup power systems.[8] Razvozhaev noted that only 40 percent of Sevastopol apartment buildings have power and that Sevastopol is operating on a “two through six” schedule (residents receiving power for two hours and having outages for six hours).[9] Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov claimed on October 24 that there are electricity and water supply restrictions in occupied Crimea following Ukrainian drone strikes and power outages outside of occupied Crimea.[10] A local Crimean-based Telegram channel claimed on October 23 that consumers observed simultaneous power outages in occupied Sevastopol, Simferopol, Yalta, Feodosia, Alushta, Dzhankoy, and other major settlements in occupied Crimea.[11] The channel noted that the power bridge into occupied Crimea is not working, and that occupied Crimea is relying on its own power generators.[12] Internet observation organization NetBlocks reported a sharp drop in internet traffic in occupied Crimea following Ukrainian drone strikes against energy infrastructure on October 24.[13]

Ukraine agreed to observe a limited ceasefire in Russian-occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast beginning on October 27, indicating a convergence between Russia and Ukraine on the ceasefire start date, but the geographical extent and other terms of the ceasefire remain unclear. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on October 23 that Ukraine will observe a ceasefire in a “designated area” of Russian-occupied Oleshky beginning at 0300 local Kyiv time on October 27 to conduct a humanitarian operation in occupied Oleshky.[14] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov stated on October 23 that Russia has agreed to the limited ceasefire “in the Kherson direction” beginning at 0400 local Moscow time (equivalent to 0300 Kyiv time) on October 27.[15] Russian Human Rights Commissioner Yana Lantratova claimed on October 23 that there will be a safe passage for citizens who wish to leave the combat zone.[16] Ukraine and Russia agreed to begin observing a ceasefire on the morning of October 27 but the precise geographical area that the ceasefire will cover and whether the Russian forces will provide a legitimate and duress-free choice to the Ukrainian Oleshky residents to evacuate to Ukraine or Russia remains unclear.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials are confirming the resumption of unrestricted access to SpaceX’s low-earth orbit satellite communication technology (Starlink and Starshield) without disruptions in Ukraine on October 24.
• Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine overnight on October 23 to 24 caused power outages across occupied Ukrainian oblasts including occupied Crimea.
• Ukraine agreed to observe a limited ceasefire in Russian-occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast beginning on October 27, indicating a convergence between Russia and Ukraine on the ceasefire start date, but the geographical extent and other terms of the ceasefire remain unclear.
• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Dobropillya.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military, energy, and industrial infrastructure on the night of October 23 to 24. Russian forces launched 126 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military, energy, and industrial infrastructure on the night of October 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified Russian aircraft at Yeysk Airfield in Krasnodar Krai (roughly 178 kilometers from the frontline) and the Tolyattikauchuk petrochemical plant in Tolyatti, Samara Oblast (roughly 775 kilometers from the international border) on October 23 or overnight on October 23 to 24.[17] Geolocated footage published on October 24 shows a fire at the Tolyattikauchuk petrochemical plant following Ukrainian strikes.[18] Tolyatti City Mayor Ilya Sukhikh acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes damaged industrial facilities in the city.[19] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel posted footage on October 24 showing Ukrainian forces striking the Omskiy Kauchuk Chemical Plant and the Ozon warehouse in Omsk City, Omsk Oblast (roughly 2,500 kilometers from the international border), causing fires.[20] Geolocated footage published on October 24 shows the aftermath of the strike against the Omskiy Kauchuk Chemical Plant which reportedly damaged its D-3 and D-5 production units.[21] Omsk Oblast Governor Vitaliy Khotsenko acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck Omsk City’s northern industrial zone.[22] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar reported on October 24 that Ukrainian drone debris fell on a Rostovpassazhirtrans trucking company branch in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast and damaged a transformer station in Kalinin, Rostov Oblast (both between roughly 190 and 200 kilometers from the frontline), causing localized power outages.[23]

The Ukrainian General Staff provided an updated battlefield damage assessment (BDA) of Ukraine's October 23 strike against the Proton-Electrotex plant in Oryol City, Oryol Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on October 24 that Ukraine’s October 23 strike damaged the main production building of the Proton-Electrotex plant — a manufacturer of optoelectronic equipment for S-71 Kover cruise missiles, Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and Pantsir-S1 air defense systems — in Oryol City, Oryol Oblast (roughly 161 kilometers from the international border).[24]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 24 that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, but ISW did observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[25] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 24 that Russian forces are conducting a personnel rotation in Krasnopillya raion southeast of Sumy City.[26]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 23 and 24 but did not advance.[27] Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on October 24 that Russian forces are actively attacking toward Vilcha, Vovchanski Khutory, and Bilyi Kolodyaz (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[28] Trehubov stated that terrain features in the area are forcing Russian forces to use the same routes repeatedly to attack the settlements, likely enhancing Ukrainian forces’ ability to detect and strike Russian infiltration groups.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 23 and 24 but did not advance.[29]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian drone and subsurface operations north of Kupyansk are denying Russian forces a staging ground from which to conduct infiltration missions into Kupyansk from the north. Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on October 24 that Russian forces move through Holubivka (just north of Kupyansk) to reach Kupyansk but do not permanently station their troops in the settlement, indicating that Russian forces do not maintain a consistent presence in Holubivka.[30] Trehubov stated that Russian forces rarely manage to enter Radkivka (west of Holubivka and north of Kupyansk) and typically do so only during poor weather conditions, indicating that Ukrainian drone operations are preventing Russian forces from establishing control over Radkivka. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on October 23 that Ukrainian forces took control of a section of an underground pipeline extending from Radkivka to a point northeast of Holubivka where the pipeline passes beneath the Oskil River.[31] The source claimed that Ukrainian control of the pipeline in this area prevents Russian forces from reaching the northern part of Kupyansk. The source claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain drone air superiority in this area, which prevents Russian forces from using open terrain to conduct infiltration missions into Kupyansk.

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova on October 24, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[32]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 23 and 24 but did not advance.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Slovyansk on October 23 and 24 but did not advance.[34] Geolocated footage published on October 23 shows a Russian fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone striking a Ukrainian civilian evacuation vehicle in Slovyansk.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within, west of, and northwest of Kostyantynivka on October 23 and 24 but did not advance.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces conducted an airstrike on a Russian position in central Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya), according to geolocated footage published on October 23, indicating that Russian forces advanced in the area.[37]

Russian forces reportedly conducted a large motorized assault in the Pokrovsk direction on October 21. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on October 23 that Russian forces conducted the largest motorized assault in its area of responsibility (AoR) of 2026, using motorcycles and other vehicles.[38] The brigade added that Russian forces attempted to advance at dawn under low-visibility weather conditions, but that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault, eliminating 43 Russian personnel and injuring 12.

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on October 23 and 24 but did not advance.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 24 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking towards Perebudova (northeast of Oleksandrivka) along the left (western) bank of the Mokri Yaly River.[40]

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 24 that Russian forces advanced north of Marivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[41]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 23 and 24 but did not advance.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 24 that Russian forces advanced toward Novosoloshyne (northwest of Hulyaipole and 12 kilometers from the furthest Russian advances).[43] The milbloggers’ reporting patterns are consistent with the Kremlin’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to fabricate claims of Russian tactical successes in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing, contrary to all available evidence.[44]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Orikhiv direction on October 23 and 24 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[45]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 24.

Russian forces continue to hunt civilians using human safari tactics in Kherson Oblast. Footage published on October 24 shows a Russian drone striking a civilian walking a dog in Kherson Oblast.[46] Russian forces in the Kherson direction have long employed human safari tactics, in which Russian drone operators purposefully hunt civilians as part of the broader effort to institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a tool of war.[47]

See topline text for reporting on power outages in occupied Crimea.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[48]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 23 to 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 126 Shahed-type (61 of which were jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol and Dan-T loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the direction of Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk Cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[49] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 101 drones and loitering munitions, that an unspecified number of aerial vehicles struck 14 locations, and debris fell at five locations.

Russian forces continue striking Ukrainian bridges across the Dnipro River as part of their campaign to degrade Ukraine’s economy and logistics across the Dnipro River. Geolocated footage published on October 24 shows Russian strikes against the Zaporizhzhia Cable-Stayed Bridge in Zaporizhzhia City.[50]

Russian forces fielded two new small cruise missiles based on the Geran-5 drone as part of Russia’s continued focus on producing scalable and more cost-effective ground- and air-launched cruise missiles and jet-powered drones that are difficult for Ukrainian forces to intercept at scale. Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi reported on October 23 that Russian forces have introduced two modified Geran-5 K5-K variants that feature redesigned fuselages with changes to their tail assembly, wing design, and internal turbojet engine mounting.^[51] Ukrainian military personnel stated to Militarnyi that Russian designers made changes to the design to increase the missiles’ maximum speed to 900 kilometers per hour, comparable to the Russian Kh-101 cruise missile.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.