Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 23, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:00 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:30 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Ukrainian officials are widely reporting continued in-motion speed restrictions on SpaceX’s low-earth orbit satellite communication technology (Starlink and Starshield) on October 23, but the situation remains unclear. Ukrainian sources, including the Ukrainian General Staff and sources within the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD), reported on October 23 that Ukrainian forces have observed “cases of connection loss” in Starlink/Starshield terminal operations at speeds of 161 kilometers per hour (around 100 miles per hour).[1] Sources within the Ukrainian MoD stated that there has been “no confirmation” about the removal of in-motion speed restrictions.[2] Ukrainian defense minister Serhii Sternenko stated that the situation with Starlink/Starshield speed restrictions “remains ambiguous” since some Ukrainian units report the resumption of operations at speeds exceeding the previously established limits, but the resumption does not apply to all missions, and he noted that some disruptions continue.[3] The situation regarding in-motion Starlink/Starshield speed restrictions remains unclear, but Ukrainian sources are emphasizing that Ukrainian forces continue experiencing problems with accessing Starlink/Starshield terminals as of October 23.

Russia and Ukraine have reportedly agreed to a limited ceasefire in Russian-occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast. The White House reported on October 23 that US First Lady Melania Trump secured a localized ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine in Russia-occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast beginning on October 29 to facilitate humanitarian aid deliveries and a civilian evacuation from the city amid a dire humanitarian crisis.[4] Ukraine’s Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets confirmed on October 23 the White House’s press release and noted that Ukraine and Russia agreed to conduct a humanitarian mission in occupied Oleshky, including securing a limited ceasefire, delivering humanitarian cargo to the city, and ensuring the free movement of civilians from the settlement.[5] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov confirmed on October 23 that Russia agreed to the limited ceasefire in the Kherson direction beginning at 0400 local Moscow time on October 27 — a notably different start date from the one given in the White House press release.[6]

Russian occupation authorities are fully responsible for the humanitarian crisis in Oleshky and have repeatedly and deliberately blocked evacuation and humanitarian routes into the settlement since the beginning of Russia's occupation.[7] Russian occupation authorities stopped the delivery of food and other critical supplies into Oleshky in late December 2025 and have failed to deliver any food or medicine to Oleshky since May 2026. The Kremlin rejected three local humanitarian ceasefire proposals from Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets in May, July, and September 2026, after which Ukrainian forces conducted an operation to provide food to Oleshky residents via drone drops in September 2026.[8] Russian authorities have long refused to address the humanitarian crisis in Oleshky, and Gerasimov’s October 23 statement is the first instance of a Russian attempt to facilitate humanitarian aid deliveries.

Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated his long-standing commitment to wider territorial aims in Ukraine far beyond Donetsk Oblast by invoking mythologized and false Russian “historical claims”. Putin claimed on October 22 that occupied Ukraine is “the territory of historical Russia” while rejecting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s October 21 proposal to freeze the current frontline as part of a ceasefire agreement.[9] Putin also claimed that the “latest genetic research” identifies Russians and Ukrainians as “one people.” Putin’s October 22 reference to “historical Russia” likely refers to "Novorossiya" — an amorphous invented region in southern and eastern Ukraine that the Kremlin has claimed is “integral” to Russia.[10] Novorossiya notably includes not only Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts), but also Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[11] Putin’s invocation of Russia’s historical claims demands that Ukraine surrender the Ukrainian-controlled 20.5 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 24.5 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast, including Zaporizhzhia City with a pre-war population of over 700,000 people, and 30 percent of Kherson Oblast, including Kherson City with a pre-war population of nearly 300,000 people. Putin’s October 23 statement explicitly demonstrates that Russian demands extend far beyond Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and Donetsk Oblast and may include the entire territory of Ukraine. Putin also emphasized his commitment to achieving all Russian war goals, which include the Russian demand for Ukraine’s full capitulation.[12] Putin’s statement demonstrates that the Kremlin is willing to participate in “negotiations” with Ukraine solely for the purpose of accepting Kyiv's surrender — not for the purpose of coming to some compromise peace agreement.

Putin also agreed to discuss the “European security architecture as a whole” after ensuring Ukraine’s and Russia’s future security.^[13] Putin’s comment on “revising” the European security architecture refers to another Russian long-standing demand first articulated in the December 2021 ultimatum preceding the full-scale invasion that includes halting the deployment of military forces and weapons systems to NATO states that joined the alliance after 1997 and granting Russia a veto over certain NATO exercises.[14] Putin’s December 2021 demands are incompatible with US President Donald Trump’s commitment to maintaining a US military presence in Poland and the current US troop deployments in the Baltic States.

The Kremlin appears to be increasingly adopting a more cautious monetary policy amid continued inflationary pressures, which may pose risks to wage growth and Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Russian Central Bank announced on October 23 that it would keep the key interest rate at 14 percent for the second consecutive month, after lowering the rate 10 times over the past 18 months, citing elevated price pressure and high inflation expectations.[15] The Central Bank’s baseline scenario assumes an average key interest rate of 12.5 to 13.5 percent in 2027 — only 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points below the current rate. The Central Bank noted that underlying price growth is “not slowing” and identified pro-inflationary risks (or risk factors that increase inflation over the medium term), including price growth between five and six percent and estimated annual inflation of 6.8 percent. The Central Bank estimated that annual inflation will range between 7.1 and 7.6 percent by the end of 2026, a slight increase from the Central Bank’s September 11 announcement, and noted that volatile items like motor fuel (an oblique reference to the effects of Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure) will continue impacting price dynamics. Russian Central Bank Chairwoman Elvira Nabiullina stated on October 23 that supply and demand continue facing inflationary risks, elevated inflation expectations, labor market tensions, and a larger budget deficit.[16] Nabiullina stated that Russia has experienced a decrease in consumer activity and that Russia’s GDP growth estimates for 2026 are between 0.5 and one percent. Nabiullina stated that the Central Bank is aiming to return the inflation rate to four percent in 2027.

The Russian Central Bank’s continued reduction of the key interest rate over an 18-month period prior to September 2026 likely contributed to domestic inflationary pressures.[17] Nabiullina has consistently expressed the need for monetary restraint — often trying to resist the Kremlin’s demands to expand capital availability for the Russian DIB and devalue the ruble to increase export revenues, despite ongoing fiscal inflationary pressures.[18] The Central Bank’s apparent success in avoiding further interest rate reductions at this time indicates that Putin has likely become more tolerant of contractionary monetary policy. Putin has recently prioritized reducing inflation to secure support amongst the Russian population by attempting to reduce the economic effects of Russian war spending, a prioritization that may have led him to accept Nabiullina’s fiscal policy for now.[19] Keeping the key rate at the current level will likely suppress wage growth and limit the amount of capital available to the Russian DIB, which may prevent Putin from achieving his goals of raising Russians’ effective purchasing power and maintaining the DIB’s production capacity. It remains difficult to assess, however, what effect fiscal policy will have on wage inflation and Russians’ quality of life, since Russia’s persistent labor shortages drive wage inflation for employed individuals while households face pressures that nominal wage figures do not capture.[20]

A likely Russian drone struck a cargo ship off the coast of Romania and drone debris fell in Moldova on October 23. Romanian President Nicusor Dan stated on October 23 that an unspecified drone struck a Comoros-flagged Khoryv cargo ship “near Romanian territorial waters” and added that the strike is a consequence of “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.”[21] The Romanian Naval Authority reported that the Khoryv vessel sent a distress signal about 13 nautical miles (around 24 kilometers and just outside of the Romanian territorial waters) off the coast of Constanta, Romania.[22] European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called the October 23 drone strike yet another “Russian escalation” in the Black Sea.[23] Territorial waters extend up to 12 nautical miles (about 22 kilometers) from the country's shoreline, and states have sovereignty and jurisdiction over their territorial waters.[24] The October 23 drone strike comes against the backdrop of recent escalating Russian strikes against vessels in the Black Sea, including likely Russian drone strikes against two commercial tankers within Romanian territorial waters on October 14 and 15 and strikes against civilian vessels in the Bulgarian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) overnight on October 12 to 13.[25] The Moldovan police separately reported on October 23 that drone debris fell up to 100 meters from a residential building near Chistelnica, Telenesti Raion, Moldova.[26] These continuous, likely Russian violations of Moldovan and Romanian sovereign territory demonstrate Russia’s increasing willingness to pursue strike tactics that may directly impact the territory of NATO or NATO-aligned states.[27]

Ukraine and Russia conducted civilian prisoner and prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on October 23. Ukrainian and Russian authorities reported on October 23 that Ukraine and Russia exchanged 270 prisoners each.[28] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russia returned nine civilian prisoners back to Ukraine as part of the exchange.[29] Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported that the October 23 POW exchange is the third stage of a combined prisoner swap that began on August 19, 2026.[30] Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets separately reported that Russia and Ukraine exchanged seven more civilians on October 23.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials are widely reporting continued in-motion speed restrictions on SpaceX’s low-earth orbit satellite communication technology (Starlink and Starshield) on October 23, but the situation remains unclear.
• Russia and Ukraine have reportedly agreed to a limited ceasefire in Russian-occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated his long-standing commitment to wider territorial aims in Ukraine far beyond Donetsk Oblast by invoking mythologized and false Russian “historical claims”.
• The Kremlin appears to be increasingly adopting a more cautious monetary policy amid continued inflationary pressures, which may pose risks to wage growth and Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB).
• A likely Russian drone struck a cargo ship off the coast of Romania, and drone debris fell in Moldova on October 23.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted civilian prisoner and prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on October 23.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Kostyantynivka.
• Russian forces launched 176 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukraine continued its long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets overnight on October 22 to 23 and on October 23.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces launched a large strike package toward Moscow City, prompting the suspension of operations at all four Moscow area airports and the evacuation of government administrative buildings. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed on October 23 that 155 Ukrainian drones targeted Moscow Oblast overnight on October 22 and 23.[32] Russian state aviation regulator Rosaviatsia announced on October 23 that Vnukovo, Domodedovo, Zhukovsky, and Sheremetyevo airports — all four major airports servicing Moscow City — introduced temporary restrictions.[33] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel posted an image on October 23 showing drone debris on the tarmac at Sheremetyevo Airport.[34] The channel also published footage on October 23 purporting to show balloons flying over Moscow City, purportedly carrying explosives or small drones.[35] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on October 23 that Russian authorities evacuated the IQ-Quarter tower in Moscow City, which reportedly houses offices for the Russian Ministries of Economic Development, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Digital Development, and the Federal Agency for Technical Regulation and Metrology.[36]

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range strikes against a Russian defense industrial facility, a chemical production plant, and administrative and military infrastructure in Russia. Geolocated footage published on October 23 shows the moment of a likely Ukrainian missile strike against the Proton plant in Oryol City, Oryol Oblast (roughly 161 kilometers from the frontline).[37] A Ukrainian OSINT channel stated that reportedly Ukrainian Storm Shadow cruise missiles struck the plant.[38] Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi reported that the plant manufactures components for the Russian S-71 Kover cruise missiles, Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and Pantsir-S1 air defense systems.[39] Geolocated footage published on October 23 shows a Ukrainian FP-1 drone approaching the Azot UralKhim Chemical Plant in Berezniki, Perm Krai (roughly 1,585 kilometers from the international border) and smoke plumes rising from the facility.[40] Perm Krai governor Dmitry Makhonin acknowledged on October 23 that Ukrainian forces struck and damaged an industrial facility.[41] A Ukrainian OSINT channel posted footage on October 23 purporting to show Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Federal Taxation Service data center in Gorodets, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (roughly 785 kilometers from the international border).[42] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin acknowledged on October 23 that drone debris damaged unspecified infrastructure in Gorodets raion.[43] A Ukrainian OSINT channel posted on October 23 an image showing smoke plumes near Baltimore Air Base in Voronezh City (roughly 190 kilometers from the international border).[44] The channel reported that preliminary information indicates that Ukrainian forces targeted the former Voronezh Military Aviation Engineering University and an adjacent military aircraft parking area.[45] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev acknowledged on October 23 that Ukrainian drones targeted Voronezh City.[46]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 23 but did not advance.[47]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions northeast and northwest of Kharkiv City. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions southeast of Khrypuny (northeast of Kharkiv City) and south of Nova Kozacha (northwest of Kharkiv City), according to geolocated footage published on October 20 and 22, respectively, after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk on October 22 and 23 but did not advance.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 22 and 23 but did not make confirmed advances.[50]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on October 23.

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 22 and 23 but did not advance.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 23 that Russian forces are developing an offensive from Yampil (southeast of Lyman) towards Ozerne (southwest of Yampil) and Dibrova (west of Yampil).[52]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Slovyansk on October 23.[53] Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin ordered on October 22 the mandatory evacuation of all families with children in Kramatorsk and Slovyansk hromadas due to ongoing Russian strikes against civilian and residential infrastructure.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sofiivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 22.[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in southern Dobropillya. Russian forces are operating in southern Dobropillya, according to geolocated footage published on October 22, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[56] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 21 that Russian forces infiltrated southern Dobropillya.[57]

Russian sources continue to use likely AI-generated or AI-altered footage to make aggrandized claims in the Dobropillya direction. A Russian source published footage on October 23 purportedly showing Russian forces raising flags in Vesele Pole (north of Dobropillya and roughly 12 kilometers from the furthest assessed extent of Russian advances).[58] ISW has reason to believe that the Russian flag raising video may be AI-generated or AI-altered, which would be consistent with previous Russian information operations that use AI footage to claim battlefield advances.[59]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on October 23.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 22 and 23 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[60]

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions west of Orikhiv. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in eastern Stepnohirsk, according to geolocated footage published on October 22, after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 23 that Russian forces advanced south of Lukyanivske (west of Orikhiv).[62]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian drone operators in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies manpower concentration near Kamyanka, Zaporizhia Oblast (roughly 31 kilometers from the frontline) on October 22 or overnight on October 22 to 23.[63]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 23.

See topline text for reporting on the localized ceasefire in occupied Oleshky.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are operating near Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv), according to a Russian milblogger.[64] ISW last observed elements of the 119^th VDV Regiment operating in Sumy Oblast as of July 2025.[65]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[66]

Russian forces launched 176 drones against Ukraine overnight on October 22 to 23.[67]

See the infographic below for more information from the Ukrainian Air Force about Russian drone strikes.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42663; https://hromadske dot ua/en/world/273025-trump-says-musk-lifted-starlink-restrictions-in-ukraine-but-kyiv-reports-limits-remain?_gl=1ybpufa_upMQ.._gaODM4MjAzNTMyLjE3OTI3Njk2MTU._ga_QRXBZKG0YNczE3OTI3Njk2MTQkbzEkZzEkdDE3OTI3Njk2NzgkajYwJGwwJGgw_ga_PB4ZGJGX9D*czE3OTI3Njk2MTQkbzEkZzEkdDE3OTI3Njk2NzgkajYwJGwwJGgw

[2] https://hromadske dot ua/en/world/273025-trump-says-musk-lifted-starlink-restrictions-in-ukraine-but-kyiv-reports-limits-remain?_gl=1ybpufa_upMQ.._gaODM4MjAzNTMyLjE3OTI3Njk2MTU._ga_QRXBZKG0YNczE3OTI3Njk2MTQkbzEkZzEkdDE3OTI3Njk2NzgkajYwJGwwJGgw_ga_PB4ZGJGX9D*czE3OTI3Njk2MTQkbzEkZzEkdDE3OTI3Njk2NzgkajYwJGwwJGgw

[3] https://t.me/ssternenko/65177

[4] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/10/first-lady-melania-trump-secures-ceasefire-between-russia-and-ukraine-localized-to-oleshky/

[5] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/12907

[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/68479

[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/oleshky-how-russia-governs-through-humanitarian-decline/

[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/

[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81071 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2026/

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2026/ http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/20796 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/

[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/

[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/ ; 

[13] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81071

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_26-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://tass dot ru/politika/13380415; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-issues-list-demands-tensions-europe-ukraine-nato; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/

[15] https://www.cbr dot ru/press/pr/?file=23102026_133000key.htm ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2026/

[16] https://www.cbr dot ru/press/event/?id=32929

[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2026/

[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/

[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2026/

[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2025/

[21] https://www.facebook.com/NicusorDan.ro/posts/1652795266196881?ref=embed_post

[22] https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/88003; https://www.reuters.com/world/romania-blames-russia-drone-that-sinks-cargo-ship-1-killed-3-missing-2026-10-23/

[23] https://x.com/vonderleyen/status/2113586098383262079

[24] https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2026/

[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/

[26] https://t.me/Politia_Republicii_Moldova/17425

[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2026/

[28] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21483; https://t.me/mod_russia/68472; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42665; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/23642

[29] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21483

[30] https://t.me/Koord_shtab/23642

[31]

[32] https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/22254

[33] https://t.me/favt_info/8908

[34] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/33249

[35] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/33253

[36] https://t.me/astrapress/129106

[37] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/33275 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/33274

[38] https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2113647567112405028?s=20

[39] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/missile-strike-rus-proton-electronics-plant/

[40] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/33221?single ; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2113523591690211410 ; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2113523006425469159

[41] https://t.me/mahonin59/13626

[42] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/33225

[43] https://t.me/glebnikitin_nn/10641

[44] https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2113547650159026636

[45] https://t.me/astrapress/129082

[46] https://t.me/gusev_36/7629

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42660; https://t.me/wargonzo/37832

[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13299; https://t.me/jacksons_dairy/13350; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13303; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2204416140455167

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42660; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42658

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42660 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42658 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37832 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20173

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42660; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42658; https://t.me/grvZapad/20173; https://t.me/wargonzo/37832

[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/37832

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42660; https://t.me/wargonzo/37832 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49137

[54] https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/18827

[55] https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2113395494462333391; https://t.me/btr80/42262

[56] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2113549089480888670?s=20; https://t.me/Desyat_10_rykopozatyi/8688

[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3661; https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2113110330834387022

[58] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13304; https://t.me/lost_armour/11916

[59] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/geospatial-intelligence/russia-is-integrating-ai-models-into-its-cognitive-warfare-campaign-against-ukraine/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42660 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42658 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37832 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21714

[61] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2113453326075646319 ; https://t.me/risk_dept/770

[62] https://t.me/divgen/84704

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42663

[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/57021

[65] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025/

[66] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[67] https://t.me/kpszsu/89621