3 hours ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 15, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:30 AM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Ukrainian forces reportedly regained unrestricted access to SpaceX’s Starshield on October 15, following in-motion speed restrictions on Starshield communications network over Ukraine. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sources stated on October 15 that Ukrainian units are reporting the resumption of unrestricted Starshield access, following October 14 speed restrictions of 100 miles per hour (roughly 160 kilometers per hour) for the terminals connected to the Starshield communications network operating in Ukraine.[1] Starshield is a more secure, jam-resistant, and military-oriented version of the Starlink satellite network that SpaceX designed for government use, while Starlink serves civilian and commercial purposes.[2] Ukrainian forces do not have access to Starshield or any Starlink services over Russia as SpaceX has geographically restricted Ukraine’s access to just within Ukraine's international borders.[3] Ukraine therefore relies on alternative communication methods and point-to-point navigation to strike targets in Russia.

High-ranking Kremlin officials continue to emphasize that there is and was no energy ceasefire agreement, rejecting any meaningful concept of a ceasefire proposal. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on October 15 that “there will be no ceasefire” in response to a journalist question about Russia’s willingness to make any concessions toward peace negotiations.[4] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov additionally claimed that Ukraine did not adhere to a strikes moratorium against Russian energy facilities, amidst numerous reports that Russian forces continued striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure while Ukrainian forces refrained from striking Russian energy infrastructure between October 11 and October 14.[5] Peskov falsely claimed that Ukraine's and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's unwillingness to engage in peace negotiations is thwarting US peace negotiations efforts, attempting to paint Ukraine as the intransigent party in all wider peace efforts.[6] High-ranking Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have not offered any concessions in peace negotiations and have rejected numerous compromise proposals that both the US and Ukraine have offered, demonstrating the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to compromise on any terms that fall short of fulfilling Russia’s maximalist demands of Ukraine’s complete capitulation.[7]

Ukrainian forces struck six Russian Su-34M fighter-bombers at the Borisoglebsk Military Airfield in Voronezh Oblast overnight on October 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Navy reported that Ukrainian forces used Neptune cruise missiles to strike the Borisoglebsk Military Airfield in Voronezh Oblast (roughly 267 kilometers from the international border) overnight on October 14 to 15, damaging six Russian Su-34M fighter-bombers and technical equipment.[8] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Ukraine’s strike against the Borisoglebsk Military Airfield destroyed four Su-34 fighter jets and damaged two more.[9] Satellite imagery published on October 15 shows damage to four Su-34 fighter jets at the Borisoglebsk Military Airfield following a Ukrainian Neptune missile strike.[10] A Russian milblogger responded to the strike by emphasizing that Russian forces need layered ground- and air-based air defenses to protect Russian aircraft close to Ukraine’s border.[11] The milblogger noted that Russian forces can preserve their aircraft assets only by temporarily withdrawing all frontline, long-range, and military transport aviation beyond a 400-kilometer radius from Ukraine’s international border. Russian forces routinely use Su-34M fighter-bombers to conduct missile and glide bomb strikes against Ukraine.[12] The basing of Su-34M aircraft in close proximity to Ukraine’s border allows Russian forces to conduct more sorties during strike series, prolonging the aircraft’s engine life and consuming less jet fuel. Ukraine’s ability to force Russian aviation farther away from the international border will increase Ukraine’s ability to detect Russian sorties sooner and mobilize air defenses faster, potentially helping to mitigate the more devastating impacts of cruise missile strikes.

Likely Russian drones struck four civilian vessels in the Black Sea, including two commercial tankers in Romanian territorial waters on October 14 and 15. Romanian Foreign Minister Toiu Oana stated on October 15 that unspecified drones struck four commercial vessels, including within Romanian territorial waters and its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and noted that “Russia bears full responsibility” for those strikes.[13] Reuters reported on October 15 that unnamed actors struck the San Marino-flagged Wine Trader tanker 13 nautical miles (roughly 24 kilometers) southeast of the Romanian Sulina Canal (one nautical mile outside of Romanian territorial waters) and the Comoros-flagged Yara J chemical and oil tanker eight to 10 nautical miles (roughly 15 to 19 kilometers) southeast of the canal within Romanian territorial waters on October 14.[14] An unnamed NATO official told Reuters that the drones that struck the vessels "were of Russian origin."[15] A NATO statement added that unspecified drones also struck the Marshall Islands-flagged Sea Destiny bulk carrier within Romanian waters and the Tanzanian-flagged Dania J tanker, reportedly moored in Ukraine’s Izmail Port.[16] Automatic identification system (AIS) data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that Sea Destiny is currently anchored off the coast of Romania and Dania J was near the Izmail Port as of six days ago. The strikes caused fires on board the Wine Trader and the Yara J tankers, leading to in-depth search missions and the ultimate rescue of five sailors, with seven sailors still missing. Territorial waters extend up to 12 nautical miles (about 22 kilometers) from the nation’s shoreline, compared to the EEZ which extends up to 200 nautical miles (roughly 370 kilometers) from the baseline, and states have sovereignty and jurisdiction over their territorial waters.[17] Russian drone strikes against vessels in Romania's territorial sea violate Romania’s territorial integrity. Romanian President Nicusor Dan declined to comment on Russia's involvement in the strikes as of October 15. The October 14 and 15 drone strikes come against the backdrop of recent escalating Russian strikes against vessels in the Black Sea, including strikes against civilian vessels in the Bulgarian EEZ overnight on October 12 to 13.[18] These strikes demonstrate Russia’s increasing willingness to pursue strike tactics that may directly impact the territory of NATO or NATO-aligned states.[19]

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian forces reportedly regained unrestricted access to Starshield on October 15, following in-motion speed restrictions on SpaceX’s Starshield communications network over Ukraine.
  • High-ranking Kremlin officials continue to emphasize that there is and was no energy ceasefire agreement, rejecting any meaningful concept of a ceasefire proposal.
  • Ukrainian forces struck six Russian Su-34M fighter-bombers at the Borisoglebsk Military Airfield in Voronezh Oblast overnight on October 14 to 15.
  • Likely Russian drones struck four civilian vessels in the Black Sea, including two commercial tankers in Romanian territorial waters on October 14 and 15.
  • Ukrainian forces likely struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast overnight on October 14 to 15. Russia launched two Kh-59 cruise missiles and 580 drones against Ukraine overnight on October 14 to 15 and 138 drones during the day on October 15.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk and southwest of Orikhiv.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
  • Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazenyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast overnight on October 14 to 15. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 15 that Ukrainian forces "attempted" a combined drone and missile strike against an oil refinery in Ryazan Oblast (roughly 485 kilometers from the international border) and that drone debris caused a fire at the refinery.[20] A Russian milblogger noted that it is extremely rare for the Russian MoD to publish information about Ukrainian strikes in Russia and speculated that its October 15 report aims to achieve a political effect and portray Ukraine in a bad light against the backdrop of the Russian-US diesel fuel deal and opaque ceasefire discussions.[21] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov also acknowledged the fire at the refinery following Ukrainian strikes, and open-source imagery shows the fire.[22]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 14 and 15 but did not advance.[23]

 Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

 Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 14 and 15 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kharkiv City.[24]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 14 and 15 but did not make confirmed advances.[25] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Nefedivka and Chorne (both north of Velykyi Burluk).[26] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the seizure of Nefedivka and Chorne.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of the settlements.[28] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 15 that Ukrainian forces are still present in Nefedivka.[29]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Holubivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 14.[30] Russian forces concentrated assaults toward Radkivka (north of Kupyansk) on October 14 and 15 but did not advance.[31]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on October 15.

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

 Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)

 The Russian military command has seemingly still not internalized the extent of Ukrainian military successes in the Lyman direction as part of Operation Vivaldi. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on October 15 that Russian sources continue to falsely claim seizures of settlements that Ukrainian forces liberated during Operation Vivaldi and that the Russian military command has not yet realized the full scale of Ukrainian advances in the area.[32] The spokesperson stressed that there are large discrepancies between the Russian official maps of the Lyman direction and the true situation on the frontline. Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi collapsed the Russian salient north of Lyman, completely disrupting the Russian military command's plan to conduct a wide encirclement of Ukraine's Fortress Belt.[33] The pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military inhibited Russian forces’ ability to respond to Ukrainian counterattacks and to bring in reinforcements, as the Russian military leadership has a completely unrealistic understanding of where the forward line of contact is.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continue infiltration missions east of Slovyansk. Ukrainian forces struck Russian servicemembers northeast of Nykonorivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 15, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near and in Kostyantynivka and along the east (left) bank of the Kazenyi Torets River on October 14 and 15 but did not advance.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions northeast of Dobropillya. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 15 that Ukrainian forces control Lidyne, contrary to previous Russian claims.[37] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces seized Marivka (northeast of Dobropillya).

Russian forces conducted a motorized assault toward Dobropillya and are intensifying offensive operations in the area ahead of Winter 2026-2027. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya direction reported on October 15 that Russian forces have intensified assaults toward Dobropillya in an effort to consolidate positions on the outskirts of the city in dense urban areas before winter.[38] The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed roughly two Russian infantry platoons and nine motorized vehicles in the last day. Russian efforts toward Dobropillya are critical for Russian offensive prospects against the Fortress Belt, and Russian offensives around Dobropillya are still aimed at conducting a wide encirclement of the entire Fortress Belt, cutting key Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), and covering the western flank of the Kramatorsk push.[39]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 14 and 15 but did not advance.[40]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on October 14 and 15 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Oleksandrivka.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 14 and 15 but did not advance.[42]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Orikhiv. The Ukrainian 17th Army Corps reported on October 15 that Ukrainian forces control Novoandriivka, refuting previous Russian claims.[43]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 15 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies manpower concentration near Novokostyantynivka (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) on October 14 or overnight on October 14 to 15.[44]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 15.

 Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 15 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 18th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) drone operator training center and its instructors’ residence in Khorly, Kherson Oblast (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline).[45]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[46]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 14 to 15 and during the day on October 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59 cruise missiles from over the Black Sea and 580 Shahed-type and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea overnight.[47] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 536 drones, that Russian drones struck 31 locations, and that drone debris fell on 11 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces subsequently launched 138 drones (90 of which were jet-powered) during the day on October 15 and that Ukrainian forces downed 125 drones, including 79 jet-powered ones.[48]

Russian forces conducted the largest drone strike against Kirovohrad Oblast thus far in the war. Kirovohrad Oblast Military Administration Head Andriy Raykovych reported on October 15 that Russian forces struck Kirovohrad Oblast with 360 drones, marking the largest Russian strike on the oblast since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion.[49] Raykovych stated that Russian forces deliberately targeted critical infrastructure, transport companies, logistics facilities, and residential buildings, striking 26 locations and killing three people and injuring six.

Ukrainian forces have depleted their stock of Patriot ballistic missile interceptor missiles, which will allow Russia to inflict maximum damage on Ukraine's infrastructure until Ukraine receives or can develop effective anti-ballistic missile defenses. An unnamed source familiar with the matter told CNN on October 15 that Ukraine has run out of Patriot interceptors.[50] Russian forces intensified their ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in Summer 2026, taking advantage of global Patriot interceptor shortages.[51] Russian forces will very likely continue to leverage ballistic missiles in their Winter 2026-2027 strike packages against Ukraine alongside jet-powered drones in order to inflict substantial damage on Ukrainian cities in ways that disproportionately hurt civilians.[52]

Russian forces continue to rapidly expand their jet-powered drone launch capacity. Reuters published satellite imagery on October 15 showing that Russia has nearly finished building a new jet-powered droneport near Millerovo, Rostov Oblast (roughly 176 kilometers from the frontline) featuring eight platforms for launch rails.[53] Reuters reported that Russia began the construction of the drone base sometime after August 31 and that the site would be capable of launching jet-powered drones. Russian forces have been expanding their jet-powered drone launch capacity since Fall 2026, including at the Tsimbulova Droneport in Oryol Oblast, as Russian forces are heavily relying on jet-powered drones to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses at greater operational depths.[54]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarussian MoD reportedly deployed a military communications system designed to facilitate Russian advances along Russia's international borders with Belarus, Ukraine, and European states. A Belarusian outlet reported on October 12 that Russia is building a new secure military-technical communications network along the Russian-Belarusian border and towards international borders with Ukraine and NATO member states in order to ensure the deployment of Russian troops to NATO borders.[55] The network comprises radio relay lines and directional antennas of both Russian and Belarusian cellular operators, which allow data to be transmitted over a radio channel with minimal risk of external interception or eavesdropping. The report suggests that the geography and the architecture of the network indicate its subordination to the Russian military needs, as its only command center is located in Russia.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4174649-robota-starshield-dla-sil-oboroni-vidnovilasa-dzerelo.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/10/15/ukrinform-rabota-starlink-dlya-vsu-polnostyu-vozobnovilas ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/

[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/; https://www.spacex.com/starshield; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-06/spacex-gets-us-contract-to-expand-ukraine-s-access-to-starshield

[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/

[4] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2154853/

[5] https://t.me/tass_agency/400454; https://tass dot ru/politika/28217463; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/

[6] https://tass dot ru/politika/28217415

[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/;https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-west-shouldnt-play-russias-game-with-ukrainian-elections/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/

[8] https://www.facebook.com/navy.mil.gov.ua/posts/pfbid02iXHErBqA6prn3R1sRwBAUL23ffzWrFRuoUqSUUeCXnpQwSahdrodR7roWsXn56isl?__cft__[0]=AZga7KXvk0Xmzy-rMFJHQ4iVguJo9ipu0-kw6ATeJiuNo7Og8oOYR97DUi7wrRCG2BrpFo0gS5gCLy34fNOyttNxIgWrOd4m8HFgeG1nkQUtAaZ3Cmix0UerXcGJiQ_XTyQNcv2X5M8uEQ0NWWsPHOc9kkcTShyR&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[9] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2110696798377345331; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21384

[10] https://x.com/avivector/status/2110706976007065645 ; https://x.com/NotWoofers/status/2110500629374488608; https://x.com/MDiloJr/status/2110551261183680794; https://x.com/RALee85/status/2110680883435016626 ; https://x.com/avivector/status/2110665837749129689 ; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2110480859220586809 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/61445 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2110665989104750686?s=20; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8261?single;

[11] https://t.me/bomber_fighter/26852

[12] https://united24media dot com/war-in-ukraine/ukraine-takes-out-6-russian-su-34m-bombers-with-a-single-airbase-strike-navy-says-23456

[13] https://x.com/oana_toiu/status/2110760404074815665?s=20

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/two-ships-ablaze-romanian-black-sea-waters-8-sailors-missing-2026-10-15/

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/two-ships-ablaze-romanian-black-sea-waters-8-sailors-missing-2026-10-15/

[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/two-ships-ablaze-romanian-black-sea-waters-8-sailors-missing-2026-10-15/

[17] https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm

[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/

[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/

[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/68217

[21] https://t.me/dva_majors/100536; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2026/

[22] https://t.me/pavelmalkov_official/7457; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/32594

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42594 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42592 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37628 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9621

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42594 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42592 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9621 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48789 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37628

[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42594 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42592 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48789

[26] https://t.me/mod_russia/68220

[27] https://t.me/epoddubny/29475

[28] https://t.me/divgen/84590

[29] https://t.me/severnnyi/9621

[30] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2110419401619231002; https://t [dot] me/hisnikii/2205; https://t [dot] me/hisnikii/2205

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42594; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42592

[32] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/10/15/%c2%abfrendlifayer%c2%bb-po-rosijsky-ukrayinskyj-nrk-zmusyv-okupantiv-piv-dnya-strilyaty-odne-v-odnogo/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=614&v=LB0kJtN1I6c&feature=youtu.be

[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=UkraineDisruptsOffensive

[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=UkraineDisruptsOffensive

[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13234; https://t.me/obmp137/242

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42594; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42592; https://t.me/wargonzo/37628

[37] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56875; https://t.me/mod_russia/68133

[38] https://suspilne dot media/1427861-robota-starlink-polipsilas-zatrimali-pidozruvanogo-u-vbivstvi-patoh-ukrainskih-vijskovih-1695-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1792052131&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHiuKvFUr2w&pp=0gcJCf4LAYcqIYzv

[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=UkraineDisruptsOffensive

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42594 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42592

[41]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42594 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42592 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56869

[42]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42592 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42594 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37628 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21587

[43] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2110612072975458644 ; https://t.me/armycorps17/1954 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42599

[45] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9716 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/na-hersonshhyni-znyshhyly-tsentr-pidgotovky-operatoriv-bpla-18-yi-armiyi-rf/

[46] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[47] https://t.me/kpszsu/86810

[48] https://t.me/kpszsu/86954

[49] https://suspilne dot media/1427861-robota-starlink-polipsilas-zatrimali-pidozruvanogo-u-vbivstvi-patoh-ukrainskih-vijskovih-1695-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1792043461&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/kirovogradskaODA/27673

[50] https://www.cnn.com/2026/10/15/europe/ukraine-us-patriot-interceptor-missiles-run-out-intl

[51] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/

[52] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/

[53] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-russia-war/russia-builds-major-new-drone-attack-base-six-weeks-satellite-images-show-2026-10-15/

[54] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2026/; https://t.me/StrategicaviationT/42335; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/articles/2026/10/01/8055931/

[55] https://belpol dot pro/militarizacziya-belarusi-doklad-belpol/

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