Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 13, 2026

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Senior Russian officials explicitly stated that the war in Iran, not Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries, is the primary driver of global diesel shortages, while simultaneously using the October 9 fuel agreement to convince the US to support its negotiation position. Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Economic Minister Alexander Novak stated on October 12 that "problems in the Strait of Hormuz" have caused a general reduction in global oil refining capacity, destabilizing US and global diesel fuel markets.[1] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Borisenko similarly stated on October 12 that the key to stable US fuel supplies is “a resolution of the conflict around Iran.”[2] Kremlin officials' acknowledgement of the war in Iran as a key driver of US and global diesel fuel shortages follows recent lower-ranking Russian official and ultranationalist voices’ statements that Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries are not responsible for high diesel prices globally.[3] Kremlin officials meanwhile continued efforts to frame the October 9 agreement as a diplomatic overture to the United States. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev stated on October 12 that some Western officials are opposing the Russian-US diesel agreement because they understand its major benefit for the "world and for peace."[4] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 13 that the agreement is a mutually beneficial aspect of bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Russia and explicitly denied its direct connection to Russia’s negotiating position on Ukraine.[5] Moscow has repeatedly offered the United States economic incentives that it claims are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in order to extract concessions from the U.S. in regards to the war.[6] Russia heavily relies on oil revenues to fund its war in Ukraine and would disproportionately benefit from convincing the U.S. to force Ukraine to stop striking its oil refineries.[7]

Russian officials are meanwhile attempting to assuage the Russian domestic populace's fears of domestic fuel shortages. Novak stated on October 12 that Russian diesel fuel exports to the US under the new agreement will not disrupt the Russian domestic fuel market situation, likely to ease any concern within Russian society of potential future diesel shortages and associated public discontent, following months of fuel shortages across Russia throughout Summer 2026.[8] Novak held a meeting with the Russian Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Transport, and oil companies on October 13 on the Russian fuel market situation and instructed relevant agencies and fuel companies to intensify additional measures to ensure ample regional fuel supplies and respond to fuel price fluctuations.[9] Russia has suffered from severe fuel shortages in recent months, which caused low levels of public discontent across the country, and the Kremlin is likely attempting to preemptively calm fears about potential effects of the fuel agreement with the U.S.[10] Russia will likely prioritize fulfilling its diesel agreement with the U.S. over ensuring the stability of the Russian domestic fuel market, however, as the Kremlin is hoping to exploit the diesel agreement to advance its interests in the war in Ukraine.

Likely Russian drones struck two civilian vessels in the Bulgarian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the southwestern Black Sea overnight on October 12 to 13. The Bulgarian Security Council reported on October 13 that three unspecified aerial drones struck the Maltese-flagged Chelsea 3 cargo ship approximately 18 nautical miles (roughly 33 kilometers and within the Bulgarian EEZ) east of Byala, Bulgaria and sank another vessel approximately 17 nautical miles (roughly 31 kilometers and within the Bulgarian EEZ) east of Krapets, Bulgaria.[11] Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev stated that the strike is “absolutely unacceptable” and noted that the outcome of such strikes “benefits Russia”.[12]  Radev did not directly attribute the strike to Russia but summoned Russian Ambassador to Bulgaria Eleonora Mitrofanova and spoke with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte following the strikes.[13] Russian forces previously struck two additional civilian vessels in Bulgaria’s EEZ on October 6.[14] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that there have been nine strikes against cargo ships off the coasts of Bulgaria and Romania in the southwestern Black Sea area in recent months.[15] These recent strikes in the Bulgarian EEZ demonstrate Russia's increasing acceptance of risk in its strike packages, expanding risk tolerance from aerial incursions into European airspace to maritime kinetic events.[16]

French authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Indian Ocean on October 12. French President Emmanuel Macron reported that the French Navy boarded and seized the Russian shadow fleet DF Peak oil tanker more than 450 nautical miles (roughly 833 kilometers) south of the French Reunion Island (east of Madagascar) in the Indian Ocean on the morning of October 12.[17] Automatic identification systems (AIS) data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the DF Peak was sailing under a Benin flag without a specified departure port toward the Cruz Grande Port, Chile. The DF Peak is under US, EU, UK, and Ukrainian sanctions.[18] French authorities previously seized five Russian shadow fleet vessels, most recently on June 25 off the coast of Sicily, Italy.[19] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s ability to sell oil is partially a function of its ability to transport it, and continued European efforts against the Russian shadow fleet will degrade Russia’s ability to transport oil.[20] The Kremlin has also used Russian shadow fleet vessels operating in international waters as launch and recovery platforms for drone incursions into NATO airspace.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Senior Russian officials explicitly stated that the war in Iran, not Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries, is the primary driver of global diesel shortages, while simultaneously using the October 9 fuel agreement to convince the US to support its negotiation position.
• Russian officials are meanwhile attempting to assuage the Russian domestic populace's fears of domestic fuel shortages.
• Likely Russian drones struck two civilian vessels in the Bulgarian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the southwestern Black Sea overnight on October 12 to 13.
• French authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Indian Ocean on October 12.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Sumy City.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russia’s critical and ballistic missile infrastructure. Russian forces launched five Iskander-M or S-400 ballistic missiles, 108 drones, and nine Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City

• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazenyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian critical and ballistic missile infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a repair base for Iskander-M ballistic missile launchers and loader vehicles near Kondrinka, Kursk Oblast (roughly 150 kilometers from the frontline) on October 12 or overnight from October 12 to 13.[22]

Satellite imagery provided an updated battlefield damage assessment (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian fuel infrastructure. Satellite imagery published on October 12 shows that Ukraine's October 10 strikes against the NZNP oil-loading terminal in Rostov-on-Don (roughly 210 kilometers from the frontline) damaged at least seven out of the twelve oil storage tanks.^[23]

Ukraine’s ongoing long-range strike campaign is exploiting systemic deficiencies in Russia’s air defense network, while persistent institutional failures are hindering Russian adaptation efforts. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that Russian facility-level air defenses are ineffective against Ukrainian drone strikes because Ukrainian forces can penetrate Russian air defense lines in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts and approach their targets from different directions to bypass the more localized air defenses.^[24] The milblogger claimed that Russian commanders routinely fail to employ counter-drone systems to protect and complement Russia’s higher-tier air defenses in border areas, allowing Ukrainian drones to strike these higher-tier systems and penetrate the Russian rear.[25] The Russian milblogger argued that Russian air defenses are capable of intercepting advanced missiles and aviation, but do not adequately employ lower-tier air defense systems against combined Ukrainian drone and missile strikes.[26] Russian defense company Ushkuynik Scientific and Production Center General Director Alexey Chadayev stated on October 13 that Yandex officials relied on outdated assumptions about Ukrainian strike patterns despite witnessing Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Wildberries and Ozon warehouses and only instituted facility-level protections at their data centers.[27] Ukrainian forces have struck three Yandex data centers since October 8, causing temporary internet and telecommunications disruption.[28]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Sumy City. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on October 12.[29]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified Russian radar station near Shkryabino, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 31 kilometers from the international border) on October 12 or overnight on October 12 to 13.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 12 and 13 but did not advance.[31]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 13.

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces are attempting to maintain their bridgehead on the left bank (east) of the Oskil River to continue supporting operations near Kupyansk. Ukrainian Joint Forces Group spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on October 13 that Russian forces are attempting to maintain their bridgehead on the western side of the Oskil River and are conducting localized attacks in the area.^[32] Trehubov stated that loss of the bridgehead near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) or separation of this bridgehead from Russian forces would significantly degrade Russian efforts in Kupyansk.

Russian forces continue to use Ukrainian civilians as human shields to facilitate retreat efforts near Kupyansk in a direct violation of international humanitarian law. The Ukrainian 2nd Khartiya Corps published footage on October 13 showing Russian soldiers leading civilians, including children, into the  Shebelinka-Ostrohozk gas pipeline near Kupyansk, as Russian artillery fire covered the retreat.[33] The Ukrainian 2nd Khartiya Corps previously reported on September 27 that Russian forces conducted a similar mission disguised as civilians.[34] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of civilians as human shields is indicative of a pervasive culture within the Russian military that seeks to both weaponize and maximize civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war.[35]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova on October 13, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[36]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces concentrated attacks toward Lyman itself and north of Lyman toward Kolodyazi on October 12 and 13 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in the area.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northwest of Chasiv Yar. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in eastern Klynove, according to geolocated footage published on October 12, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Klynove.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within and west of Kostyantynivka and southwest of Druzhkivka on October 12 and 13 but did not advance.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective:  Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions south of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck Russian servicemembers in western Matyasheve and western Svitle (both south of Dobropillya), according to geolocated footage published on October 12, after what ISW assesses were both Russian infiltration missions.[41]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued to falsely claim that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in Dobropillya, despite extensive evidence to the contrary. The Russian MoD claimed on October 12 that Russian forces thwarted a Ukrainian attempt to use a platoon-sized force and armored vehicles to break out of the claimed encirclement in Dobropillya and that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces (GoF) is advancing in central and northwestern Dobropillya and clearing western parts of the town.[42] ISW only observed evidence of limited Russian infiltration missions into southern Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly refuted Russian claims that Russian forces have consolidated positions in Dobropillya or have encircled Ukrainian forces there.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 12 or 13.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on October 12 and 13 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Fedorivka (east of Oleksandrivka).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked towards Fedorivka and Komar through Perebudova and across the Mokryi Yaly River (all east of Oleksandrivka).[45] Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Fedorivka, as Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks toward the Mokryi Yaly River.[46]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 11 and 12 but did not advance.[47]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations aimed at enveloping Orikhiv from the west and northwest on October 12 and 13, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[48]

Russian forces recently unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Dnipro River in an inflatable watercraft and secure positions on the right (west) bank of the river near Prydniprovske (east of Kherson City), according to geolocated footage published on October 12.[49]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note:  The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[50]

Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes across Ukraine overnight on October 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five Iskander-M or S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast; and 108 Shahed-type (including 74 jet-powered drones) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and nine Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[51] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 88 drones (including 58 jet-powered drones), that unspecified drones and missiles struck 17 locations, and that air vehicle debris fell on seven locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched nine Banderol loitering munitions against Kharkiv City.[52]

Ukrainian forces reportedly did not receive early warnings ahead of Russian forces’ October 12 to 13 overnight ballistic missile strikes that targeted Kyiv City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces did not receive information regarding Russian ballistic missile launches and only detected Russian ballistic missiles launched against Ukraine overnight via radar.[53] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on October 13 that US and NATO satellite-derived intelligence regarding Russian missile activity failed to reach Ukraine in time, likely due to technical failures or other unspecified issues.[54] Ihnat noted that this is not the first time Ukrainian forces have failed to receive this intelligence from their NATO or US intelligence partners. Russian forces predominantly launch their surface-to-surface ballistic missiles from seven regions that are mostly within the 200-kilometer range from Ukraine, giving Ukraine limited reaction time to detect Russian launches and for Ukrainian air defenses to respond.[55]

Rivne Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Koval reported on October 13 that a Russian drone struck a university building in Rivne City, causing extensive damage and injuries.^[56] The Rivne Oblast State Emergency Service reported that the strike injured 30 people.[57]

Russia may be developing a new Geran-6 strike drone that could incorporate elements that would make it similar to a ballistic missile. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported on October 13 that Russia tasked unspecified military-industrial design bureaus with developing a new Geran-6 jet-powered strike drone.[58] The source stated that the new Geran-6 would have the ability to fly along a ballistic trajectory and have two variants with either a 300- or 600-kilogram warhead. The source stated that the operational range of Geran-6 would extend over the entire territory of Ukraine and that Russia has reportedly scheduled its full-scale production for mid-2028, with first possible deployment as soon as June 2027. If true, this unconfirmed report indicates that the Geran-6 would emulate the characteristics of a quasi-ballistic missile, given its payload and flight path, and suggests that Russia may be aiming to develop a cost-efficient ballistic missile to more reliably penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. Russian forces have increasingly relied since Summer 2026 on ballistic missiles to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses and exploit Ukraine’s anti-ballistic missile interceptor shortage.^[59]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.