Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 7, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:30 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:45 AM ET

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Russian forces continued their missile and drone strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and targeted Kyiv City with 36 ballistic missiles overnight on November 6 to 7. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces conducted a massive missile and drone strike campaign against Ukraine overnight, primarily targeting Kyiv City and Ukraine's energy infrastructure.[i] Zelensky specified that Russian forces targeted 13 oblasts in total, launched 172 drones and 36 ballistic missiles, and that all missiles targeted Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast. Zelensky stated that Russian strikes damaged an electricity substation in Kyiv Oblast connecting the Rivne and Khmelnytskyi nuclear power plants with Kyiv City and Ukraine’s central oblasts and struck substations in Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 7 that Russian forces struck the Trypilska Thermal Power Plant and the Kyivska and Northern electrical substations in Kyiv Oblast as well as an electrical substation in Zhytomyr Oblast.[ii] Russia‘s deliberate targeting of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure corroborates an unconfirmed, intercepted Russian plan that Russian forces would systematically attempt to strike Ukrainian electricity generation and transmission facilities to disconnect Ukraine’s nuclear power plants from a unified grid and cut off Kyiv City from external power supplies.[iii] Russia has been increasingly incorporating turbojet engines and mesh radio modems into its long-range strike drones, which is likely allowing Russian forces to more effectively penetrate Ukrainian air defenses and conduct more precise strikes compared to Russia’s Winter 2025-2026 strike campaign. The depletion of Ukraine’s missile interceptors and limited counter-launch capabilities risk leaving Ukraine vulnerable to Russian ballistic missile strikes.

The large-scale Russian ballistic missile strike against Kyiv City also damaged the Northern Bridge as Russian forces continue efforts to target Ukraine’s transportation infrastructure and disrupt its economy. Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported on November 7 that Russian forces damaged the roadbed, trolleybus overhead line, and power line at the Northern Bridge across the Dnipro River in the city.[iv] Zelensky stated that Russian forces launched six ballistic missiles at the bridge, four of which struck it.[v] Geolocated footage published on November 7 shows extensive damage to the bridge.[vi] Russian forces have repeatedly struck Kyiv City’s Northern and Southern bridges throughout October 2026.^[vii] Such strikes aim to disrupt the wider Ukrainian economy, sow panic among the population, and significantly degrade civilian life and movement in Ukraine‘s capital.

Ukrainian forces are targeting missile launch sites and ballistic missile production facilities in Russia to reduce Russia's ability to conduct devastating ballistic missile strikes amidst Ukraine's dwindling air defense stockpiles. Ukrainian forces struck two Iskander missile launchers and a Pantsir-S1 air defense system in Bryansk Oblast on November 6 and overnight from November 6 to 7, according to the Ukrainian General Staff.[viii] The General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces launched a Neptune cruise missile strike against the Proton-Electrotex Plant in Oryol City, Oryol Oblast (roughly 160 kilometers from the international border), overnight.[ix] The Proton-Electrotex Plant produces optoelectronic equipment, including parts for Iskander-M ballistic missiles. Ukraine's ability to conduct long-range strikes against military assets in Russia is critical for Ukrainian defense against Russian missile strikes ahead of the likely difficult Winter 2026-2027, particularly as Russia's missile production rate remains high. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian forces have stockpiled up to 700 ballistic missiles as of October 2026 and that Russia's Iskander-M ballistic missile stockpile increased by 13 percent in October compared to August 2026.[x] The GUR added that Russia produces 65 Iskander-M missiles per month.

Western support, including the provision of air defense systems and interceptors, long-range missiles, and reliable low-latency satellite access over Russia, remains vital to Ukraine's ability to significantly degrade Russia's drone and missile strike capabilities. The provision of US Tomahawk missiles, for example, would allow Ukraine to strike important military infrastructure that Russia protects in its rear, as ISW has long assessed.[xi] Zelensky similarly called on November 5 for Germany to provide Ukraine with Taurus cruise missiles to support the Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian ballistic missile launchers.[xii] Even a relatively small number of Western-provided missiles could allow Ukraine to begin systematically targeting Russia's drone production facilities at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan or the Engels-2 Air Base in Saratov Oblast that houses strategic bombers, which Russian forces use to launch cruise missiles against Ukraine. Ukraine has been using its long-range drones and domestically produced cruise missiles to strike targets deep in the Russian rear, and further Western support would allow Ukraine to degrade Russia’s long-range strike capabilities.

Ukrainian and Russian officials provided further details about the composition of the delegations for the upcoming trilateral negotiations scheduled for November 10 to 11 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE). Ukrainian Servant of the People Party Head Davyd Arakhamia stated on November 6 that Foreign Intelligence Service Head Rustem Umerov will lead the Ukrainian delegation, which will also include Presidential Communications Adviser Dmytro Lytvyn, Presidential Office Head Kyrylo Budanov, and Presidential Office First Deputy Head Serhiy Kyslytsya.[xiii] Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the Russian delegation on November 6, which will include Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Head Admiral Igor Kostyukov, Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, and Deputy Foreign Ministers Mikhail Galuzin and Sergei Ryabkov.[xiv] Kostyukov led the Russian delegation at the first two rounds of trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi in late January and early February 2026 before Medinsky replaced him to lead the Russian delegation at trilateral negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland, in February 2026. Medinsky notably used his position to stall negotiations by discussing the so-called “historical roots” of the war, the Kremlin’s shorthand for its original maximalist demands.[xv] Ushakov is a senior Kremlin official who regularly comments on the status of negotiations with Ukraine and has repeatedly reiterated the Kremlin’s maximalist demands that Ukraine make unilateral concessions before Russia agrees to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations.[xvi] Galuzin was a member of the Russian delegation to negotiations in Istanbul, Turkey, as well as Geneva in May 2025 and February 2026, respectively, and has reiterated the need to address the so-called “root causes” of the war.[xvii] Ryabkov has not formally participated in peace negotiations but frequently claims that Russia can only accept peace proposals that align with Putin’s war aims and “ground realities.” Ryabkov routinely reiterates Russia’s commitment to the alleged US-Russia agreements following the Alaska Summit in August 2025, despite the lack of public statements following the summit and no confirmation that any agreement was reached.[xviii] Ryabkov also facilitated the Kremlin's 2021 ultimatums to the United States and NATO member states, which amounted to the destruction of the current NATO alliance under the guise of “security guarantees” for Russia.[xix] The Kremlin appears to be sending a delegation of officials who previously stalled negotiations, which further indicates that the Kremlin remains disinterested in engaging in good faith negotiations. The addition of Ryabkov is notable, as the Kremlin may use Ryabkov's previous experience with the 2021 ultimatums to deflect from Ukraine's efforts to secure security guarantees at the trilateral negotiations.

Russian officials once again rejected security guarantees for Ukraine and sought to deny European participation in peace negotiations that will include discussions on the European security architecture. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on November 7 that any deployment of foreign forces to Ukraine, either through the Coalition of the Willing or under another alliance, is “categorically unacceptable” and that Russia will interpret such actions as a “military intervention” and “additional threats to Russia's security.”[xx] Zakharova added that the start of the Coalition of the Willing exercises on November 9 confirms that “Europeans have no place” at the negotiations table. Russian officials have recently revived Russia’s demand to exclude European officials from participating in peace negotiations that will discuss European security architecture and continue impeding Ukrainian efforts to receive any meaningful Western security guarantees ahead of the November 10 trilateral negotiations in Abu Dhabi.[xxi]

Russia launched another rocket launch vehicle carrying a military satellite on November 7 to support Russia’s space-based capabilities. The Russian MoD reported on November 7 that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) launched a Soyuz-2.1b medium-class launch vehicle carrying an unspecified military satellite from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast.[xxii] The Russian MoD conducted similar Soyuz-2.1b launches from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome on August 24 and September 17, 2026.[xxiii] Russian milbloggers speculated that the November 7 launch will deliver a military satellite into orbit and noted that the recent Soyuz-2.1b launches likely aimed to update Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS).[xxiv] One milblogger noted that unspecified researchers do not rule out the possibility that Russia uses Soyuz-2.1b launches as part of the effort to establish a Rassvet (Russian analogue to Starlink) satellite constellation.[xxv]

Putin approved amendments to a 2004 decree on November 6, designating the Russian forces’ chief of logistics and chief of armaments positions as deputy ministers within the Russian MoD.[xxvi] The November 6 decree formalized Putin’s August 5, 2026 decision to designate Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Valery Solodchuk as the deputy defense minister for rear-area logistics and Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Alexander Sanchik as the deputy defense minister responsible for procurement.[xxvii] Putin's August 5 decision came against the backdrop of Ukraine’s intensifying intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns that effectively targeted Russian rear area logistics and military infrastructure.[xxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continued their missile and drone strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and targeted Kyiv City with 36 ballistic missiles overnight on November 6 to 7.
• The large-scale Russian ballistic missile strike against Kyiv City also damaged the Northern Bridge as Russian forces continue efforts to target Ukraine’s transportation infrastructure and disrupt its economy.
• Ukrainian forces are targeting missile launch sites and ballistic missile production facilities in Russia to reduce Russia's ability to conduct devastating ballistic missile strikes amidst Ukraine's dwindling air defense stockpiles.
• Western support, including the provision of air defense systems and interceptors, long-range missiles, and reliable low-latency satellite access over Russia, remains vital to Ukraine's ability to significantly degrade Russia's drone and missile strike capabilities.
• Ukrainian and Russian officials provided further details about the composition of the delegations for the upcoming trilateral negotiations scheduled for November 10 to 11 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE).
• Russian officials once again rejected security guarantees for Ukraine and sought to deny European participation in peace negotiations that will include discussions on the European security architecture.
• Russia launched another rocket launch vehicle carrying a military satellite on November 7 to support Russia’s space-based capabilities.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin approved amendments to a 2004 decree on November 6 designating the Russian forces’ chief of logistics and chief of armaments positions as deputy ministers within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration and the Chasiv Yar tactical area, as Ukrainian forces cleared an area east of Slovyansk from Russian infiltration groups. Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Orikhiv.
• Ukrainian forces struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov Oblast on the night of November 6 to 7, at least the eighth strike against the refinery in 2026, and likely a defense industrial warehouse in Rostov Oblast on the morning of November 7. Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and 172 drones against Ukraine overnight

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for additional reports of Ukrainian operations in Russia.

Ukrainian forces struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov Oblast on the night of November 6 to 7, marking at least the eighth strike against the refinery in 2026.[xxix] Geolocated footage published on November 7 shows a fire near the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov City (about 460 kilometers from the international border).[xxx] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in an unspecified area of the oblast and residential buildings in Saratov City.[xxxi] Ukrainian forces last struck the refinery on the night of September 10 to 11.[xxxii]

Ukrainian forces may have struck a defense industrial warehouse in Rostov Oblast on the morning of November 7.[xxxiii] Geolocated footage published on November 7 shows a fire at a warehouse adjacent to the Almaz defense industrial plant in Rostov-on-Don (roughly 210 kilometers from the frontline).[xxxiv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the warehouse, but Russian opposition source Astra reported that the cause of the fire at the warehouse, which contained oils and polymers, is unknown.[xxxv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 7, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced in the area.[xxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 5 and 6 but did not advance.[xxxvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction, particularly to the north near Radkivka, Zapadne, and Velyka Shapkivka, on November 6 and 7 but did not advance.[xxxviii] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that attempted Russian infiltration missions into Doroshivka (west of Zapadne) lacked proper support and were unsuccessful.[xxxix]

A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF reported on November 7 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Borova but that the configuration of the frontline near Zelenyi Hai on the Bohuslavka-Novoplatonivka line (north of Borova) remains unclear.[xl] The source specified that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelenyi Hai, Vyshneve, Borivska Andriivka, and Nova Kruhlyakivka (all northeast of Borova).

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast and southeast of Lyman on November 6 and 7 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Lyman.[xli] Several Russian milbloggers and a source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that Russian forces are taking new positions near Maslyakivka (just east of Lyman).[xlii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration and in the Chasiv Yar tactical area, as Ukrainian forces cleared an area east of Slovyansk from Russian infiltration groups. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 7 that Russian forces maintain positions in Fedorivka and Markove (both southeast of Kramatorsk) and central and eastern Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[xliii] Mashovets reported that Russian forces maintain positions west of Kalenyky (east of Slovyansk), northwest and southwest of Dibrova (southeast of Slovyansk and east of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal), and west of Novomarkove and Maiske (both southeast of Kramatorsk) and that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Chasiv Yar.[xliv] Mashovets reported that Russian forces conducted infiltration missions southeast of Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk), into and south of Pyskunivka (northeast of Mykolaivka), and near Starodubivka (west of Pyskunivka). Mashovets reported that Russian forces conducted infiltration missions in the area between Stinky and Molocharka (southeast of Druzhkivka), indicating that Russian forces have not yet consolidated positions in these settlements.[xlv] Mashovets reported that Russian forces also infiltrated along a windbreak on the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal toward Malynivka and Tykhonivka (both east of Kramatorsk) and into the chalk mountains northwest of Fedorivka (southeast of Kramatorsk). Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces cleared Mykolaivka of Russian infiltrators and that only one small Russian infantry group remains southeast of Orikhuvatka (south of Mykolaivka).

The tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration is stalling, largely due to personnel shortages. Mashovets reported on November 7 that the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army ([CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps, Southern Military District) is concentrating its main efforts on the right flank of its area of responsibility (AoR) – south of the Siverskyi Donets River – and is attempting to advance on both sides of the M-03 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway.[xlvi] Mashovets reported that Russian forces have not been able to achieve any tactically significant results for at least the past two weeks (approximately since October 24).[xlvii] Mashovets stated that the number of Russian assaults in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk direction has dropped to minimal levels during this period, primarily due to personnel shortages within the Russian 3rd CAA, in part resulting from the failure to account for personnel attrition during movement to the frontline. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces would likely need to narrow the sectors for future assaults, as personnel shortages prevent Russian forces from conducting a wider offensive across the entire 3rd CAA’s AoR, and consolidate the positions where Russian infantry conducted infiltration missions.[xlviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction on November 6 and 7 but did not advance.[xlix]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast, south, and southwest of Dobropillya on November 6 and 7 but did not advance.[l]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on November 7.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on November 6 and 7 but did not advance.[li]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 6 and 7 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[lii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Orikhiv. Ukrainian forces advanced in central Mala Tokmachka, according to geolocated footage published on November 7.^[liii]

The death toll from Russia’s November 2 strike against a humanitarian aid station in Komyshuvakha (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) has risen to at least 55 people. Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on November 7 that the death toll has risen to 55, as dozens of people remain missing.[liv]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on November 7.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[lv]

See topline text for reporting on Russia's long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian energy and transport infrastructure on the night of November 6 to 7.

Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and 172 drones (including 137 jet-powered) against Ukraine overnight on November 6 to 7.[lvi]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.