Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 6, 2026

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US officials are presenting a list of topics, including security guarantees and European security architecture, for upcoming negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, as issues that the United States, Europe, Ukraine, and Russia agree to discuss. Russia’s frequently reiterated positions on these topics, however, remain incompatible with the official positions and interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe. Former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner stated on November 5 that a US delegation held "productive" talks with Ukrainian, NATO, and European partners in Brussels to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine and the broader European security architecture as part of a lasting peace in Ukraine.[1] Kushner added that the United States is exploring five principal goals to address all parties’ security concerns through mutually agreed agreements: permanent security consultations, reliable crisis communications, greater military transparency, reciprocal measures to reduce escalation risks, and an enduring framework for long-term European security and stability.[2] Kushner stated that NATO will remain central to Europe's collective defense and that each state will retain the authority to make decisions about its alliances--presumably referring to the rights of Ukraine to continue its aspirations to join NATO and of current NATO member states to remain part of the alliance. Kushner also noted that the United States aims to move to a broader multilateral negotiation format with direct European participation should the upcoming trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian November 10-11 talks in Abu Dhabi make progress.

Russian demands for ending its war in Ukraine undermine wider US policy objectives relating to Europe’s defense and contradict Ukrainian and European negotiating positions. The Kremlin recently reiterated its 2021 demand that NATO roll back to its 1997 borders, contradicting Kushner's statement about NATO's role in Europe's defense and individual states' decision-making power about alliances.[3] This Russian demand also conflicts with US President Donald Trump's ongoing efforts to establish a US Army base in Poland.[4] Moscow's position on security guarantees for Ukraine has also long differed from that of Europe and Ukraine, with Russia repeatedly rejecting any possibility of the deployment of foreign forces to Ukraine and discussing having Russia and China involved in guaranteeing Ukraine's security.[5] Kremlin officials have also revived their demand that European officials not be able to participate in negotiations to end the war so long as they refuse to negotiate on Russian terms.[6] Although US, European, Ukrainian, and Russian officials all seem to agree on the need to discuss the European security architecture as part of the peace settlement, the Russian position is incompatible with that of European and Ukrainian officials and with the requirements for establishing and maintaining durable peace both in Ukraine and Europe.

An unidentified actor is conducting a coordinated campaign of hoax bomb threats targeting European commercial flights, airports, and media outlets, likely to disrupt European society and impose economic costs. One or more unidentified actors issued bomb threats to at least 18 commercial planes and airports on November 6, bringing the total number of bomb threats against European aviation during the week of November 2 to over 50.[7] An anonymous senior broadcaster from Irish media outlet RTÉ stated that an unidentified actor issued bomb threats to 18 media organizations on November 6.[8] RTÉ, Irish media outlet Newstalk, Bulgarian media outlet Nova TV, and UK media outlet Sky News confirmed that they received threats.[9] A “Mikhail Andropov” signed the bomb threat message, titled “Message to the West,” sent to various European news outlets on November 6 and claimed responsibility for the previous hoax bomb threats against European commercial flights since November 2.[10] RTÉ and Newstalk stated that “Mikhail Andropov” claimed to be preparing a “new wave of attacks” over an unspecified period.[11] Reuters reported that it was unable to establish the sender’s identity, the email’s origin, or whether the email originated from the same source as the threats to any or all of the commercial planes affected during the week of November 2.[12] European security services effectively and promptly responded to the bomb threats, including by scrambling NATO aircraft to escort some of the threatened commercial planes, and did not find explosives in any of the targeted aircraft, airports, or newsrooms.[13]  

European states have not yet attributed this coordinated campaign to a specific actor, but it advances the Kremlin’s military and cognitive campaigns against Europe and is consistent with Russian approaches, which ISW assessed in two papers published in September 2026.[14] European leaders, including Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares, Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto and Irish Taoiseach (head of the national government) Micheál Martin separately described the spate of recent bomb threats as "coordinated" in statements on November 5 and 6.[15] Irish Member of the European Parliament Barry Andrews stated “it is not a coincidence, in my mind, that this occurs days before Ireland hosts a major summit, hosting over 50 leaders,” noting that two informal EU summits are set to take place in Dublin, Ireland during the week of November 9.[16] European leaders should continue to prioritize attributing kinetic attacks and other threats to Russia or other responsible actors once they have gathered sufficient evidence to do so, as the German government did on September 1 following the Russian sabotage attack against Leipzig Halle airport on August 4.[17]

The Russian government continues to reduce its civil servants’ staffing level in order to cut non-essential social spending amid rising budget deficits. Russian State Duma sources told Russian business outlet RBK on November 5 that the State Duma will reduce its workforce by approximately 15 to 20 percent and that the Russian Federation Council will reduce its staff by approximately 10 to 15 percent.[18] Sources stated that the reduction of government staffing levels is aimed at reducing government spending and that there will be no “drastic cuts,” as Russian authorities will likely eliminate unstaffed positions and lay off retirement-age employees first. RBK noted that Russian authorities will shrink the State Duma and Federation Council based on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s October 2024 decree that calls for a reduction of at least 10 percent in civil servant numbers within some government agencies to pay bonuses to employees of relevant government agencies.[19] Moscow City Mayor Sergei Sobyanin in March 2026 similarly reduced the number of civil servants in Moscow City’s executive and administrative agencies by 15 percent due to Moscow City’s slowing budget revenue growth.[20] The State Duma and Federation Council staff cuts are the latest examples of the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to cut non-essential social spending to direct more government funds toward Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• US officials are presenting a list of topics, including security guarantees and European security architecture, for upcoming negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, as issues that the United States, Europe, Ukraine, and Russia agree to discuss. Russia’s frequently reiterated positions on these topics, however, remain incompatible with the official positions and interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe.
• An unidentified actor is conducting a coordinated campaign of hoax bomb threats targeting European commercial flights, airports, and media outlets, likely to disrupt European society and impose economic costs.
• European states have not yet attributed this coordinated campaign to a specific actor, but it advances the Kremlin’s military and cognitive campaigns against Europe and is consistent with Russian approaches, which ISW assessed in two papers published in September 2026.
• The Russian government continues to reduce its civil servants’ staffing level in order to cut non-essential social spending amid rising budget deficits.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Kostyantynivka.
• Ukrainian forces struck one of the largest oil refineries in southern Russia on the night of November 5 to 6. Russia launched 227 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck one of the largest oil refineries in southern Russia on the night of November 5 to 6.[22] Geolocated footage published on November 6 shows a smoke plume near the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 375 kilometers from the frontline) after a reported Ukrainian drone strike.[23] Russian opposition source Astra assessed that an eyewitness photo shows that the refinery’s oil tank farm is on fire.[24] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed that falling drone debris started a fire at an unspecified business in Afipsky.[25] Ukrainian forces have struck the refinery at least five times before in 2026, most recently on the night of August 24 to 25.[26]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions northwest of Sumy City. A Russian milblogger posted a map on November 6 that acknowledged Ukrainian presence in southern Bachivsk, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions there contrary to Russian claims.[27]

Ukrainian forces reported that they recently conducted Operation Cheburechna in northern Sumy Oblast and cleared 642 hectares of forested area, leveraging rigorous operational planning and deception. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 5 that Operation Cheburechna lasted seven weeks. Ukrainian forces first targeted Russian logistical routes, advanced deep into the forests, set up ambushes, pushed back Russian forces in the area, and transferred cleared positions to other Ukrainian units.[28] GUR noted that Ukrainian month-long operational planning and the use of radio deception prevented the Russian military command from identifying Ukrainian positions and recognizing the scale of Ukrainian assault. GUR reported that Operation Cheburechna completely halted Russian offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, while preserving Ukrainian forces’ logistical routes and positions in the area.

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 5 and 6 but did not advance.[29]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 6.

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kupyansk on November 5 and 6 but are reportedly struggling to supply and consolidate positions in and near Kupyansk.[30] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces do not control Kucherivka, Petropavlivka (both east of Kupyansk), Kurylivka, and Kivsharivka (both southeast of Kupyansk), and positions in Kupyansk on the right (western) bank of the Oskil River.[31] The source's claim is likely not indicative of recent Ukrainian counterattacks, however. The source also claimed that Russian forces continue to struggle to supply their positions within Kupyansk -- possibly as a result of Ukraine's Operation Veles, which disrupted Russian forces' supply routes into the town via underground pipelines - and that some battalions within the 347th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) in the Tabaivka-Hlushkivka area (southeast of Kupyansk) have lost about half of their personnel.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Sobolivka (just west of Kupyansk).[33]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on November 6 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Borivska-Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[34]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on November 5 and 6 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Lyman.[35]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian air defense systems in the Lyman direction. The commander of a Ukrainian drone strike unit operating in the Lyman direction reported on November 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 surface-to-air missile system at an unspecified date in the Lyman direction.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations east and southeast of Slovyansk on November 5 and 6 but did not make confirmed advances, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Slovyansk.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 5 and 6 that Russian forces advanced in western Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[38]

Russian forces are leveraging glide bomb and tactical drone strikes to suppress Ukrainian defenses and facilitate ground advances in the Slovyansk direction. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) from a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on Nov 6 that Russian forces in this area conduct massive glide bomb and tactical drone strikes and then follow up with ground assaults.[39] The NCO noted that Ukrainian air defenses restrict the range from which Russian aviation can launch glide bombs to at 20 kilometers or more behind the frontline.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces advanced in northwestern Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on November 5.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective:  Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast and southwest of Dobropillya on November 5 and 6 but did not advance.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on November 5 and 6 but did not advance.[42]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northwest of Hulyaipole. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in northern Dobropillya, Zaporizhia Oblast, according to geolocated footage published on November 5, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[43]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 5 and 6 but did not advance.[44]

The death toll from Russia’s November 2 strike against a humanitarian aid station in Komyshuvakha (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) has risen to at least 53 people. The State Emergency Service of Ukraine reported on November 5 that the death toll has risen to 53 people as rescuers continue to examine the rubble.[45]

Russian forces leveraged the limited ceasefire in the Kherson direction to accumulate manpower and equipment for future operations. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kherson direction reported on November 6 that Russian forces took advantage of the limited ceasefire in the Kherson direction and brought up about 1,000 Russian servicemembers and equipment to the occupied left (eastern) bank of Kherson Oblast.[46]

The Ukrainian suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in occupied Crimea allows Ukrainian forces to conduct effective counterforce strikes. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Second Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on November 6 that Ukrainian strikes against Russian Pantsir air defense systems in Crimea allowed Ukrainian forces to strike Russian drone launch sites near the Hvardiiske Airfield in occupied Crimea, likely referring to Ukrainian strikes against Russian drone infrastructure in occupied Hvardiiskyi Raion, Crimea (roughly 198 kilometers from the frontline) on November 4 or overnight on November 4 to 5.[47] Pletenchuk stated that Ukrainian strikes have degraded the Russian air defense network across occupied Crimea.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[48]

Russian forces launched 227 drones (including 86 jet-powered) against Ukraine overnight on November 5 to 6.[49] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on November 6 that Russian strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure caused new electricity outages in Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts.[50] Ukrenergo reported that it introduced further emergency power outages in Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, and Cherkasy oblasts to prevent a drop in voltage levels within the power system.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.