17 hours ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 5, 2026

Kateryna Shymkiv, Arielle Sher, Alexander Neuman, Katherine Wells and Karolina Hird

Assessment as of: 6:30PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:15 AM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

The Kremlin is weaponizing humanitarian crises Russia itself has created in order to court the Trump Administration. The White House reported on November 5 that First Lady Melania Trump hosted Ukrainian and Russian officials in recognition of the success of the recent limited ceasefire in occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast.[1] Ukraine’s Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets and Verkhovna Rada Deputy David Arakhamiya attended the ceremony alongside Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev and Russian Human Rights Commissioner Yana Lantratova. Lantratova is notably under US sanctions and has been directly implicated in the kidnapping of at least one Ukrainian child.[2] Dmitriev compared the Oleshky ceasefire to Melania Trump’s previous efforts to repatriate deported Ukrainian children from Russia.[3] Dmitriev highlighted the humanitarian success of the ceasefire without acknowledging that Russia’s invasion and occupation are entirely and solely responsible for the humanitarian crisis in Oleshky.[4] Dmitriev’s comments are in line with previous Russian efforts to use limited humanitarian cooperation — on crises like Oleshky or the return of forcibly deported Ukrainian children, for which Russia itself is uniquely responsible — to court the Trump Administration into adopting a more favorable posture toward Russia and to extract concessions from the United States in future negotiations.[5] Russian officials’ attempts to portray Russian President Vladimir Putin as a willing negotiator with humanitarian inclinations notably follow a string of devastating Russian strikes against Ukrainian civilians in recent months, including a recent strike that killed at least 14 people in Dnipro City while the Oleshky ceasefire was ongoing.[6]

The reported arrest of a prominent Russian milblogger for his coverage of the Oleshky ceasefire is likely part of long-standing Kremlin efforts to censor critical information space actors. Russian media and milbloggers reported on November 5 that Russian authorities arrested prominent Russian military correspondent Vladimir Romanov “Romanov Lite” in connection with his reporting on the humanitarian operation in occupied Oleshky.[7] Romanov reported on October 30, in a now altered post, that 17 buses with evacuated Oleshky residents would travel to Ukrainian-controlled territory and that four would go to Russia, but noted that Russian state media would likely show more buses going to Russia — implying that the Kremlin was planning to deliberately misreport on the humanitarian mission.[8] Romanov has not posted on his Telegram channel since October 31.[9] US outlet Newsmax, the only American outlet allowed into Oleshky, reported that 15 buses left Oleshky, with 11 bound for Ukraine and four to Russia.[10] The Kremlin engaged in a coordinated propaganda campaign intended to present the occupation of Oleshky in a way favorable to Russia in the lead-up to the occupation, and Romanov’s reporting directly undermined those Russian narrative curation efforts.[11] Romanov, one of the last outspoken Russian milbloggers, often criticizes the Russian military command for exaggerating Russian battlefield successes.[12] Russian authorities have long prosecuted and censored Russian milbloggers for speaking against the Kremlin’s false narratives of pervasive Russian battlefield successes, and Romanov’s arrest is likely part of the Kremlin’s efforts to restrict the Russian information space such that only approved pro-Kremlin media figures can retain a platform.[13]

Russia appears to be struggling to export diesel to the United States under the October 9 US-Russia diesel fuel agreement. The Financial Times reported on November 4 that the sanctioned Russian tanker Talisman and the Sierra Leonean-flagged tanker Leruo, initially destined for the US, abruptly changed course on November 2, with the Talisman en route to Brazil while the Leruo steered away from the Atlantic Ocean into the Mediterranean Sea.[14] The Leruo is reportedly signaling “for orders,” indicating that the cargo does not have a confirmed buyer or destination port. Two other tankers carrying Russian diesel are still headed towards the US Atlantic Coast despite signaling that their cargo does not have an official destination port. The four tankers are currently operating without confirmed buyers, as Russia’s ability to successfully offload its diesel at a US port remains unclear. Russia itself is struggling with domestic diesel shortages, which is notable considering there are now four Russian diesel tankers floating in the ocean with no clear destination or buyer.[15] Ukraine’s intensified long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries has reduced Russia’s diesel supply domestically and its ability to supply diesel internationally.[16]

The Russian military is continuing the process of forming new maneuver divisions as part of longstanding plans to transition towards a force structure based on divisions and mass. A Russian milblogger published a recruitment advertisement on November 5 claiming that the Russian military command is reorganizing the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) into a division.[17] The reorganization of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade follows the recent reformation of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (also of the 3rd CAA) into the 84th Motorized Rifle Division in early October 2026.[18] The 6th Brigade’s reformation, if confirmed, would mean that there are two division-level formations operating under the 3rd CAA, which is generally typical in the structure of a contemporary Russian CAA. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not officially commented on the reorganization as of November 5. The 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade has been operating in the Kramatorsk direction, Donetsk Oblast.[19] The reorganization of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade into divisions is part of ongoing military reforms that Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 and brings the total tally of Russian brigades reorganized into maneuver divisions to 13 since 2022.[20] It remains unclear if or how Russia will staff these formations to doctrinal end-strength.

Iran reportedly sought to acquire Russian military equipment in 2023 and 2024 that could support the regime’s counterinsurgency efforts. [NOTE: A version of the following text also appeared in ISW-CTP’s November 5 Iran Update.] Iran purchased at least six Mi-28 helicopters and at least 90 helicopter-mounted, APU-9L guided missile launchers from Russia in 2023 and Spring 2024, respectively, according to documents the Financial Times received from a Ukrainian private intelligence organization.[21] Iranian Deputy Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Mehdi Farahi announced in November 2023 that Iran had “finalized” agreements to purchase at least six Russian Mi-28 helicopters, which can mount APU-9L launchers.[22] An Iranian journalist later shared footage of an Mi-28 in a hangar at an unspecified location in Tehran in January 2026, though it remains unclear whether Iran received the launchers and the guided missiles designated for the launchers.[23] APU-9L launchers are designed for Kh-39 LMUR guided missiles, and it is unclear whether they can accommodate other munitions.[24] The APU-9L system is designed for strikes against stationary and moving targets at ranges of up to 14.5 kilometers, meaning it can be deployed to strike force concentrations, radar stations, or electronic warfare assets, among others.[25] Iran likely sought to acquire these systems to support its counterinsurgency and border security operations, given the system’s limitations.

Key Takeaways:

  • The Kremlin is weaponizing humanitarian crises Russia itself has created in order to court the Trump Administration.
  • The reported arrest of a prominent Russian milblogger for his coverage of the Oleshky ceasefire is likely part of long-standing Kremlin efforts to censor critical information space actors.
  • Russia appears to be struggling to export diesel to the United States under the October 9 US-Russia diesel fuel agreement.
  • The Russian military is continuing the process of forming new maneuver divisions as part of longstanding plans to transition towards a force structure based on divisions and mass.
  • Iran reportedly sought to acquire Russian military equipment in 2023 and 2024 that could support the regime’s counterinsurgency efforts.
  • Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian logistical, industrial, and oil infrastructure in Ryazan and Oryol oblasts.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • Russian forces launched two Kh-35 anti-ship missiles and 128 drones against Ukraine overnight.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
  • Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprising four subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

 

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian logistical, industrial, and oil infrastructure in Ryazan and Oryol oblasts. Geolocated footage published on November 5 shows a large smoke plume at the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City (roughly 461 kilometers from the international border) following a likely Ukrainian drone strike overnight on November 4 to 5.[26] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) Telegram channel posted images on November 5 showing smoke plumes and fires at a Wildberries marketplace logistics warehouse and an OpenYard server equipment production facility in central Ryazan City following likely Ukrainian drone strikes.[27] Geolocated footage published on November 4 shows a fire at the Orelmaslo vegetable oil plant in southern Oryol City (roughly 160 kilometers from the international border) following a likely Ukrainian strike on the night of November 3 to 4.[28]

OSINT sources provided an updated battlefield damage assessment (BDA) of Ukraine’s October 23 strikes against Moscow Oblast. Geolocated imagery published on November 5 shows drone wreckage on a runway at the Russian Sheremetyevo Airport in Khimki, Moscow Oblast, following a large Ukrainian strike package that prompted Russian authorities to temporarily suspend operations at all four Moscow area airports.[29]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions northeast of Sumy City. A Russian milblogger acknowledged on November 5 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions south of Yunakivka in areas where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[30]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 4 and 5 but did not advance.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 5, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[32]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 4 and 5 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Borova.[33]

Russian forces significantly intensified their strikes against Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast, in summer and fall 2026. Izyum Deputy Mayor Volodymyr Matsokin stated on November 4 that Russian forces struck Izyum at least seven times between October 29 and November 4 and that one of those strikes was the largest since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.[34] Izyum Military Administration Head Serhiy Fedchenko stated on September 10 that Russian forces have been conducting massive strikes against Izyum since the end of June 2026.[35] Izyum serves as a logistics hub for Ukrainian forces operating in the Borova and Lyman directions, and Russian forces are likely ramping up strikes against the city to disrupt Ukrainian logistics in these areas.[36]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)

Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Lyman and towards Lyman itself on November 4 and 5 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Lyman.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces reduced the intensity of attacks in the Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directions on November 4 and 5 as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks east of Kramatorsk.[38]

 

Russian forces reportedly struck a bridge over the Kazennyi Torets River in Kramatorsk. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted repeated strikes against a bridge over the Kazennyi Torets River in Kramatorsk, destroying part of the bridge’s load-bearing structure.[39] Russian forces regularly strike bridges over the Kazennyi Torets River to interdict Ukrainian logistics in the Fortress Belt and facilitate future offensive operations against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces reduced the intensity of attacks toward Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka on November 5 after intensified activity on November 3 and 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces only conducted 10 assaults in the Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka areas on November 5, following two days of Russian forces maintaining the highest number of assaults across the theater in these areas.[41] Russian forces across the theater reduced the intensity of assaults on November 5 compared to recent days, attacking around 184 times, compared to an average of 206 assaults per day in the last week (since October 28).[42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on November 4 and 5 but did not make confirmed advances.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novohryshyne (southwest of Dobropillya) and into western Nadiia (just northwest of Novohryshyne) but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Novohryshyne itself.[44]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka or Oleksandrivka directions on November 5.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 4 and 5 but did not advance.[45]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Orikhiv as Russian forces continued infiltration missions intended to encircle Orikhiv. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 5 that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian forces from most of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), continue to confidently control Novoandriivka (southwest of Orikhiv) and Novopavlivka (north of Novoandriivka) and maintain positions north of Stepove and Lobkove (east of Novoandriivka).[46] Mashovets stated that Russian forces infiltrated northwest of Mali Shcherbaky, southwest of Pavlivka, and into Lukyanivske (all west of Orikhiv). Mashovets stated that Russian forces also infiltrated into southern Prymorske (west of Orikhiv), likely via the bed of the drained Kakhovka Reservoir. Mashovets stated that Russian infiltrators are using the former reservoir bed to bypass Ukrainian defenses in Plavni and advance towards Malokaterynivka (north of Prymorske). Mashovets assessed that Russian forces continue attempts to encircle Orikhiv from the east and west, while simultaneously attempting to infiltrate into the town and subsequently restart offensive operations towards Zaporizhzhia City.[47]

The death toll from Russia’s November 2 strike against a humanitarian aid station in Komyshuvakha (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) has risen to at least 43 people. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian glide bomb strikes against Komyshuvakha killed at least 43 people as of the morning of November 5.[48] Zelensky stated that the death toll will likely continue to rise as dozens of people may remain under the rubble.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated on November 5 that individual units of the Russian Chechen 349th Akhmat-Russia Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD), currently operating under the Northern GoF) may be operating in the Orikhiv direction under the Dnepr GoF.[49] ISW previously observed elements of the Russian 349th Akhmat-Russia Motorized Rifle Regiment operating northeast of Sumy City in late September 2026.[50] Mashovets added that elements of the Russian Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are likely operating in the Orikhiv direction.[51] ISW previously observed elements of the 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in the Kostyantynivka direction in late July 2026.[52]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian storage, preparation, and launch site for strike drones in occupied Hvardiiskyi Raion, Crimea (roughly 198 kilometers from the frontline) on November 4 or overnight on November 4 to 5.[53]

Crimean occupation officials continued to report power outages in occupied Crimea for the third day in a row due to Ukrainian strikes.[54] Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov claimed on November 5 that Ukrainian strikes on the night of November 4 to 5 caused repeated power outages across occupied Crimea.[55]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[56]

Russian forces launched two anti-ship missiles and 128 drones (including 65 jet-powered) against Ukraine overnight on November 4 to 5.[57]

Russian forces continue to launch thousands of tactical strike drones across frontline areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 5 that Russian forces launched 7,947 Molniya and Lancet strike drones during tactical-level strikes against Ukrainian positions, logistics, and the civilian population of frontline settlements between October 29 and November 4.[58] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted 7,225 of these drones — a 91 percent interception rate. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launch on average over 1,100 Molniya drones per day and launched 1,607 Molniya drones on October 30, the most during the period.

Russian forces continue their massive strike campaign against Ukrainian energy and water infrastructure. Ukraine’s largest energy company DTEK reported that Russian forces struck Ukrainian power plants and electricity transmission facilities 78 times since around November 2, compared to 11 such strikes throughout all of 2022.[59] DTEK reported on November 4 that three of its power plants suspended operations following Russian strikes on November 3.[60] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported new power outages in Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, and Cherkasy oblasts due to Russian strikes overnight on November 4 to 5.[61] Ukraine’s director of the Institute of Water Problems and Land Reclamation, Mykhailo Yatsuk, stated on November 4 that the mass Russian strikes against Ukraine’s energy system on November 3 triggered Kyiv City’s most severe water outage since 2022.[62] Kyiv City water supply enterprise Kyivvodokanal reported on November 5 that all districts of Kyiv City were experiencing water supply disruptions due to ongoing power outages.[63]

 

 

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/11/first-lady-melania-trump-unites-russia-and-ukraine-at-the-white-house-following-historic-ceasefire/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2026/

[2] https://war-sanctions.gur dot gov.ua/en/kidnappers/persons/904 ;

[3] https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/2118384615714951495

[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/oleshky-ceasefire-demonstrates-that-russia-has-the-capability-but-not-the-will-to-end-civilian-suffering-in-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-updates-september-2026-present/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-january-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-february-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-march-5-2026/;

[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russia-is-turning-deported-ukrainian-children-into-bargaining-chips/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/oleshky-ceasefire-demonstrates-that-russia-has-the-capability-but-not-the-will-to-end-civilian-suffering-in-ukraine/

[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2026/

[7] https://t.me/agregatortruth/44272 ; https://www.dialog dot ua/russia/z-blogera-romanova-arestovali-za-post-pro-ukrainu-emu-grozit.html

[8] https://ru dot themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/05/odin-iz-samih-populyarnih-z-voenkorov-propal-posle-soobscheniya-o-nezhelanii-zhitelei-aleshek-evakuirovatsya-v-rossiyu-a210567 ; https://www.dialog dot ua/russia/z-blogera-romanova-arestovali-za-post-pro-ukrainu-emu-grozit.html

[9] https://t.me/s/romanov_92

[10] https://x.com/alexsalvinews/status/2116491373901996347

[11] https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/oleshky-ceasefire-ukraine-press/689179/ ; https://kyivindependent dot com/news-from-occupied-ukraine-russia-prepares-oleshky-disinformation-campaign-budgets-for-occupation-for-next-three-years/

[12] https://t.me/romanov_92/53405; https://t.me/romanov_92/45035; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/

[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_9-27/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_14-23/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_31-9/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_14-9/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_20-7/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-4/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_6-3/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2024/

[14] https://www.ft.com/content/f66ebf48-6d09-4a91-9af5-8bf7adca65ba?syn-25a6b1a6=1

[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/

[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_9-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_23-7/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/

[17] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/24139

[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/

[19] https://t.me/shock3OA/9184; https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2098757736737415283; https://t.me/shock3OA/9068; https://t.me/motopatriot78/55748; https://t.me/shock3OA/8839; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30661

[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_21-22/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-20/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_4-17/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-12/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_14-9/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_9-7/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_31-2/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2025/

[21] https://www.ft.com/content/19ec7782-9f22-4101-ba55-da88860310bc

[22] https://www.ft.com/content/19ec7782-9f22-4101-ba55-da88860310bc; https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/en/

news/2023/11/28/2996773/deal-done-iran-to-get-milmi-28-chopper-sukhoi-su-35-jet

[23] https://www.ft.com/content/19ec7782-9f22-4101-ba55-da88860310bc

[24] https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2118327745469907035;

https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-lmur-launch-from-ground-based-system/

[25] https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2118327745469907035;

https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-lmur-launch-from-ground-based-system/

[26] https://t.me/supernova_plus/62533 ; https://x.com/MackjackMaier/status/2118244238911516966?a=OKra42SPswpELx1Co5U&s=20 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2118167020391018566 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2118161155587981391 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2118169455788478502 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2118157319515316577

[27] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/34109 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/34066 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/ryazanskyj-npz-ta-logistychnyj-sklad/

[28] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2118122680243351816; https://t.co/zLqa2GSXHJ

[29] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2118322861026783727; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/33249 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2026/

[30] https://t.me/z_arhiv/34263

[31]https://t.me/severnnyi/9842 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38174 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42815 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42813

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/38174 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20282

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42813 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42815 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20282

[34] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1445091-odin-z-najbilsih-udariv-za-cas-povnomasstabnoi-vijni-so-vidomo-pro-ataki-na-izum-za-tizden/

[35] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1399482-udari-stali-masstabnisi-ak-zive-izum-za-cotiri-roki-pisla-zvilnenna/

[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/

[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42815; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42813; https://t.me/grvZapad/20282

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42815 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42813 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38174 ; https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14506

[39] https://t.me/epoddubny/29831 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/77367

[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/

[41] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2026/

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42802 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42784 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42766 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42747 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42741 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42733 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42725 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42718

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42815 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42813 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/57228

[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/57228

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42815; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42813; https://t.me/wargonzo/38174; https://t.me/voin_dv/21920

[46] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3688 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3689

[47] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3687

[48] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21668

[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3687

[50] https://t.me/sashakots/64773; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/

[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3687

[52] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42818

[54] ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2026/

[55] https://t.me/Aksenov82/10154 ; https://t.me/Aksenov82/10139

[56] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[57] https://t.me/kpszsu/93213

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42819

[59] https://t.me/dtek_ua/4788

[60] https://t.me/dtek_ua/4776

[61] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5611

[62] https://kyivindependent dot com/russian-strikes-cause-kyivs-worst-water-outage-of-full-scale-war/

[63] https://t.me/kvk20/169