Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 3, 2026

Data Cutoff: 12:45 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russian forces conducted a large, combined drone and missile strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on November 2 to 3 as part of Russia’s strike campaign aimed at inflicting increasing costs on Ukrainian society and coercing Ukraine into capitulating over the winter. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces conducted a massive missile and drone strike against Ukraine overnight, primarily targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in nine oblasts and causing widespread power outages.[1] Zelensky stated that Russian forces launched 289 strike drones, 17 ballistic missiles, and 59 cruise missiles, and data from the Ukrainian Air Force suggests that Ukrainian forces intercepted only 17.65 percent of ballistic and anti-ship missiles while intercepting 83.05 percent of cruise missiles.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck four power plants and two electrical substations across Ukraine, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck at least six power plants.[3] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian forces targeted Ukraine’s energy facilities more than 20 times overnight and during the day on November 3, inflicting serious damage and launching one of the largest strikes on energy infrastructure since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Ukrenergo added that strikes caused power outages in at least five oblasts.[4] These strikes coincide with the beginning of the residential heating season across Ukraine, including in Kyiv City, which Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko announced started on November 2.[5]

Polish authorities prevented a Russian provocation along Poland’s international border with Russia on the night of November 2 to 3. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk reported on November 3 that Polish authorities mobilized resources to prevent a provocation near Sepopol, Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship, Poland, after Polish border guards observed individuals carrying flashlights along Poland’s international border with Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia.[6] Tusk added that the “tension and escalation from Russia” may continue and that Poland should be ready to prevent any possible future provocations. Polish authorities have also taken steps to strengthen security along the Polish-Russian border following recent intelligence warnings and an increase in Russian sabotage operations in Europe.[7]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov likely indirectly responded to Poland's recent defensive measures against Russia by falsely framing Poland as the aggressor. Lavrov claimed on November 3 that Poland and the Baltic States are the “most active promoters” of Europe's “reactionary and aggressive” policies towards Russia.[8] Kremlin officials regularly and baselessly attempt to frame European measures to strengthen its defense posture as evidence of aggression against Russia, despite Russia's increased kinetic and cyber activity within Europe.[9] Lavrov is likely attempting to cast Poland as the aggressor against Russia to simultaneously obfuscate the real Russian threat to Europe and sow domestic division within Poland.

Ukrainian, US, and Russian officials provided new details on upcoming trilateral negotiations set to take place on November 10 and 11 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated on November 2 that the United States will mediate working-level negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, and that discussions will focus on post-war security arrangements, de-escalation, and humanitarian efforts.[10] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 3 that the trilateral negotiations will be in a team-level format to pave the way for future leader-level negotiations.[11] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced on November 3 that Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky will head the Russian delegation during the trilateral negotiations.[12] Medinsky led the previous Russian delegation to trilateral negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland, in February 2026 and used his position to stall negotiations by discussing the so-called “historical roots” of the war — terminology which Ukrainian and US officials have previously noted that Kremlin officials bring up during negotiations to distract from discussions of a serious peace deal.[13] Medinsky's role as lead negotiator indicates that the Kremlin remains disinterested in engaging in good-faith negotiations and is instead committed to a protracted war effort against Ukraine.[14]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and regional authorities are increasingly cutting and delaying non-essential military and recruitment expenditures amid failures to adequately address rising budget deficits. Russian opposition source Verstka reported on October 30 that the Russian MoD proposed a draft order to postpone December payments for Russian military personnel not fighting in Ukraine to January 2027.[15] St. Petersburg online newspaper Fontanka reported on November 3, citing responses from the St. Petersburg military enlistment office, that St. Petersburg reduced its regional one-time recruitment bonuses to 400,000 rubles (roughly $4,940), down from one million rubles (roughly $12,350) in mid-October 2026 and 3.5 million rubles (roughly $43,224) before October 2026.[16] These bonuses do not include federal payments of 400,000 rubles from the Russian MoD. A Russian propagandist claimed on November 3 that Russian regional authorities have also widely reduced or eliminated death benefits for families of deceased servicemembers throughout 2026, citing compensation cuts ranging from 50 to 100 percent of the original payments in at least a dozen federal subjects.[17] Russia’s force generation model relies on increasingly expensive financial incentives to maintain recruitment rates and avoid a politically risky general mobilization as inflation and battlefield casualties continue to increase.[18] The Kremlin and Russian federal subjects have reduced social spending to finance Russian offensive capabilities and expanded taxes and exports to generate new revenue. The Kremlin is now likely seeking further fiscal relief by cutting military expenditures outside the Ukraine war effort.[19]

The Kremlin is weaponizing limited information about an internal Ukrainian clash to exploit genuine concern over mobilization and stoke division in Ukrainian society. Ukraine's security officials confirmed on November 3 that a clash broke out between protesters and National Guard servicemembers outside a building in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka, Kyiv Oblast, on November 2, after unknown actors disseminated unconfirmed video appeals accusing Ukrainian servicemembers illegally detaining people nearby.^[20] Ukraine's National Guard confirmed that it officially rented the facility as a temporary accommodation point for mobilized personnel and that there were four people receiving medical assistance at the location after their detention for going absent without leave (AWOL).[21] The Kyiv Oblast Police stated that Ukrainian military personnel were staying in the building and refuted claims about the alleged detention of any citizens.[22] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on November 3 that Ukrainian law enforcement is investigating the details of the incident and acknowledged that the incident demonstrated genuine tension in Ukraine about mobilization policies that Ukraine needs to resolve.[23] Budanov implied that the clashes may have involved “provocateurs,” and Ukrainian authorities detained a woman posing as a medic at the site.[24] Budanov stated that the woman had purchased an ambulance and inspected the site prior to the incident, and had corresponded with Telegram channels that were spreading information about the incident.[25]

Russian officials and state media have weaponized the incident to stoke and amplify existing tensions within Ukrainian society regarding mobilization. Senior Kremlin officials described the house as a “torture chamber” and Russian milbloggers spread unconfirmed accusations that the Ukrainian forces tortured, extorted, forcibly mobilized, and murdered people in the building's basement.[26] Moscow is likely exploiting the lack of confirmed information about the incident to spread inflammatory and unsubstantiated claims in an effort to sow discord in Ukrainian society.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large, combined drone and missile strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on November 2 to 3 as part of Russia’s strike campaign aimed at inflicting increasing costs on Ukrainian society and coercing Ukraine into capitulating over the winter.
• Polish authorities prevented a Russian provocation along Poland’s international border with Russia on the night of November 2 to 3.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov likely indirectly responded to Poland's recent defensive measures against Russia by falsely framing Poland as the aggressor.
• Ukrainian, US, and Russian officials provided new details on upcoming trilateral negotiations set to take place on November 10 and 11 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and regional authorities are increasingly cutting and delaying non-essential military and recruitment expenditures amid failures to adequately address rising budget deficits.
• The Kremlin is weaponizing limited information about an internal Ukrainian clash to exploit genuine concern over mobilization and stoke division in Ukrainian society.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in Yaroslavl Oblast.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced on November 3.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in Yaroslavl Oblast. Geolocated footage and imagery published on November 2 and 3 show fire and smoke plumes at the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl Oblast (roughly 770 kilometers from the frontline), following a likely Ukrainian strike.[27] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Yeraev acknowledged on November 3 that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire and damage at the refinery.[28]

A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel provided an updated battlefield damage assessment (BDA) of Ukraine’s October 30 to 31 overnight strike against a Russian defense industrial facility. Geolocated footage published on November 3 shows damage to three workshops at the Kamensky Plant in Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Rostov Oblast (roughly 181 kilometers from the frontline) following Ukrainian strikes.[29] The Kamesnky Plant is one of Russia’s largest chemical plants in southern Russia that specializes in the production of solid rocket propellant, gunpowder, explosives, detonators, fuses, and other ammunition components.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions north of Sumy City. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position southwest of Andriivka, according to geolocated footage published on November 1, in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintain positions.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions northeast of Kharkiv City and southeast of Velykyi Burluk. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position south of Khrypuny (northeast of Kharkiv City), according to geolocated footage published on November 2, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[32] Geolocated footage published on October 22 and November 3 showed Russian forces operating in central Rohozianka (southeast of Velykyi Burluk) during what ISW assesses was a likely Russian infiltration mission.[33] Rohozianka is at least 12 kilometers from the closest point of Russian forward line, and ISW is unable to verify the Russian infiltration route into the settlement. ISW did not observe evidence to assess that the footage is AI-doctored but is not prepared to assess that Russian forces maintain positions so far from the frontline.

 Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 2 and 3 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk.[34]

Order of Battle: elements of the Russian 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[35] ISW previously observed elements of the Russian 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment operating north of Kharkiv City in late October 2026 and previously observed two instances of the formation’s elements operating in the Kupyansk direction in March and May 2026.[36]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on November 3 that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Borova, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[37]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Lyman on November 2 and 3 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast and southeast of Lyman.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

ISW recently observed evidence which suggests that Ukrainian forces had advanced in Pyskunivka (northeast of Slovyansk) and Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Slovyansk) on a prior date.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces concentrated attacks near Kostyantynivka and southwest of Druzhkivka along the Kazennyi Torets River on November 2 and 3 but did not advance.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces conducted fewer assaults in the Dobropillya direction on November 2 and 3 than on any other day since at least August 1, 2026. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted 13 assaults toward Dobropillya on November 2 and 3 — the lowest number of recorded assaults in this direction since at least August 1.[41] Russian forces have long maintained the highest intensity of assaults toward Dobropillya, attacking 55 times on November 1 and averaging around 28 attacks per day throughout October 2026.[42]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on November 3.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on November 2 and 3 but did not advance.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 2 and 3 but did not make confirmed advances.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 2 that Russian forces advanced west of Hirke (west of Hulyaipole).[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 2 and 3 but did not make confirmed advances, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Orikhiv.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 2 that Russian forces advanced south of Omelnyk (northeast of Orikhiv).[47]

The death toll of Russia’s devastating November 2 air strikes against Komyshuvakha (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) on November 2 has risen to at least 31 civilians. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 3 that Russian forces conducted nine air strikes against Komyshuvakha, including launching a FAB-3000 glide bomb on the civilian underground shelter, on November 2.[48] The GUR reported that Russian forces deliberately targeted the Komyshuvakha humanitarian aid site and killed 31 civilians, including four police officers and two Ukraine State Emergency Service first responders, and that almost 50 individuals are still missing.

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Dnipro River delta south of Kherson City. Ukrainian forces struck Russian forces on the southeastern coast of Kruhlyk Island, according to geolocated footage published on November 2, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[49] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kherson direction reported on November 3 that Russian forces are leveraging adverse weather conditions to conduct limited assault operations across the Dnipro River in rubber boats.[50] The spokesperson added that the Russian forces used the localized ceasefire in occupied Kherson Oblast to bring in additional manpower, equipment, and supplies to occupied Oleshky (southeast of Kherson City). Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets stated on November 2 that Russian forces used military equipment marked with red crosses for demining operations under close Ukrainian supervision and noted that he has no evidence of Russian forces exploiting the localized ceasefire to strengthen their positions in the area.[51]

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military base belonging to an unspecified unit tasked with protecting the Kerch Strait bridge in occupied Crimea on November 3. A Crimea-based Telegram channel posted geolocated imagery on November 3 showing a fire at the Russian ammunition depot and a military camp housing elements of a Russian military unit next to the Kerch Strait Bridge in Kerch, occupied Crimea (roughly 250 kilometers from the frontline) after a likely Ukrainian strike.[52] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on November 3 that Ukraine’s November 2 to 3 overnight strikes caused widespread power outages in occupied Sevastopol.[53]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[54]

See topline text for reporting on Russian forces' long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic and anti-ship missiles, 59 cruise missiles, and 289 drones (including 120 jet-powered) against Ukraine overnight on November 2 to 3 and 81 drones (including 74 jet-powered drones) during the day on November 3.[55] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on November 3 that Russian forces struck a city clinical hospital in Kharkiv City, injuring 73 people and damaging the cardiology department.[56]

Ukrainian forces have deployed a network of electronic warfare (EW) systems around Kyiv City to protect the city from Russian strike drones utilizing mesh network connectivity for live operator control. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on November 2 that Ukrainian forces have deployed EW systems around Kyiv City to form a protective dome that disrupts mesh radio networks that Russian forces use to communicate with strike drones.[57] Russian forces use mesh networks to maintain live operator control over the drones, transmit live video feed, and extend operational ranges of drones.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree introducing a new legal framework for Russian military-technical cooperation with Belarus. Putin signed a decree on November 2 approving new regulations on the implementation of Russia’s 2009 agreement with Belarus on military-technical cooperation, outlining the specific parameters for the protection of state secrets during the execution of contracts and the exchange of military products between Russia and Belarus.[58] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that the states have a combined defense industrial base (DIB).[59]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.