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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 20, 2026
Assessment as of: 7:45 PM ET
Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.
Russian forces launched the largest missile and drone strike against Ukraine of November 2026 on the night of November 19 to 20, targeting critical infrastructure and bridges in Kyiv City. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 20 that Russian forces launched 27 ballistic missiles, 84 cruise missiles and 404 Shahed and Gerbera-type strike drones against Ukraine -- the largest Russian strike package thus far in November 2026.[i] Zelensky noted that Russian forces launched several missile groups at intervals of 20 to 30 minutes to complicate Ukrainian rescue efforts and that Russian strikes killed eight people. Ukrainian forces intercepted roughly 94 percent of both cruise missiles and drones but only approximately 11 percent of the ballistic missiles. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Ukrainian energy production and transmission lines, logistics infrastructure, and defense-industrial facilities across at least 15 Ukrainian oblasts and Kyiv City.[iii] Russian strikes also damaged the Podilsko-Voskresensky, Darnytskyi, and Southern bridges across the Dnipro River in Kyiv City.[iv] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported that Ukrainian authorities resumed restricted traffic across the damaged bridges. Russian President Vladimir Putin vowed on November 19 that Russian forces would launch “much more painful” strikes in retaliation for Ukrainian strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge. have been striking major bridges across the Dnipro River in Ukraine since the beginning of OctoberRussia's intensifying strike campaign .[ix]
Russian forces intentionally fired missiles and drones into Polish airspace during strikes against Ukraine on the morning of November 20. Polish Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz stated that a Russian Kh-101 missile crashed in a rural area in Nowy Lipowiec, Poland.[x] A Russian missile, which Armed Forces Operational Commander Brigadier General Ireneusz Nowak stated could have been a Kh-101 missile, crashed near Rudnik nad Sanem, Poland.[xi] A Russian jet powered drone, which Nowak stated could have been a Geran-5 drone, crashed near Mołodycz, Poland.[xii] None of the three crashes caused any casualties or substantial damage. Russian forces fired these missiles and drones as part of their November 20 strike package targeting Ukraine, and the Polish Armed Forces noted that they identified as many as 11 missiles and drones in Ukrainian airspace that could have posed a threat of entering Polish airspace.[xiii] NATO scrambled Polish, Swedish, and Dutch aircraft and NATO air defense activated ground-based radar systems in response.[xiv] Nowak stated that Poland and NATO did not try to down the Russian and missiles because the conditions did not meet the Polish rules of engagement.[xv] Poland likely assessed that shooting down the Russian missiles and drone would pose an unacceptable risk of casualties and damage and that the projected impact locations would not cause any damage.[xvi] Kosiniak-Kamysz had stated on July 31, 2026, that Polish forces will engage incoming projectiles if the engagement could threaten populated areas, and it is standard practice in NATO and other militaries to make similar risk assessments when deciding if a military should engage incoming aerial threats.[xvii] ISW assesses that the Kremlin conducted these airspace violations to coincide with an ongoing Coalition of the Willing military exercise taking place in Nowa Deba, Poland, in an effort to deter the Coalition of the Willing’s support for Ukraine and test NATO responses. The Coalition of the Willing is a non-NATO military initiative founded in March 2025 and comprised of 37 pro-Ukraine states that have pledged to contribute to a hypothetical post-war peacekeeping force deployed in Ukraine.[xviii] The Coalition of the Willing’s British- and French-led military component, Multinational Force - Ukraine (MNF-U), is conducting its first military exercise, Exercise Koalicja, in Nowa Dęba, Poland from November 9 to November 22.[xix] Kosiniak-Kamysz stated on November 20 that 5,000 to 6,000 personnel from Belgium, France, Estonia, Spain, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Germany, Sweden, and the UK deployed forces to Poland to participate in Exercise Koalicja. Polish forces are providing logistical support, and Turkish forces are remotely participating from Istanbul, Turkey.[xx] Multinational Force - Ukraine is conducting Exercise Koalicja to test its ability to forward-deploy forces, to develop the forces' interoperability, and to rehearse a deployment to Ukraine.[xxi] The Russian Kh-101 missile that impacted near Rudnik nad Sanem crashed approximately 35 kilometers away from the exercise’s location in Nowa Dęba, Poland.[xxii] French Minister of Armed Forces and Veterans Catherine Vautrin, British Minister of Defense Wes Streeting, Lithuanian Minister of Defense Robertas Kaunas, Estonian Minister of Defense Martin Herem, and eight unspecified allied military chiefs were in or traveling to Nowa Deba, Poland for the Koalicja exercises' “VIP day” at the time of the Russian airspace violation.[xxiii] Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk called the airspace violation an “intentional [Russian] provocation.”[xxiv] Tusk and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that the occurrence of the Russian airspace violation on the day of Exercise Koalicja’s VIP day was not a coincidence.[xxv]
Polish officials requested additional NATO forces and air defense capabilities in response to the airspace violations.[xxvi] Polish authorities secured the affected sites and opened investigations in Molodycz, Rudnik nad Sanem, and Nowy Lipowiec on November 20.[xxvii] Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk spoke with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on November 20, and Rutte will visit Poland on November 21.[xxviii] Kosiniak-Kamysz called on NATO allies to more actively participate in Polish defense and specifically requested that NATO member states deploy additional AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) and F-35 fighter jets to Poland.[xxix] Kosiniak-Kamysz stated that he will appeal directly to Rutte to reinforce NATO’s Eastern Sentry operation with additional personnel and resources. NATO launched Eastern Sentry, a multi-domain activity to coordinate the deployment and use of NATO capabilities in Poland and other frontline NATO states, on September 12, 2025, in response to the large-scale Russian drone incursion into Poland on the night of September 9-10, 2025.[xxx] NATO aircraft scrambled in response to the Russian missiles and drones approaching and entering Polish airspace, but the proximity of the impact sites to the Ukrainian border limited the ability of NATO air defenses to safely engage the targets.[xxxi] NATO member states and Ukraine should prioritize negotiating air defense agreements that allow NATO air defenses and aircraft to engage Russian missiles and drones that threaten NATO territory while those targets are still in Ukrainian airspace, in addition to deploying additional air defense assets to frontline states.
Poland did not invoke NATO Article 4 consultations in response to these intentional Russian drone and missile impacts on NATO territory. NATO risks raising the real threshold for allied responses to blatant Russian violations of NATO airspace by failing to use the alliance's provisions for collective action in response to intentional attacks. ISW assesses that Russia’s campaign of incursions into NATO and European airspace is intended to test NATO response thresholds and to deter European support for Ukraine by signaling that Russian aggression against Europe will continue for as long as Europe continues to back Kyiv.[xxxii] The Kremlin aims to normalize airspace violations in Europe and raise the threshold for NATO member states to invoke Article 4 consultations, let alone Article 5 defensive action provisions. NATO must take Russian kinetic actions against Europe seriously and respond appropriately, no matter how frequently they occur, and must avoid normalizing blatant Russian escalations as below the threshold that should trigger a unified NATO response. Such a response can take many forms and can be calibrated appropriately to the situation and the risk of escalation.
Two unidentified drones, likely Russian strike drones involved in strikes on Ukraine, additionally violated Moldovan airspace from Ukraine on November 20 before reentering Ukrainian airspace.[xxxiii]
US negotiators continue outlining proposals for resolving the war in Ukraine that are incompatible with the frequently reiterated formal positions of the Kremlin and the Russian negotiating team. Former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner stated on November 19 that the United States was able to convince Russia about NATO-style Article 5 security guarantees for Ukraine, which oblige each member state to take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force,” in case of aggression against a single member state.[xxxiv] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on November 20, citing people involved in peace negotiations, that the US negotiators have raised two possible scenarios for resolving the war in Ukraine in recent months. In one, Ukraine would cede control of in exchange for full NATO membership, while the other would freeze the current frontline in exchange for security guarantees through an international treaty between Ukraine and the United States and potentially European allies.[xxxv] Kremlin officials and the Russian negotiating team have continuously rejected Ukraine’s NATO membership and Western security guarantees for Ukraine, however. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on November 20 that Ukraine’s accession to NATO is “unacceptable” to Russia and noted that Russian discussions on security guarantees aim to ensure Russia’s own security -- explicitly rejecting these US proposals for resolving the war in Ukraine.[xxxvi] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev on November 20 reiterated the Kremlin's long-running claim that Ukraine's aspiration to join NATO was one of the primary causes of the war.[xxxvii] WSJ reported on November 20 that Russian November 2026 Abu Dhabi demands included the removal of Ukraine’s NATO aspirations from Ukrainian constitution, a NATO commitment to refrain from stationing foreign troops in and supplying military equipment to Ukraine, and NATO's return to its 1997 borders - demands that formed part of the ultimatum that Russia issued in December 2021 as its pretext for the full-scale invasion.[xxxviii] Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin officials have also repeatedly rejected any deployment of foreign forces to Ukraine as part of post-war security guarantees.[xxxix] Russian demands for full Ukrainian neutrality and the end of Western military support to Ukraine have not changed since before the Russian full-scale invasion. They remain entirely incompatible with the US proposals for establishing a durable peace in Ukraine.
Ukraine's Operation Bear Trap foiled a planned Russian encirclement and liberated over 200 square kilometers in northern Kharkiv Oblast in recent months, as Russian military officials nonetheless baselessly claimed that Russian forces had successfully encircled thousands of Ukrainian troops in the area. The Kremlin continues to try to persuade the West to accept Russia’s fictitious frontline as the basis for peace negotiations. A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction reported on November 20 that Ukraine's Operation Bear Trap liberated 204 square kilometers and 14 settlements north and northeast of Velykyi Burluk near the international border.[xl] The Ukrainian regiment published a map indicating that Ukrainian forces liberated Komisarove, Shyroke, Chorne, Nefedivka, Shevyakivka, Vodyane, Dovhenke, Zarubynka, Ustynivka, Ivashkyne, Anyskyne, Vilkhuvatka, Dovzhanka, and Chuhunivka. The map also indicates that Russian forces maintain control over four settlements right along the international border -- Ozerne, Bereznyky, Artilne, and Rublene. The commander of the Ukrainian, Lieutenant Colonel Oleksandr Nastenko, told BBC‘s Ukraine service that Ukrainian forces have maintained strict operational security during Operational Bear Trap and that the operation is ongoing as Ukrainian forces continue to clear some border settlements.[xli]
BBC’s Ukraine service reported that Russian forces planned to attack along the Artilne-Vilhuvatka line (northeast of Velykyi Burluk and near the international border) and the Vovchansk-Bilyi Kolodyaz line (northwest of Velykyi Burluk) in order to close an encirclement near Prykolotne (north of Velykyi Burluk).[xlii] Ukrainian military sources speaking to BBC’s Ukraine service stated that the situation came "close to critical" after Russian forces crossed the international border near Artilne and advanced toward Prykolotne at the end of June 2026. Nastenko noted that Russian forces had advanced near Vilhuvatka and Dovzhanka (just west of Vilhuvatka) and that sabotage and reconnaissance groups had entered Prykolotne. Ukraine's Operation Bear Trap, however, was able to stop the planned Russian encirclement and liberate territory north and northeast of Velykyi Burluk. Iclaims in September and October 2026.[xliii] Severnorthern Kharkiv Oblast encirclement in recent weeks, and a Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger continued to claim on November 20 that fighting is ongoing near Prykolotne.[xliv]
Preliminary reports about Operation Bear Trap indicate that Ukrainian forces used armored vehicles, including to launch a diversionary attack to lure Russian forces into a drone kill zone. The Ukrainian regiment reported that Ukrainian forces used a T-80 tank and an M-1 Abrams tank to attack Vilhuvatka to create the impression that the main Ukrainian attack would come in that sector.[xlv] Ukrainian forces then attacked elsewhere as Ukrainian drone operators struck the reserves that the Russian military command deployed to the Vilhuvatka area in response to what they thought was the Ukrainian .[xlvi] Nastenko stated that Ukrainian forces used tanks and Bradley armored fighting vehicles in other unspecified attacks during Operation Bear Trap. Ukrainian forces also reportedly used mesh networks with repeaters to conduct remote drone mining of Russian ground lines of communication around 30 kilometers from the frontline.[xlvii]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces launched the largest missile and drone strike against Ukraine of November 2026 on the night of November 19 to 20, targeting critical infrastructure and bridges in Kyiv City.
- Russian forces intentionally fired missiles and drones into Polish airspace during strikes against Ukraine on the morning of November 20.
- ISW assesses that the Kremlin conducted these airspace violations to coincide with an ongoing Coalition of the Willing military exercise taking place in Nowa Deba, Poland, in an effort to deter the Coalition of the Willing’s support for Ukraine and test NATO responses.
- Polish officials requested additional NATO forces and air defense capabilities in response to the airspace violations.
- Poland did not invoke NATO Article 4 consultations in response to these intentional Russian drone and missile impacts on NATO territory. NATO risks raising the real threshold for allied responses to blatant Russian violations of NATO airspace by failing to use the alliance's provisions for collective action in response to intentional attacks.
- Two unidentified drones, likely Russian strike drones involved in strikes on Ukraine, additionally violated Moldovan airspace from Ukraine on November 20 before reentering Ukrainian airspace.
- US negotiators continue outlining proposals for resolving the war in Ukraine that are incompatible with the frequently reiterated formal positions of the Kremlin and the Russian negotiating team.
- Ukraine's Operation Bear Trap foiled a planned Russian encirclement and liberated over 200 square kilometers in northern Kharkiv Oblast in recent months, as Russian military officials nonetheless baselessly claimed that Russian forces had successfully encircled thousands of Ukrainian troops in the area. The Kremlin continues to try to persuade the West to accept Russia’s fictitious frontline as the basis for peace negotiations.
- Preliminary reports about Operation Bear Trap indicate that Ukrainian forces used armored vehicles, including to launch a diversionary attack to lure Russian forces into a drone kill zone.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Dobropillya.
- Ukrainian forces struck three Russian ballistic missile launchers in Russia, a Russian explosives factory in Smolensk Oblast, and oil infrastructure in the Republic of Tatarstan tied to Russia's Druzhba pipeline.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
- Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
- Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
- Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belaru
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck three Russian ballistic missile launchers as part of efforts to defend against Russia's long-range strike campaign. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces struck three Russian ballistic missile launchers in unspecified locations overnight on November 19 to 20, destroying at least one.[xlviii]
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian explosives factory in Smolensk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on November 20 shows a fire near the Dorogobuzh chemical plant near Dorogobuzh, Smolensk Oblast (roughly 285 kilometers from the international border) after a Ukrainian strike.[xlix] The Dorogobuzh plant produces nitrogen fertilizers and explosive precursors and is one of Russia's largest manufacturers of mineral fertilizers, reportedly responsible for about 11 percent of Russia's ammonium nitrate production.[l] Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin claimed that Ukrainian strikes damaged a civilian industrial facility, an energy facility, and residential buildings in the region.[li]
Ukrainian forces struck oil infrastructure in the Republic of Tatarstan tied to Russia's Druzhba pipeline as part of wider efforts to degrade Russia's energy export capabilities. Ukrainian forces struck the Kaleikino oil pumping station near Almetyevsk, Republic of Tatarstan (roughly 1,120 kilometers from the frontline) on November 19, according to the Ukrainian General Staff.[lii] The pumping station is a part of the Druzhba pipeline, and the strike hit three RVSPA-50000 oil tanks, damaging two and setting fire to one. The Ukrainian General Staff added that the November 18 Ukrainian strike against the Ilsky Oil Refinery near Ilsky, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 257 kilometers from the frontline) destroyed one RVS-5000 oil tank and damaged eight RVS-1000 and RVS-5000 oil tanks, five technical buildings, and one warehouse.[liii]
Moscow has been turning to seaborne gasoline imports since the summer to offset the impact of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign on Russia's oil refining capacity. Russia imported a record high of 390,000 tons of gasoline by sea in October 2026, according to Kpler data that the Financial Times (FT) reviewed.[liv] The FT reported that Russia began importing gasoline by sea in July from a wide variety of suppliers and has imported record volumes of petrol from Belarus. Ukrainian strikes since late October 2026 have reduced Russia’s oil refining by approximately 30 percent, according to two industry sources speaking to Reuters.[lv] Ukrainian strikes caused severe gasoline shortages across Russia in mid-summer 2026, and gasoline imports likely helped the Russian government weather the traditional high demand for gasoline in the summertime.[lvi]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 19 and 20 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Sumy City.[lvii]
[Northern Border CW map]
[N Sumy map]
[Sumy map here]
[Krasnopillya map here]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian air defenses and drone operators in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Pantsir-S2 air defense system in Bryansk Oblast overnight on November 19 to 20.[lviii] The Ukrainian 8th Corps reported on November 20 that Ukrainian forces struck the living quarters housing elements of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems near Rylsk, Kursk Oblast (roughly 29 kilometers from the international border).[lix]
Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City on November 19 and 20 but did not advance.[lx] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Kozacha (north of Kharkiv City) after Russian forces entered the settlement.[lxi]
See topline text for reports of Ukraine's Operation Bear Trap that recently liberated territory in the Velykyi Burluk direction.
[N Kharkiv map here]
[Velykyi Burluk map here]
Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Ukrainian forces continue to maintain control over eastern Kupyansk and are resisting Russian efforts to seize the city, over a year after the Kremlin's claimed seizure of Kupyansk. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 20 that Ukrainian forces continue to hold the eastern part of Kupyansk and areas east and southeast of the city, contrary to Russian claims.[lxii] Mashovets stated that Russian forces conducted infiltration missions in central Kupyansk and western Polohy (southeast of Kupyansk).[lxiii] Mashovets stated that Russian forces continue conducting infiltration missions into Kivsharivka from the direction of Pishchane (both southeast of Kupyansk), indicating that Russian forces do not maintain consolidated positions in Kivsharivka.
Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 20 that elements of the Russian 744th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating in the Kupyansk direction – the first time that ISW has observed the mention of this unit operating on the frontline.[lxiv] Mashovets also reported that elements of the Russian 380th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st GTA, MMD) possibly redeployed to the Kupyansk direction from northern Kharkiv Oblast.[lxv] ISW last observed elements of the 380th Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast in July 2025, and it is possible that the unit is split between the two sectors.[lxvi] Mashovets also reported that elements of the Russian 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District) are possibly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[lxvii] ISW last observed elements of the Russian 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction in November 2025.[lxviii] Mashovets also reported that elements of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st GTA, MMD) continue operating in the Kupyansk direction. ISW previously observed evidence to assess that the Russian military command redeployed elements of 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment to the Lyman direction in May 2026.[lxix]
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on November 20 that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Borova.[lxx]
Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on November 19 and 20 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Lyman. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on November 20 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zarichne.[lxxii]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
Russian forces continued offensive operations east and northeast of Slovyansk on November 19 and 20 but did not advance.[lxxiii]
Russian forces are fielding Molniya-type fixed-wing strike drones capable of carrying up to 20-kilogram payloads in the Cha. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar tactical area reported on November 20 that Russian forces are actively fielding new Molniya drone variants capable of carrying two 10-kilogram anti-tank mines, up from the single mine that older variants could carry.[lxxiv]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within and west of Kostyantynivka on November 19 and 20 but did not advance.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced southern Dobropillya and maintain positions southwest of the city. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Dobropillya, according to geolocated footage published on November 20.[lxxvi] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya direction stated on November 19 that Ukrainian forces continue to hold Shylivka and captured a Russian servicemember who previously conducted a flag-raising mission in the western part of the settlement.[lxxvii]
Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations north and northeast of Novopavlivka on November 20, but ISW did not observe evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Novopavlivka.[lxxviii]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Oleksandrivka. A Ukrainian military source stated on November 20 that Ukrainian forces consolidated their positions in Vesele.[lxxix]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 19 and 20 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[lxxx]
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the headquarters of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast on November 18. A source in Russian security services reported on November 20 that Ukrainian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against the Russian 58th CAA (SMD) headquarters in occupied Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline), killing the head of the formation's personnel department.[lxxxi] The source stated that the strike killed seven other servicemembers and wounded 12.
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on November 20.
Russian officials are downplaying the extent of the damage to the Kerch Strait Bridge following successful Ukrainian strikes. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin claimed on November 20 that recent Ukrainian strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge damaged the main beam of the bridge’s arch and the arch itself.[lxxxii] Khusnullin claimed that authorities are working on restoring the bridge. The Russian Ministry of Transportation reported on November 19 that traffic on the first track of the railway section of the Kerch Strait Bridge has resumed.[lxxxiii] Russian Prime Minister Andrei Nikitin stated on November 19 that Russian authorities could repair the damaged bridge ”in the very near future.”[lxxxiv] Satellite imagery captured on November 19 shows that Ukrainian strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge significantly damaged the bridge's railway track in at least three places and fully destroyed the bridge's automobile section.[lxxxv]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[lxxxvi]
See topline text for reporting on Russia's missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on November 19 to 20.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. 
[i] https://t.me/kpszsu/97713; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2123728708242481257; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21912
[ii] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21912
[iii] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/3284; https://t.me/chernivetskaODA/21188; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/29794; https://t.me/synegubov/27871; https://t.me/kirovogradskaODA/29423; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/8193; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/34675; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/8909; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/35430; https://t.me/odeskaODA/22788; https://t.me/NataliaZabolotna_VinODA/28353; https://t.me/volynskaODA/12253; https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/19039
[iv] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/8193; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/8201
[v] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/8201
[vi] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81305; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2026/
[vii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2026/
[viii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2026/
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[x] https://www.gov dot pl/web/obrona-narodowa/wicepremier-w-kosiniak-kamysz-o-naruszeniu-polskiej-przestrzeni-powietrznej; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqx2x9dklxnro;
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[xiv] https://www.gov dot pl/web/obrona-narodowa/wicepremier-w-kosiniak-kamysz-o-naruszeniu-polskiej-przestrzeni-powietrznej
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[xvi] https://www.gov dot pl/web/obrona-narodowa/szef-mon-w-sejmie-rp-o-naruszeniu-polskiej-przestrzeni-powietrznej
[xvii] https://www.gov dot pl/web/obrona-narodowa/szef-mon-w-sejmie-rp-o-naruszeniu-polskiej-przestrzeni-powietrznej; https://www.mod.gov dot lv/lv/zinas/nakti-uz-11-novembri-latvijas-gaisa-telpa-ielidojusi-tris-bezpilota-lidaparati; https://www.lrt dot lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/3111448/kaunas-apie-raketa-skirta-dronui-numusti-simtu-tukstanciu-o-ne-milijonu-euru-klausimas
[xviii] https://apnews.com/article/poland-ukraine-military-exercise-peace-france-britain-a28d60d1b37093199dd017472028d7ac; https://us.diplomatie.gouv dot fr/en/coalition-willing-alliance-security-ukraine-and-europe
[xix] https://www.lrt dot lt/naujienos/pasaulyje/6/3120156/lietuvos-ir-kiti-europos-kariai-lenkijoje-treniruojasi-galimai-pokario-misijai-ukrainoje; https://www.gov dot pl/web/obrona-narodowa/koalicja-262-szef-mon-obserwowal-pierwsze-cwiczenie-sil-koalicji-chetnych; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-lead-multinational-military-training-exercise-to-prepare-for-peace-in-ukraine--2
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[xxi] https://www.gov dot pl/web/obrona-narodowa/koalicja-262-szef-mon-obserwowal-pierwsze-cwiczenie-sil-koalicji-chetnych
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[xxv] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/nov/20/russian-missiles-drone-poland-attacks-ukraine
[xxvi] https://united24media dot com/world/poland-requests-extra-nato-forces-under-eastern-sentry-mission-after-airspace-violation-24576; https://defence24 dot com/geopolitics/russian-missiles-hit-poland-nato-responds-but-moscow-will-not-stop
[xxvii] https://x.com/MKierwinski/status/2123709774323663220?a=vHXDjE5Leo8Q7eYY0p8&s=20; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/polish-army-investigates-report-unknown-objects-near-ukraine-border-2026-11-20/
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[xxxiii] https://www.army.md/index.php/ro/comunicate-de-presa/informeaza-40; https://www.army dot md/ro/comunicate-de-presa/zece-incidente-aeriene-republica-moldova-perioada-14-20-noiembrie-2026; https://www.army dot md/ro/comunicate-de-presa/informeaza-41
[xxxiv] https://www.youtube.com/live/ibOh8qRxy3c; https://suspilne dot media/1455154-kusner-zaaviv-pro-progres-u-peregovorah-iz-rosieu-sodo-garantij-bezpeki-dla-ukraini/; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm
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[xl] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1443549134089203; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eP2VG3zqVE
[xli] https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/ck7v2zdqlz3no
[xlii] https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/ck7v2zdqlz3no
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[xliv] https://t.me/wargonzo/38518; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2026/
[xlv] https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/ck7v2zdqlz3no; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eP2VG3zqVE
[xlvi] https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/ck7v2zdqlz3no; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eP2VG3zqVE
[xlvii] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eP2VG3zqVE; https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/ck7v2zdqlz3no
[xlviii] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21912
[xlix] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2123571751808627074; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/34921; https://x.com/Magyargeo56/status/2123736672454000766; https://t.me/supernova_plus/63264
[l] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/11/20/ukrainskie-drony-atakovali-zavod-po-proizvodstvu-udobreniy-i-komponentov-dlya-vzryvchatki-v-smolenskoy-oblasti
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[liv] https://www.ft.com/content/6ae074cc-bc09-4159-b59e-72d25ac2ac50?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[lv] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/recent-ukrainian-attacks-have-reduced-russias-oil-processing-capacity-by-30-2026-11-10/
[lvi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/
[lvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42951; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42949; https://t.me/wargonzo/38518; https://t.me/severnnyi/9982
[lviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42956
[lix] https://www.facebook.com/reel/2173858993339416; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1455272-zsu-urazili-misaca-dislokacii-rubikonu-s-u-kurskij-oblasti/
[lx] https://t.me/severnnyi/9982; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42951
[lxi] https://t.me/severnnyi/9982
[lxii] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3713
[lxiii] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3714
[lxiv] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3713
[lxv] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3713
[lxvi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2025/
[lxvii] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3713
[lxviii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/
[lxix] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2026/
[lxx] https://t.me/grvZapad/20403
[lxxi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42951; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42949; https://t.me/wargonzo/38518; https://t.me/grvZapad/20403
[lxxii] https://t.me/grvZapad/20403
[lxxiii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42951; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42949
[lxxiv] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/11/20/z-odnogo-boku-alyuminiyeva-trubka-zapayana-z-inshogo-boku-porozhnya-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-molniyi-nesut-po-20-kg-vybuhivky/ ;
[lxxv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42951; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42949; https://t.me/wargonzo/38518
[lxxvi] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2123736737784467893; https://t.me/Centr_omega_NGU/11231
[lxxvii] https://t.me/ombr_155/2033
[lxxviii] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/50236
[lxxix] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14565
[lxxx] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42949 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38518 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/22115 ; https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14564 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38518
[lxxxi] https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/822
[lxxxii] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1130407?utm_source=top
[lxxxiii] https://t.me/Mintrans_Russia/12215 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/6afef8dea9872299930e175f?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F
[lxxxiv] https://aif dot ru/incidents/nikitin-rabota-po-vosstanovleniyu-krymskogo-mosta-vedetsya-kruglosutochno
[lxxxv] https://t.me/radiosvoboda/107132
[lxxxvi] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/










